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Strategic Build-Down—*Alton Frye*
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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The articles in this issue cover an unusually wide variety of subjects. A special word of explanation is in order for two articles.

Ordinarily there is a significant time lag between the publication of even highly important scientific findings and discussion of their policy implications. And when Carl Sagan proposed to write for us on the latter aspect of the work that he and others are just formally publishing on a new range of consequences of nuclear war, we were initially skeptical. We were persuaded otherwise by his extraordinary effort not only to set down his own conclusions but also to get comment on them from a large number of experts approaching the subject from many standpoints. We believe that the issues are indeed of vital importance and look forward to opening our pages to extensive further discussion, whether in the form of Comment and Correspondence or in the form of separate articles.

It happens that the necessarily last-minute completion of this article coincided with *Foreign Affairs* moving to the virtual completion of copy by our own word-processing equipment. The strain on our staff has been very great and the performance of Mark Uhlig, Elise O'Shaughnessy and Linda Robinson beyond praise.

A second note is needed for the concluding article by Seymour Maxwell Finger, a veteran of the United Nations under ambassadors of both political parties. Rarely in its history has *Foreign Affairs* published articles that focus heavily on a single currently active individual. However, last winter's reader survey indicated high interest in such articles. We are proud to inaugurate a new Profiles category, and Mr. Finger's measured and scholarly appraisal of the performance at the U.N. of Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick reflects the criteria we shall seek to apply to it.

Finally, we note with sadness the passing of Raymond Aron, an almost uniquely towering figure in the range and depth of his influence in the study of international affairs. We join in the sentiments eloquently expressed by Fritz Stern in the Recent Books section.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which appears in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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Robert G. Neumann

ASSAD AND THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

The consequences of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 have significantly changed the entire range of power relationships in the Middle East. They have done so in a manner neither desired nor expected by any of the players in this latest phase of the Middle East puzzle game. They have enabled Syria suddenly to emerge from isolation and humiliation and to seize the power switch of Middle Eastern diplomacy. They have diminished and rendered uncertain Israel's role in the area. They have brought the Soviet Union back into the Middle East in a position of influence from which it will not easily be dislodged. They have profoundly affected American diplomacy, drawing it away from a broadly based peace initiative and sucking the Marines into a narrow, dangerous position in Lebanon, where U.S. forces have already suffered serious casualties. And they have conjured up again the danger of a superpower confrontation in the area which neither power desires but which the Soviet Union may be less reluctant to avoid than in the past.

Israel made a fundamental miscalculation in its 1982 invasion of Lebanon and achieved none of its broader goals. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's sweeping geopolitical concepts were clear: to secure the northern borders of Israel from PLO-organized rocket attacks (hence "Peace in Galilee"); to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization militarily and politically, thereby depriving the Arab population of the occupied West Bank of leadership; to have Lebanon's Maronite Phalange (Lebanese Forces) join Israel's final drive into Beirut and form a Phalange-dominated Lebanese government, which would then become the second Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel; and, more long run, to encourage or push the Palestinians on the West Bank and in the Diaspora to move to Jordan ("Jordan is Palestine"), where they would, because of their overwhelming majority, eventually overthrow the Hashemite dynasty. The ensuing destabilization would once again produce Israel's intervention in one form or another. That would bring

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Robert G. Neumann is Senior Advisor and Director of Middle East Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University. He was U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.

Israel's power to the borders of Saudi Arabia and radiate its influence as far away as Pakistan and even into Africa.[1] Thus would Israel become the overwhelming master of the Middle East, the Arab cause would be seen as hopeless, and one Arab country after another would feel compelled to sue for peace.

It was a grandiose dream but nearly all of it came to nought. Security for Israel's northern region was obtained—yet that had not been seriously threatened since the summer of 1981. The destruction of the Soviet-supplied Syrian air defense system and the greater part of the Syrian air force seemed at the time to humiliate Syria and the Soviet Union, but proved to lead directly, in December 1982, to the Soviets furnishing more advanced replacements. The war and its aftermath proved long and extraordinarily costly to Israel in lives and expenses, it deeply affected national unity and Israel's standing in the world, and it also broke the will and the heart of its once charismatic leader, Menachem Begin.

Israel has quickly drawn lessons from its setback and shifted from adventurism to damage control. Moshe Arens, Sharon's successor as Defense Minister, became instrumental in detaching Israel from its disappointing alliance with the Phalange, giving up the idea of a Maronite-dominated Lebanon, and attempting to court Druze and Shi'ite communities, though not with great success. In early September, the Israelis withdrew from Beirut to the Awali River to shorten their lines and increase the security of their forces. But by so doing, they rendered inevitable a new and even more murderous phase in the ten-year-old war in Lebanon as the Druze population of the Shouf Mountains battled the Phalange. It was the Israelis who had allowed the Phalange into the Shouf at certain critical points, thereby acquiring additional moral responsibility for what happened. A deeply divided Israel, still absorbing the lessons of Lebanon under a less charismatic leader than Begin, and facing deep economic problems, is in no mood for new adventures unless directly threatened.

America meanwhile has moved increasingly into Israel's former role without fully understanding all of its implications. No grand design underlay U.S. involvement in Lebanon. Rather, it was the result of miscalculations which were quite different from those of the Israelis, a fact illustrated by the three-month gap between the Israeli invasion and our first serious policy statement. On September 1, 1982, President Reagan laid down the lines of America's Middle

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[1] "Israel's Strategic Problems in the 80s," address by Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, prepared for delivery at a conference of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, December 14, 1981, and published as a press bulletin dated Jerusalem, December 15, 1981.

East policy. He proposed a comprehensive peace plan for the Middle East, epitomized in the "territories for peace" formula and a clear-cut U.S. position favoring Palestinian self-government in conjunction with Jordan. Only secondarily did the President demand the evacuation of Lebanon by all foreign forces, i.e., Israelis, Syrians, and remaining Palestinians. But a series of wrong predictions and wrong moves shifted the entire emphasis of U.S. policy to Lebanon, leaving the broader peace objectives unimplemented.

To begin with, some top officials confidently stated that peace would be achieved quickly and easily in Lebanon—"before Christmas" of 1982. Many Arab leaders also urged the Lebanese priority on the American government. But that only proves that Arabs can be as ignorant of Lebanon and America's ability to change conditions there as Americans. Diplomats, they thought, could return to the broader peace initiative after America's prestige and credibility had been enhanced by its presumed success in Lebanon. In the meantime, the U.S. government expected that King Hussein of Jordan, in agreement with Yassir Arafat of the PLO, would produce some movement on the broader peace front by declaring his willingness to negotiate with Israel.

Neither expectation was realistic. King Hussein had made it clear all along that he would come to the negotiating table only if the eventual disposition of the occupied territories was discussed and not merely transitional autonomy terms—preconditions certain to be rejected by the Begin government.[2]

As to Lebanon, it is a mystery what the easy optimism of an early evacuation was based on. Neither Syria nor Israel was motivated to withdraw quickly. The Begin government was determined to hold out for sizable political gains to vindicate the invasion. Syria, which had first sent its army into Lebanon in 1976 in response to a call for help from the embattled Maronites[3] and had later switched sides, showed no inclination to withdraw.

Nine months were wasted in increasingly fruitless shuttles by America's Middle East negotiator, Ambassador Philip Habib, until Secretary of State George Shultz took charge on May 17, 1983, and obtained a Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal agreement. It was greeted with considerable satisfaction in Washington, yet it bore within it the seeds of its own destruction.

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[2] Conclusions drawn by the author from an extended conversation with King Hussein in Amman, January 31, 1983, and from subsequent meetings with informed Israelis.

[3] An act that "drew praise from the United States, sharp criticism from the Soviet Union and a telling silence from Israel," David Ignatius, "How to Rebuild Lebanon," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1983, p. 1196.

Syria had not been included in the negotiations, and Syria's indications that it would withdraw, once Israel did, had been taken at face value, as if the type of withdrawal agreement would make no difference. Under the agreement, Israel had gained special rights in southern Lebanon which were to prove fatal. The agreement bordered on a peace treaty because of a "normalization of relations" provision, including liaison missions and trade. This created a sour note in Syria and throughout the Arab world. Even if Syria had actually been ready to withdraw once Israel did, it was hardly likely that it would do so if the special rights accorded Israel under the May 17 agreement were maintained.

There is a widespread impression in America that peace in the Middle East can be achieved "one step at a time" or perhaps "one peace at a time." In support of this contention, Americans frequently cite the Camp David Accords by which Egypt, in making peace with Israel, obtained the return of the Sinai peninsula.

The Arabs view the Camp David Accords exactly the opposite way. They consider them a disaster because, by taking Egypt out of the Arab front, they permanently unbalanced the power relationship between the Arabs and Israel. Moreover, while Egyptian President Anwar Sadat gained the return of the Sinai, he did not obtain the return of the West Bank to Arab control, and that was important to him and to the rest of the Arab world. To the Arabs, the "one peace at a time" formula constitutes a nightmare image of increasingly impotent Arab states having to cut unfavorable deals with an overpowering Israel. Syria is particularly affected by this thought because, having long been isolated, it fears that under this scenario it would be the last and therefore the weakest to sign up. This same apprehension turned Saudi Arabia against Egypt after Sadat signed his separate peace with Israel. It was this concern that played right into Assad's hands and made him determined to overthrow the Gemayel government and force the nullification of the Israeli-Lebanese-U.S. withdrawal agreement.

He has refused even to negotiate on a withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, calling the May 1983 agreement "a Zionist-American hegemonistic plan. . . .worse than the Camp David Accords." Renewed fighting in September was stimulated and supported by Syrian forces in northern and eastern Lebanon, and Assad's agreement to a cease-fire was conditioned on national reconciliation talks among various Lebanese political and religious factions that would spell, in effect, the end of the Gemayel government as then constituted. The Syrian leader also determined once and for all to bring the PLO under total Syrian control. To this end he encouraged and then supported by all means, including arms and regular Syrian forces, the destruction of Yassir Arafat.[4]

In one fell swoop, Hafez al-Assad has emerged from years of isolation and placed himself at the power switch of Middle East policy. For some time to come, he will remain a man who cannot be ignored by anyone who seeks influence in the region.

II

Hafez al-Assad evokes mixed reactions in Arab countries outside Syria. The harshness of his regime and the brutality with which he has suppressed dissidents, especially in Hama, arouse resentment and fear. The implacable resolve with which he carries on his feud with his fellow Arabs and fellow Baathists in Iraq is deeply regretted. And the fact that, in pursuit of the latter aim, he has closed Iraq's pipeline through Syria and favored Khomeini's Iran has profoundly upset the Arab states of the Gulf. Furthermore, while all Arab governments have had problems at various times with Yassir Arafat and the PLO, attempts by any one government to destroy or control the PLO have been resented.

Yet harshness in the single-minded pursuit of policy evokes both fear and admiration in the Arab world, and Assad has much support for his opposition to Lebanon's quasi peace with Israel under the withdrawal agreement. The same is true of his opposition to a Phalange-dominated Lebanese government, because the Phalange is viewed not only as a tool of Israel but also as a group that seeks to separate Lebanon from the main currents of Arab life. In such opposition, Assad has the support not only of Lebanon's Muslims and of the northern Maronites but also of a great many non-Maronite Christians (Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian, etc.) who constitute sizable minorities in other Arab countries (13 percent in Syria, 5 percent in Jordan, 5 percent in Iraq) and who fear for their future if they become identified with Phalangist "separateness."

Nor can one ignore Assad's prime superpower supporter, the Soviet Union. Syria's relationship to the U.S.S.R. is another Middle East complexity that does not easily fit into the clear definitions preferred by Western, and especially by American, observers. Imperial Russia, and even more so the Soviet Union, has consistently attempted to gain a place of influence in the Middle East. The U.S.S.R. recognized the new state of Israel the same day as the United States; the weapons used by Israel in its war of independence came largely from Communist Czechoslovakia.[5] During the early Stalinist time, the Soviet Union operated primarily through traditional communist parties in the Middle East. That relationship brought very few results. When the Soviet Union realized that Arab nationalism aroused by the creation of Israel provided more fertile soil, it changed its method and switched sides.

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[4] Eric Rouleau, "The Future of the PLO," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983, pp.138–156.

The U.S.S.R. wants several things in the Middle East, above all a recognized place for what it believes to be its legitimate interest in that area lying close to its borders. Hence its resentment about repeated American attempts to exclude it therefrom. Even more concern has arisen in the U.S.S.R. over the American quest for military bases in the region and organization of the Rapid Deployment Force.

Beginning in 1955, and especially after America's rejection of the Aswan Dam in 1956, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser became the main Soviet "window" in the Middle East, but at the same time both Syria and Iraq were courted and received large military equipment, the principal tool of spreading Soviet influence-building.

Then, after President Sadat ejected the Russians abruptly in 1972 and Iraq attacked Iran in 1980, Syria became the Soviet Union's only viable "window" and thereby attained particular importance in Soviet eyes. The Soviet-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in October 1980, calling for "cooperation in the military field" and mutual consultations on threats to each other's security or violations of peace and security "in the whole world." As a result, substantial Soviet aid was extended to the Syrian ground forces, as well as the Syrian air defense and air forces. And then, when the latter were wiped out by Israel in June 1982, the Russians embarked in December 1982 on the largest reequipment effort in their history. They not only gave the Syrians an air defense system of unprecedented sophistication, but also furnished ground-launched missiles that now present a serious threat even to American offshore naval power. And, having seen how inept the Syrians had been in June 1982, this time the Soviets are themselves operating this equipment with a force estimated at 8,000 combat Soviet personnel. In the opinion of experts, it will be four to five years before the Syrians will become fully capable of handling the new equipment.

This new degree of Soviet involvement raises serious questions. Thus far the Syrians have proved themselves quite independent of

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[5] Arnold Krammer, *The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc 1947–53*, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1979, pp. 28, 54 ff.

Soviet direction when it suited them. In fact, there is considerable evidence that the Soviet leadership has been quite unhappy over Assad's harsh treatment of Yassir Arafat, but Assad paid no attention to Soviet advice and the Soviets subsided.

For the time being, the Soviets are taking the long view. They enjoy being on the side of a winner and profit from the diminution of America's position as a result of America's expected failure in Lebanon. At the moment, therefore, it is inaccurate to treat Syria as simply a Soviet agent. If anything, the Syrian tail often wags the Soviet dog. But the predominant weight of the U.S.S.R. and its control over Syria's air defense and other missile systems will confront Syria and all Middle Eastern countries, as well as the United States, with a new range of problems and options that will be examined later in this article.

III

In Lebanon, Assad has pretty well succeeded in attaining his principal objective. A number of circumstances have helped him. Lebanon became a state only in recent history. Whether it ever became a nation is open to debate. The Ottoman Empire, which governed the region until 1918, had attempted to calm the long-turbulent land by creating a complicated system of confessional balance, which later became the basis of the National Pact of 1943. But the weakness of the "sick man of Europe" (as the Turkish realm had long been called) invited the intrigues and machinations of foreign powers, each becoming the patron of one sect or region, a forerunner of later developments. In Turkish days that game was played by the French, British, Russians, and Austrians. That role was played much later by Syria and Israel.

The oft-quoted "greater Syria" concept was originally a Jordanian idea, when TransJordan's first ruler, Abdullah, aspired to establish his throne in Damascus. Later, but well before Assad, the idea had been co-opted by Syrian nationalists, arguing this partly from the fact that the Turks had made the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon a part of the district (*vilayet*) of Damascus. The nebulous nature of the relationship between Syria and Lebanon had prevented the Syrians from ever establishing an embassy in Beirut while keeping the Lebanese from sending permanent envoys to Damascus.

This situation became further complicated by the massive entry of Palestinians into Lebanon. They had begun to flee into the then relatively prosperous and open Lebanon after successive Arab-Israeli wars. Many more went to Lebanon when they were driven out of Jordan after their unsuccessful attempt to seize power in that country in the "Black September" of 1970. That sparked the final destabilization of Lebanon, as the Palestinians established virtually a state within a state there. In Lebanon's ten-year-long civil war they usually sided with the Muslims against the Christians while at the same time using Lebanon's weakness for forays into northern Israel. Syria's entry in 1976 reinforced the Syrian claims and had the tacit consent of Israel, which coveted the southern region of Lebanon for itself.

Israel, virtually since its foundation, has aspired to a special relationship, even an alliance, with the Christian Maronites of Lebanon, whom Israel regarded as a bulwark against the flood of ovewhelmingly Muslim Arabs.[6] This set the stage for the relations between the Phalange, led by the charismatic Bashir Gemayel, and the Israelis, who equipped and trained his forces. In Ariel Sharon's plan, the Phalange was to be accorded a special place to join forces with the Israelis in occupying Beirut and in establishing a Maronite-dominated state allied with Israel.

But the plan ran awry. As Bashir Gemayel's position became ever more powerful, he became reluctant to play the role the Israelis had assigned him. This was first revealed when the Phalange stood aside in the final Israeli onslaught on Beirut. It became more obvious when, for a short while, Lebanese of all factions realized that Bashir Gemayel was the only man who had the chance to unify Lebanon. Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon, with their total disdain and ignorance of Arab mentality, never understood that it might well have been in their interest to give in to Bashir Gemayel's insistence on putting some distance between himself and them.

On September 1, 1982, the very day that President Reagan made his Middle East policy speech in the United States, Begin met secretly with Bashir not far from the northern Israeli town of Nahariyya, pounded him with accusations of betrayal, and demanded a formal peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. The presence at that meeting of Saad Haddad, the cashiered Lebanese major and Israel's proxy, further underlined Begin's message that if Bashir Gemayel did not give in, there was another solution available to the Israelis.[7] Bashir knew that, if he did not resist Begin's demands, he could never lead a unified Lebanon. But, as so often in Lebanon's history, that brief dream became extinct when Bashir Gemayal was assassinated a short while later.

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[6] Dan Kurtzman, *Ben-Gurion, Prophet of Fire*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, p. 321.

[7] Jonathan C. Randal, *Going All the Way: Christian War Lords, Israeli Adventures and the War in Lebanon*, New York: Viking Press, 1983, p. 10.

It has to be left to speculation whether Bashir Gemayel, with his strong, even brutal, leadership of the Phalange, could have realized his promise of holding the Phalange in line while holding out his hand to the other groups and militias. It is an even greater question whether Israel and Syria would have allowed him to do so.

In any event, such an opportunity did not long remain with Bashir's successor and older brother, Amin Gemayel. For a short while Amin inherited the good will that had swept toward his dead brother. Had he moved quickly toward reconciliation with Sunnis, Shi'ites and Druze, perhaps he might have succeeded—although it was always a question to what extent he could control his own Phalangist forces. He certainly never had the standing with them that characterized Bashir.

What did happen was that Amin hesitated. He could not control the Phalange military leadership, which did as it pleased, massacred the Palestinians in the Shatila and Sabra refugee camps, and pushed Shi'ites and Druze around. Quite likely the Phalange leaders thought that they had America's forces in their corner and no longer needed to reach out for a national consensus. This pushed Druze and Shi'ites in the opposite direction, toward Syria. And later, when the Israeli-Lebanese-U.S. withdrawal agreement appeared to challenge Syria's claim to leadership in Lebanon, and especially after the partial Israeli withdrawal from the Shouf Mountains created a vacuum, the civil war not only started again with great violence but also greatly solidified Syria's leadership over all anti-Phalangist forces, since the anti-Phalangists needed Syrian weapons and support to carry on the fight.

At this juncture, peace could come to Lebanon only if a fundamental restructuring of political, social, and economic power were to take place that would reduce Maronite domination and enhance the power of those hitherto neglected groups, the Druze and especially the Shi'ites who had become the largest single group in Lebanon. This is not to say that these groups are particularly comfortable with Syrian domination. The Shi'ites at first accepted the Israeli presence largely out of hatred for the Palestinians; they became disenchanted with the Israelis when the latter neglected them and favored the Christian Major Saad Haddad in Shi'ite-dominated southern Lebanon. This is even more true of the Druze, who have lived in blood feuds with the Maronites for well over a century. Although their leader, Walid Jumblatt, had little reason to love the Syrians, who are generally believed to have been responsible for the assassination of his father, he felt that he had no choice except Syrian tutelage.

All of this complicated U.S. strategy. American Marines had originally landed—first to provide a screen for the evacuation of the Palestinian fighters and later to provide greater stability for the government in the halcyon days of hope for Lebanese unity under Amin Gemayel. But, by this act, America has slid incrementally into a most awkward predicament. The more it becomes identified with the Phalange and takes military action against the Druze and Shi'ites, the more it becomes a partisan and the more Assad's leadership is strengthened. The more America views the Lebanese conflict and Syria's position there in a primarily East-West context, the more Assad and his Lebanese allies need a close relationship with Moscow, thus making America's conception a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In U.S. government circles, some argue for greater American-Israeli coordination in order to achieve a balance of power with Damascus and Moscow. As of mid-November 1983, it appears that the United States has moved down this road at least to a limited extent, seeking to strengthen the Israeli position and role with the sweetening of significant new forms of U.S. aid. If this view prevails, the result would most likely be the very opposite of what its proponents desire. Temporarily and militarily, the Syrians and their Soviet backers may become more cautious. But politically, they would gain not only in Lebanon but throughout the Middle East, as even moderate Arab states would feel obliged to move closer to Syria, because their internal stability would be undercut if they appear ready to cooperate with a perceived U.S.-Israel combination.

Consequently it has to be accepted that for the foreseeable future Assad will remain a dominant force in Lebanon. His power rests on a good deal more than the presence of his army. This was further emphasized by the fact that the fragile cease-fire agreement of September 1983, which Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar bin Sultan hammered out in close collaboration with U.S. special envoy Robert McFarlane, was announced in Damascus.

Assad's aims in Lebanon are not difficult to discern. They are, first of all, a dominant role in Lebanon, and through that, a place in the Middle East so strong that nothing can be settled there without his consent. For Lebanon, this certainly means that the Syrian troops will remain not only as long as the Israeli forces are there but also as long as the Israeli-Lebanese-U.S. withdrawal agreement remains in force, as it gives special rights in Lebanon to the Israelis. If the Israelis were to withdraw unconditionally—which is unlikely to occur soon—the presence in Lebanon of Syrian troops might no longer be required if Assad's domination were assured by other means, and if there were a pliant Lebanese government, probably but not necessarily under someone other than Amin Gemayel.

The United States, with limited forces in Lebanon, and in the face of congressional and popular resistance to further American involvement there, is in no position effectively to challenge Syrian predominance in Lebanon. Only Israel could do that, but whether Israel would wish to do so is highly questionable.

Israel has become introspective, reexamining its own nature and aspirations. For the first time, the nature of the state and the mission of its armed forces and military policy are questioned, endangering the unity that is vital to Israel's security. There is now a sharp and distinct division between the opposition Labor alliance's view that Israel must withdraw from Lebanon (except for some security provisions in the south) and must come to some territorial revision on the West Bank, and the Likud government view, which wants to do neither. The prospect is for weak Israeli governments with uncertain life spans, facing a severe economic crisis that demands drastic measures further dividing the political spectrum. And there remains the divisive problem of what to do with the large and restive Arab population under Israel's control.

In such a situation, Israel can hardly be expected to be in a mood for new adventures in Lebanon. To be sure, there are Israeli politicians who believe Israel should come to the aid of its ally the United States and move against the Syrians and in support of the Gemayel government. But a more dominant trend is that Israel must now look after its own interests and not move against Syria unless clearly threatened. There are even those in Israel who feel that its northern border may be more secure when faced by a Syrian-dominated region. Syria scrupulously observes the armistice on its own borders, and its firm control of the PLO has shown that no uncontrolled element will be allowed near Israel's lines unless the Syrians want this to happen. There are even those in Israel who believe that it should try to cut a deal with a strong Syria rather than a weaker Jordan.

IV

What will be the consequences of Syria's new prominence? Saudi Arabia resented Assad's torpedoing of the attempted first Fez summit meeting, which reconvened on September 9, 1982, succeeding only with great difficulties. Saudi Arabia is also unhappy over Syria's siding with Iran and against Iraq. They fear that an

Iranian victory would have incalculable dangers and consequences for the entire Gulf region. But Saudi Arabia, conscious of its great wealth and physical vulnerability, has always preferred efforts at getting along with radical neighbors over confrontation. Even when it finally subsidizes a radical state like Syria, it prefers persuasion to threats of withholding funds—not unlike America's attitude toward Israel. Its increasingly active diplomacy has been apprehensive over Syria's close involvement with the Soviet Union but has attempted to deal with Syria on a case-by-case basis, not as an adversary. This is also why Saudi Arabia has gone well beyond its usual discreet and indirect action in working so closely with the United States to bring about a cease-fire in Lebanon: it would need both the United States and Syria, though in different ways, should there be outright hostility by Iran. By brokering a cease-fire in Lebanon and taking steps toward reconciliation, which, if successful, would be essentially favorable to Syria, Saudi Arabia has acknowledged facts.

If Americans were to side too openly with the Phalangists and continue to bombard Druze and Shi'ite forces in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia would have to put distance between itself and the United States. It hopes to avoid such a situation by adroit diplomacy. Saudi Arabia will continue to watch the situation warily, and if some Arab coalition were to start forming to balance Syria, Saudi Arabia might well lend it its support.

The situation is even more awkward for Jordan. Jordan and Syria have been frequent adversaries, and during the 1970 "Black September" uprising of the PLO, Jordanian tanks and planes as well as an Israeli threat of intervention stopped Syria's tanks from advancing against Jordanian lines.

Jordan's principal sensitivity is, however, directed toward the Palestinian question. In an endeavor to move toward possible negotiation with Israel and the PLO, King Hussein welcomed the Reagan plan and began a dialogue with Yassir Arafat with a view toward arriving at a common negotiating formula. Arafat was frustrated by more radical groups within the PLO structure and even more by Syria's influence, which suspected another "Camp David" from Jordan and vigorously opposed any peace initiative that would exclude Syria. In the face of such opposition, Yassir Arafat had to go back on the modest progress that his discussions with King Hussein had made, and this caused Hussein to withdraw from the whole effort in April 1983.[8]

In the new situation created by a much more powerful Syria with enhanced control over the PLO, a new Jordanian initiative has become even more difficult, and in a spirit of deep disappointment over U.S. failure to proceed more vigorously with Reagan's "territory for peace" formula, Hussein has begun to take steps toward better relations with both Syria and Moscow. But Hussein is clearly not comfortable in that association and would probably prefer to return to his earlier initiative if he were confident of U.S. steadfastness and could count on a forthcoming Palestinian attitude.

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[8] Eric Rouleau, *loc.cit.*

To this end, King Hussein has let it be known that if the PLO were to come completely under Syrian control, he might no longer feel bound by the 1974 Rabat summit resolution, which declared the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. But what Hussein could in fact do is less clear. He certainly cannot simply negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians without a mandate from them. Such a mandate might conceivably come from West Bank leaders if they were convinced that Arafat was finished and that no significant PLO remnant continued to exist outside Syrian control.

Another approach could be the long-rumored Jordanian return to a parliamentary form of government, in which West Bank Palestinians would obtain sizable representation. Both these alternatives would require Israeli acquiescence, of which there is no evidence as these lines are written.

Yassir Arafat, even in his moment of extreme peril, showed renewed interest in a resumption of his talks with Hussein. But whether he will be in a position to undertake it is seriously in doubt. He and his PLO fighters had earlier emerged in relatively good shape from the battering they took from the Israelis. When they had to accept evacuation from Lebanon, Arafat, fearing the total Syrian domination long attempted by Assad, strenuously resisted establishing his headquarters in Damascus, and chose the more distant but politically innocuous Tunis. Arafat's subsequent negotiation with King Hussein determined President Assad to finish off Arafat once and for all. But leadership in the Arab world is inextricably tied to an espousal of the Palestinian cause; thus any Arab claim to leadership would be severely damaged by opposition from the PLO. This Assad was determined to prevent.

Assad moved in his habitual style of methodical preparation and harsh thrusts. In the past, rebellions against Yassir Arafat's leadership had mainly occurred outside the Fatah movement, the largest core of the PLO. This time it was to happen within. Assad's power grab was aided by Arafat's unwise appointment of two ineffective and discredited officers to higher command. On the other hand, the rebellion remained handicapped by the obvious fashion in which it was fomented by Assad. When Assad decided to move even more forcefully against him, Arafat, realizing that he had no chance against such determination, attempted to effect yet another of his innumerable compromises and returned to Damascus. But Assad would have none of it and forcibly evicted him and his lieutenants from Syria. He allowed Arafat to escape to the northern Lebanese town of Tripoli where the majority of his fighters who remained in Lebanon are concentrated. But Assad is clearly out to crush Arafat and has now moved against him even there. The end of an independent PLO, at least in Lebanon, appears to be in sight, even though the Soviets and several Arab governments have pleaded with Assad for a compromise.

Total Syrian control over the PLO would strengthen Assad's hand in Lebanon, but not in the region. The Palestinians on the West Bank clearly oppose Syrian control and have therefore remained firm in their support for Arafat's leadership. If a Syrian-dominated PLO were to reemphasize "armed struggle," as seems likely, this would cause a deep split in the West Bank Palestinians, who have a more realistic view of Israeli retaliatory power—of which they would be the prime victims. This would also cause serious misgivings in the rest of the Arab world.

Although every Arab country has had its conflicts with Arafat, the Arab world was clearly uncomfortable with Assad's move against the PLO and gave him no support. On the contrary, verbal support for Arafat came from every country with the exception of Syria and Libya—but little else. Only one potential ally is conceivable, and that is Egypt. But such a move on Egypt's part is nowhere in sight. It remains a possibility for the future if Arafat can stay alive and in command of a sizable element of the PLO that long.

Egypt's course, even before Sadat's death, has been uncertain. Sadat's grand strategy was clear, imaginative—and flawed. He understood the deep psychological barrier between Israel and the Arab world, especially the conviction of Menachem Begin and many others that the Arabs would never make peace with Israel. Fortified by the performance of Egyptian arms in the 1973 war, Sadat felt strong enough to take a daring step towad peace by his trip to Jerusalem. By this he hoped to convince the Israelis that peace was possible. He emphasized in every one of his declarations, beginning with his speech to the Knesset, that the price for peace was the return of the West Bank to Arab control.

This, however, Begin was never prepared to do. And although Sadat obtained the return of the Sinai Peninsula, the opportunity to return triumphantly to the Arab fold as the one leader who was able to win the great and decisive prize of a Palestinian solution was denied him. The Egyptian people were glad to have peace after so many bloodlettings and welcomed large American assistance after Camp David, but help from the United States alone could never be sufficient to solve Egypt's massive social and economic problems. The peace with Israel turned increasingly sour.

Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's successor, felt deeply humiliated by Israel's invasion of Lebanon: the peace treaty with Israel, which he did not want to renounce, immobilized his armed forces, and no other Arab country had the capability of intervening and stopping Israel's awesome military might. Egypt's frustration expressed itself by the withdrawal of its ambassador from Israel and President Mubarak's declaration that the ambassador would not return until Israel's forces had withdrawn from Lebanon. To this Mubarak added another condition during his October 1983 visit to the United States: namely, that there would be no exchange of ambassadors until Israel also stopped all settlements on the West Bank.

With that act Mubarak signaled even more clearly that, while he did not wish to give up the peace treaty with Israel, he had in fact put it in cold storage and wanted to move further toward a return to the Arab fold. Egyptian pride did not permit a return on other than Egyptian terms, and for that the rest of the Arabs were not yet ready.

But the sudden rise to leadership of Hafez Assad may eventually motivate Egypt to move more directly toward a position of leadership in the Arab camp and could make that step more acceptable to the moderate Arabs. One way of doing so would be by offering asylum to Arafat—if he survives—and the remnants of his Palestinian movement and also supporting resumption of Jordanian-PLO negotiations. But by suggesting that the PLO form a "government in exile," Egypt expects that Arafat would be willing to abandon the doctrine of "armed struggle," finally accept that a split in his movement has become fact—even without Syrian intervention—and move clearly and unmistakably in the direction of a diplomatic and political solution. Such a step would achieve a greater balance in Arab ranks, it would restore the traditional situation in which Cairo and Damascus were often rival power centers, and it would give life to a new peace initiative either within the Reagan plan or some other formula.

Even though the moderate Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia, have been sympathetic to Egypt's return, they fear that by accepting a country that has made a separate peace with Israel, they would make themselves too vulnerable to radical attacks. Egypt, on the other hand, feels that by retaining its link with Israel—however frail—while rejoining the Arab fold, the Arabs would signal a greater readiness for peace, which Egypt regards as their only choice against an overwhelmingly strong and American-assisted Israel.

The gap between these two positions has been narrowed but not closed. Egypt will not take overt steps until it has been reassured in advance of being welcomed back, "warts and all." But in the meantime it has strengthened its position among the Arabs by postponing indefinitely the return of an Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv despite severe presssure from Israel and from some American circles.

Israel's growing disenchantment with its cold peace with Egypt stokes the fire of those Israeli extremists who have always been convinced that a negotiated peace could never be achieved between Israelis and Arabs. But to more impartial observers, it would seem that in the long run Israel's security would benefit from the return to the Arab camp of a country which did make peace with Israel and whose weight would strengthen those who strive for a diplomatic rather than a military solution.

V

High as Assad stands in the Arab fold, his long-term success is by no means guaranteed. His rise is very high but his power base is very narrow. He is a member of the Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shi'ites regarded by the overwhelming majority of Sunni Syrians as heretical, and the Alawites constitute no more than ten percent of the Syrian population.

Also, Lebanon has proved slippery ground for all those who entered it intending to remain, as the Israelis have come to realize. No Lebanese group is really at ease under Syrian domination; the presence of Syrian soldiers in the relative comfort and freedom of Lebanon has proved demoralizing and corrupting to the Syrian army; and Assad faces serious economic problems at home.

Nor should one discount Iraq's return to the quest for leadership that it had to abandon when its war against Iran turned sour. Some day the war will end and then Iraq's manpower resources (greater than those of Syria), its large oil reserves and bloodied but combat-experienced army could make Hafez al-Assad rue the day when he sided with Iran and damaged Iraq's economy severely by closing its pipeline through Syria. And finally, the Arab world, though admiring Assad's deft footwork, nevertheless harbors general resentment against his forceful moves against the PLO.

Thus, Assad has so many enemies that it may not take more than one serious misstep to bring him face to face with great difficulties. And, if Egypt decided to move in favor of a more active and assertive policy such as that suggested above, Assad's predominance could not long be maintained.

In the meantime—which may be quite long—barring his sudden demise, Assad has become the strong man of the Middle East. The more the United States opposes him, the stronger he becomes, albeit at the price of moving ever closer to his great protector, the Soviet Union. He has no serious rivals—at the moment.

What will Assad do with his triumph once he feels firmly in the saddle? He has fought his way to the top largely by negative means, by blocking or destroying rivals, by derailing agreements that did not include him or that gave him a lesser place than he felt entitled to, and above all by incredible tenacity against severe odds and strong enemies.

Negative acts are not sufficient to give Assad the position of supreme leader, the "Arab hero" role that Abdul Nasser and Anwar Sadat sought in vain. For that, a great positive act will be necessary. That would obviously be to tackle successfully the Arab-Israeli problem. Assad will not be in a great hurry to approach that goal. His style has been gradual, methodical, detailed preparation by intricate maneuvers combining daring action with a desire to take minimal risks. What remains to be seen is whether, in the event he lasts long enough, he will try to deal with that supreme problem by taking the road of war or of diplomacy. There are grave risks involved in both.

The Arabs have been defeated by Israel many times. It lies in the Arab nature, in the tradition of constant warfare among tribes, to recover fairly quickly and easily from defeat. But humiliation is another matter. And it has long been the strategy of Israel not only to defeat but also to humiliate the Arabs, to instill in them the conviction that Israel is invincible and that resistance is hopeless. Israel has now suffered considerably in Lebanon. Although there can be no question that its armed forces have prevailed, other factors underline the limits of its expansion. Yet the sense of deep humiliation remains in the Arab world because it was not the Arabs who defeated Israel; Israel overreached itself.

Therefore the road to war and revenge remains inviting to Syria. But there are serious problems on that path. Syria's reequipment by the Soviet Union will take several years to be fully effective. It is doubtful that Israel, even in its present introspective mood, would stand idly by to see that completed. There would be considerable support for taking action in an otherwise divided Israel. But as control over Syria's new sophisticated air defense system lies, and will remain, in Soviet hands, Syria would not only have to accept a virtual alliance with the Soviet Union to fight Israel successfully, but would also have to be willing to face the danger of superpower confrontation. To take that road, even if Israel waited, Assad would have to throw himself completely into Russia's arms, without being quite certain that the Soviets, who both use and distrust him, are actually willing to risk a conflict with the United States. To be sure, in recent times the Soviet Union has become more assertive and seems less inclined to shrink back from such confrontation, but Assad cannot be sure that the Soviet Union would continue to support him at such a moment; nor could he be certain that, if it did, he would survive or retain much freedom of action.

In view of these very large and dangerous questions, one should not exclude the possibility that Hafez Assad, if he remains in power and still on top of the mountain, may choose the political way. And why not? Even Abdul Nasser gave it a brief and secret try in 1955 through intermediaries with Israel's Ben-Gurion.[9] Sadat tried it more directly, but only with partial success.

There is, however, one significant difference. Even if Assad eventually takes the road of diplomacy, Soviet support will remain essential for him to play his role fully because his own power base is too narrow to deal alone with American diplomacy. He would not have the freedom the much larger and more powerful Egypt had to discard Soviet help but would have to move in step with the Russians, retaining them as an indispensable part of his strategy in peace or war. That means that even if Assad chooses the road to peace by diplomatic means, he could not pick the form of the Camp David agreement or of the "Jordanian formula" but would have to give preference to the earlier concept of the Geneva Conference, in which the Soviet Union and the United States figured as co-chairmen.

Until Assad makes up his mind and feels strong enough to move, he will constantly shift tactically between policies of force and of diplomacy, keeping both friends and opponents off balance. He is a master of such tactics.

Although there is little indication that the American government, in its present mood, would feel favorably inclined toward a Geneva strategy, this cannot be excluded for all time. After all, the Geneva strategy experienced a short life span under the Nixon and Carter Administrations and could conceivably do so again within the context of a future, more relaxed atmosphere between the United States and the Soviet Union.

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[9] Elmore Jackson, *Middle East Mission: The Story of a Major Bid for Peace in the Time of Nasser and Ben-Gurion*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1983.

VI

In the meantime, U.S. diplomacy has little choice but to face up to the vastly changed situation in the Middle East. Provided Assad remains in power for a prolonged period, both Syria and the United States should have an interest in gradually improved relations in order to give the Syrians an option other than total and exclusive dependence upon the Soviet Union. This might worry Israel but might not be totally unacceptable provided American diplomacy proceeds with care, skill and balance. The possibility of such diplomacy would also be enhanced if the U. S. government could find its way out of its present seemingly exclusive preoccupation with Lebanon and return to a broader peace initiative along the lines of the Reagan plan. Only then, in order not to exclude Syria, would a purely "Jordanian solution" seem quite difficult and the Reagan plan need some amendment.

There are so many imponderables in this situation that an exact course for the future in the Middle East cannot be charted at this time. One thing is certain: the situation in that troubled region has fundamentally changed and all parties have to reexamine it.

Peace in the Middle East remains a vital and necessary concern for America, the entire West, and for Japan, which depend so much on that region's strategic importance and resources. America's goodwill to approach that goal has been strong, but its skill and ability to play a constructive role has not been much in evidence. The policy outlined in President Reagan's speech of September 1, 1982, which he has since reaffirmed, cannot possibly succeed without a strategy that bears priorities and realities firmly in mind. Among those realities are the continued central importance of the Palestinian problem and the need for successive American administrations to view Middle Eastern problems in a regional rather than a predominantly East-West context—without ignoring the fact that an East-West element does exist and has recently become stronger.

In this respect another important change in the Middle East should be noted. Gradually but relentlessly dawning on Israel's volatile public is the fact that the permanent presence of a large Arab population will bring insoluble problems and is bound to burden severely Israel's vital relations with the United States.[10] Because of this realization the political groups in Israel that are willing to accept the return of much of the occupied West Bank to Arab control (if Israel's security can be safeguarded) are bound to grow. Moreover, Israel's economic crisis is beginning to worry its impoverished Sephardic element lest continued costly settlements on the West Bank endanger social benefits. The awareness of those trends has caused the opposition Labor alliance to make territorial revision a major item of its election platform. This significant difference would become particularly sharp if elections were to take place in Israel ahead of time in 1984.

At the same time the battered Palestinians, in the Diaspora and especially on the West Bank, have to face up to the question of whether "armed struggle" has not become an impossible, romantic dream[11] and whether diplomatic moves are not the only steps left if they are ever to gain any kind of self-determination, even if that produces a split in PLO ranks. Bitterness at Arab inaction in their hour of mortal peril and fear of total emasculation through Syrian control have brought growing, though not yet dominant, realism into Palestinian ranks.

This surely is a situation that could favor new initiatives toward a Middle East peace.

If Syria were to perceive the existence of such a trend, what would its attitude be? Oppose it, in all likelihood. But even such opposition need not be irrevocable if Assad chooses the road of peace as his crowning achievement, rather than of war.

Even if Syria's opposition were irreducible, a peace diplomacy could find allies, especially in Egypt, that would tend to balance the Syrian-Soviet alliance.

America's success in dealing with these awesomely complex issues of the Middle East will depend to a large degree on its ability to retain a sense of proportion in all its relations with Middle Eastern and superpower parties and, while doing so, to master the traditional Middle Eastern game of opposing and cooperating at the same time.

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[10] For an elaboration of this thesis, see Harold Saunders, "An Israeli-Palestinian Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1982, pp. 100–121.

[11] Eric Rouleau, *loc. cit.*, and Aaron David Miller, *The PLO and the Politics of Survival*, Washington Paper Number 99, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1983.

Carl Sagan

NUCLEAR WAR AND CLIMATIC CATASTROPHE: SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS

> It is not even impossible to imagine that the effects of an atomic war fought with greatly perfected weapons and pushed by the utmost determination will endanger the survival of man.
>
> Edward Teller
> *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1947

> The extreme danger to mankind inherent in the proposal by [Edward Teller and others to develop thermonuclear weapons] wholly outweighs any military advantage.
>
> J. Robert Oppenheimer, *et al.*
> *Report of the General Advisory Committee, AEC*
> October 1949

> The fact that no limits exist to the destructiveness of this weapon makes its very existence and the knowledge of its construction a danger to humanity. . . . It is . . . an evil thing.
>
> Enrico Fermi and I. I. Rabi
> Addendum, *ibid.*

> A very large nuclear war would be a calamity of indescribable proportions and absolutely unpredictable consequences, with the uncertainties tending toward the worse. . . . All-out nuclear war would mean the destruction of contemporary civilization, throw man back centuries, cause the deaths of hundreds of millions or billions of people, and, with a certain degree of probability, would cause man to be destroyed as a biological species . . .
>
> Andrei Sakharov
> *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1983

Apocalyptic predictions require, to be taken seriously, higher standards of evidence than do assertions on other matters

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where the stakes are not as great. Since the immediate effects of even a single thermonuclear weapon explosion are so devastating, it is natural to assume—even without considering detailed mechanisms—that the more or less simultaneous explosion of ten thousand such weapons all over the Northern Hemisphere might have unpredictable and catastrophic consequences.

And yet, while it is widely accepted that a full nuclear war might mean the end of civilization at least in the Northern Hemisphere, claims that nuclear war might imply a reversion of the human population to prehistoric levels, or even the extinction of the human species, have, among some policymakers at least, been dismissed as alarmist or, worse, irrelevant. Popular works that stress this theme, such as Nevil Shute's *On the Beach,* and Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth,* have been labeled disreputable. The apocalyptic claims are rejected as unproved and unlikely, and it is judged unwise to frighten the public with doomsday talk when nuclear weapons are needed, we are told, to preserve the peace. But, as the above quotations illustrate, comparably dire warnings have been made by respectable scientists with diverse political inclinations, including many of the American and Soviet physicists who conceived, devised and constructed the world nuclear arsenals.

Part of the resistance to serious consideration of such apocalyptic pronouncements is their necessarily theoretical basis. Understanding the long-term consequences of nuclear war is not a problem amenable to experimental verification—at least not more than once. Another part of the resistance is psychological. Most people—recognizing nuclear war as a grave and terrifying prospect, and nuclear policy as immersed in technical complexities, official secrecy and bureaucratic inertia—tend to practice what psychiatrists call denial: putting the agonizing problem out of our heads, since there seems nothing we can do about it. Even policymakers must feel this temptation from time to time. But for policymakers there is another concern: if it turns out that nuclear war could end our civilization or our species, such a finding might be considered a retroactive rebuke to those responsible, actively or passively, in the past or in the present, for the global nuclear arms race.

The stakes are too high for us to permit any such factors to influence our assessment of the consequences of nuclear war. If nuclear war now seems significantly more catastrophic than has generally been believed in the military and policy communities, then serious consideration of the resulting implications is urgently called for.

It is in that spirit that this article seeks, first, to present a short summary, in lay terms, of the climatic and biological consequences of nuclear war that emerge from extensive scientific studies conducted over the past two years, the essential conclusions of which have now been endorsed by a large number of scientists. These findings were presented in detail at a special conference in Cambridge, Mass., involving almost 100 scientists on April 22–26, 1983, and were publicly announced at a conference in Washington, D.C., on October 31 and November 1, 1983. They have been reported in summary form in the press, and a detailed statement of the findings and their bases will be published in *Science*.[1] The present summary is designed particularly for the lay reader.

Following this summary, I explore the possible strategic and policy implications of the new findings.* They point to one apparently inescapable conclusion: the necessity of moving as rapidly as possible to reduce the global nuclear arsenals below levels that could conceivably cause the kind of climatic catastrophe and cascading biological devastation predicted by the new studies. Such a reduction would have to be to a small percentage of the present global strategic arsenals.

II

The central point of the new findings is that the long-term consequences of a nuclear war could constitute a global climatic catastrophe.

The immediate consequences of a single thermonuclear weapon explosion are well known and well documented—fireball radiation, prompt neutrons and gamma rays, blast, and fires.[2] The Hiroshima bomb that killed between 100,000 and 200,000 people was a fission device of about 12 kilotons yield (the explosive equivalent of 12,000 tons of TNT). A modern thermonuclear warhead uses a device something like the Hiroshima bomb as the trigger—the "match" to light the fusion reaction. A typical thermonuclear weapon now has a yield of about 500 kilotons (or 0.5 megatons, a megaton being the explosive equivalent of a million tons of TNT). There are many weapons in the 9 to 20 megaton range in the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union today. The highest-yield weapon ever exploded is 58 megatons.

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[1] R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pollack and Carl Sagan [TTAPS], "Global Atmospheric Consequences of Nuclear War," *Science*, in press; P. R. Ehrlich, M. A. Harwell, Peter H. Raven, Carl Sagan, G. M. Woodwell, *et al.*, "The Long-Term Biological Consequences of Nuclear War," *Science*, in press.

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This article would not have been possible without the high scientific competence and dedication of my co-authors on the TTAPS study, Richard P. Turco, Owen B. Toon, Thomas P. Ackerman, and James B. Pollack, and my 19 coauthors of the accompanying scientific paper on the long-term biological consequences of nuclear war. Finally, I wish to thank my Soviet colleagues, V. V. Alexandrov, E. I. Chazov, G. S. Golitsyn, and E. P. Velikhov among others, for organizing independent confirmations of the probable existence of a post-nuclear-war climatic catastrophe, and for helping to generate a different kind of climate—one of mutual concern and cooperation that is essential if we are to emerge safely from the trap that our two nations have jointly set for ourselves, our civilization, and our species.

Strategic nuclear weapons are those designed for delivery by ground-based or submarine-launched missiles, or by bombers, to targets in the adversary's homeland. Many weapons with yields roughly equal to that of the Hiroshima bomb are today assigned to "tactical" or "theater" military missions, or are designated "munitions" and relegated to ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles, torpedoes, depth charges and artillery. While strategic weapons often have higher yields than tactical weapons, this is not always the case.[3] Modern tactical or theater missiles (e.g., Pershing II, SS-20) and air support weapons (e.g., those carried by F-15 or MiG-23 aircraft) have sufficient range to make the distinction between "strategic" and "tactical" or "theater" weapons increasingly artificial. Both categories of weapons can be delivered by land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and aircraft; and by intermediate-range as well as intercontinental delivery systems. Nevertheless, by the usual accounting, there are around 18,000 strategic thermonuclear weapons (warheads) and the equivalent number of fission triggers in the American and Soviet strategic arsenals, with an aggregate yield of about 10,000 megatons.

The total number of nuclear weapons (strategic plus theater and tactical) in the arsenals of the two nations is close to 50,000, with an aggregate yield near 15,000 megatons. For convenience, we here collapse the distinction between strategic and theater weapons, and adopt, under the rubric "strategic," an aggregate yield of 13,000 megatons. The nuclear weapons of the rest of the world—

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[2] Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, *The Effects of Nuclear War*, 3rd ed., Washington: Department of Defense, 1977.

[3] The "tactical" Pershing I, for example, is listed as carrying warheads with yields as high as 400 kilotons, while the "strategic" Poseidon C-3 is listed with a yield of only 40 kilotons. *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1982*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, London: Taylor and Francis, 1982; J. Record, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974.

mainly Britain, France and China—amount to many hundred warheads and a few hundred megatons of additional aggregate yield.

No one knows, of course, how many warheads with what aggregate yield would be detonated in a nuclear war. Because of attacks on strategic aircraft and missiles, and because of technological failures, it is clear that less than the entire world arsenal would be detonated. On the other hand, it is generally accepted, even among most military planners, that a "small" nuclear war would be almost impossible to contain before it escalated to include much of the world arsenals.[4] (Precipitating factors include command and control malfunctions, communications failures, the necessity for instantaneous decisions on the fates of millions, fear, panic and other aspects of real nuclear war fought by real people.) For this reason alone, any serious attempt to examine the possible consequences of nuclear war must place major emphasis on large-scale exchanges in the five-to-seven-thousand-megaton range, and many studies have done so.[5] Many of the effects described below, however, can be triggered by much smaller wars.

The adversary's strategic airfields, missile silos, naval bases, submarines at sea, weapons manufacturing and storage locales, civilian and military command and control centers, attack assessment and early warning facilities, and the like are probable targets ("counterforce attack"). While it is often stated that cities are not targeted "per se," many of the above targets are very near or colocated with cities, especially in Europe. In addition, there is an industrial targeting category ("countervalue attack"). Modern nuclear doctrines require that "war-supporting" facilities be attacked. Many of these facilities are necessarily industrial in nature and engage a work force of considerable size. They are almost always situated near major transportation centers, so that raw materials and finished products can be efficiently transported to other industrial sectors, or to forces in the field. Thus, such facilities are, almost by definition, cities, or near or within cities. Other "war-supporting" targets may include the transportation systems themselves (roads, canals, rivers, railways, civilian airfields, etc.), petroleum refineries, storage sites and pipelines, hydroelectric plants, radio and television transmitters and the like. A major countervalue attack therefore might involve almost all large cities in the United States and the Soviet Union, and possibly most of the large cities in the Northern Hemisphere.[6] There are fewer than 2,500 cities in the world with populations over 100,000 inhabitants, so the devastation of all such cities is well within the means of the world nuclear arsenals.

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[4] See, e.g., D. Ball, Adelphi Paper 169, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981; P. Bracken and M. Shubik, in *Technology in Society*, Vol. 4, 1982, p. 155.

[5] National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council, *Long-term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear Weapons Detonations*, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1975; Office of Technology Assessment, *The Effects of Nuclear War*, Washington, 1979; J. Peterson (Ed.), *Nuclear War: The Aftermath*, special issue *Ambio*, Vol. 11, Nos. 2–3, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 1982; R. P. Turco, *et al., loc. cit.* footnote 1; S. Bergstrom, *et al., Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services*, Rome: World Health Organization, Publication No. A36.12, 1983; National Academy of Sciences, new 1983 study in press.

Recent estimates of the immediate deaths from blast, prompt radiation, and fires in a major exchange in which cities were targeted range from several hundred million to 1.1 billion people—the latter estimate is in a World Health Organization study in which targets were assumed not to be restricted entirely to NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.[7] Serious injuries requiring immediate medical attention (which would be largely unavailable) would be suffered by a comparably large number of people, perhaps an additional 1.1 billion.[8] Thus it is possible that something approaching half the human population on the planet would be killed or seriously injured by the direct effects of the nuclear war. Social disruption; the unavailability of electricity, fuel, transportation, food deliveries, communications and other civil services; the absence of medical care; the decline in sanitation measures; rampant disease and severe psychiatric disorders would doubtless collectively claim a significant number of further victims. But a range of additional effects—some unexpected, some inadequately treated in earlier studies, some uncovered only recently—now make the picture much more somber still.

Because of current limitations on missile accuracy, the destruction of missile silos, command and control facilities, and other hardened sites requires nuclear weapons of fairly high yield exploded as groundbursts or as low airbursts. High-yield groundbursts will vaporize, melt and pulverize the surface at the target area and propel large quantities of condensates and fine dust into the upper troposphere and stratosphere. The particles are chiefly entrained in the rising fireball; some ride up the stem of the mushroom cloud. Most military targets, however, are not very hard. The destruction of cities can be accomplished, as demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by lower-yield explosions less than a kilometer above the surface. Low-yield airbursts over cities or near forests will tend to produce massive fires, some of them over areas of 100,000 square kilometers or more. City fires generate enormous quantities of black oily smoke which rise at least into the upper part of the lower atmosphere, or troposphere. If firestorms occur, the smoke column rises vigorously, like the draft in a fireplace, and may carry some of the soot into the lower part of the upper atmosphere, or stratosphere. The smoke from forest and grassland fires would initially be restricted to the lower troposphere.

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[6] See, e.g., J. Peterson, *op. cit.* footnote 5.

[7] S. Bergstrom, *op. cit.* footnote 5.

[8] *Ibid.*

The fission of the (generally plutonium) trigger in every thermonuclear weapon and the reactions in the (generally uranium-238) casing added as a fission yield "booster" produce a witch's brew of radioactive products, which are also entrained in the cloud. Each such product, or radioisotope, has a characteristic "half-life" (defined as the time to decay to half its original level of radioactivity). Most of the radioisotopes have very short half-lives and decay in hours to days. Particles injected into the stratosphere, mainly by high-yield explosions, fall out very slowly—characteristically in about a year, by which time most of the fission products, even when concentrated, will have decayed to much safer levels. Particles injected into the troposphere by low-yield explosions and fires fall out more rapidly—by gravitational settling, rainout, convection, and other processes—before the radioactivity has decayed to moderately safe levels. Thus rapid fallout of tropospheric radioactive debris tends to produce larger doses of ionizing radiation than does the slower fallout of radioactive particles from the stratosphere.

Nuclear explosions of more than one-megaton yield generate a radiant fireball that rises through the troposphere into the stratosphere. The fireballs from weapons with yields between 100 kilotons and one megaton will partially extend into the stratosphere. The high temperatures in the fireball chemically ignite some of the nitrogen in the air, producing oxides of nitrogen, which in turn chemically attack and destroy the gas ozone in the middle stratosphere. But ozone absorbs the biologically dangerous ultraviolet radiation from the Sun. Thus the partial depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, or "ozonosphere," by high-yield nuclear explosions will increase the flux of solar ultraviolet radiation at the surface of the Earth (after the soot and dust have settled out). After a nuclear war in which thousands of high-yield weapons are detonated, the increase in biologically dangerous ultraviolet light might be several hundred percent. In the more dangerous shorter wavelengths, larger increases would occur. Nucleic acids and proteins, the fundamental molecules for life on Earth, are especially sensitive to ultraviolet radiation. Thus, an increase of the solar ultraviolet flux at the surface of the Earth is potentially dangerous for life.

These four effects—obscuring smoke in the troposphere, obscuring dust in the stratosphere, the fallout of radioactive debris, and the partial destruction of the ozone layer—constitute the four known principal adverse environmental consequences that occur after a nuclear war is "over." There may be others about which we are still ignorant. The dust and, especially, the dark soot absorb ordinary visible light from the Sun, heating the atmosphere and cooling the Earth's surface.

All four of these effects have been treated in our recent scientific investigation.[9] The study, known from the initials of its authors as TTAPS, for the first time demonstrates that severe and prolonged low temperatures would follow a nuclear war. (The study also explains the fact that no such climatic effects were detected after the detonation of hundreds of megatons during the period of U.S.-Soviet atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, ended by treaty in 1963: the explosions were sequential over many years, not virtually simultaneous; and, occurring over scrub desert, coral atolls, tundra and wasteland, they set no fires.) The new results have been subjected to detailed scrutiny, and half a dozen confirmatory calculations have now been made. A special panel appointed by the National Academy of Sciences to examine this problem has come to similar conclusions.[10]

Unlike many previous studies, the effects do not seem to be restricted to northern mid-latitudes, where the nuclear exchange would mainly take place. There is now substantial evidence that the heating by sunlight of atmospheric dust and soot over northern mid-latitude targets would profoundly change the global circulation. Fine particles would be transported across the equator in weeks, bringing the cold and the dark to the Southern Hemisphere. (In addition, some studies suggest that over 100 megatons would be dedicated to equatorial and Southern Hemisphere targets, thus generating fine particles locally.)[11] While it would be less cold and less dark at the ground in the Southern Hemisphere than in the Northern, massive climatic and environmental disruptions may be triggered there as well.

In our studies, several dozen different scenarios were chosen, covering a wide range of possible wars, and the range of uncertainty in each key parameter was considered (e.g., to describe how many fine particles are injected into the atmosphere). Five representative cases are shown in Table 1, below, ranging from a small low-yield attack exclusively on cities, utilizing, in yield, only 0.8 percent of the world strategic arsenals, to a massive exchange involving 75

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[9] R. P. Turco, *et al., loc. cit.* footnote 1.

[10] National Academy of Sciences, 1983, *loc. cit.* footnote 5.

[11] J. Peterson, *op. cit.* footnote 6.

TABLE 1

NUCLEAR EXCHANGE SCENARIOS

Case	Total Yield (MT)	% Yield Surface Bursts	% Yield Urban or Industrial Targets	Warhead Yield Range (MT)	Total Number of Explosions
1. Baseline Case, countervalue and counterforce(a)	5,000	57	20	0.1–10	10,400
11. 3,000 MT nominal, counterforce only(b)	3,000	50	0	1 –10	2,250
14. 100 MT nominal, countervalue only(c)	100	0	100	0.1	1,000
16. 5000 MT "severe," counterforce only(b, d)	5,000	100	0	5 –10	700
17. 10,000 MT "severe," countervalue and counterforce(c, d)	10,000	63	15	0.1–10	16,160

a. In the Baseline Case, 12,000 square kilometers of inner cities are burned; on every square centimeter an average of 10 grams of combustibles are burned, and 1.1% of the burned material rises as smoke. Also, 230,000 square kilometers of suburban areas burn, with 1.5 grams consumed at each square centimeter and 3.6% rising as smoke.

b. In this highly conservative case, it is assumed that no smoke emission occurs, that not a blade of grass is burned. Only 25,000 tons of the fine dust is raised into the upper atmosphere for every megaton exploded.

c. In contrast to the Baseline Case, only inner cities burn, but with 10 grams per square centimeter consumed and 3.3% rising as smoke into the high atmosphere.

d. Here, the fine (submicron) dust raised into the upper atmosphere is 150,000 tons per megaton exploded.

percent of the world arsenals. "Nominal" cases assume the most probable parameter choices; "severe" cases assume more adverse parameter choices, but still in the plausible range.

Predicted continental temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere vary after the nuclear war according to the curves shown in Figure 1 on the following page. The high heat-retention capacity of water guarantees that oceanic temperatures will fall at most by a few degrees. Because temperatures are moderated by the adjacent oceans, temperature effects in coastal regions will be less extreme than in continental interiors. The temperatures shown in Figure 1 are average values for Northern Hemisphere land areas.

Even much smaller temperature declines are known to have serious consequences. The explosion of the Tambora volcano in Indonesia in 1815 led to an average global temperature decline of only 1°C, due to the obscuration of sunlight by the fine dust propelled into the stratosphere; yet the hard freezes the following year were so severe that 1816 has been known in Europe and America as "the year without a summer." A 1°C cooling would



FIGURE 1

TEMPERATURE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR CASES

NOTE: In this Figure, the average temperature of Northern Hemisphere land areas (away from coastlines) is shown varying with time after the five Cases of nuclear war defined in Table 1. The "ambient" temperature is the average in the Northern Hemisphere over all latitudes and seasons: thus, normal winter temperatures at north temperature latitudes are lower than is shown, and normal tropical temperatures are higher than shown. Cases described as "nominal" assume the most likely values of parameters (such as dust particle size or the frequency of firestorms) that are imperfectly known. Cases marked "severe" represent adverse but not implausible values of these parameters. In Case 14 the curve ends when the temperatures come within a degree of the ambient values. For the four other Cases the curves are shown ending after 300 days, but this is simply because the calculations were not extended further. In these four Cases the curves will continue to the directions they are headed.

nearly eliminate wheat growing in Canada.[12] In the last thousand years, the maximum global or Northern Hemisphere temperature deviations have been around 1°C. In an Ice Age, a typical long-term temperature decline from preexisting conditions is about 10°C. Even the most modest of the cases illustrated in Figure 1 give temporary temperature declines of this order. The Baseline Case is much more adverse. Unlike the situation in an Ice Age, however, the global temperatures after nuclear war plunge rapidly and take only months to a few years to recover, rather than thousands of years. No new Ice Age is likely to be induced by a Nuclear Winter.

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[12] National Academy of Sciences, 1975, *op. cit.* footnote 5.

Because of the obscuration of the Sun, the daytime light levels can fall to a twilit gloom or worse. For more than a week in the northern mid-latitude target zone, it might be much too dark to see, even at midday. In Cases 1 and 14 (Table 1), hemispherically averaged light levels fall to a few percent of normal values, comparable to those at the bottom of a dense overcast. At this illumination, many plants are close to what is called the compensation point, the light level at which photosynthesis can barely keep pace with plant metabolism. In Case 17, illumination, averaged over the entire Northern Hemisphere, falls in daytime to about 0.1 percent of normal, a light level at which plants will not photosynthesize at all. For Cases 1 and especially 17, full recovery to ordinary daylight takes a year or more (Figure 1).

As the fine particles fall out of the atmosphere, carrying radioactivity to the ground, the light levels increase and the surface warms. The depleted ozone layer now permits ultraviolet light to reach the Earth's surface in increased proportions. The relative timing of the multitude of adverse consequences of a nuclear war is shown in Table 2, on the following page.

Perhaps the most striking and unexpected consequence of our study is that even a comparatively small nuclear war can have devastating climatic consequences, provided cities are targeted (see Case 14 in Figure 1; here, the centers of 100 major NATO and Warsaw Pact cities are burning). There is an indication of a very rough threshold at which severe climatic consequences are triggered—around a few hundred nuclear explosions over cities, for smoke generation, or around 2,000 to 3,000 high-yield surface bursts at, e.g., missile silos, for dust generation and ancillary fires. Fine particles can be injected into the atmosphere at increasing rates with only minor effects until these thresholds are crossed. Thereafter, the effects rapidly increase in severity.[13]

As in all calculations of this complexity, there are uncertainties. Some factors tend to work towards more severe or more prolonged effects; others tend to ameliorate the effects.[14] The detailed TTAPS calculations described here are one-dimensional; that is, they assume the fine particles to move vertically by all the appropriate

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[13] The climatic threshold for smoke in the troposphere is about 100 million metric tons, injected essentially all at once; for sub-micron fine dust in the stratosphere, about the same.

[14] The slow warming of the Earth due to a CO_2 greenhouse effect attendant to the burning of fossil fuels should not be thought of as tempering the nuclear winter: the greenhouse temperature increments are too small and too slow.


Time After Nuclear War
1 hr
1 day
1 wk
1 mo
3 mo
6 mo
1 yr
2 yr
5 yr
10 yr
?

Effect	U.S. / S.U. Population at risk	N.H. Population at risk	S.H. Population at risk	Casualty rate for those at risk	Potential global deaths
Blast	H	M	L	H	M - H
Thermal Radiation	H	M	L	M	M - H
Prompt Ionizing Radiation	L	L	L	H	L - M
Fires	M	M	L	M	M
Toxic Gases	M	M	L	L	L
Dark	H	H	M	L	L
Cold	H	H	H	H	M - H
Frozen Water Supplies	H	H	M	M	M
Fallout Ionizing Radiation	H	H	L - M	M	M - H
Food Shortages	H	H	H	H	H
Medical System Collapse	H	H	M	M	M
Contagious Diseases	M	M	L	H	M
Epidemics and Pandemics	H	H	M	M	M
Psychiatric Disorders	H	H	L	L	L - M
Increased Surface Ultraviolet Light	H	H	M	L	L
Synergisms	?	?	?	?	?

TABLE 2

EFFECTS OF THE BASELINE NUCLEAR WAR

NOTE: This is a schematic representation of the time scale for the effects, which are most severe when the thickness of the horizontal bar is greatest. The columns at the right indicate the degree of risk of the populations of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Northern Hemisphere, and the Southern Hemisphere—with H, M, and L standing for High, Medium, and Low respectively.

laws of physics, but neglect the spreading in latitude and longitude. When soot or dust is moved away from the reference locale, things get better there and worse elsewhere. In addition, fine particles can be transported by weather systems to other locales, where they are carried more rapidly down to the surface. That would ameliorate obscuration not just locally but globally. It is just this transport away from the northern mid-latitudes that involves the equatorial zone and the Southern Hemisphere in the effects of the nuclear war. It would be helpful to perform an accurate three-dimensional calculation on the general atmospheric circulation following a nuclear war. Preliminary estimates suggest that circulation might moderate the low temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere predicted in our calculations by some 30 percent, lessening somewhat the severity of the effects, but still leaving them at catastrophic levels (e.g., a 30°C rather than a 40°C temperature drop). To provide a small margin of safety, we neglect this correction in our subsequent discussion.

There are also effects that tend to make the results much worse: for example, in our calculations we assumed that rainout of fine particles occurred through the entire troposphere. But under realistic circumstances, at least the upper troposphere may be very dry, and any dust or soot carried there initially may take much longer to fall out. There is also a very significant effect deriving from the drastically altered structure of the atmosphere, brought about by the heating of the clouds and the cooling of the surface. This produces a region in which the temperature is approximately constant with altitude in the lower atmosphere and topped by a massive temperature inversion. Particles throughout the atmosphere would then be transported vertically very slowly—as in the present stratosphere. This is a second reason why the lifetime of the clouds of soot and dust may be much longer than we have calculated. If so, the worst of the cold and the dark might be prolonged for considerable periods of time, conceivably for more than a year. We also neglect this effect in subsequent discussion.

Nuclear war scenarios are possible that are much worse than the ones we have presented. For example, if command and control capabilities are lost early in the war—by, say, "decapitation" (an early surprise attack on civilian and military headquarters and communications facilities)—then the war conceivably could be extended for weeks as local commanders make separate and uncoordinated decisions. At least some of the delayed missile launches could be retaliatory strikes against any remaining adversary cities. Generation of an additional smoke pall over a period of weeks or longer following the initiation of the war would extend the magnitude, but especially the duration of the climatic consequences. Or it is possible that more cities and forests would be ignited than we have assumed, or that smoke emissions would be larger, or that a greater fraction of the world arsenals would be committed. Less severe cases are of course possible as well.

These calculations therefore are not, and cannot be, assured prognostications of the full consequences of a nuclear war. Many refinements in them are possible and are being pursued. But there is general agreement on the overall conclusions: in the wake of a nuclear war there is likely to be a period, lasting at least for months, of extreme cold in a radioactive gloom, followed—after the soot and dust fall out—by an extended period of increased ultraviolet light reaching the surface.[15]

We now explore the biological impact of such an assault on the global environment.

III

The immediate human consequences of nuclear explosions range from vaporization of populations near the hypocenter, to blast-generated trauma (from flying glass, falling beams, collapsing skyscrapers and the like), to burns, radiation sickness, shock and severe psychiatric disorders. But our concern here is with longer-term effects.

It is now a commonplace that in the burning of modern tall buildings, more people succumb to toxic gases than to fire. Ignition of many varieties of building materials, insulation and fabrics generates large amounts of such pyrotoxins, including carbon monoxide, cyanides, vinyl chlorides, oxides of nitrogen, ozone, dioxins, and furans. Because of differing practices in the use of such synthetics, the burning of cities in North America and Western Europe will probably generate more pyrotoxins than cities in the Soviet Union, and cities with substantial recent construction more than older, unreconstructed cities. In nuclear war scenarios in which a great many cities are burning, a significant pyrotoxin smog might persist for months. The magnitude of this danger is unknown.

The pyrotoxins, low light levels, radioactive fallout, subsequent ultraviolet light, and especially the cold are together likely to destroy almost all of Northern Hemisphere agriculture, even for the more modest Cases 11 and 14. A 12° to 15°C temperature reduction by itself would eliminate wheat and corn production in the United States, even if all civil systems and agricultural technology were intact.[16] With unavoidable societal disruption, and with the other environmental stresses just mentioned, even a 3,000-megaton "pure" counterforce attack (Case 11) might suffice. Realistically, many fires would be set even in such an attack (see below), and a 3,000-megaton war is likely to wipe out U.S. grain production. This would represent by itself an unprecedented global catastrophe: North American grain is the principal reliable source of export food on the planet, as well as an essential component of U.S. prosperity. Wars just before harvesting of grain and other staples would be incrementally worse than wars after harvesting. For many scenarios, the effects will extend (see Figure 2) into two or more growing seasons. Widespread fires and subsequent runoff of topsoil are among the many additional deleterious consequences extending for years after the war.

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[15] These results are dependent on important work by a large number of scientists who have previously examined aspects of this subject; many of these workers are acknowledged in the articles cited in footnote 1.

[16] David Pimentel and Mark Sorrells, private communication, 1983.

Something like three-quarters of the U.S. population lives in or near cities. In the cities themselves there is, on average, only about one week's supply of food. After a nuclear war it is conceivable that enough of present grain storage might survive to maintain, on some level, the present population for more than a year. But with the breakdown of civil order and transportation systems in the cold, the dark and the fallout, these stores would become largely inaccessible. Vast numbers of survivors would soon starve to death.

In addition, the sub-freezing temperatures imply, in many cases, the unavailability of fresh water. The ground will tend to be frozen to a depth of about a meter—incidentally making it unlikely that the hundreds of millions of dead bodies would be buried, even if the civil organization to do so existed. Fuel stores to melt snow and ice would be in short supply, and ice surfaces and freshly fallen snow would tend to be contaminated by radioactivity and pyrotoxins.

In the presence of excellent medical care, the average value of the acute lethal dose of ionizing radiation for healthy adults is about 450 rads. (As with many other effects, children, the infirm and the elderly tend to be more vulnerable.) Combined with the other assaults on survivors in the postwar environment, and in the probable absence of any significant medical care, the mean lethal acute dose is likely to decline to 350 rads or even lower. For many outdoor scenarios, doses within the fallout plumes that drift hundreds of kilometers downwind of targets are greater than the mean lethal dose. (For a 10,000-megaton war, this is true for more than 30 percent of northern mid-latitude land areas.) Far from targets, intermediate-timescale chronic doses from delayed radioactive fallout may be in excess of 100 rads for the baseline case. These calculations assume no detonations on nuclear reactors or fuel-reprocessing plants, which would increase the dose.

Thus, the combination of acute doses from prompt radioactive fallout, chronic doses from the delayed intermediate-timescale fallout, and internal doses from food and drink are together likely to kill many more by radiation sickness. Because of acute damage to bone marrow, survivors would have significantly increased vulnerability to infectious diseases. Most infants exposed to 100 rads as fetuses in the first two trimesters of pregnancy would suffer mental retardation and/or other serious birth defects. Radiation and some pyrotoxins would later produce neoplastic diseases and genetic damage. Livestock and domesticated animals, with fewer resources, vanishing food supplies and in many cases with greater sensitivity to the stresses of nuclear war than human beings, would also perish in large numbers.

These devastating consequences for humans and for agriculture would not be restricted to the locales in which the war would principally be "fought," but would extend throughout northern mid-latitudes and, with reduced but still significant severity, probably to the tropics and the Southern Hemisphere. The bulk of the world's grain exports originate in northern mid-latitudes. Many nations in the developing as well as the developed world depend on the import of food. Japan, for example, imports 75 percent of its food (and 99 percent of its fuel). Thus, even if there were no climatic and radiation stresses on tropical and Southern Hemisphere societies—many of them already at subsistence levels of nutrition—large numbers of people there would die of starvation.

As agriculture breaks down worldwide (possible initial exceptions might include Argentina, Australia and South Africa if the climatic impact on the Southern Hemisphere proved to be minimal), there will be increasing reliance on natural ecosystems--fruits, tubers, roots, nuts, etc. But wild foodstuffs will also have suffered from the effects of the war. At just the moment that surviving humans turn to the natural environment for the basis of life, that environment would be experiencing a devastation unprecedented in recent geological history.

Two-thirds of all species of plants, animals, and microorganisms on the Earth live within 25° of the equator. Because temperatures tend to vary with the seasons only minimally at tropical latitudes, species there are especially vulnerable to rapid temperature declines. In past major extinction events in the paleontological record, there has been a marked tendency for tropical organisms to show greater vulnerability than organisms living at more temperate latitudes.

The darkness alone may cause a collapse in the aquatic food chain in which sunlight is harvested by phytoplankton, phytoplankton by zooplankton, zooplankton by small fish, small fish by large fish, and, occasionally, large fish by humans. In many nuclear war scenarios, this food chain is likely to collapse at its base for at least a year and is significantly more imperiled in tropical waters. The increase in ultraviolet light available at the surface of the earth approximately a year after the war provides an additional major environmental stress that by itself has been described as having "profound consequences" for aquatic, terrestrial and other ecosystems.[17]

The global ecosystem can be considered an intricately woven fabric composed of threads contributed by the millions of separate species that inhabit the planet and interact with the air, the water and the soil. The system has developed considerable resiliency, so that pulling a single thread is unlikely to unravel the entire fabric. Thus, most ordinary assaults on the biosphere are unlikely to have catastrophic consequences. For example, because of natural small changes in stratospheric ozone abundance, organisms have probably experienced, in the fairly recent geologic past, ten percent fluctuations in the solar near-ultraviolet flux (but not fluctuations by factors of two or more). Similarly, major continental temperature changes of the magnitude and extent addressed here may not have been experienced for tens of thousands and possibly not for millions of years. We have no experimental information, even for aquaria or terraria, on the simultaneous effects of cold, dark, pyrotoxins, ionizing radiation, and ultraviolet light as predicted in the TTAPS study.

Each of these factors, taken separately, may carry serious consequences for the global ecosystem: their interactions may be much more dire still. Extremely worrisome is the possibility of poorly understood or as yet entirely uncontemplated synergisms (where the net consequences of two or more assaults on the environment are much more than the sum of the component parts). For example, more than 100 rads (and possibly more than 200 rads) of external and ingested ionizing radiation is likely to be delivered in a very large nuclear war to all plants, animals and unprotected humans in densely populated regions of northern mid-latitudes. After the soot and dust clear, there can, for such wars, be a 200 to 400 percent increment in the solar ultraviolet flux that reaches the ground, with an increase of many orders of magnitude in the more dangerous shorter-wavelength radiation. Together, these radiation assaults are likely to suppress the immune systems of humans and other species, making them more vulnerable to disease. At the same time, the high ambient-radiation fluxes are likely to produce, through mutation, new varieties of microorganisms, some of which might become pathogenic. The preferential radiation sensitivity of birds and other insect predators would enhance the proliferation of herbivorous and pathogen-carrying insects. Carried by vectors with high radiation tolerance, it seems possible that epidemics and global pandemics would propagate with no hope of effective mitigation by medical care, even with reduced population sizes and greatly restricted human mobility. Plants, weakened by low temperatures and low light levels, and other animals would likewise be vulnerable to preexisting and newly arisen pathogens.

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[17] C. H. Kruger, R. B. Setlow, *et al.*, *Causes and Effects of Stratospheric Ozone Reduction: An Update*, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1982.

There are many other conceivable synergisms, all of them still poorly understood because of the complexity of the global ecosystem. Every synergism represents an additional assault, of unknown magnitude, on the global ecosystem and its support functions for humans. What the world would look like after a nuclear war depends in part upon the unknown synergistic interaction of these various adverse effects.

We do not and cannot know that the worst would happen after a nuclear war. Perhaps there is some as yet undiscovered compensating effect or saving grace—although in the past, the overlooked effects in studies of nuclear war have almost always tended toward the worst. But in an uncertain matter of such gravity, it is wise to contemplate the worst, especially when its probability is not extremely small. The summary of the findings of the group of 40 distinguished biologists who met in April 1983 to assess the TTAPS conclusions is worthy of careful consideration:[18]

> Species extinction could be expected for most tropical plants and animals, and for most terrestrial vertebrates of north temperate regions, a large number of plants, and numerous freshwater and some marine organisms. . . . Whether any people would be able to persist for long in the face of highly modified biological communities; novel climates; high levels of radiation; shattered agricultural, social, and economic systems; extraordinary psychological stresses; and a host of other difficulties is open to question. It is clear that the ecosystem effects *alone* resulting from a large-scale thermonuclear war could be enough to destroy the current civilization in at least the Northern Hemisphere. Coupled with the direct casualties of perhaps two billion people, the combined intermediate and long-term effects of nuclear war suggest that eventually there might be no human survivors in the Northern Hemisphere.
>
> Furthermore, the scenario described here is by no means the most severe that could be imagined with present world nuclear arsenals and those contemplated for the near future. In almost any realistic case involving nuclear exchanges between the superpowers, global environmental changes sufficient to cause an extinction event equal to or more severe than that at the close of the Cretaceous when the dinosaurs and many other species died out are likely. In that event, the possibility of the extinction of *Homo sapiens* cannot be excluded.

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[18] P. Ehrlich, *et al.*, *loc. cit.* footnote 1.

IV

The foregoing probable consequences of various nuclear war scenarios have implications for doctrine and policy. Some have argued that the difference between the deaths of several hundred million people in a nuclear war (as has been thought until recently to be a reasonable upper limit) and the death of every person on Earth (as now seems possible) is only a matter of one order of magnitude. For me, the difference is considerably greater. Restricting our attention only to those who die as a consequence of the war conceals its full impact.

If we are required to calibrate extinction in numerical terms, I would be sure to include the number of people in future generations who would not be born. A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people.

There are many other possible measures of the potential loss—including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise.

For me, the new results on climatic catastrophe raise the stakes of nuclear war enormously. But I recognize that there are those, including some policymakers, who feel that the increased level of fatalities has little impact on policy, but who nevertheless acknowledge that the newly emerging consequences of nuclear war may require changes in specific points of strategic doctrine. I here set down what seem to me some of the more apparent such implications, within the context of present nuclear stockpiles. The idea of a crude threshold, very roughly around 500 to 2,000 warheads, for triggering the climatic catastrophe will be central to some of these considerations. (Such a threshold applies only to something like the present distribution of yields in the strategic arsenals. Drastic conversion to very low-yield arsenals—see below—changes some of the picture dramatically.) I hope others will constructively examine these preliminary thoughts and explore additional implications of the TTAPS results.

1. *First Strike*. The MIRVing of missiles (the introduction of mul-

tiple warheads), improvements in accuracy, and other developments have increased the perceived temptation to launch a devastating first strike against land targets—even though both sides retain a powerful retaliatory force in airborne bombers and submarines at sea. Much current concern and national rhetoric is addressed to the first-strike capability of extant or proposed weapons systems. The mere capability of a first strike creates incentives for a preemptive attack. Launch-on-warning and simultaneous release of all strategic weapons are two of several ominous and destabilizing innovations contrived in response to the fear of a first strike.

The number of U.S. land-based strategic missiles is about 1,050; for the Soviet Union, about 1,400. In addition, each side has at least several dozen dedicated and alternative strategic bomber bases and airstrips, as well as command and control facilities, submarine ports and other prime strategic targets on land. Each target requires—for high probability of its destruction—two or perhaps three attacking warheads. Thus, a convincing first strike against land targets requires at least 2,200 and perhaps as many as 4,500 attacking warheads. Some—for example, to disable bombers that succeed in becoming airborne just before the first strike—would detonate as airbursts. While many missile silos, especially in the United States, are surrounded by farmland and brush, other strategic targets, especially in Europe and Asia, are sufficiently near forests or urban areas for major conflagrations to be set, even in a "pure" counterforce attack. Accordingly, a major first strike would be clearly in the vicinity of, and perhaps well over, the climatic threshold.

A counterforce first strike is unlikely to be completely effective. Perhaps 10 to 40 percent of the adversary's silos and most of its airborne bombers and submarines at sea will survive, and *its* response may not be against silos, but against cities. Ten percent of a 5,000-warhead strategic arsenal is 500 warheads: distributed over cities, this seems by itself enough to trigger a major climatic catastrophe.

Such a first strike scenario, in which the danger to the aggressor nation depends upon the unpredictable response of the attacked nation, seems risky enough. (The hope for the aggressor nation is that its retained second-strike force, including strategic submarines and unlaunched land-based missiles, will intimidate the adversary into surrender rather than provoke it into retaliation.) But the decision to launch a first strike that is tantamount to national suicide for the aggressor—*even if the attacked nation does not lift a finger to retaliate*—is a different circumstance altogether. If a first strike gains no more than a pyrrhic victory of ten days' duration before the prevailing winds carry the nuclear winter to the aggressor nation, the "attractiveness" of the first strike would seem to be diminished significantly.

A Doomsday Machine is useless if the potential adversary is ignorant of its presence.[19] But since many distinguished scientists, both American and Soviet, have participated vigorously in recent studies of the climatic consequences of nuclear war, since there appears to be no significant disagreement in the conclusions, and since policymakers will doubtless be apprised of these new results, it would appear that a decision to launch a major first strike is now much less rational, and therefore, perhaps, much less probable. The better political leaders understand the nuclear winter, the more secure are such conclusions.

If true, this should have cascading consequences for specific weapons systems. Further, the perceived vulnerability to a first strike has been a major source of stress and fear, and thereby a major spur to the nuclear arms race. Knowledge that a first strike is now less probable might make at least some small contribution to dissipating the poisonous atmosphere of mistrust that currently characterizes Soviet-American relations.

2. *Sub-threshold War.* Devastating nuclear wars that are nevertheless significantly below the threshold for severe climatic consequences certainly seem possible—for example, the destruction of 10 or 20 cities, or 100 silos of a particularly destabilizing missile system. Nevertheless, might some nation be tempted to initiate or engage in a much larger, but still reliably sub-threshold nuclear war? The hope might be that the attacked adversary would be reluctant to retaliate for fear of crossing the threshold.

This is not very different from the hope that a counterforce first strike would not be followed by a retaliatory strike, because of the aggressor's retention of an invulnerable (for example, submarine-based) second-strike force adequate to destroy populations and national economies. It suffers the same deficiency—profound uncertainty about the likely response.

The strategic forces of the United States or the Soviet Union—even if they were all at fixed sites—could not be destroyed in a reliably sub-threshold war: there are too many essential targets. Thus, a sub-threshold first strike powerfully provokes the attacked nation and leaves much of its retaliatory force untouched. It is easy to imagine a nation, having contemplated becoming the object of a sub-threshold first strike, planning to respond in kind, because it judges that failure to do so would itself invite attack. Retaliation could occur immediately against a few key cities—if national leaders were restrained and command and control facilities intact—or massively, months later, after much of the dust and smoke have fallen out, extending the duration but ameliorating the severity of the net climatic effects.

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[19] The term "Doomsday Machine" is due to Herman Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable,* New York: Horizon Press, 1962.

This, however, may not be the case for such nations as Britain, France or China. Because of the marked contiguity of strategic targets and urban areas in Europe, the climatic threshold for attacks on European nuclear powers may be significantly less than for the United States or the Soviet Union. Provided it could be accomplished without triggering a U.S.-Soviet nuclear war, first strikes against all the fixed-site strategic forces of one of these nations might not trigger the climatic catastrophe. Nevertheless, the invulnerable retaliatory capability of these nations—especially the ballistic-missile submarines of Britain and France—makes such a first strike unlikely.

3. *Treaties on Yields and Targeting*. I would not include this possibility, except that it has been mentioned publicly by a leading American nuclear strategist. The proposal has two parts. The first is to ban by treaty all nuclear warheads with yields in excess of 300 or 400 kilotons. The fireballs from warheads of higher yields mainly penetrate into the stratosphere and work to deplete the ozonosphere.

The reconversion of nuclear warheads to lower individual yields would reduce (although not remove) the threat of significantly enhanced ultraviolet radiation at the surface of the Earth, but would in itself have no bearing on the issue of climatic catastrophe, and would increase the intermediate-timescale radioactive fallout. Within the present strategic arsenals, there is no mix of yields that simultaneously minimizes ionizing radiation from fallout and ultraviolet radiation from the Sun.

As delivery system accuracy has progressively improved, there has been a corresponding tendency toward the deployment of lower-yield warheads, although not through any concern about the integrity of the ozonosphere. There is also a trend toward higher fission fractions, implying more radioactive fallout. Limitations on the sizes and therefore, to some extent, on the yields of new warheads are part of recent U.S. arms control proposals. With the bulk of Soviet strategic warheads having yields larger than their U.S. counterparts, however, treaties limiting high yields place greater demands on Soviet than on U.S. compliance. Moreover, to enforce a categorical yield ceiling seems to imply verification problems of some difficulty.

The second part of the proposal is to guarantee by treaty that cities would not be targeted. Then the worst of the climatic effects might be avoided, although the climatic consequences of "pure" counterforce exchanges can still be extremely serious (Figure 1). The encoding of targeting coordinates, however, is in principle done remotely, and involves different coordinates for each warhead. Even if we could imagine international inspection teams descending unannounced on Soviet or American missile silos to inspect the targeting coordinates, an hour later the coordinates could be returned to those appropriate for cities.

Targeting policy is among the most sensitive aspects of nuclear strategy, and maintaining uncertainty about targeting policy is thought to be an essential component of U.S. deterrence. The proposal is unlikely to be received warmly by the U.S. Joint Strategic Targeting Staff or its Soviet counterpart. It is also difficult to understand how those skeptical of the verifiability by reconnaissance satellites of SALT II provisions on the deployment of missiles ten meters long can rest easy about verification of treaties controlling what is encoded in a microchip one millimeter long. Nevertheless, a symbolic, unverifiable targeting treaty, entered into because both sides recognize that it is not in their interest to target cities, might have some merit.

4. *Transition to Low-Yield High-Accuracy Arsenals.* A conceivable response to the prospect of climatic catastrophe might be to continue present trends toward lower-yield and higher-accuracy missiles, perhaps accompanied by development of the technology for warheads to burrow sub-surface before detonating. Payloads have been developed for the Pershing II missile that use radar area-correlators for target recognition and terminal guidance; the targeting probable error is said to be 40 meters.[20] It is evident that a technology is gradually emerging that could permit delivery accuracies of 35 meters or better over intercontinental ranges.

It is evident as well that burrowing technology is also under rapid development.[21] A one-kiloton burst, two to three meters sub-surface, will excavate a crater roughly 60 meters across.[22] Clearly, high-accuracy penetrating warheads in the one-to-ten-kiloton range would be able, with high reliability, to destroy even very hardened silos and underground command posts.

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[20] *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, May 15, 1978, p. 225.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] S. Glasstone and P. J. Dolan, *op. cit.* footnote 2.

Low-yield sub-surface explosions of this sort cannot threaten the ozonosphere. They minimize fires, soot, stratospheric dust and radioactive fallout. Even several thousand simultaneous such detonations might not trigger the nuclear winter. Similar technology might be used for pinpoint attacks on military/industrial targets in urban areas. Thus, the TTAPS results will probably lead to calls for further improvements in high-accuracy earth-burrowing warheads.

There are, I think, a number of difficulties with this proposal, as attractive as it seems in a strictly military context. A world in which the nuclear arsenals were completely converted to a relatively small number of burrowing low-yield warheads would be much safer in terms of the climatic catastrophe. But such warheads are provocative. They are the perfect post-TTAPS first-strike weapon. Their development might well be taken as a serious interest in making a climatically safe but disabling first strike. Greatly expanded deployment of anti-ballistic missiles might be one consequence of their buildup.

Retaliation from surviving silos, aircraft and especially submarines, as discussed above, is likely, whatever the disposition of yields in a first strike. Also, arsenals cannot be converted instantaneously. There would be a very dangerous and protracted transition period in which enough newer weapons are deployed to be destabilizing, and enough older weapons are still in place to trigger the nuclear winter.

However, if the inventories of modern higher-yield (more than ten kiloton) warheads were first brought below threshold, a coordinated U.S.-Soviet deployment of low-yield burrowers might be accomplished in somewhat greater safety. On many launchers, each with a single warhead, they might provide a useful reassurance to defense ministries at some points in the transition process. At any rate, the dramatic reduction of arsenals necessary to go below threshold before large-scale burrower deployment is indistinguishable from major arms reduction for its own sake (see below).

5. *Consequences for the Developing World.* Before the TTAPS calculations were performed, it was possible to argue that the developing world would be severely affected by secondary economic consequences, but not fundamentally destroyed by a northern mid-latitude nuclear war. Now it seems more likely that nations having no part in the conflict—even nations entirely neutral in the global confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union—might be reduced to prehistoric population levels and economies, or worse. Nations between 70°N and 30°S, nations with marginal economies, nations with large food imports or extensive malnutri-

tion today, and nations with their own strategic targets are particularly at risk.

Thus, the very survival of nations distant from any likely nuclear conflict can now be seen to depend on the prudence and wisdom of the major nuclear powers. India, Brazil, Nigeria or Saudi Arabia could collapse in a nuclear war without a single bomb being dropped on their territories.[23]

Quite apart from any concern about the deflection of world financial, technical and intellectual resources to the nuclear arms race, the prospect of nuclear war now clearly and visibly threatens every nation and every person on the planet. The diplomatic and economic pressure accordingly placed on the five nuclear powers by the other nations of the world, concerned about their own survival, could be at least marginally significant.

6. *Shelters*. The usual sorts of shelters envisioned for civilian populations are ineffective even for the nuclear war consequences known before the TTAPS study. The more ambitious among them include food and water for a week or two, modest heating capabilities, rudimentary sanitary and air filtration facilities and no provisions for the psychological burdens of an extended stay below ground with unknown climatic and ecological consequences propagating overhead. The kinds of shelters suitable for prolonged subfreezing temperatures, high radiation doses, and pyrotoxins would have to be very much more elaborate—quite apart from the question of what good it would be to emerge six or nine months later to an ultraviolet-bathed and biologically depauperate surface, with insect pests proliferating, disease rampant, and the basis of agriculture destroyed.

Appropriate shelters, able to service individual families or family groups for months to a year, are too expensive for most families even in the affluent West. The construction of major government shelters for civilian populations would be enormously expensive as well as in itself potentially destabilizing. The prospect of the climatic catastrophe also heightens the perceived inequity between government leaders and (in some cases) their families, provided elaborate shelters, and the bulk of the civilian population, unable to afford even a minimally adequate shelter.

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[23] The distribution of the coldest regions will vary with time and geography. In one recent but still very crude three-dimensional simulation of the nuclear winter, the temperature has, by 40 days after the war, dropped by 15 to more than 40 centigrade degrees over much of the globe, including a vast region extending from Chad to Novosibirsk, from the Caspian Sea to Sri Lanka, embracing India, Pakistan and western China, and having its most severe effects in Afghanistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. V. V. Alexandrov and G. L. Stenchikov, preprint, Computing Center, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1983.

But even if it were possible to build perfectly effective shelters for the entire populations of the United States and the Soviet Union, this would in no way address the danger to which the rest of the world would be put. Shelters for the combatant nations under circumstances in which only their citizens are threatened are one thing. Shelters for the combatant nations when gravely threatened noncombatant nations have only rudimentary or nonexistent shelters are a very different matter.

7. *Ballistic-Missile Defense Systems.* It might be argued that the prospect of a climatic catastrophe strengthens whatever arguments there may be for ground-based or space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, as proposed by President Reagan in his March 23, 1983 "Star Wars" speech. There are grave technical, cost and policy difficulties with such proposals.[24] Even advocates do not envision it being fully operational in less than two or three decades.

Optimistic informed estimates of porosity or "penetrance" (the fraction of attacking missiles successfully detonating at their targets despite the BMD) are no lower than 5 to 30 percent. The present world arsenal of strategic warheads is so much greater than the threshold for climatic catastrophe that, even if 5 to 30 percent of attacking missiles get through in something like a full exchange, the catastrophe could be triggered. And most competent estimates put the porosity—at least for the foreseeable future—at 50 percent to 99 percent. Further, one likely response to an adversary's anticipated deployment of BMD systems would be a proportionate increase in the stockpiles of offensive warheads in compensation.

There are three phases in the trajectories of incoming missiles when they might be attacked: boost phase, midcourse phase, and terminal phase. Boost-phase and midcourse interception would, at best, require an untried technology deployed at scales never before attempted. Only terminal-phase BMDs exist at the present time (anti-ballistic missiles or ABMs), and even they, ineffective as they are, may require ruinous capital investments before they can provide meaningful levels of defense. Developments in terminal-phase maneuverability of attacking warheads are likely to raise the price tag of an effective BMD sharply again. Even in the best of circumstances, offense will be more effective and less costly than defense.

Finally, terminal-phase interception, generally effective only for hard-target defense, is characteristically designed to occur at very low altitudes. There would be an advantage to the offense if it fused the incoming missiles so they would explode if attacked ("sympathetic detonation"). In some schemes, the BMD itself involves nuclear warheads exploded near the ground. A fair fraction of hard targets, especially in Europe and the Soviet Union, are within a few tens of kilometers of cities or forests. Thus, the most readily deployable BMD suffers the disability, when it works at all, of generating fires contributory to a climatic catastrophe, quite apart from its porosity.

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[24] Richard Garwin, testimony before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Congress, November 10. 1983; Hans Bethe, manuscript in preparation.

8. *Other Possibilities*. There are a number of other conceivable responses to the climatic catastrophe, some even more desperate than those discussed above. For example, a nation might relocate its silos and mobile launchers (the latter inviting barrage attack) to cities and forests to guarantee that a barely adequate counterforce first strike by its adversary would trigger a global climatic catastrophe with high confidence. Or nations with small nuclear arsenals or marginal strategic capability might contemplate amassing a threshold arsenal of some 500 to 2,000 deliverable warheads in order to be taken seriously in "great power" politics.

But these and similar contrivances increase the probability of nuclear war or the dangers attendant to nuclear war sufficiently that they are likely to be rejected by the nation contemplating such moves or, failing that, by other nations. Major relocations of strategic weapons systems or the deployment of new strategic arsenals are readily detectable by national technical means.

V

None of the foregoing possible strategic and policy responses to the prospect of a nuclear war-triggered climatic catastrophe seem adequate even for the security of the nuclear powers, much less for the rest of the world. The prospect reinforces, in the short run, the standard arguments for strategic confidence-building, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union; for tempering puerile rhetoric; for resisting the temptation to demonize the adversary; for reducing the likelihood of strategic confrontations arising from accident or miscalculation; for stabilizing old and new weapons systems—for example, by de-MIRVing missiles; for abandoning nuclear-war-fighting strategies and mistrusting the possibility of "containment" of a tactical or limited nuclear war; for considering safe unilateral steps, such as the retiring of some old weapons systems with very high-yield warheads; for improving communications at all levels, especially among general staffs and between heads of governments; and for public declarations of relevant policy changes. The United States might also contemplate ratification of SALT II and of the 1948 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (ratified by 92 nations, including the Soviet Union).

Both nations might consider abandoning apocalyptic threats and doctrines. To the extent that these are not credible, they undermine deterrence; to the extent that they are credible, they set in motion events that tend toward apocalyptic conclusions.

In the long run, the prospect of climatic catastrophe raises real questions about what is meant by national and international security. To me, it seems clear that the species is in grave danger at least until the world arsenals are reduced below the threshold for climatic catastrophe; the nations and the global civilization would remain vulnerable even at lower inventories. It may even be that, now, the only credible arsenal is below threshold. George Kennan's celebrated proposal[25] to reduce the world arsenals initially to 50 percent of their current numbers is recognized as hard enough to implement. But it would be only the first step toward what is now clearly and urgently needed—a more than 90-percent reduction (Kennan proposed an ultimate reduction of more than 84 percent—adequate for strategic deterrence, if that is considered essential, but unlikely to trigger the nuclear winter. Still further reductions could then be contemplated.

The detonation of weapons stockpiles near or above threshold would be, we can now recognize, in contravention of the 1977 Geneva Convention on The Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, signed by 48 nations and duly ratified by the Soviet Union and the United States.[26] And Article 6 of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires the United States and the Soviet Union, among other signatory states, "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. . . ." I do not imagine that these treaties can, by themselves, play a determining role in producing major reductions in the world strategic arsenals, but they establish some sense of international obligation and can at least expedite urgent bilateral and multilateral consultations.

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[25] George F. Kennan, "The Only Way Out of the Nuclear Nightmare," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 31, 1981. This is Kennan's acceptance speech for the Albert Einstein Peace Prize on May 19, 1981, in Washington, D.C.

[26] Article 1, paragraph 1, states: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to another State Party." Paragraph 2 goes on: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 . . ."

VI

We have, by slow and imperceptible steps, been constructing a Doomsday Machine. Until recently—and then, only by accident—no one even noticed. And we have distributed its triggers all over the Northern Hemisphere. Every American and Soviet leader since 1945 has made critical decisions regarding nuclear war in total ignorance of the climatic catastrophe. Perhaps this knowledge would have moderated the subsequent course of world events and, especially, the nuclear arms race. Today, at least, we have no excuse for failing to factor the catastrophe into long-term decisions on strategic policy.

Since it is the soot produced by urban fires that is the most sensitive trigger of the climatic catastrophe, and since such fires can be ignited even by low-yield strategic weapons, it appears that the most critical ready index of the world nuclear arsenals, in terms of climatic change, may be the total *number* of strategic warheads. (There is some dependence on yield, to be sure, and future very low-yield, high-accuracy burrowing warheads could destroy strategic targets without triggering the nuclear winter, as discussed above.) For other purposes there are other indices—numbers of submarine-launched warheads, throw-weight (net payload deliverable to target), total megatonnage, etc. From different choices of such indices, different conclusions about strategic parity can be drawn. In the total number of strategic warheads, however, the United States is "ahead" of the Soviet Union and always has been.

Very roughly, the level of the world strategic arsenals necessary to induce the climatic catastrophe seems to be somewhere around 500 to 2,000 warheads—an estimate that may be somewhat high for airbursts over cities, and somewhat low for high-yield groundbursts. The intrinsic uncertainty in this number is itself of strategic importance, and prudent policy would assume a value below the low end of the plausible range.

National or global inventories above this rough threshold move the world arsenals into a region that might be called the "Doomsday Zone." If the world arsenals were well below this rough threshold, no concatenation of computer malfunction, carelessness, unauthorized acts, communications failure, miscalculation and madness in high office could unleash the nuclear winter. When global arsenals are above the threshold, such a catastrophe is at least possible. The further above threshold we are, the more likely it is that a major exchange would trigger the climatic catastrophe.

Traditional belief and childhood experience teach that more weapons buy more security. But since the advent of nuclear weapons and the acquisition of a capacity for "overkill," the possibility has arisen that, past a certain point, more nuclear weapons do not increase national security. I wish here to suggest that, beyond the climatic threshold, an increase in the number of strategic weapons leads to a pronounced *decline* in national (and global) security. National security is not a zero-sum game. Strategic insecurity of one adversary almost always means strategic insecurity for the other. Conventional pre-1945 wisdom, no matter how deeply felt, is not an adequate guide in an age of apocalyptic weapons.

If we are content with world inventories above the threshold, we are saying that it is safe to trust the fate of our global civilization and perhaps our species to all leaders, civilian and military, of all present and future major nuclear powers; and to the command and control efficiency and technical reliability in those nations now and in the indefinite future. For myself, I would far rather have a world in which the climatic catastrophe cannot happen, independent of the vicissitudes of leaders, institutions and machines. This seems to me elementary planetary hygiene, as well as elementary patriotism.

Something like a thousand warheads (or a few hundred megatons) is of the same order as the arsenals that were publicly announced in the 1950s and 1960s as an unmistakable strategic deterrent, and as sufficient to destroy either the United States or the Soviet Union "irrecoverably." Considerably smaller arsenals would, with present improvements in accuracy and reliability, probably suffice. Thus it is possible to contemplate a world in which the global strategic arsenals are below threshold, where mutual deterrence is in effect to discourage the use of those surviving warheads, and where, in the unhappy event that some warheads are detonated, there is little likelihood of the climatic catastrophe.[27]

To achieve so dramatic a decline in the global arsenals will require not only heroic measures by both the United States and the Soviet Union—it will also require consistent action by Britain, France and China, especially when the U.S. and Soviet arsenals are significantly reduced. Currently proposed increments in the arsenals at least of France would bring that nation's warhead inventory near or above threshold. I have already remarked on the strategic instability, in the context of the climatic catastrophe only, of the warhead inventories of these nations. But if major cuts in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals were under way, it is not too much to hope that the other major powers would, after negotiations, follow suit. These considerations also underscore the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation to other nations, especially when the major inventories are in steep decline.

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[27] Since higher-yield tactical warheads can also be used to burn cities, and might do so inadvertently, especially in Europe, provision for their elimination should also eventually be made. But initial attention should be directed to strategic warheads and their delivery systems.

Figure 2, on the following page, illustrates the growth of the American and Soviet strategic inventories from 1945 to the present.[28] To minimize confusion in the Figure, the British, French and Chinese arsenals are not shown; they are, however, as just mentioned, significant on the new scale of climatically dangerous arsenals. We see from the Figure that the United States passed the Doomsday Threshold around 1953, and the Soviet Union not until about 1966. The largest disparity in the arsenals was in 1961 (a difference of some 6,000 warheads). At the present time the disparity is less than it has been in any year since 1955. A published extrapolation of the present strategic arsenals into 1985 is shown as dashed, nearly vertical lines, accommodating new U.S. (Pershing II, cruise, MX and Trident) and Soviet (SS-21, -22, -23) strategic systems. If these extrapolations are valid, the United States and the Soviet Union would have almost identical numbers of inventories by the late 1980s.

The uppermost (dash-dot) curve in Figure 2 shows the total U.S. and Soviet arsenals (essentially the world arsenals) climbing upward since about 1970 with a very steep slope, the slope steepening still more if the projection is valid. Such exponential or near-exponential runaways are expected in arms races where each side's rate of growth is proportional to its perception of the adversary's weapons inventory; but it is likewise clear that such rapid growth cannot

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[28] The total warheads calculated in Figure 2 include strategic and theater weapons, but not tactical weapons. Not all published sources are in perfect agreement on these numbers. The principal sources used here are the *Report of the Secretary of Defense [Harold Brown] to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget, FY 1983 Authorization Request* and *FY 1986 Defense Programs*, Washington: Department of Defense, 1981; and *National Defense Budget Estimates, FY 1983*, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, March 1982.

Beyond 1983, projected increases in arsenals are shown for U.S. and Soviet arsenals as nearly vertical dashed lines, with the sum of these arsenals as the line at the top of the Figure terminating in an arrowhead. The data are from Frank Barnaby in the special issue of *Ambio* cited in footnote 5, pp. 76–83. See also *Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces*, Congressional Budget Office, January 1978.

Figure 2 shows three regions: an upper region in which the nuclear winter could almost certainly be triggered; a lower region at which it could not be triggered; and a transition zone, shown shaded. The boundaries of this transition zone are more uncertain than shown, and depend among other things on targeting strategy. But the threshold probably lies between several hundred and a few thousand contempory strategic weapons.

FIGURE 2

PAST AND FUTURE NUCLEAR STOCKPILES



continue indefinitely. In all natural and human systems, such steep growth rates are eventually stopped, often catastrophically.

It is widely agreed—although different people have different justifications for this conclusion—that world arsenals must be reduced significantly. There is also general agreement, with a few demurrers, that at least the early and middle stages of a significant decline can be verified by national technical means and other procedures. The first stage of major arms reduction will have to overcome a new source of reluctance, when almost all silos could be reliably destroyed in a sub-threshold first strike. To overcome this reluctance, both sides will have prudently maintained an invulnerable retaliatory force, which itself would later move to sub-threshold levels. (It would even be advantageous to each nation to provide certain assistance in the development of such a force by the other.)

As arsenals are reduced still further, the fine tuning of the continuing decline may have to be worked out very carefully and with additional safeguards to guarantee continuing rough strategic parity. As threshold inventories are approached, some verifiable upper limits on yields as well as numbers would have to be worked out, to minimize the burning of cities if a nuclear conflict erupted. On the other hand, the deceleration of the arms race would have an inertia of its own, as the acceleration does; and successful first steps would create a climate conducive to subsequent steps.

There are three proposals now prominently discussed in the United States: Nuclear Freeze, Build-Down, and Deep Cuts. Their possible effects are diagrammed in Figure 2. They are by no means mutually exclusive, nor do they exhaust the possible approaches. A negotiated Freeze would at least prevent the continuing upward escalation in stockpiles, would forestall the deployment of more destabilizing systems, and would probably be accompanied by agreement on immediate annual phased reductions (the curved lines in the middle to late 1980s in Figure 2). To reduce the perceived temptation for a first strike, de-MIRVing of missiles during arms reduction may be essential.

The most commonly cited method of following the Freeze with reductions is incorporated in the Kennedy-Hatfield Freeze Resolution: percentage reductions. Under this approach, the two sides would agree on a percentage—often quoted as being between five percent and ten percent—and would agree to decrease deployed warheads by that percentage annually. The percentage reduction method was proposed to the Soviet Union by the United States at the Vienna Summit in June 1979 and was to be applied to the limits and sub-limits of the SALT II accords until these reached a reduction of 50 percent.

The Build-Down proposal is one in which modernization is permitted, but each side must pay a price in additional reductions of warheads for each warhead mounted on a modernized missile. In many current versions of the proposal, it would also require both sides to decrease their total warhead inventories by about five percent a year (again, the percentage annual reduction approach), to ensure that at least some reductions would take place even if modernization did not. The rate of decline for Build-Down illustrated in Figure 2 is essentially that of Representative Albert Gore (D.-Tenn.), in which rough parity at 8,500 warheads each is adopted as a goal for 1991–92, and the levels are reduced to 6,500 warheads each by 1997.[29]

There is concern that the "modernization" of strategic systems that Build-Down encourages might open the door to still more destabilizing weapons. It is also by no means clear that all proponents of Build-Down envision further reductions below the interim goal of about 5,000 warheads each for the United States and Soviet Union. If this rate of Build-Down continued indefinitely, the two nations would not cross back below threshold until about the year 2020. As dramatic a change from the present circumstances as this represents, in light of the present global crisis, it is, I think, too leisurely a pace.

Deep Cuts, originally advocated by George Kennan and Noel Gayler[30] as an initial halving of the global arsenals in some relatively short period of time, proposes the turning in of the fission triggers of thermonuclear weapons, deployed or undeployed, to a binational or multinational authority, with the triggers subsequently gainfully consumed in nuclear power plants (the ultimate in beating swords into plowshares). A highly schematic curve for something like Deep Cuts is also shown in Figure 2, starting from Gore's assumption of parity by 1991–92. Halving of the present global arsenals would then occur around 1995, and the global arsenals would return to below the Doomsday Threshold by the year 2000.

The actual shape of these declining curves would very likely have kinks and wiggles in them to accommodate the details of a bilaterally—and eventually multilaterally—agreed-upon plan to reduce the arsenals without compromising the security of any of the nuclear powers. The Deep Cuts curve shown has a rate of decline only about as steep as the rate of rise beginning in 1970. Much steeper declines may be feasible and should be considered.

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[29] *Congressional Record*, August 4, 1983, Vol. 129, No. 114.

[30] George F. Kennan, *loc. cit.* footnote 24; Noel Gayler, "How to Break the Momentum of the Nuclear Arms Race," *The New York Times Magazine*, April 25, 1982.

No one contends it will be easy to reverse the nuclear arms race. It is required at least for the same reasons that were used to justify the arms race in the first place—the national security of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is necessarily an enterprise of great magnitude. John Stuart Mill said: "Against a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small result. It produces no result at all." But if the same technical ingenuity, dedication and resources were devoted to the downward slopes in Figure 2 as to the upward slopes, there is no reason to doubt that it could be negotiated safely.

In the deployment of more stabilizing weapons systems, in the possible development—especially in later stages of arms reductions—of novel means of treaty verification, and (perhaps) in the augmentation of conventional armaments, it will, of course, be expensive.

But, given the stakes, a prudent nuclear power should be willing to spend more every year to defuse the arms race and prevent nuclear war than it does on all military preparedness. For comparison, in the United States the annual budget of the Department of Defense is about 10,000 times that of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, quite apart from any questions about the dedication and effectiveness of the ACDA. The equivalent disparity is even greater in many other nations. I believe that the technical side of guaranteeing a major multilateral and strategically secure global arms reduction can be devised and deployed for considerably less—perhaps even a factor of 100 less—than the planet's direct military expenditures of $540 billion per year.[31]

Such figures give some feeling for the chasm that separates a prudent policy in face of our present knowledge of nuclear war from the actual present policies of the nuclear powers. Likewise, nations far removed from the conflict, even nations with little or no investment in the quarrels among the nuclear powers, stand to be destroyed in a nuclear war, rather than benefiting from the mutual annihilation of the superpowers.. They too, one might think, would be wise to devote considerable resources to help ensure that nuclear war does not break out.

VII

In summary, cold, dark, radioactivity, pyrotoxins and ultraviolet light following a nuclear war—including some scenarios involving only a small fraction of the world strategic arsenals—would imperil every survivor on the planet. There is a real danger of the extinction of humanity. A threshold exists at which the climatic catastrophe could be triggered, very roughly around 500–2,000 strategic warheads. A major first strike may be an act of national suicide, even if no retaliation occurs. Given the magnitude of the potential loss, no policy declarations and no mechanical safeguards can adequately guarantee the safety of the human species. No national rivalry or ideological confrontation justifies putting the species at risk. Accordingly, there is a critical need for safe and verifiable reductions of the world strategic inventories to below threshold. At such levels, still adequate for deterrence, at least the worst could not happen should a nuclear war break out.

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[31] Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures*, Leesburg (Va.): World Priorities, 1983.

National security policies that seem prudent or even successful during a term of office or a tour of duty may work to endanger national—and global—security over longer periods of time. In many respects it is just such short-term thinking that is responsible for the present world crisis. The looming prospect of the climatic catastrophe makes short-term thinking even more dangerous. The past has been the enemy of the present, and the present the enemy of the future.

The problem cries out for an ecumenical perspective that rises above cant, doctrine and mutual recrimination, however apparently justified, and that at least partly transcends parochial fealties in time and space. What is urgently required is a coherent, mutually agreed upon, long-term policy for dramatic reductions in nuclear armaments, and a deep commitment, embracing decades, to carry it out.

Our talent, while imperfect, to foresee the future consequences of our present actions and to change our course appropriately is a hallmark of the human species, and one of the chief reasons for our success over the past million years. Our future depends entirely on how quickly and how broadly we can refine this talent. We should plan for and cherish our fragile world as we do our children and our grandchildren: there will be no other place for them to live. It is nowhere ordained that we must remain in bondage to nuclear weapons.

Alton Frye

STRATEGIC BUILD-DOWN: A CONTEXT FOR RESTRAINT

The search for national security is a dialectic of hope and fear. Fear of war spawns demand for weapons; hope for peace feeds demand to control those weapons. Judging by the rampant growth of weaponry in modern times, fear is more fruitful than hope. If foreign policy is the management of contradictions, national security policy requires a synthesis of hope and fear, a prudent blend of arms and arms control.

That synthesis has proved elusive. Now a new approach has emerged in the idea known as "build-down." In essence the build-down principle says that no new weapons should be deployed unless a larger number of existing weapons are destroyed. Conceived and refined over the last two years, the build-down seeks to apply a relatively simple principle to the complex realities of international competition in the development and deployment of weapons. The concept has aroused interest initially as a novel scheme to dampen the continuing expansion of Soviet and American strategic nuclear forces, but it could have broader applicability. After months of intricate political dialogue with a congressional coalition led by Senators William Cohen (R.-Maine) and Sam Nunn (D.-Georgia), President Reagan adopted the build-down principle in October 1983 as a basic element in the U.S. proposals at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva.[1]

One needs to contrast the build-down proposal with the prior American position in START. Previously, the United States had concentrated on schemes to restructure the current Soviet forces, demanding not only that total missile warheads be cut to 5,000 on each side, but that the Soviets phase out large numbers of their

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[1] On the bargaining between Congress and the Administration, see William S. Cohen, "The Arms Build-Down Proposal: How We Got From There To Here," *The Washington Post*, October 9, 1983, p. C8; the Senator's initial proposal was contained in "A Guaranteed Arms Build-Down," *The Washington Post*, January 3, 1983, p. A13. The bipartisan Cohen-Nunn coalition gained crucial momentum with publication of former Senator and Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie's article, "Build Down The Forces We Don't Need," *The Washington Post*, March 6, 1983, p. C8. The refinement of the build-down concept owes much to a remarkable team of congressional staff members, Robert Savitt, Arnold Punaro and Robert Bell of the U.S. Senate, and Leon Fuerth of the U.S. House of Representatives.

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biggest missiles. That would diminish, but not eliminate, the great disparity between the two nations in missile throw-weight, in which Moscow holds a considerable edge. Limits on heavy bombers, a category in which the U.S. lead is substantial and growing, were vague and inconsequential: the United States would have been free to go ahead with a planned growth in the number of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and other bomber weapons—one that, even with substantial cuts in missile warheads, would have given it *more* strategic nuclear weapons in the 1990s than it has now. However appealing from the standpoint of the United States and from the perspective of Western theories of strategic stability, those proposals were widely perceived as inequitable and non-negotiable.

Mr. Reagan's acceptance of the build-down concept modifies the U.S. position dramatically. Without demanding initial agreement on the ultimate composition of strategic missile forces—in effect leaving each side broad freedom to balance its forces as it deems best—the latest proposal tries to harness the momentum of force modernization to the declared goal of arms reductions. Specifically, Mr. Reagan now offers to build down ballistic missile warhead inventories from the current 8,000–9,000 range on each side to 5,000 by eliminating more than one warhead for each warhead newly deployed.[2]

1. Each warhead installed on a new land-based missile (ICBM) with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) would oblige a party to eliminate two existing warheads.
2. New warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMS) or small, single-warhead ICBMs would force reductions at a lower ratio, perhaps three for two.
3. If a side were not modernizing and introducing new warheads—a highly unlikely contingency in the next few years—it would still have to make annual reductions at an agreed percentage rate, possibly five percent.
4. The President would also apply the build-down principle to deployment of new bombers (though not directly to individual weapons carried on bombers), reducing bomber forces to levels well below those permitted under the 1979 strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II).
5. The United States would also accept limits on the number of air-launched cruise missiles each aircraft could carry and on the

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[2] In this discussion, the terms "warheads" and "weapons" are used interchangeably; unless otherwise noted, estimates of warhead inventories are based on the maximum number of warheads permitted on individual missiles under the SALT II Treaty.

aggregate number of such missiles deployed.

And finally:

6. The extent of reductions in missile throw-weight would be balanced against the reductions in bomber carrying capacity through a formula measuring potential destructive capacity. This feature of the proposed approach (to be explained below) is important. Since the two categories vary so basically from each other, and since the Soviet side would be more affected by the missile warhead reductions and the U.S. side more affected by the reductions in bomber-carried weapons, a measure integrating these force components is necessary to permit precise trade-offs between them.

In short, the new approach seeks major reductions in both missile-carried and bomber-carried weapons—through the build-down route—and also explicitly links the two. In announcing this basic shift in the U.S. START position, President Reagan stated the central objective: "We seek limits on the destructive capability of missiles and recognize that the Soviet Union would seek limits on bombers in exchange. There will have to be trade-offs and the United States is prepared to make them, so long as they result in a more stable balance of forces."

The last phrase should be underscored. Set alongside other statements by the President and top members of his Administration, it defines the U.S. objective in terms of "balance," not superiority, and in terms of stability, in which neither side has the capacity or incentive to launch a first strike against the other. This concept of strategic stability has long been the dominant view in both military and arms control circles all over the world. It was notably absent from Mr. Reagan's utterances on nuclear weapons before he became President. That he has so categorically embraced it since then is a change of profound importance, and one that may not yet be fully grasped by his critics at home or by observers abroad.

II

To understand the problems to which the build-down proposal is addressed, it may be useful to summarize ten key developments in the nuclear weapons postures and arms control efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union. These developments are familiar to experts, but they are seldom spelled out so that others have a reasonably clear picture.

1. *The Different Strategic Nuclear Postures.* Over the years, the two superpowers have taken different paths in their strategic nuclear programs. The United States fielded a more-or-less balanced "triad" of bombers, intercontinental land-based missiles and sub-

marine-launched ballistic missiles. By the 1980s, the United States deployed 27 percent of its strategic warheads on bombers, 22 percent on ICBMs and 51 percent on SLBMs. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, partly because of its extensive land area and restricted sea access, and partly for technological reasons, relied primarily on ICBMs, which today carry about 72 percent of its strategic warheads. Less than 20 percent of its warheads are on SLBMs and less than ten percent on bombers.

2. *The SALT I Agreements of 1972* focused in large part on the emerging possibility of large-scale anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems on both sides and achieved a drastic limitation of such systems. With respect to offensive weapons, a five-year interim agreement (later extended) froze the numbers of strategic ballistic-missile launchers, but the way was left open for wide use of MIRVs. Bombers were not controlled.

3. *The Evolution of the Postures on Both Sides during the 1970s and Early 1980s.* The advent of MIRVs pushed both the United States and the Soviet Union to new plateaus of strategic deployment. The number of warheads more than doubled in U.S. strategic offensive forces and more than tripled on the Soviet side, moving both countries toward the 10,000 warhead level. Moreover, once the MIRV threshold was crossed, the sheer quantity of weaponry created a qualitatively different and less stable strategic relationship. The number of available warheads increased dramatically in relation to the number of launchers. Where more than one missile was once necessary to attack an enemy missile site, it became possible for one MIRVed missile to attack several sites, raising incentives to strike first in some ultimate crisis.

Given a significantly larger Soviet ICBM force, there developed a deep concern that the Soviet Union might be able to conduct a first strike against the U.S. ICBM force, crippling that force to the point where it could not respond. This was the perceived "window of vulnerability" that bulked large in pressures to enlarge the U.S. ICBM force and to increase its survivability---notably through the MX missile.

4. *The SALT II Agreements Signed in 1979* set new ceilings on the numbers of launching vehicles on both sides, including heavy bombers. They prescribed the numbers of missiles that could be MIRVed, while also limiting the number of warheads that each missile might carry. Elaborate counting systems and verification procedures were agreed. But the agreements left intact the asymmetries between the two forces, which by that time had come to include a very substantial Soviet lead in heavy missiles with large payloads or throw-weight;

in effect, this asymmetry was balanced against the continuing U.S. lead in bombers and the assumed American advantage in such advanced technologies as cruise missiles. Critics attacked the agreements because they left the Soviet heavy missiles intact, and because they neither provided a significant reduction from then-existing levels, nor prevented large-scale modernization. The hypothetical problem of the ICBM "window of vulnerability" remained. These and other factors made the debate on the agreements in 1979 a prolonged one, with the outcome in doubt at the time that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late 1979 and virtually compelled President Carter to withdraw the agreements from the Senate.

5. *Tacit Acceptance of the SALT II Regime.* The U.S. failure to ratify SALT II led the Reagan Administration, at least in its initial rhetoric, to treat the agreements as a dead letter. In practice neither side disregarded the accords, although the Soviet Union did not make the reductions that would have been compelled if SALT II had been in full effect. By the spring of 1982 the Reagan Administration declared that it would not undercut the Treaty if the Soviet Union did not, and there were reciprocal assurances from the Soviet side. This "common law" status of the agreements is far from satisfactory; in particular, serious unresolved issues have arisen from evidence of Soviet actions that may be in breach of the accords.

6. *The U.S. START Proposals of 1982.* As noted, these focused on reductions in ballistic-missile warhead levels, with prescribed numbers and categories that would have severely modified the Soviet ICBM posture, while omitting any substantial treatment of U.S. bombers. The proposals did for the first time explicitly define ceilings in numbers of warheads, rather than primarily in terms of launching vehicles. But many analysts and political leaders considered them inequitable and they were in any event extraordinarily difficult to negotiate.

7. *Continued Force Modernization on Both Sides.* The Soviet Union pressed forward with new ICBMs (the so-called PL-4 and PL-5) and a MIRVed SLBM for the Typhoon submarine, as well as the new Blackjack strategic bomber and long-range cruise missiles. The Reagan Administration began flight tests of the MX ICBM, scheduled for deployment beginning in 1986, and accelerated the Trident SLBM program. Responding to congressional demands, it began work on a smaller, single-warhead ICBM (Midgetman). It revived the B-1 bomber and moved ahead with a varied array of air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles. In the category of intermediate nuclear forces (INF)—forces not covered by SALT—contin-

ued Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles prompted the NATO program for U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles in Europe. In a March 1983 address, later known as the "star wars" speech, Mr. Reagan triggered new interest and alarm concerning possible ABM systems based in space.

8. *Strong Public Pressures to Freeze the Numbers and Types of New Nuclear Weapons.* The freeze movement in the United States sought to achieve this by a negotiated agreement with the Soviet Union that would put an immediate stop to all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. The Reagan Administration argued that its thrust for deep reductions was preferable and opposed the freeze idea. Behind this U.S. debate lay a continuing deep concern in key quarters for the retention of proximate numerical parity between the forces on both sides.

9. *The Scowcroft Commission.* In January 1983, faced with strong congressional resistance to the MX missile, the Reagan Administration appointed Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft (USAF, Ret.) to chair a bipartisan expert commission, charged with reviewing the whole question of strategic posture and arms control. The Commission emerged with the conclusion that the "window of vulnerability" was not in fact as serious a threat as had been depicted. Nonetheless, it endorsed limited deployment of an MX missile sited in individual hardened silos. But at the same time the Commission highlighted the instability created by MIRVs on both sides and strongly urged an ultimate shift away from multiple warhead ICBMs, specifically recommending the development and eventual deployment of the Midgetman. The Commission's fundamental stress was on the importance of invulnerable strategic forces as a means to deter counterforce attacks (i.e., attacks directed at the other side's strategic nuclear capabilities).[3]

10. *The Breakdown of National Consensus* during the SALT II debate grew more acute in 1981–83, as President Reagan and Congress wrestled with strategic modernization decisions and arms control proposals. Congressional approval of any MX program was in doubt and there was widespread dissatisfaction with the Administration's START proposals. It began to appear that *no* proposal—whether for modernization or strategic arms reduction—could command a consensus in the United States, either in terms of the legislative majority

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[3] In its report, the Commission referred specifically and favorably to congressional proposals "in which reductions are forced in warhead numbers as a price of modernization." Commission member William J. Perry, former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, was an early proponent of the build-down principle. General Scowcroft became the central intermediary in subsequent bargaining with Congress on the MX missile and arms control initiatives. See *Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces*, Washington, April 1983, p. 25.

required to approve controversial weapons or the two-thirds Senate majority needed to approve any treaty.

This summary is not of course exhaustive, and it is necessarily simplified for the sake of brevity. But it spotlights the problematic aspects of meshing the U.S. strategic nuclear posture with serious arms control efforts, as these stood in early and mid-1983. The build-down approach was developed as a response to the problems raised by these developments. It was a concept well suited to the objectives defined by the Scowcroft Commission. Moreover, as we spell out in Section VIII, it was a response to the lack of consensus and impending impasse between Congress and the Chief Executive.

The build-down approach is not a magic panacea for all the problems that have piled up in the last 20 years. It accepts the continued existence of large numbers of nuclear weapons on both sides as a given, and assumes that the two countries will remain concerned, partly for political reasons, with both the substance and the appearance of parity. At root it addresses the goal endorsed by the Scowcroft Commission—moving toward reduced nuclear postures that are less vulnerable to a first strike. That goal requires a balanced melding of warhead reductions and selective modernization.

Build-down would retain the counting and verification provisions embodied in the SALT II Treaty while moving beyond it to bring about meaningful reductions in the arsenals on both sides. It would operate, not through rigid categories and subcategories (although previously agreed provisions would remain in effect), but through relatively free choice for the two military establishments to bring themselves within broadly defined warhead ceilings and other limits. And, as we have already noted, it would provide a trade-off in which reductions in the Soviet missile advantage would be balanced against reductions in the U.S. bomber advantage.

This article will consider each of these questions, dwelling especially (in Section V) on the kinds of choices that the two sides would be encouraged to make by the ground rules of a build-down. Following analysis of the potential merits (and difficulties) of the build-down approach (Sections III–VII), two concluding sections assess the implications of the build-down approach for the ongoing political debate in the United States, and the reasons why it ought to appeal to the Soviet Union.

But first let us take a hard look at an objection already being made to the build-down idea, namely that its focus on numbers and quantity leaves untouched the kind of qualitative improvements that are—it may be argued—an even more important component of the strategic arms race.

III

The build-down approach is indeed couched in terms of *numbers* of *offensive* weapons. It neither includes nor precludes possible arms control measures expressly aimed to halt improvements in the quality of such weapons—such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB), limits on ballistic missile testing, or the suspension of fissile material production. All these are elements of proposals for a nuclear freeze, usually defined as a comprehensive curb on both the quantitative and qualitative escalation of nuclear armaments. The build-down is not a substitute for or an alternative to the full range of limitations envisioned by the nuclear freeze movement. But, if successful, it can help arrest the deterioration in Soviet-American relations and pave the way for more ambitious restraints.

Moreover, the build-down approach does not address the problem of defensive systems. Now tightly limited by the 1972 ABM Treaty, this is an area in which President Reagan has excited new interest within his government and new worries in the Kremlin regarding a possible American movement toward strategic defense based in space. On its face, the sharp reduction in offensive warheads visualized under build-down might tend to reduce the incentive to seek some new "impregnable" defense—or conversely it might tend to make such a defense seem more attainable. In any case the problem is not within the scope of the build-down approach. One dragon at a time.

The fact that the build-down approach does not directly control modernization of strategic weapons is understandably a matter of concern to those who are dedicated to a total freeze. The build-down seeks not to prohibit modernization but to regulate it. It would do so, not by elaborate categorical restriction, but by putting a price on modernization. That price would be stated in terms of force reductions. New weapons could not be deployed unless a greater number of existing weapons were phased out of the forces. In this way, each side could be assured that the process of modernization would not mean continued increases in the number of nuclear weapons being deployed. Indeed, the very momentum of modernization would compel unprecedented reductions in strategic offensive forces. And those reductions would simultaneously lower the level of lethal capabilities and improve the climate for more substantial arms control arrangements.

In short, as we shall see in greater detail in Section V below, the build-down approach *would* indirectly affect the qualitative character of the nuclear arsenals on both sides. And here it is important to stress that qualitative improvement in weapons and delivery systems *may* cut in either direction, toward or away from that "more stable balance" that is our main objective. Just as MIRVs have been deeply destabilizing, the progressive replacement of MIRVed missiles by single-warhead ones (in effect, a reduction in the ratio of warheads to missiles) would work in the opposite direction. For years the United States has sought, both by argument and example, to persuade the Soviet Union to reduce the proportion of ICBMs in favor of a higher proportion of SLBMs, which are less accurate and less vulnerable. Qualitative change may make matters worse—improvements in accuracy or explosive power almost automatically have this effect—but it may also make them better. Indiscriminate modernization and indiscriminate reductions can erode stability. The task of policy is to discriminate.

Finally, numbers *are* important in themselves. Quantitative increases on the scale in prospect greatly complicate either side's ability to plan and execute a program of force modernization which can yield significant improvements in stability. A larger number of weapons may add a kind of inertial stability, as each government recognizes the impossibility of destroying enough of the other's weapons to avoid a decimating retaliation. But that larger number also increases the risk of war through accident, terrorist theft or official lunacy. More important, expanding force levels generate pressures to compensate for new-felt insecurity by adopting reckless policies, e.g., launch-on-warning, and by structuring forces in ways which improve survivability at the cost of the verifiability necessary to reassure the parties that neither intends to use the weapons it deploys. In the latter regard, dual-purpose systems like cruise missiles, which could carry either conventional or nuclear munitions and which are likely to proliferate on land, sea and in the air, pose grave problems.

Moreover, numbers are the feature of the arms race most visible to other nations. Moscow and Washington share an interest in moderating their own competition as a prerequisite for convincing others to refrain from building independent nuclear capabilities. Non-proliferation, as well as the stability of the superpower balance, requires a renewed effort to dampen the Soviet-American arms race. Neither quantitative nor qualitative arms controls will prosper in a world where additional nations acquire nuclear forces, as is apparent from the impediments to superpower restraint already posed by the existence of British, French and Chinese nuclear weapons.

IV

Our next question is the relationship of the build-down approach to the SALT II agreements. On the one hand, the scheme would preserve and strengthen the positive accomplishments of the SALT II treaty. In order for the build-down to operate, there would have to be an agreed data base identifying the forces to which the rules would apply. There would have to be counting rules to determine the number of warheads associated with specific missiles, and there would have to be tight controls to prevent circumvention of the reductions by secreting additional warheads on the missiles which remain. There would also have to be agreed procedures for monitoring new deployments and destruction of other systems. The SALT regime provides these, as well as a functioning institution to supervise the build-down, namely, the Standing Consultative Commission.

Perhaps most valuable is the SALT II rule for counting the number of warheads on a given ballistic missile type. The rule is simple: a missile is considered to have the maximum number of warheads with which it has been tested. Thus, a Soviet SS-18 is credited with ten warheads and an American Poseidon with 14. In fact, intelligence sources indicate that these missiles sometimes carry fewer warheads, but the counting rule provides an accurate estimate of the maximum number of weapons to which the country is entitled on such boosters. From these counting rules, one can derive a satisfactory baseline count from which the build-down would begin. There would be no distinctive verification problems, since actual launchers would have to be destroyed for the nation to receive credit for the warhead reductions. The Standing Consultative Commission has a decade's experience with monitoring launcher dismantlement, and national technical means of observation provide high confidence of compliance. Warheads removed from missiles might, of course, be stored, but they would have no strategic significance without means to deliver them.

Similarly, SALT II provides at least skeleton rules for the most important class of bomber weapons, the newly developed air-launched cruise missiles. It permits a side to field a force with an average of 28 cruise missiles per aircraft, but the number of ALCMs on existing types of heavy bombers like the U.S. B-52s and the Soviet Bears is limited to 20 each. (The higher average number grew out of U.S. interest in possible future deployments on wide-

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

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
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The Illuminated Vortex

Understanding how the in-cylinder flow of the fuel-air mixture is influenced by chamber geometry provides a key to improving engine performance. By applying a laser measurement technique, a researcher at the General Motors Research Laboratories has gained new insight into the behavior of the flow.



Figure 1: History of mean velocity at a single engine location.

THE FLUID motions inside engine cylinders have considerable influence over the progress of combustion. Mixing of air and fuel, combustion rate, and heat losses from the cylinder are all important transport processes strongly dependent on fluid motions. The motion inside the cylinder has two components. Mean velocity influences the transport of momentum, energy, and species on a cylinder-wide scale, while the turbulence component influences the same phenomena on a local basis. The in-cylinder flow field depends primarily on the geometry of the cylinder and inlet port. Hence, decisions made in the engine design stage exert a controlling influence over the flow. But before questions about how different geometrical features affect the flow field can be answered, the problem of how to measure the flow must be solved. By applying Laser Doppler Anemometry (LDA), Dr. Rodney Rask, a researcher at the General Motors Research Laboratories, has obtained detailed measurements of the flow field.

LDA is a technique in which two focused laser beams pass into the cylinder through a quartz window. In the minute measuring region where the laser beams cross, a regular pattern of interference fringes is created. As the 1-micron particles, which have been added to the engine inlet flow, cross the measurement region, they scatter light in the bright fringes. In Dr. Rask's LDA system, the scattered light is collected by the same lenses used to focus the laser beam, and measured by a photomultiplier tube. The resulting signal is processed electronically to determine the time it takes a particle to traverse a fixed number of fringes. Since the fringe spacing is a known function of the laser beam crossing angle, this transit time provides a direct measure of velocity.

During operation of the LDA, measurements of velocity as a function of engine rotation (crankangle) are made at a number of locations within the cylinder. The instantaneous velocity at each point must then be separated into mean and turbulence components. The simplest technique is to declare that the mean velocities for all cycles are identical and ensemble average the data. However, this approach ignores the cyclic variation in the mean velocity. Another technique looks at individual cycles and uses a variety of methods, including sophisticated filtering, to split the instantaneous velocity into its components. This



Figure 2: Panoramic view of engine flow patterns. With changing crankangle, the center of rotation precesses from the cylinder's lower left quadrant to its upper right quadrant.

approach is consistent with the LDA measurements, which clearly show that the mean velocity does not repeat exactly from one engine cycle to the next.

Differences in the flow field from one cycle to the next can seriously compromise engine efficiency. Near the end of the compression stroke, it is important to maintain a consistent velocity at key cylinder locations (e.g., at a spark plug). Dr. Rask's LDA measurements have identified design features that control cyclic variability.

FIGURE 1 shows mean velocity measured at a single location during an engine cycle. High velocity exists during the intake stroke when the inlet flow is rushing through the narrow valve opening. This jet-like flow into the cylinder causes large velocity differences between adjacent cylinder locations and produces strong turbulence. As the end of the intake stroke is approached (180 degrees in Figure 1), the levels of both mean velocity and turbulence drop rapidly. This decrease is a result of the changing boundary conditions for the cylinder—from strong inflow to no inflow. During the compression stroke the flow field evolves, but it undergoes no drastic changes. However, in a high-squish chamber, where the flow is forced into a small bowl in the piston or cylinder head, considerable turbulence is generated near the end of the compression stroke.

Measurements from many cylinder locations are necessary to make the flow field understandable. Figure 2 shows four flow patterns covering a period from near the end of intake into the compression stroke. Note the strong vertical flow, with the center of the vortex away from the cylinder center and precessing with changing crankangle.

By experimenting with geometrical variables, Dr. Rask has gained new understanding of phenomena observed in operating engines. The resulting knowledge has guided the design and development of new engines with a minimum of trial-and-error testing. The LDA findings are also being used to validate and calibrate engine flow computer models under development.

"From our measurements," Dr. Rask states, "we have been able to deduce how changes in the geometry of the port and combustion chamber modify the velocity field. These flow field effects are now being used to help designers tailor engine combustion for optimum performance."

General Motors

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MARK OF EXCELLENCE

THE MAN BEHIND THE WORK

Dr. Rodney Rask is a Senior Staff Research Engineer in the Fluid Mechanics Department at the General Motors Research Laboratories.

Dr. Rask received his undergraduate and graduate degrees in mechanical engineering from the University of Minnesota. His Ph.D. thesis concerned the Coanda effect.

Prior to joining General Motors in 1973, Dr. Rask worked on the design of nuclear reactors at the Knoll's Atomic Power Laboratories. In addition to further refinements in LDA measurement techniques, his current research interests include computer simulation of engine systems, with special emphasis on the intake manifold.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT
v.
UNION POLITICAL SPENDING

The First Amendment was written nearly 200 years ago to protect the right of all Americans to freely express their own opinions—and the right not to support opinions with which they disagree.

But despite the First Amendment, one group in America has the power to force men and women to financially support political causes and candidates they oppose—or lose their jobs. That group is organized labor.

Federal labor law as well as some state laws permit unions and employers to require working Americans to pay union dues as a condition of employment, regardless of whether or not they want to join or support a union. As a result, the AFL-CIO and member unions collect more than $3.5 billion per year—$10 million a day—in compulsory dues.

This massive amount of union treasury money, often called "soft money," cannot be used for direct cash contributions to candidates for federal office. But federal election law permits the use of "soft money" for a host of union activities for candidates, political parties, referendums and ideological causes.

And spend it the unions do. Political historian Theodore White called the AFL-CIO political effort in 1968 "unprecedented in American history." It included, for example, the registration of 4.6 million voters, the printing and distribution of 115 million pamphlets and leaflets, telephone banks in 638 localities, 72,225 house-to-house canvassers, and nearly 100,000 volunteers on election day.

Labor columnist Victor Riesel estimates that the cost of organized labor's unreported "in-kind" political activities in 1976 was over $100 million. Allowing for inflation and the dramatic increase in union political action, that figure could top $150 million in 1984.

In response, more and more union members are speaking out against the flagrant abuse of their First Amendment rights, looking to the nation's courts for help.

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the use of compulsory union dues for political, ideological and other non-collective bargaining activities is unconstitutional, violating employees' First Amendment rights. But some courts have strayed badly in their interpretation of the legal precedents.

This fall, the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation will seek from the Supreme Court a strict definition of collective bargaining and a uniform remedy to protect the constitutional rights of American workers against the use of their compulsory dues for union political spending. **(Ellis/Fails v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks)**

The issue is clear, the abuse widespread. Rank and file workers, especially those who choose not to become union members, have little or no say as to which candidates and causes their money is used to support.

As a federal appeals court has stated, this wholesale violation of employees' First Amendment rights damages workers twice: They are forced to "contribute" to political candidates they oppose, and their ability to finance candidates they do support is thereby severely diminished.

Nearly 200 years ago, Thomas Jefferson wrote: "To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."

Unhappily, such tyranny prevails in America today in the form of union political spending financed by compulsory union dues. This tyranny can only be eliminated by the combined action of an informed press, an aroused citizenry and a responsible judiciary.

If you would like further information about this fundamental abuse of the First Amendment, please write us for a copy of our pamphlet, "The First Amendment vs. Union Political Spending: A 26-Year Legal Battle for Employees' Political Freedom", and more information about the landmark case, **Ellis/Fails v. BRAC.** Or call Joanna Boyce at 800-336-3600.

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

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

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

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
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
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JFK: ORDEAL IN AFRICA
by RICHARD D. MAHONEY

bodied ALCM carriers, an option not now seriously in view.) As we shall see in Section VI, however, these rules would need to be refined in order to weigh bomber forces systematically against missile forces.

Thus, build-down would build upon SALT II. But it would also improve upon it, in three key respects. First, whereas SALT II was based on counting launchers, the build-down approach (like the Reagan Administration's original START proposals) focuses explicitly on the number of warheads—using the counting rule just described for missiles. Second, build-down is a proposal for major reduction in warheads—whereas SALT II stabilized launcher totals at existing levels but left the sides free to add thousands of warheads. By reversing the trend toward additional warheads, build-down would cure the central weakness of SALT II, its relatively permissive treatment of new forces. In this way build-down would correct the allegedly fatal flaw which led some to doubt the value of that treaty. With warhead totals forced to decline, the real virtues of SALT II would survive and should win wider approval. Instead of 15,000 or more strategic warheads on each side in the 1990s, build-down could produce forces in the 8,000-warhead range for missiles and bombers combined.

And finally, build-down approaches reductions in a totally different way than SALT II did. No one who studies the tortuous negotiations that ran from 1973 to 1979 to produce the SALT II Accords can fail to see how much time and effort had to go into defining precise categories of weapons to be limited. By contrast, one dimension of build-down theory is the degree of flexibility it would permit defense planners in shaping their force postures. The scheme would retain previously agreed categorical limits, e.g., no new heavy ICBMs could be tested or deployed, and the various MIRV sub-limits and fractionation rules would remain in force. However, the build-down rule itself would focus not on altering the core of the two forces, but on adjusting the margins of total deployments. It would liberate negotiators from the intractable task of persuading their counterparts to accept basic restructuring of their forces as the condition of agreement. And it would grant broad discretion to military establishments to select their own forces, while enabling them to plan their defenses against a smaller threat than they now face.

V

What kinds of choices would be likely in a situation where, for every new warhead added to the official count, defense planners would have to dismantle more than one existing warhead? Obviously, precise prediction is impossible: a major feature of the approach is to leave each side with flexibility to respond to the new regime. Yet some sense of what would happen does lie behind the build-down proposal; undoubtedly the Soviet Defense Ministry is even now emulating the Pentagon in making intensive studies, while American and foreign observers should at least grasp the elements of choice.

Two points seem fairly evident. First, build-down would compel attention to force survivability as the overriding requirement. The logic is straightforward. A planner who must rely on a smaller number of weapons for deterrence must make sure that enough of them can survive an enemy surprise attack. In theory, one can get by with fewer weapons if the opponent also has fewer, since the scale of the threat bears most directly on the size of one's own force requirements. But one must take every precaution to guarantee that moving to a smaller force does not expose a nation to increased risk of a successful first strike. Thus, there is a tremendous premium on making each component of a diminishing force less vulnerable. For example, as overall levels come down, it would be foolish to maintain a rising percentage of weapons in presumably vulnerable fixed silos.

Second, any introduction of new warheads on a large scale would involve major adjustments in existing deployments. The proposed build-down ratio is particularly high for ICBMs with multiple warheads.

Both points are deliberate and evident. In combination, these considerations should operate to reduce incentives for future generations of large MIRVed ICBMs. For the United States, they should advance the long-term strategic vision articulated by the Scowcroft Commission, part of which was that any MX deployment would be strictly limited as a transition to a more dispersed force of single-warhead ICBMs. The build-down process would heighten the urgency of moving on to small, single-warhead missiles as an element in a mixed force on land, sea and in the air. Congressional advocates of the small ICBM, notably Congressmen Albert Gore (D.-Tenn.) and Les Aspin (D.-Wisc.), have already conditioned authorization to install a few MXs on expedited development of the small missile. The Soviets are apparently proceeding with a comparable system and have intimated interest in using it to reduce their mounting vulnerability.

One must note one further point about the single-warhead Midgetman ICBM. Unless we and the Soviets can agree on a mechanism to reduce forces, its prospects are doubtful. At present and impending force levels, very large numbers of them would be necessary to ensure survivability, and the costs of such a force would be insupportable. Only if the numbers of weapons come down markedly can a silo-basing mode for single-warhead missiles become feasible and economical, although more costly mobile deployment could survive a larger threat; against very numerous and very large weapons in a barrage attack, even mobile deployments might not suffice. It is reasonable to conclude that the evolution of forces preferred by the Scowcroft Commission and a wide spectrum of informed opinion—namely, eventual de-MIRVing of the land-based force—will not be practical unless the two sides agree to cut back total warhead levels. Some form of build-down is indispensable to de-MIRVing.

On the Soviet side, there is also an important point to be made. This is that the present Soviet ICBM posture is one of high concentration of warhead totals in a relatively few launching sites; in that respect Soviet ICBMs are relatively more vulnerable than U.S. land-based missiles, which carry fewer warheads. The "window of vulnerability" argument hinges on nominal calculations that the Soviet Union already has enough warheads capable of destroying hard targets to hold all U.S. missile silos hostage. Less well known is the evidence in published NATO studies and presentations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States also has a potent counterforce capability. Specifically, even without the MX, the United States has the capacity to destroy quickly several hundred hard targets containing a far larger *proportion* of total Soviet warheads than are at risk in American silos. Over 50 percent of all Soviet warheads now stand on about 650 ICBMs, while less than 23 percent of U.S. warheads are at risk on theoretically vulnerable ICBMs.[4]

So far as concerns the instabilities which flow from mutual counterforce capabilities, the two countries are already subject to them. The MX and its Soviet counterparts could make the situation marginally worse, but merely interrupting their deployment will not cure the problem. While there remain opportunities to impede refinement of counterforce capabilities on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the accuracy and lethality of ICBMs are now so great that only a combination of force reduction and adaptation can redress the instabilities associated with missiles that are at once potent and vulnerable. The cardinal advantage of the single-warhead missile is that, while it almost certainly could attack hardened targets, more than one warhead would be required for a confident strike against it.

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[4] Cf. Alton Frye, *Strategic Restraint: Ethical Perspectives and Political Initiatives*, Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, ACIS Working Paper No. 39, June 1983, pp. 13–16, and "Strategic Myths Mislead Reagan," *The Washington Post*, October 2, 1983, p. C5.

Since there is no longer the option of precluding ICBMs capable of counterforce missions, the best we can do unilaterally is to shift the force exchange ratios toward stability by deploying single-warhead missiles. Planners on both sides are bound to recognize this relationship and build-down would encourage them to act on it. Because they are farther along with development of a single-warhead missile, the Soviet Union may well pursue this path sooner than the United States.

On the Soviet side, we have just noted that build-down would tend to discourage or limit any new large-scale system, especially of MIRVed ICBMs. Moreover, under the proposed build-down regime, even if the Soviet (or U.S.) side did not modernize, it would have to reduce its warheads by five percent a year.[5]

Thus planners would face hard choices. They would have to judge the value of new systems in comparison to the larger number of currently deployed weapons they must dismantle. And, as the compulsory percentage reductions proceeded with or without new systems, they would have to decide which existing systems to retain and which to eliminate.

For example, at some point in the process of reductions and

[5] Some examples may help to clarify the subtle and potentially confusing interaction between reductions dictated by an annual percentage rate and those dictated by variable ratios. The basic point is that in determining the scale of reductions, the largest cutback—whether set by the percentage rate or the variable ratios—would govern.

Thus, a percentage rate of five percent would force cuts of more than 400 missile warheads on each side in the first year; reductions under the percentage rate would be smaller in later years, as the total warhead balance to which the rate applied declined. In order to come within the lower ceiling set by the net reduction goal, a country would have to eliminate *in addition to the first 400 weapons* one existing warhead for each warhead newly deployed. Thus, a country deploying 400 new warheads in a year when it had to make a net reduction of 400 warheads, would have to destroy 800 of its currently installed weapons. In effect, the percentage rate reduction creates *an implicit ratio* of warheads destroyed to warheads deployed that is never less than 2:1, so long as the number of newly deployed warheads does not exceed the net reduction total specified by the percentage.

At higher deployment rates, e.g., 600 new warheads in a year when a side must make a net reduction of 400, MIRVed ICBMs would always remain subject to the 2:1 penalty but marginal additions of SLBMs and single-warhead missiles would enjoy preferential ratios requiring smaller reductions. If the 600 new warheads were all on MIRVed ICBMs, the side would have to eliminate 1,200 existing warheads, meaning a *net* reduction in the force of 600 weapons. If 300 of the 600 were on SLBMs and single-warhead missiles, subject to a 3:2 ratio, the side would only have to eliminate 1,050 existing warheads (600 for the MIRVed ICBMs and 450 for the other warheads) for a net reduction of 450.

Projections of actual modernization programs by Lawrence J. Cavaiola and Bonita J. Dombey of the Congressional Budget Office suggest that, of the two build-down mechanisms, the percentage rate is likely to be more potent in the early years and the variable ratios are likely to grow in impact in the late 1980s. See *Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces: The Administration's Program and Alternatives*, Washington: Congressional Budget Office, May 1983.

modernization, the Soviet Union would have to choose between reducing either its SS-18 heavy missiles (credited with ten warheads each under the counting system) or its SS-19 medium missiles (credited with six each). Would one prefer some multiple of three SS-18s or of five SS-19s? To an American analyst the choice seems clear. Retaining the SS-19s would provide a more survivable and more flexible force. The inclination to phase down the SS-18s should flow from the military logic of the case, but the Soviets might wish to disregard it for political or psychological reasons. If they did so, they would simplify U.S. targetting, although the consequences for stability could be worrisome. This kind of potential trade-off illustrates the way a build-down might induce changes that could not be negotiated directly. The Soviets would be free to retain the heavy SS-18s, but their objective interest should favor the more dispersed force of SS-19s. (By the same token, the United States could only achieve significant numbers of MX-type missiles by sacrificing twice as many warheads on the sea-based missiles it has consistently preferred as the backbone of its retaliatory posture.)

This kind of choice has a direct bearing, of course, on the difficult issue of throw-weight, which has been the subject of long and arcane disputation. While the two countries have rough parity in the number of missile warheads, the Soviets today have a three-to-one advantage in the throw-weight of their missiles. Their missiles are bigger, but, being liquid-fueled, there can be disagreement as to whether they are as versatile and reliable as U.S. solid-fuel systems. Some officials have insisted that even if the Soviets accept reductions in the number of missile warheads to a lower level, they must also agree to cut their throw-weight advantage by making those reductions in their larger ICBMs. That is the meaning of the longstanding U.S. demands in START for sub-limits on Soviet heavy missiles.

However one assesses the Soviet advantage in throw-weight, the crucial point in assessing the build-down approach is that *any agreement which cuts the number of warheads will itself tend to cut the throw-weight disparity.*

For instance, if the Soviets agreed to a 5,000-warhead limit for ballistic missiles, reaching that level would drop their missile throw-weight by more than 50 percent and lower the ratio of throw-weight between the two forces. That would be true even if Moscow elected to maximize its total throw-weight by holding onto its larger missiles, the SS-18s and SS-19s, in which case it would fill its permissible warhead quota with only about 650 missiles—and it would have no other missiles at all on land or sea. Obviously, that posture is preposterous; the realistic range of Soviet forces would presumably spread the warheads over more launchers with relatively less gross throw-weight. In addition, technological trends on both sides point toward relatively compact and portable warheads, meaning that a reduction in the number of warheads will mean concomitant cuts in throw-weight and megatonnage. The two countries have such vast power at their disposal that these changes will still leave them with extraordinarily high levels of destructive capability, but there is little doubt that, even with modernization, reducing the number of warheads in the two forces will trim the currently deployed explosive yield quite significantly.

So much for rough judgments of the impact of build-down on the strategic force postures of the two sides. President Reagan's START proposal in October did not extend the build-down idea to cover the intermediate nuclear forces (INF)—Soviet SS-20s and the NATO program—which have been the subject of separate Geneva negotiations conducted on the U.S. side by Ambassador Paul Nitze. Yet applying the build-down rule to all essentially strategic missiles, including INF, would make sense. There is a substantial consensus among the Western Allies that INF and START negotiations should sometime be merged, but much dispute about when and how.

Build-down could impose a common standard on both classes of systems, without requiring immediate merging of the talks. INF discussions could continue as a separate forum to determine what sub-limit would be desirable for intermediate forces within an overall warhead ceiling encompassing both START and INF forces. Under such an aggregate limit, build-down would automatically provide useful regulation of INF forces. While the United States would be able to allocate some of its warheads for the largely political purposes served by theater deployments, it would have strong reasons not to deploy very many weapons in Europe.

Likewise, the Soviet Union would need to reconsider how much of its declining warhead quota should go to systems capable of covering only part of its strategic target list. Gradually, operational considerations should lead planners to emphasize versatility over the limited functions of theater systems. Just as the logic of reductions favors dispersed systems with fewer warheads per launchers, it also argues for longer-range systems able to cover all targets. There would be a good case for preferring intercontinental missiles over intermediate-range launchers. Again, at some point, the Soviets would be obliged to choose whether the next warheads to be removed come from SS-20s or from SS-19s. The judgment is not preordained but the tendency should be toward fewer SS-20s.

Extending the build-down to INF weapons would underscore a reality which recent commotions over INF have obscured. Even if the zero option were accepted, and all the SS-20s eliminated, there are ample warheads among the thousands on Soviet ICBMs to cover all relevant targets in Europe without significantly affecting the balance of Soviet-American strategic forces. The threat to Europe would diminish in no meaningful degree. It would be more sensible to treat the nuclear threat to the Alliance as a whole, and build-down offers one means to cope with that threat in an integrated way.

Subjecting INF forces to a rule governing intercontinental forces has the incidental advantage of adopting the Soviet view that such weapons are "strategic" in nature, a definition which could facilitate negotiation. Another virtue of this consolidated category of START and INF warheads is that negotiations would proceed from approximate parity at about 9,000 warheads. The U.S. lead in warheads attributable to strategic missiles under SALT II would be balanced by the addition of over 1,200 Soviet INF missile warheads, while U.S. INF warheads would be limited even as the NATO program unfolded.

An agreement of this kind would provide a form of political coupling for Europe and the United States through its recognition of the commonality of the long-range nuclear threat. Compartmenting INF issues, as separate negotiations have done so far, virtually ensures frictions within the Alliance and frustrations in both negotiating forums. Here, too, a build-down rule could serve to regulate deployments the two sides are unlikely to prohibit.

VI

We turn next to the question of trade-offs between missile capabilities and bomber capabilities, to which President Reagan has now committed the United States. It is a difficult and controversial issue. Partly because the previous U.S. START position emphatically separated missile and bomber weapons, and partly because some officials did not know that build-down proponents were recommending differentiated counting rules for bomber weapons, the issue of an aggregate warhead count embracing both types of weapons has become a contentious point.

But it is clear that unless the United States and the Soviet Union can agree on a comprehensive approach to limit bombers as well as missiles, there will be no START agreement. The United States, with its historic preference for strategic aircraft, is modernizing rapidly with B-1 bombers and several thousand air-launched cruise missiles, hundreds of them now entering service on converted B-52s. The Advanced Technology Bomber is to follow in the 1990s with the exploitation of so-called stealth techniques to reduce its radar detectability. The Soviet Union shows interest in long-range cruise missiles of its own and U.S. intelligence projects the introduction of the new Blackjack bomber as early as 1986 or 1987. If the Soviets keep a heavy bomber force comparable in size to their past deployments, they may want to build 100 to 150 such planes. Their recent investment in the Backfire medium bomber confirms that they do not plan to abandon a vigorous aircraft program. How might one best regulate these modernization programs under build-down?

The first problem is that of counting bombers and their loads. To devise a sensible counting rule for bombers one must deal with the crucial differences between weapons delivered by aircraft and those delivered by missiles. Aircraft cannot conduct a quick first strike and can be recalled after precautionary takeoffs—hence the Western view that they are more stabilizing systems. Furthermore, the alert rates for bombers are much lower than for missiles, so that at any given time a smaller proportion of bomber weapons is actually available for war. Most importantly, bombers face active defenses, as missiles will not, so long as the ABM Treaty is effective.

For all these reasons, bomber weapons are worth less than missile weapons in most strategic calculations. Their redeeming value is to enhance overall force survivability, as the Scowcroft Commission pointed out, by denying an attacker the opportunity to concentrate his strikes against other types of strategic forces. Bombers also have a quality other strategic forces lack. They can perform important conventional missions, a factor which argues for maintaining a reasonable number of them.

These diverse considerations complicate setting a satisfactory rule for bombers in the strategic nuclear equation. At the end, while elaborate quantitative assessments are interesting and helpful, any counting rule for bombers will be arbitrary. In my opinion, the best way to handle bombers in a build-down regime is to elaborate the distinction already made in SALT II between bombers equipped with ALCMs and those which are not. For purposes of defining an aggregate warhead count, it would be useful to treat the relevant category as "independently deliverable nuclear weapons." By that term, I mean to include warheads which are capable of reaching individual targets separately from their launchers. Missile re-entry vehicles and ALCMs would fall into that category. By contrast, gravity bombs and short-range missiles require a bomber to penetrate to the vicinity of the target and are thus integral to the bomber platform itself. Taking all things into account, it would be reasonable to count such non-ALCM bombers as one weapon. SALT II left such bombers relatively unconstrained and offers a plausible precedent for this thesis.

In short, and speaking personally, I believe the most promising route toward an early and worthwhile agreement would be to subject missiles and bombers to an aggregate warhead ceiling with differentiated counting rules for bombers. ALCM-carrying bombers would count as twenty warheads; non-ALCM bombers as one.

But there is a second difficult problem of measurement. The trade-off envisaged by President Reagan is only partly between numbers of warheads. It is also a trade-off between the throw-weight of missiles and the payload of bombers—the carrying capacity of these different vehicles which determines the overall destructive power they are able to deliver.

Wrestling with this problem over several months, Lt. Gen. Glenn Kent (USAF, Ret.) made an important analytical contribution by inventing a measure of "Potential Destructive Capacity" (PDC). Kent's analysis uses plausible factors to weight the potential number and size of weapons which missiles and bombers can carry. It then proposes the concept of "standard weapon stations" as a unit of account for reducing both types of systems. Kent's work is intellectually elegant and offers a novel approach to integrating missile and bomber weapons.[6]

The main merit in a consolidated measure of potential destructive capacity is not that it is needed to ensure reductions in missile throw-weight—the warhead cuts would accomplish that—but that it makes possible a fair trade-off between throw-weight and bomber payload. As desirable as it would be for the two countries to move toward equality in both warhead numbers and lower levels of missile throw-weight, it is not feasible in this century. Even if the United States allocated all its warheads to MX missiles—an absurd thought—its total throw-weight would not approach Soviet levels. The forces are highly asymmetrical and the diplomatic task is not to make them identical, but to make them compatible with stable deterrence. To persuade Moscow to accept the sacrifice of some of its advantage in missile throw-weight, Washington will have to accept meaningful constraints on its advantages in bombers. President Reagan's acknowledgement of the necessity to strike this balance is probably the most important fruit of the prolonged legislative-executive bargaining of recent months.

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[6] See Glenn Kent and Edward L. Warner, "Key Aspects of Compulsory Double Build-Down Approach," unpublished, September 6, 1983.

General Kent's analysis illustrates one way to make equitable trade-offs between these asymmetrical forces, although the definition of Potential Destructive Capacity can and should be simplified.[7] The vital point is that the United States has expressed willingness to apply the build-down rule to bombers in a way that would assure Moscow that U.S. bomber payload is contracting commensurately with Soviet throw-weight. These would be substantial American concessions compared to the many thousand bomber weapons to which the United States is entitled under SALT II. They would warrant Soviet acceptance of the missile warhead and throw-weight reductions sought by the United States.

VII

Where, then, might the two sides emerge under the build-down approach? As we have noted, both the United States and the Soviet Union now have approximately 10,000 warheads in their strategic and INF forces. Programs now under way or projected point toward still higher force levels in the 1990s, approaching or surpassing 15,000 strategic warheads on each side. And these forces, left unchecked, would increasingly incorporate systems perplexing for arms control, including a varied array of cruise missiles and mobile ICBMS.

A build-down agreement would sharply change this prospect. The proposed target would be 5,000 missile-carried warheads, with a progressive tendency toward reducing the ratio of warheads to missiles. Assuming planners act rationally to distribute their reduced warhead quota over a reasonable number of launchers, the situation should be one of relatively greater strategic stability. To put the matter concretely, gradual introduction of perhaps 1,000 Midgetmen in the context of declining Soviet warhead totals should move the ratio of hard-target killers to ICBM targets from the present

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[7] On the assumption that bomber payload is worth about one-half an equivalent amount of missile throw-weight and that a bomber's payload is one-tenth the plane's gross takeoff weight, one could define Potential Destructive Capacity (PDC) as the sum of missile throw-weight plus one-half of bomber payload. Counting bombers identified in the SALT II data base (many of which are in fact moth-balled in the United States and obsolete in the Soviet Union), the potential destructive capacity totals are about 18,000,000 pounds for the United States and about 15,000,000 for the Soviet Union. In conjunction with reductions in missile warheads to 5,000, a parallel requirement to cut PDC to equality at 8,500,000 pounds should be workable and worthwhile. Under this limit, just as there would be constraints on the extent to which throw-weight was fractionated, there would presumably have to be limits on the divisibility of bomber payload, e.g., no more than 20 ALCMs per plane and no more than 2,500 ALCMs overall. These calculations are derived from the Kent-Warner data and appear in my unpublished technical analysis, "Constraining Potential Destructive Capability in Strategic Forces," September 1983.

5 to 1 toward less than 3 to 1, while evolutionary changes in the Soviet missile force would presumably move away from the dangerously skewed deployment now in evidence. It should indeed be, in President Reagan's key phrase, "a more stable balance of forces."

As to bomber-carried weapons, any viable agreement would almost certainly demand a curtailment in present U.S. plans. Speaking roughly, under a fair application of the bomber counting rules discussed earlier, the U.S. bomber force might have a strength of 250 to 300 aircraft (compared to 576 in the SALT II data base) and approximately 3,000 warheads, including perhaps 2,000–2,500 ALCMS. It is possible to envisage an aggregate warhead ceiling for both bombers and missiles that would be at the level of 8,000 warheads and would provide major cutbacks in potential destructive capacity. If INF missiles were included, the aggregate ceiling might emerge at a level of approximately 8,500 warheads.[8]

These levels would be dramatically below those now expected in the 1990s, but would leave ample scope for the two sides to modernize their way out of the vulnerabilities and unreliabilities now emerging. If it is possible to agree on a ballistic-missile warhead sub-limit of 5,000 to 6,000 within the aggregate, so much the better for stability. Because the Soviets have so many weapons on missiles, they may be reluctant to accept the missile reentry vehicle sublimit preferred by the United States. If, however, they do intend to deploy a sizable Blackjack force with cruise missiles (or long-range cruise missiles on Backfire, which would redefine those planes as "heavy bombers" in SALT II terms), they would consume a good fraction of their quota for that assignment.

A parallel build-down in warheads and potential destructive capacity would leave asymmetries between the forces. The Soviets might well prefer to keep 60 percent (3,000 warheads) of their missile quota on land, while the United States could continue its customary reliance on submarines and bombers. But each would be able to shift priorities as it constructs its posture against a predictably smaller threat from the other.

At any rate, compared to the present and prospective situations, it is not clear that stability would be harmed if the two countries had different force mixes within an aggregate ceiling on missile and bomber warheads. For example, a Soviet strategic force of 6,000 ballistic-missile warheads and 2,000 bomber weapons would provide no apparent advantages over an American force of 5,000 missile warheads and 3,000 bomber weapons. And reasonable latitude to compose one's force as one chooses would surely expedite agreement at a time when tardiness brings the severe penalty of continued force expansion by the other superpower. As the two sides build down to a specified level, the main discipline on how a side exercises freedom to mix different types of forces should come from the strategic dynamics which argue for dispersing warheads on more diverse platforms. Marshal Ogarkov himself has privately acknowledged to visitors that it would be imprudent for the Soviets to hold fast in an increasingly vulnerable posture anchored on heavy ICBMs.

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[8] I should make clear that my discussion of an aggregate warhead limit for missiles and bombers differs from the specific build-down proposal put forward at START, but it illustrates the range of outcomes to be expected under a missile warhead build-down coupled with a build-down in bomber platforms and potential destructive capacity on missiles and bombers.

VIII

Let us turn now to the potential impact of the build-down proposal on the ongoing debate within the United States—which is reflected elsewhere, notably in Europe. For the build-down, while developed strictly for its functional merits, does have a political purpose which ought to be stated forthrightly.

From the beginning, the build-down was contrived to bridge the serious differences now evident among Americans. It seeks to mold a consensus among those who have campaigned for a nuclear freeze and those who have opposed it. Not all those on either side will find the compromise satisfactory, but they should understand its features. Those who say we must stop strategic modernization immediately and those who say we must not limit modernization at all will oppose any proposition aimed at mapping a middle ground between the contending factions.

Few Americans hold such extreme positions, and it would be a caricature to portray pro- and anti-freeze camps as polarized in this way. Many Americans endorse the freeze as a shorthand message to prod a reluctant Administration to get on with the business of negotiating with the Soviet regime it has chosen to confront. In that sense, the freeze movement is demand-side politics, a vehicle enabling apprehensive citizens to indicate their preference for comprehensive arms restraints rather than unbounded military competition. On examination, moreover, many freeze proponents acknowledge the need for some adjustments in the present U.S. forces. The dispute shades off into questions of what kinds of replacement forces should be allowed under a freeze; that, in turn, often leads to the conclusion that, if replacement is to occur, it would be better to emphasize systems thought to be more stabilizing (like bombers and sea-based missiles) instead of such destabilizing weapons as large missiles with multiple warheads in fixed silos.

Thoughtful freeze advocates also recognize the political obstacles to their proposal. By a decisive margin of 58 to 40, the Senate has now tabled the freeze resolution. Even if Congress called for a freeze along the recommended lines, the Reagan Administration would clearly not propose it. And if such an ambitious proposal were advanced, one would expect negotiations to be protracted.

Similarly, reasonable advocates of force modernization accept the need to strive for effective arms accords. They do not contend that modernization should be totally unfettered. The assertion is that *selective* modernization is needed to correct or hedge against instabilities in the existing forces, for example, the rising threats to ICBM silos. Across a broad spectrum of American opinion, there is a greater basis for mutual accommodation than sometimes appears.

Making such an accommodation possible is, of course, a challenge to the American government, and one which it has found difficult to meet. A perceptive member of Congress has said that, "80 percent of the people don't trust the Russians, and 70 percent don't trust the Reagan Administration to be serious about arms control." In the face of such widespread mistrust, any President would have difficulty forging a consensus on national security policy. Yet it is almost axiomatic that a democratic foreign policy without domestic consensus leads to friction at home and failure abroad. Unless we can find common ground for Americans, we are not likely to find common ground with the Soviets.[9]

IX

Not surprisingly, Moscow is the wariest of all. It is understandably suspicious of any proposal from an American Administration it considers the most hostile of modern times. Its initial press reactions to the modifications in the U.S. START proposal suggest little understanding of the build-down concept's implications and the public commitment to reach a fair bargain balancing U.S. bomber advantages against Soviet missile advantages. It would be tragic for the superpowers to miss yet another opportunity to engage in productive diplomacy. A prerequisite to fair-minded consideration of the new U.S. initiatives is Kremlin recognition that they reflect the influence of the moderate forces in American politics, drawn together in a bipartisan coalition which will outlast the current Administration.

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[9] On the build-down concept's potential contribution to a national consensus, see Alton Frye, "Needed: A Nuclear Consensus," *The Los Angeles Times*, April 20, 1982, Part II, p. 7; "Divisions Imperil Arms Control," *ibid.* April 4, 1983, Part II, p. 5; "A Guaranteed Nuclear Build-Down?", *ibid.* April 5, 1983, Part II, p. 5; and "Build-Down Puts Up Scaffolding for Accord," *The New York Times*, October 19, 1983, p. A27. Also see *Seeds of Promise: The First Real Hearings on the Nuclear Arms Freeze* (organized by the Federation of American Scientists), Andover, Mass.: Brick House Publishing Co., 1983, pp. 82–84, 179–80, 188–91.

The coalition involves an unusual alliance between Senators Cohen and Nunn on the Armed Services Committee and Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Charles Percy (R.-Ill.), as well as his fellow committee member Joseph Biden (D.-Del.). It includes a key leader of the House Appropriations Committee, Congressman Norman Dicks (D.-Wash.), together with Representative Aspin of the Armed Services Committee and Representative Gore of the Intelligence Committee. As signalled by the October 31, 1983 Senate vote of 84–13 rejecting a motion to table a resolution supporting the build-down concept, the build-down coalition is in a position to assist in prompt ratification of an agreement tailored along these lines.

Apart from the intrinsic merits of build-down, the concept has been a vehicle through which those moderates have worked to reshape the U.S. negotiating position in a positive form. Soviet analysts would be wrong to conclude that these proposals are merely a disguised attempt to deprive the Soviet Union of its preferred forces, without commensurate sacrifices by the United States. On the contrary, they are subject to refinement in negotiation in order to discover the zone of mutual acceptability. If the Soviet government cannot find a way to respond constructively to ideas launched by congressional moderates, one despairs of any accommodation on arms control. One hopes that on reflection the Soviet government is capable of receiving fresh ideas as an invitation to bargain in good faith. What is needed now is not mutual denunciation, but thoughtful counterproposals to advance the search for the durable arms control regime which seems repeatedly to slip from our grasp.

The burden now rests on Moscow. An American Administration whose previous START proposals were unbalanced and non-negotiable has bowed to legislative persuasion and put forward credible recommendations. In vulgar parlance, the legislators have challenged their own government to put up or shut up, to prove that it really wants reductions by advancing an equitable plan to achieve them. That challenge is now before the Soviet government.

If the Kremlin does not like reductions paced by the variable ratios, let it argue for exclusive reliance on a percentage rate of reductions. If it does not like the percentage rate approach, let it suggest an annual quota or other method. If it does not favor the

5,000 ballistic-missile warhead limit, let it make a case for some other number. If it does not like the proposed constraints on bomber and air-launched cruise missiles, let it formulate others for negotiation.

If it merely rejects out of hand the build-down and related initiatives, what evidence will there be that Moscow has any genuine interest in the reductions it professes to want? The Soviet reaction will go far to determine how the political center in the United States will lean in coming months—and whether the center can hold against pressures to race harder and faster toward still higher plateaus in nuclear deployments.

The chances for strategic restraint depend, of course, on whether Moscow and Washington can frame compatible objectives. Do they wish to preserve the benefits of SALT II? If so, a build-down agreement would serve that purpose. Do they want to bolster stability by encouraging movement toward more dispersed and survivable systems? Build-down could promote that goal. Do they hope to rescue the arms control process from the gridlock caused by the counterproductive separation of the INF and START negotiations? Extension of build-down to cover all long-range nuclear forces under a common warhead aggregate would advance that objective. Would they prefer to confront each other in the next decade with thousands of additional warheads on their strategic launchers? Or would they find greater security in exploiting the momentum of modernization to impose reductions to a warhead level below that of 1983? Build-down provides a mechanism to make that choice real.

It is not a complete solution or the only solution to the dilemmas of nuclear competition. But those who find merit in reducing strategic arms and in restraining strategic modernization should welcome build-down as a useful approach. Above all, a mutual commitment to build-down would testify to acceptance of the first fact of our age: the American and Soviet peoples must find safety from the nuclear menace together—or they will not find it at all.

Pierre Lellouche

FRANCE AND THE EUROMISSILES: THE LIMITS OF IMMUNITY

If Voltaire were among us today, and if Candide, his hero, were traveling successively through the various nations of Western Europe, reporting on the deep social and political controversies which surround the question of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), no doubt France would appear to him as a nuclear El Dorado—a Panglossian wonderland where, apparently at least, everyone is *for* the French nuclear force, *against* the Soviet SS-20 missiles, and *for* the impending NATO deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. Everyone, that is, except for a small but divided minority composed of Communists, some right-wing politicians and analysts, a few left-wing Socialists and a tiny group of die-hard "ecologists." All in all, Candide would draw the conclusion that all is well in Socialist France—at least insofar as nuclear weapons are concerned—and that it must be depressing indeed to be an anti-nuclear "peace" activist in such a bizarre country.

To be sure, this judgment would carry some elements of truth: It is a fact that France is reacting quite differently from the rest of the Western world to the nuclear debate provoked by the INF affair. With the exception of a few large demonstrations—mostly orchestrated and dominated by the French Communist Party—there is simply no such thing as a genuine and powerful French "peace movement" analogous to those exisiting in West Germany, Holland or the United States. In fact, French public opinion reveals a high degree of passivity and indifference vis-à-vis Pershings and the nuclear debate as a whole. Government officials readily interpret this as a "consensus" in support of French security policy, and there again, their assessment is correct—at least in part.

After all, President François Mitterrand's staunch support for NATO's 1979 decision to deploy the Pershing II and cruise missiles did not create much of a political stir at home. And when defense is debated in France (as was the case recently with the adoption of the 1984–88 Military Program Law), this is done in an atmosphere of near-total indifference, as long as the sacrosanct national deterrent force is preserved and modernized. Similarly, the decision to

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build a seventh nuclear-missile submarine (taken immediately after Mitterrand's election) was unanimously acclaimed by both right-wing and left-wing parties. To the extent that politicians argue about defense today, it is about the general economic policy of the government, which may or may not permit the implementation of the latest five-year Program Law.

To a foreign observer (and at times, even to a French analyst) the nature of the current French debate (or lack of same) is indeed stunning when compared to what is happening throughout the rest of the West. While this peculiar French attitude has come as a divine surprise to the Reagan Administration and as a growing source of irritation to both Moscow and the various West European left-wing parties and peace organizations, little attempt has been made so far to understand the roots of France's debate.[1] After all, France has always been, since the days of Charles de Gaulle, a highly eccentric and unpredictable member of the NATO family. Why look beyond this? Even European peace activists have given up hope of seeing the French masses rally behind their movement.

Yet things are obviously much more complex. Those in charge of defense policy in France, as well as knowledgeable observers throughout the political spectrum, sense that the famous French "consensus" may in fact hide some nasty weaknesses and that the INF quagmire could very well spill over into the country, creating serious political difficulties at home as well as in the conduct of a stable foreign policy. Already, visible cracks have begun to appear in the walls of the French nuclear citadel, and it is by no means clear that the country's apparent cohesion on a whole range of sensitive defense matters will be able to survive an increasingly powerful combination of domestic and diplomatic pressures stemming from the INF issue.

As will be shown below, the outcome of these conflicting trends is uncertain at present. For France, however, the issue at stake is of fundamental importance: it is whether, in East-West relations today, the country can continue to exercise a margin of absolute independence in the conduct of her security policy—particularly when this involves French nuclear weapons; or, to phrase it differently, whether France must clarify in one way or another the basic ambiguity of her security policy with respect to her precise contribution to NATO and European security.

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[1] See, however, the three chapters devoted to France by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Dominique Moïsi and Nicole Gnesotto in *Pacifisme et Dissuasion*, ed. Pierre Lellouche, Paris: IFRI/ECONOMICA, 1983.

II

When asked why their country is apparently immune to the peace campaign that has overwhelmed all of Western Europe—and even Reagan's America—the standard answer given by French officials (and generally by most of the French defense establishment) is that France has had her own nuclear weapons for some 25 years, that she left NATO's integrated military command in 1966, and that, because they are used to relying on themselves for their own defense, the French—unlike their European neighbors—are less vulnerable to the neutralist or pacifist temptation.[2]

This argument, while not unfounded, is by no means the only explanation for the French attitude. Before analyzing it in some detail, then, let us briefly review several other relevant factors:

1) *The influence of the French Communist Party* (PCF) and its domination of the French peace campaign. The rhetoric of the PCF since the adoption of the 1979 NATO decision (and the fact that the PCF has faithfully echoed the Kremlin's arguments on the issue) and the PCF's dominance of the major French peace organization ("Le Mouvement de la Paix") have undoubtedly worked to discredit the whole peace campaign in the eyes of a large majority of the French public. This has been all the more damaging as French intellectual elites and public opinion as a whole have grown increasingly hostile to the U.S.S.R. in recent years, a point discussed in more detail below. Sensing this, the PCF has tried in recent months to create or utilize less visible "fronts" in the peace campaign (such as "l'Appel des Cent" for instance). Even then, however, efforts to mobilize mass support outside the Party itself have remained largely unsuccessful.

The high degree of communist influence in the peace campaign has had another damaging result: that of splitting the various peace organizations along ideological lines (in particular with the emergence of non-communist structures, like the CODENE).[3] So far, however, the latter have been unable to correct the communist-image problem despite their attempt to join forces with the other

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[2] In addition, of course, France, not being a party to the NATO decision of December 1979, is not involved in the deployment of any new American INF on her soil—a situation which simplifies matters greatly.

[3] For a detailed discussion of French peace organizations see Nicole Gnesotto, "La France, fille ainée de l'Alliance," in Lellouche, *op. cit.*

European non-communist organizations, particularly in France and in Britain.[4]

2) *The dramatic change of perception of the U.S.S.R. (and, conversely, of the United States), in the eyes of French elites and French public opinion as a whole.* In contrast to their neighbors (who ironically have traveled precisely the opposite way), the French have gone from virulent anti-Americanism in the 1950s and 1960s to an equally strong anti-Sovietism today.[5] In the French intellectual world, this can be summarized by the final victory of Raymond Aron over Jean-Paul Sartre—even among "les intellectuels de gauche"—after nearly four decades of ideological warfare. The U.S.S.R., which used to be the "model" of justice and socialism, is viewed today as *the* living symbol of totalitarianism. The works of Solzhenitsyn and the events of the past few years (Afghanistan, Poland, the deployment of the SS-20, the Korean Airlines incident) have played a key role in this radical change of image, as evidenced, for instance, in public opinion polls.[6] As a corollary, the image of the United States has changed in an equally significant way: While the French remain—by tradition, one could say—basically critical of the United States and the way Washington handles world affairs, they no longer view it as *the* dominant military power, but rather as a needed ally in the face of an increasingly threatening Soviet Union.[7]

The significance of this evolution is fundamental: not only does it explain many of France's security decisions in recent years (from the Ottawa Declaration of 1974 onwards), but it also underlines the contrasts between the French experience and what is happening in countries like West Germany and Holland. In those nations, not only does the peace movement deliberately ignore or take a benign view of the U.S.S.R., but it also reflects an overall rejection of the U.S. model to which these countries had wholeheartedly adhered after World War II. The French, on the other hand, no longer need the United States to resolve their identity problem.

3) *The characteristics of French nuclear policy itself, and the centralization of responsibility for national security decisions under the French*

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[4] This was clearly evident during last October's anti-Pershing II demonstrations, where in France two separate demonstrations had to be organized (one Communist and one non-Communist), and even then the number of French demonstrators (30,000–40,000) was far below the hundreds of thousands of people who rallied in Germany and Holland.

[5] See Dominique Moïsi, "Les Limites du consensus," *op. cit.*, and Pierre Hassner, "Western European Perceptions of the U.S.S.R.," *Daedalus*, Winter 1979.

[6] A recent survey of public opinion polls reveals that while 58% of the French saw the U.S.S.R. as "genuinely committed to peace" in 1975, that percentage dropped by 34 points five years later to only 24%. See Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, "Opinion publique et defense en France," Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, June 1983.

[7] *Ibid.*

system. The fact that French nuclear strategy is still based on massive counterpopulation retaliation ("la dissuasion du faible au fort") has allowed France to escape the difficult dilemmas created in the United States and in the European deployment countries by the emergence of highly accurate counterforce weapons such as the MX and Pershing II missiles. Whereas the United States and NATO as a whole are struggling with the extremely difficult problem of reconciling the "operational" and "societal" elements of deterrence,[8] French leaders have had no such problem.

Indeed, the Mitterrand government has repeatedly stressed the fundamental difference in kind between French strategic nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range forces on the other. That distinction has, on the whole, proved to be quite convincing to the French population. While a growing section of French public opinion and even a few French politicians[9] show increasing doubt about the actual value of the *force de frappe* in case of war, it is a fact that the French are not experiencing the kind of "reassurance" problem (to quote Michael Howard) typical of the NATO scene today. The "limited nuclear war" and "nuclear-war-fighting" arguments are simply not a part of the French debate. It is, of course, another question as to whether France will continue to enjoy this luxury as the planned modernization of the French nuclear forces goes forward and as French strategists begin to break away from the taboo of absolute, massive retaliation as the key to deterrence and "la non-bataille."

Another factor in shaping current French attitudes has been the weight of French institutions of the Fifth Republic, and particularly the extraordinary power of the President in the conduct of French security policy. In sharp contrast with other democratic constitutions, and in particular with federal systems (such as those in West Germany and the United States), the French President enjoys an almost limitless power when it comes to defense and foreign policy. That power is part of his "domaine reservé" and implies: (a) that parliamentary debate is virtually non-existent and in any case irrelevant to defense decisions (this is in turn reinforced by the lack of expertise on defense issues in both Houses); and (b) that defense decisions will be reinforced by party discipline. The latter consequence is particularly important in the case of the Mitterrand regime, given the deep divisions inside the Socialist Party (PS) on nuclear and defense issues. Were it not for the institutions of the Fifth Republic, a major split on defense might have already taken place inside the PS. Similarly, the inclusion in the government of Communist ministers, with a foreign policy of their own, so to speak, would have been equally impossible.

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[8] See my discussion of the issue in *Pacifisme et Dissuasion*, *op. cit.* To put it simply: the greater the operational credibility of one's deterrence posture to an adversary (due to the multiplication of war-fighting options), the lower the acceptability of that posture to one's own public opinion. Conversely, the more one relies on a massive retaliation strategy, the more abstract it will be—and therefore the more acceptable too—to one's electorate.

[9] See Michel Pinton's articles criticizing the lack of credibility of the French strategy of massive retaliation in *Le Monde*, 16 June 1983.

III

With these considerations in mind, it is possible to return to the central argument generally put forward to explain the peculiar nature of the French security debate, namely France's possession of a national nuclear deterrent.

It should be noted at the outset that the mere fact of possessing a national deterrent is not, for a Western democracy, an absolute insurance against self-doubt, or against pacifist criticism. It is enough to look at the situation in Britain (and, in a different context, in the United States) to understand that the existence of the *force de frappe* per se does not suffice as an explanation for a national "consensus" on security policy and nuclear deterrence in France.

Interestingly enough, while France clearly enjoys what Dominique Moïsi has called an "agreement on fundamentals" on security policy, this consensus rests much less on the actual military value of French weapons in case of war than on a set of rather abstract and highly ambiguous principles which the French have been taught to see as deriving from the possession of a national deterrent. Very much like the Americans or the British, the French do not like to think of the possible use of their nuclear weapons. Opinion polls reveal some serious doubt as to the usability of these weapons even as a last resort,[10] and even if France herself is invaded (let alone to defend Germany).[11] Yet, a vast majority of French citizens (including, since 1977–78, members of the PCF and the PS) find it "normal" for France to have *independent* nuclear weapons[12] and no one—even in the most Atlanticist circles—would ever envisage a return to the NATO fold. In truth then, the French "consensus" centers primarily on the symbolic value of nuclear weapons—on the notion of "independence," and on France's partial membership in NATO (which most French citizens understand as no membership at all, since that is what they have been told for years by their media).

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[10] According to a poll published in October 1982 ("Ça m'interesse"), 42% of the French declared that, even if the Red Army were entering France, they would prefer negotiating with the Soviets rather than using nuclear weapons. Thirty-nine percent would favor resisting by conventional means. In all, 44 % thought that the *force de frappe* was useless, since its use would entail wiping France off the map.

[11] According to the same poll, only 3% of the French would favor resorting to nuclear weapons to defend West Germany (60% would want to remain neutral).

[12] See Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, *op. cit.*

As a result, as soon as one starts digging a little deeper into that "consensus," and starts asking questions about what French weapons are really for in case of war, deep differences begin to appear. And here, interestingly enough, the differences do not follow France's right-left ideological polarization. Instead one finds a fundamental cleavage in each political family (except for the Communist Party which is, as usual, monolithic) between those who interpret "independence" and "deterrence" as, in effect, a status of de facto armed neutrality, and those who remain profoundly committed to the rest of Europe and the Alliance.

Even more fascinating perhaps is the composition of each of these two camps. In the first group, which I call the "nationalist-neutralist" group, one finds of course the Communists, but also the left-wing of the Socialist Party (the CERES) as well as some parts of the right-wing establishment who interpret de Gaulle's foreign policy as one of strict neutrality and equidistance between the "blocs." Here, the *force de frappe* is acclaimed to be both the symbol and key instrument of national independence, and France's main adversary remains the United States and/or Germany, not the Soviet Union.

In the other, "European-Atlanticist," group, one finds the major part of the PS (behind Mitterrand himself), the centrist and center-right parties, and more recently, the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR) under Jacques Chirac. For this group, current political and strategic realities exclude any neutralist temptations on the part of France: the adversary *is* the Soviet Union, and France's forces, though independent, are also to be committed to the security of her neighbors and of Germany in particular. This commitment, it is felt, should in the long run take the form of a genuine European defense cooperation linked (in varying degrees) to a continued U.S. involvement in Europe.

Until now, no major confrontation has taken place between these two rather strange coalitions. The reason for this is twofold: First, sensing the divisions in their own parties, French politicians have carefully avoided any serious debate on defense each time the opportunity for such a discussion has arisen.[13] Second, the strategic doctrine defined more than 20 years ago by de Gaulle (and put on paper only once, in the 1972 Defense White Paper) is a masterpiece of ambiguity. Officially, the ambiguity was aimed at keeping the

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[13] This was true, in particular, during the 1976 debate about the concept of "enlarged sanctuarization" put forward under Giscard.

Soviets guessing as to what France would do in case of war; in practice, however, it satisfied everybody in France herself. In his theory of the "three circles," one of the 1972 White Paper's chief authors, General Poirier, defined nuclear weapons as protecting the "national sanctuary" (namely France herself—the "first" circle), but also stated that France's security was directly linked to developments on her immediate periphery (namely Germany, the "second" circle).[14]

It is on this comfortable ambiguity that the "consensus" was built, and through it that France was able to capitalize politically on her nuclear forces in the conduct of her foreign policy throughout the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. If it was best for French interests, however, such a doctrine—and therefore, the consensus itself—could only last so long as three conditions were met:

—that the U.S. nuclear guarantee (which the French had declared worthless for themselves since 1959) still worked to protect all of non-nuclear Europe (which meant that the overall and regional East-West balances of forces were to be maintained);

—that Germany remained secure and stable within NATO, thereby securing a European geostrategic status quo which, for the first time in their history, put the French in the "second line" from their likely adversary; and

—that France was able to keep modernizing her deterrent, unconstrained by arms control or diplomatic pressure.

The central argument of this paper is that, as a result of the evolution of the overall correlation of forces between East and West since the late 1960s, and of the parallel transformation of both East-West and West-West relations during that period, each of these conditions has been—and is still—profoundly called into question. That fact, in turn, is bound to alter in a fundamental way the basic structure of French security policy. In this environment, the INF affair, which in reality cuts across each one of the three elements just listed, may well act as the catalyst for a major period of reassessment and redefinition of French security policy.

In a sense, that process of reassessment has already begun, since the first two conditions (the credibility of the extended U.S. deterrent over Western Europe, and the stability of Germany) have been perceived in France as dangerously slipping away ever since the mid-1970s. It is this new situation which has prompted a major rapprochement with NATO since 1974 (with the signing of the

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[14] The "third" circle being French interests in Africa and the Third World.

Ottawa Declaration),[15] and a new debate in the French defense community (since 1975–76) as to what concrete contribution France can provide to the Alliance and to Germany in particular.[16] The objective then, as is still the case under the present Socialist government, was to compensate at least in part for the declining credibility of the U.S. security guarantee in order to help reassure and stabilize Germany. This produced, in 1976, a new concept called "enlarged sanctuarization" and "forward battle," which in turn triggered the first serious political clash over defense policy since 1958. The vehemence of Gaullist and Communist opposition to the new concept (which they saw as a betrayal of national independence and strict nuclear deterrence) led President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to quickly retreat back into ambiguity. . .and silence. Thereafter, Giscard carefully avoided any departure from the standard "Gaullist" strategic discourse. When the INF decision came along, Giscard treated it as "NATO business," and refused to take sides publicly on the issue.

Ironically, it was during that same period and for the same set of reasons that a much more fundamental evolution began to take place within the left, and particularly within the Socialist Party. By 1977–78, both the PCF and the PS had gone from total opposition to a French deterrent to a position of "recognition" of the nuclear force. They did so, however, for different reasons. The Communists changed their position because they saw the French nuclear force as the key to a policy of genuine armed neutrality and as a bargaining chip for a future French disarmament policy. The Socialists, however, were divided between a strong left-wing minority (CERES), which was staunchly nationalist and neo-Gaullist (in the neutralist sense), and the dominant Mitterrand line, which was both more Atlanticist and more European in its orientation. When the INF issue came along, Mitterrand seized it immediately, sensing not only its importance in the upcoming electoral debate,[17] but also the fundamental political and strategic stakes of the issue for the future of Europe. Even before the May 1981 election, it was clear that Mitterrand had made up his mind: France had to intervene in the European and German debate in order to stop the risk of neutralist drift in non-nuclear Europe, and to help restore a balance of forces

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[15] The Ottawa Declaration recognizes the particular contribution of French and British national deterrents to the Alliance's overall deterrence effort.

[16] See Pierre Lellouche, "SALT and European Security: The French Dilemma," *Survival*, January/February 1980; "La France, les SALT et la securité de l'Europe," *Politique Entrangère*, 2/1979.

[17] Giscard's May 1980 trip to Warsaw in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and his silence on the SS-20 issue became key elements in the Socialist critique of his "soft" foreign policy vis-à-vis Moscow in the spring 1981 electoral campaign.

"broken by the introduction of the SS-20."[18] Underlying this position was a clearer understanding on the part of Mitterrand than was the case with Giscard of the gravity of the internal evolution in Germany and of the magnitude of Soviet goals—namely a Europe decoupled from America in terms of nuclear deterrence, and gradually sliding from détente to appeasement in the face of the U.S.S.R.'s conventional and nuclear superiority in the region.

Although many in the French bureaucracy had reached the same conclusion by 1980–81, Giscard himself still refused to take sides publicly in the INF controversy. According to Giscard's own recounting,[19] a key consideration in his reluctance to become involved was that by taking sides with NATO he would leave France open to Soviet demands that French nuclear forces should be counted in the INF talks in Geneva. (This argument, however, is hardly convincing [20] since the Soviets have constantly pressed for "compensation" against French and British systems, ever since the opening of the SALT talks in 1969.)[21]

What has happened since the May 1981 elections is well known: The Mitterrand government has openly taken sides in favor of the implementation of the NATO decision, going so far as to intervene directly in the German electoral debate (with Mitterrand's Bundestag speech in January 1983) at the cost of antagonizing both the Soviet Union and most of the West European Socialist parties (including in particular the German Social Democratic Party and its new leadership).

This new diplomatic orientation was reinforced on the defense side by two major new developments. First, an intensification of French-German security cooperation was undertaken, symbolized by the revival of the defense provisions of the French-German Treaty of Paris of 1963. The importance of this new process should be particularly stressed given its potential implications for future construction of a genuine European security structure. Second, an ambitious program of modernization of French forces was adopted in the context of the next five-year "Loi de Programmation Militaire" (1984–1988), with a projected budget of 830 billion francs.

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[18] See his interview in *Le Monde*, July 1980.

[19] V. Giscard d'Estaing, "Une Occasion historique pour l'Europe," *Le Monde*, February 19, 1983.

[20] The inclusion problem was officially raised by the Soviet side in bilateral French-Soviet consultations held in Moscow in January 1978—that is, one year before NATO took its "double-track" decision. According to a senior French diplomat who participated in these discussions, Giscard was duly informed of the Soviet demand (see letter of M. de la Ferrière published in *Le Monde*, 3–4 July 1983).

[21] Two other considerations—as far as they can be reconstructed by this author—seem to have played an equally significant role. First, by keeping silent, Giscard was hoping to shield France from the risk of pacifist contagion from abroad and from a divisive debate about the national nuclear force. The second reason was of a more "electoral" nature. To the extent that France did not support NATO deployment—at least officially—Giscard could count on Moscow's support, and therefore on a Communist Party bent on dividing the left. And a divided left in turn would ensure Giscard's reelection in May 1981. Ironically, the division of the left did in fact take place, but it produced the exact opposite result: it is precisely because the Union of the Left was broken that Mitterrand suddenly appeared politically free from the Communists, and therefore a credible candidate for the presidency.

In addition to confirming the modernization of French nuclear forces (with the introduction of the M-4 Hades and ASMP missiles), the new legislation also deals with the modernization of conventional forces with a view toward making them rapidly operational in the context of a war in central Europe. In particular, the law provides—in addition to the reinforcement of the First French Army—for the creation of a highly mobile 47,000-man "rapid action force" (FAR) entrusted with the mission of stopping Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG) deep inside German territory.[22] Initially, the employment of such forces is to be decoupled from the "strategic maneuver" of France, involving the use of French nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the usability of these French conventional assets in the context of a war in the center of Europe. This was not previously the case, since the employment of the First French Army was so closely tied to the nuclear maneuver that the role of these conventional forces amounted in fact to little more than a final tripwire preceding the use of French nuclear weapons.

IV

This, however, is far from being the end of the story. The various steps taken so far, and particularly Mitterrand's decision to take sides openly in favor of the INF decision, are not politically cost-free for France. As realism forces France to move away from the comfortable ambiguity of the past, France is also beginning to pay the political price of her more "European" security policy, both diplomatically (in the arms control area, in particular) as well as perhaps domestically (in terms of her own internal "consensus" on defense).

On the defense side, however, the situation is still "under control," and despite mounting criticism from the PCF, the government has so far been able to prevent a major disruption of the domestic consensus on security. The government's success on this score has derived from two principal factors. First, in moving toward greater European (and NATO) solidarity, the government has been able to count on the support of the Gaullist party. This is a new situation to the extent that until 1980–81, the Gaullists (and Jacques Chirac himself) vehemently opposed any departure from a strictly national deterrence posture.[23] Second, the government has been extremely careful indeed in redefining its posture vis-à-vis an eventual participation of French forces in the battle in central Europe. In the discussion of the recent five-year program, Defense Minister Charles Hernu and other top officials emphasized that in the event of war the employment of the FAR (as well as of the First French Army) would be decoupled from the use of any nuclear weapons, including French battlefield nuclear arms. As mentioned earlier, this does free these forces from their traditional mission of acting as a tripwire for nuclear escalation, and thus makes them more "usable" in Germany. At the same time, however, it may also signal to the Soviets—indirectly at least—that France's participation in the battle is limited to the non-nuclear level only—which Moscow could well interpret as a de facto and unilateral no-first-use pledge on the part of France.

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[22] See the two articles devoted to the FAR by "critics" and Jacques Isnard, *Le Monde*, 25 October 1983.

The pressure is much greater, and the risks for France much more considerable, in the arms control area, as a result of the Soviet demand to include French and British nuclear forces in the INF talks. This pressure is all the more serious now that an increasing body of West European opinion—particularly in the left-wing parties—is now openly supporting the Soviet position.[24] This in turn has triggered a potentially important political debate in France focusing on Mitterrand's 1981 decision to support the NATO decision. Former President Giscard d'Estaing, his former prime minister, Raymond Barre, as well as his diplomatic adviser, Gabriel Robin, have all strongly criticized Mitterrand's action on the grounds that, by supporting the 1979 decision, the new president made it inevitable for the Soviets to demand the inclusion of the French nuclear deterrent at the INF negotiating table.

This controversy, however, focuses on the wrong issue, and rests in fact on two fundamentally wrong assumptions, namely that: (a) France had the choice of neutrality in this instance, and (b) the Soviets would have exchanged this French "neutrality" for non-inclusion of French forces in INF. In reality, France never had the option of neutrality in this instance, given the centrality of the issue for the future military and political order of Europe as a whole, as well as its impact on the domestic fabric of West Germany. Indeed, it was Giscard himself who convened the four-power Guadeloupe Summit in January 1979 (with Great Britain, the United States, and West Germany), during which the INF decision, with its two-track approach, was actually drawn up. Although he refrained from making official statements on this issue, Giscard did maintain toward the Allies a policy of discreet diplomatic support. Thus France was never "neutral" toward INF in any but the most formal sense.

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[23] Jacques Chirac is now not only in favor of the NATO decision, but he also supports the concept of a "European nuclear deterrent," basically through the extension of France's nuclear deterrent over Germany. (On the latter point, see his recent speech to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Bonn, *Le Monde*, 20 October 1983.)

[24] Just recently the SPD formally joined those who demand the inclusion of French and British forces in INF (see Vogel's statement in *Le Monde*, 25–26 September 1983).

Whatever position France might have taken, the Soviets would in any case have insisted upon the inclusion of French and British systems in the Geneva talks. Including these systems was their best negotiating position given their underlying goal, which was from the very beginning to prevent *any* American deployment. This inclusion also provided them with a handle to prevent (or control) future modernization of French and British deterrent forces (a central Soviet objective dating back to the beginning of the SALT process in 1969). Far from being a tactical negotiating gimmick, moreover, the effort to include French and British forces was aimed at achieving what the Soviets view as a fundamental component of their long-term strategic relationship with the West—namely an overall intercontinental balance with the United States (in which they will of course be entitled to "parity") and a separate "European balance," decoupled from the United States and increasingly free of all U.S. nuclear weapons, in which the Soviets would also be entitled to a separate "parity," this time with France and Britain. This Soviet insistence on both global and regional "parity" actually amounts to giving the U.S.S.R. the right to own as many nuclear weapons as all other non-Soviet nations on the face of the earth, that is to say absolute superiority over each of these nations. Finally, by including French and British systems the Soviets could also hope to drive a wedge, not just between Americans and Europeans, but also between the Europeans themselves—i.e., between the two nuclear powers and the rest of non-nuclear Europe.

The real dilemma for France, therefore, was not whether she could support the decision; in either case, this was (and is) a no-win situation. By keeping silent, France would have projected an image of neutrality and would have only encouraged the neutralist drift at work among her neighbors, without even obtaining the non-inclusion she was seeking from Moscow. But by taking sides on the issue in favor of NATO, the French not only seem to justify the Soviet demand for inclusion, but they are also putting themselves in a position where they are increasingly perceived (thanks to Soviet propaganda and to the political blindness of many European opinion-makers) as the selfish nuclear power which consitutes the sole obstacle to a rapid and "fair" deal in Geneva. Here again, the end result is deepening discord among the Europeans themselves.

Given this no-win situation, Mitterrand did take the right—and courageous—decision. And to some extent, the entry of France into the debate since May 1981 has helped things a great deal in some of the deployment countries—namely Germany and Italy, where the results of the recent elections have turned out to be favorable developments in the context of INF deployment.

Unfortunately, however, if the decision itself was sound, the follow-up explanations and positions of the French government were often marred by some regretable mistakes. A first error was the way in which France justified her support of the NATO decision. In this respect the French government has been as confused and contradictory in its public explanations as the rest of its allies. To cite only two examples, President Mitterrand stressed repeatedly that the deployment of "the SS-20 has broken the balance in Europe," although French officials have repeatedly insisted that "there is no such thing as a European strategic balance." Similarly one cannot argue that the Pershing II "recouples" Western Europe to the U.S. deterrent and claim simultaneously that "flexible response does not make sense."

To make things worse, French diplomacy has found it necessary to intervene publicly on the "negotiating track" of the decision, with the result that France has espoused every twist and turn of the NATO negotiating posture, even though France is not involved in the drafting of those positions and the latter are not particularly coherent—to say the least. How could the French government support, for example, the "zero option" and at the same time argue that the Pershing II is necessary for "coupling"? How could France sign the Williamsburg communiqué without being bound by the INF negotiating terms it contained?

These weaknesses of course facilitate the task of Soviet propaganda. But they are also being exploited domestically, as the more active PCF tries to steal the theme of "peace" away from the Socialist Party, thereby creating the risk of a breakdown of the French defense consensus. (Not without a certain Gallic logic, the Communists argue that French systems should be counted in Geneva and that France herself should take part directly in the talks.)

These problems, however, may only be the beginning of more serious difficulties awaiting France in the months ahead. For it is obvious that the dilemmas for France will not end with the first deployment of INF in Britain, Italy and West Germany by the turn of the year. The dilemma, of course, is that France cannot choose any of the alternatives put before her by the INF issue, that is to say, declare either nuclear neutrality or reintegration into NATO. For obvious reasons having to do with the very deterrent value of her arsenal as well as with the balance of her internal and foreign policies, France is condemned to preserve the ambiguity of her strategic posture. Here again, any clarification in either direction also amounts to a no-win situation. Announcing that French nuclear forces contribute to the protection of France's neighbors, while certainly good for Alliance cohesion, also facilitates the task of Soviet propaganda in demanding the inclusion of the French arsenal in Geneva. But claiming that French nuclear forces only defend France, and not her allies, can only reinforce the centrifugal and neutralist forces at work in Europe, while contradicting everything that has been accomplished so far in the redefinition of French security policy toward a greater role in European security.

One consequence of this dilemma is that in order to counter Soviet arguments on the inclusion of the French deterrent in Geneva, Paris has recently been led to revert to a strict Gaullist strategic line emphasizing the purely national role of the French nuclear deterrent.[25] This has come in sharp contrast to the "European" concepts floated earlier in Mitterrand's presidency, and may in fact curtail some of the key developments envisaged for the recently revived French-German security cooperation. Here, the Soviets may have already won a major victory in their effort to divide, not just the Alliance, but the Europeans among themselves. Increasingly, France appears not only as a stubborn obstacle to a settlement in Geneva, but also as a selfish, strictly nationalist power, unconcerned by the fate of other Europeans. Ironically, Mitterrand, who courageously fought to promote the image of a France committed to the security of her neighbors, appears to have been gradually pushed back in the retrenchment of nuclear isolationism.

The second element of the French dilemma is disarmament. While France is on solid ground in opposing any inclusion of her forces in a phony "Eurostrategic balance" (which is in fact an alibi for a Soviet monopoly in INF), she will be much less convincing if she continues to oppose *any* participation whatsoever, even in the context of negotiations on strategic systems. Trying to hide this "no" by a vague and often empty rhetoric on non-nuclear disarmament measures[26] is in no way enough to relieve the political pressures brought to bear on France. To a certain extent, this difficulty has been resolved by President Mitterrand's recent speech at the United Nations[27] in which he outlined the idea of a global negotiation among the five nuclear powers as a follow-up to current superpower negotiations. But, by the very size and nature of her forces, France is obliged to attach strong qualifications to her willingness to take part in such an enterprise—qualifications which in turn may not be easy to sell to West European publics eager for quick arms control results. The conditions, which were set out forcefully in Mitterrand's U.N. speech, include:

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[25] Particularly revealing is Pierre Mauroy's 1983 speech to the IHEDN, when compared to his previous two statements. See my analysis in *Le Point*, 27 September 1983.

—Prior and significant reduction of Soviet and American strategic systems;
—A freeze on strategic defensive systems by both superpowers (particularly in the areas of anti-ballistic missile systems, anti-submarine warfare, and space warfare); and
—Linkage with parallel progress in conventional disarmament (including chemical weaponry).

Reasonable and positive as it may be, this new position on disarmament cannot, however, be expected to contain the growing pressure which is brought to bear upon France as the INF situation continues to evolve. Clearly, Soviet pressure to "count" French and British forces will continue beyond December 1983, whatever happens in Geneva. Similarly, the German—and West European—pressure too is bound to increase, particularly if the INF and START talks are somehow merged in the course of the coming year. And finally, this issue is also bound to become a delicate problem for the United States itself if, as is probable, the inclusion problem is shifted (say in 1984) from INF to START (or to a combined START-INF negotiation). At that point the United States would have to contemplate a "compensation" for French and British forces in the ceiling of its global strategic arsenal. This would not only be legally difficult to do (given the Jackson Amendment of 1972 requiring equal ceilings for future strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviets), but also politically and strategically unacceptable. Given the modernization programs now envisaged in London and Paris, both countries taken together could have up to 1,500 warheads by the mid-1990s, which comes to about one-third of the 5,000-warhead-per-side limit put forward by the Reagan Administration in the current START talks. In this context, "compensation" in START would mean American strategic inferiority by about 30 percent in the total number of warheads—a solution which would be wholly unacceptable to the United States.

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[26] See Jacques Soppelsa, "Euromissiles ou Surarmement: pour une grande negociation," *Defense Nationale*, July 1983.

[27] 29 September 1983.

All this means, then, that the United States might soon be tempted to find other ways to deal with the "French and British problem," particularly as German pressure for some kind of inclusion continues to mount. And it is by no means clear that the formula which may be designed in Washington and/or Bonn will be in the best French—or British—interest. One can therefore easily foresee some difficult times ahead with respect to this issue, and potentially some extremely divisive trends gaining force among the Allies as the INF-START quagmire thickens. The intensity of reactions in France to a recent statement by Vice President Bush on the inclusion issue is a fair indication of these trends.[28]

One can also safely predict what will happen in France, if pressures continue to be brought to bear on the country. All those who now support what Mitterrand has done thus far in respect to European security will begin to feel as if they have been trapped. Instead of showing their gratitude for French support on the INF issue, the Allies' insistence on arms control limitations on her nuclear forces would be tantamount to robbing France of her independence and to "selling out" her sole means of defense.[29] The logical trend then—and the most palatable one in terms of salvaging the French domestic consensus on defense—will then be for the government and the country as a whole to return to the nuclear citadel—saying "no" both to any kind of nuclear arms control and to an ungrateful Alliance.

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[28] On September 28, 1983, Vice President Bush hinted that French and British systems would have to be taken into account at one time or another in arms control negotiations. This rather ambiguous but noncommittal statement was interpreted in France (and in Britain) as a dangerous turnaround in the official American position, which in turn prompted the State Department to issue an equally ambiguous "clarification" (see *Le Monde*, 30 September 1983).

There are two approaches which might resolve the "inclusion" impasse. Under the first approach, each party would retain the "right" to numerical parity in each category of weapons, but the United States would in effect agree to a total number of deployed systems substantially inferior to that of the U.S.S.R. The problem of compensating for French and British forces would simply be left open, while being tacitly dealt with by unequal U.S. and Soviet deployment levels.

A second possible solution could involve the difficult question of throw-weight. The Soviets enjoy for the moment a considerable throw-weight superiority over the United States, and it is unlikely that the United States can remedy this situation either through arms control or through its current program of strategic modernization. Leaving the issue as it stands—that is, with no ceiling on throw-weight—but with an understanding that this represents "compensation" for French and British systems, may perhaps provide a sensible compromise acceptable to all sides.

[29] Interestingly enough, voices in this direction are beginning to be heard in France, from personalities who in no way belong to the "nationalist-neutralist" camp described earlier. See in particular Thierry de Montbrial, "La fin d'un consensus," *Le Monde*, September 1983.

Adam Bromke
Kim Richard Nossal

TENSIONS IN CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Rarely is Canada's external policy the subject of controversy. The country occupies a relatively modest station in the world and exerts its influence through quiet diplomacy, usually coordinated with its allies, and particularly with its major partner, the United States. Canada's foreign policy reflects the nature of the polity itself: it is marked by stability, a penchant for compromise, and a distinct disinclination for rapid political change. Over the last 40 years, there has been a fundamental continuity in Canada's strategic policies, but there has also been a fundamental tension in Canada's position toward the two superpowers.

This tension has resurfaced in the last two years, again prompting political debate over Canada's international position. Not since 1963 has foreign policy been a major political issue in Canadian politics. The breakdown of détente by 1980 alerted the Canadian public to the continuing dangers of East-West rivalries. The advent of the cruise missile has once again enhanced the strategic importance of the Canadian north, and rekindled the uneasiness with which Canadians have viewed their country's minor role in maintaining the balance of terror. Now, as the Trudeau era appears to be approaching its end, foreign policy looks like being a major issue in the general elections which will be held in the summer or fall of 1984.

As the elections come closer, various options in external relations available to Canada are being debated; the positions taken by political parties and other groups are gradually crystallizing. What should Canada's role in NATO be? Should the country give priority in its defense policy to North American continentalism by cultivating a special relationship with the United States, or should it adopt a more detached stand (resembling that of the Scandinavian countries), particularly by having nothing to do with nuclear weapons? A corollary question is: should Canada move toward closer eco-

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nomic integration with the United States, or should it try to emphasize its independence in the economic sphere? And, finally, should Ottawa take a more activist stand in East-West relations and possibly even try to mediate between Washington and Moscow? These questions are being asked publicly, with an intensity and persistence unknown for decades.

II

Since the Second World War, Canada's foreign policy has enjoyed a remarkable consistency. A coherent intellectual framework defining Canada's place in the world, which has proved exceedingly durable, evolved in the early postwar years. The key problem for Canadian policymakers, then as now, was the rivalry between East and West, and Canada's role in Soviet-American relations. Canadian diplomats in the immediate postwar period were keenly aware not only of the dangers of escalating superpower tensions but also of the limited opportunities for a small power like Canada to affect politics at the apex of the system.

Canadian foreign policymakers recognized that both the United States and the Soviet Union were "living in dread" of one another, as one Canadian diplomat, Dana Wilgress, put it in 1945. "If we could succeed in removing these two obsessions co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Western world would become operative without the friction now so obvious." To achieve this, Wilgress advocated for the West neither appeasement nor aggravation of conflict. Rather, he pressed for a middle course that anticipated by 20 years NATO's official "two-track" doctrine—a firm, but flexible stance vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R.[1]

By 1947, another Canadian diplomat, Escott M. Reid, was arguing that Canada's effectiveness in seeking its goals would depend on the intensity of East-West confrontation. The more intense the conflict, the greater would be Ottawa's dependence on Washington; conversely, Canada's international role would be enhanced with any reduction of East-West tensions. In essence, Reid suggested that Canada's main goal should be to moderate U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. "If we play our cards right," he wrote, "we can exert an influence in Washington out of proportion to the relative importance of our strength. . . .The game would be difficult, the issues would be delicate, but with skill we can play it successfully."[2]

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[1] Wilgress to External Affairs, September 27, 1945, quoted in Aloysius Balmawyder, ed., *Canadian-Soviet Relations 1939-1980*, Oakville (Ont.): Mosaic Press, 1981, pp. 26–27.

[2] Escott Reid, "The United States and the Soviet Union: A Study of the Probability of War and Some Implications for Canadian Policy," August 20, 1947, quoted in Balmawyder, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

Entry into the Atlantic Alliance followed naturally, for it fitted the ideological preferences of an overwhelming majority of Canadians. Indeed, the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent was one of the main proponents of a transatlantic treaty. NATO not only provided an effective defensive shield for North America and Western Europe. Just as important, it provided a multilateral anchor for the smaller member of the North American partnership. A special relationship developed between Canada and the United States in the 1940s and early 1950s as the multiple contacts between Ottawa and Washington that had developed during the war were expanded and strengthened by a common concern over the defense of North America. In this period, Canada's actual influence on its southern neighbor often exceeded the country's strength.

During the height of the cold war there were few opportunities for Canada to pursue the other foreign policy goal of moderating East-West tensions. Little room for middle-power diplomacy existed in a world tightly polarized between two antagonistic blocs. Ottawa's 1952 attempt to mediate the prisoners-of-war issue in the Korean negotiations, for instance, was decisively repudiated by Washington.

Stalin's death, which eased tensions, opened new avenues for Canada in this realm. After the Geneva Summit in the summer of 1955, the Department of External Affairs assessed Canada's position: the line of reasoning in the department's position paper echoed that laid out a decade earlier:

> . . .if the Americans believe a real danger of attack (from the U.S.S.R.) across Canada remains, there will be pressure upon us to accept the United States bases and troops in the North and ipso facto pressure on our sovereignty. If, therefore, one of our aims is to retain and strengthen our independence of the United States, it follows that we can best accomplish this in a world where the danger of war is diminished. Thus the two basic Canadian aims—security vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R., and the maintenance of our national independence coincide at the present time in a policy to exploit the present Soviet willingness to establish more peaceful and normal relations between the two power blocs.[3]

Canadian policy toward the East-West conflict in the mid-1950s followed what in essence was a two-track approach. On the one hand, modest approaches were made to the Soviet leadership; in October 1955, for example, Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, visited the Soviet Union, the first NATO foreign minister to do so. But at the same time, Canadian-American negotiations for a continentalized air-defense command—aimed explicitly at the Soviet Union—continued. In 1957, the two countries signed the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) agreement, complementing the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line which became operational that summer.

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[3] Department of External Affairs, "Canadian Policy in the Light of Soviet Tactical Changes since Geneva," September 22, 1955, Balmawyder, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–53.

The victory of John Diefenbaker and the Progressive Conservative Party in the general elections of 1957 did not lead to a break with the fundamentals of the St. Laurent-Pearson era. To be sure, Diefenbaker was more stridently anti-communist than his predecessors, given to stinging denunciations of human rights violations in the U.S.S.R. and virulent attacks against the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Such strong rhetoric, designed primarily for domestic consumption, did not prevent Soviet-Canadian relations from expanding. Trade, especially in grain, increased considerably and cultural exchanges between the two countries were initiated.

It was not until the 1960s that Canadians confronted the question of nuclear weapons. Canadian participation in NATO and NORAD had been strictly conventional. However, the Diefenbaker government had purchased a number of weapons systems—F-104 Starfighters, BOMARC B and Honest John missiles—which required nuclear warheads to be functional. The reaction from the Canadian public, heralding its aversion to stationing nuclear weapons in the country, was exceedingly critical. The division over this question was acute within the Conservative Party. For his part, Diefenbaker refused to come to a decision. In early 1963, the U.S. Department of State issued a press release criticizing Diefenbaker's reluctance to admit nuclear warheads and reminding Canada of its obligations. This intervention sharpened the debate within the government's ranks; the minister of national defense resigned; and the government was defeated in a vote of confidence in the House of Commons.

The nuclear question figured prominently in the ensuing elections. The Liberals, promising to accept nuclear warheads for the weapons systems, were returned with a minority government under Pearson's leadership. During this period, Canadian efforts to mitigate East-West tensions continued, although Canadian-American relations were badly soured by the Vietnam War. Pearson and his External Affairs minister, Paul Martin, sought without much success to moderate American policies in Vietnam, and in NATO circles urged Canada's allies to avoid confrontationist policies. In his first speech to NATO as prime minister, Pearson pressed his allies to try "to solve political problems, one by one, stage by stage, if not on the basis of confidence and co-operation, at least that of mutual toleration based on a common interest in survival."[4] It was a theme that was to be reiterated throughout his tenure as prime minister. But relations with the Soviet Union continued to make slow improvements: in 1966, for example, Martin visited the U.S.S.R. and Canada welcomed the Harmel Report, which committed NATO to a "two track" course of preserving the strength of the Alliance and seeking reduced tensions with the communist bloc.

III

Pierre Elliott Trudeau replaced Pearson in 1968. The new leader, a relative newcomer to the Liberal Party and without ties to the foreign affairs establishment, believed that Canada's role in the changing postwar world should be more modest. On coming to power, he ordered a comprehensive review of foreign policy, which took two years to complete. In the meantime, the government halved Canada's troop levels in Europe and slashed the defense budget.[5] Importantly, Trudeau moved to reduce Canada's nuclear role by phasing out the BOMARC and Honest John missiles, and by replacing the Starfighter's armaments with conventional weapons systems. By the early 1970s, only the Voodoo CF-101 interceptors attached to NORAD were armed with nuclear weapons; when these are replaced by new F-18s in the next two years, Canada will have no nuclear arsenal.

When the White Paper on foreign policy was finally issued in 1970, it marked a substantial departure from the internationalism of the St. Laurent-Pearson years. It rejected a middle-power role and called for a reduction of Canada's commitments abroad; instead, it urged greater attention to those aspects of external relations, such as trade, which directly benefited the country.

In the early Trudeau years, the Soviet-Canadian relationship flowered with the growth of détente. Trudeau visited the Soviet Union in 1971, the year before Nixon's much-vaunted trip. On his return, the prime minister outlined his awareness of the distance separating Ottawa from Moscow. "I harbour no naïve belief," he declared, "that our two countries will find themselves in a relationship which will reflect nothing but sweetness and tender feelings. . . . There remain many fundamental differences between us. . . . But surely, the only way to resolve these differences is by increased contact and effort at understanding."[6] While in many respects his foreign policy marked new departures, Trudeau upheld the traditional Canadian "two track" doctrine.

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[4] L. B. Pearson, "A Step Nearer An Atlantic Community," Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 63/8.

[5] The Canadian military budget was increased slightly in the mid-1970s to modernize equipment and later to meet the 1977 NATO pledge of a three percent real annual increase. However, at its current 1.8 percent of GNP, it remains comparatively next to the lowest in the Alliance.

As long as the United States adhered to the Nixon-Kissinger version of East-West détente, there was little difference between Ottawa and Washington over broader international issues. Canadian and American diplomats cooperated closely at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations. When in June 1979 the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaty was signed, following the victory of the Progressive Conservatives in Canada in May, the new Prime Minister, Joe Clark, sent congratulatory messages to Presidents Carter and Brezhnev; and his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Flora MacDonald, planned to visit Moscow early in 1980.

The Carter Administration's tougher stance toward the U.S.S.R., in reprisal for the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, met with the approval of the Progressive Conservative government. Canadian-Soviet cultural exchanges and trade, including grain sales, were sharply curtailed; a boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow was threatened; and Ms. MacDonald's trip to the U.S.S.R. was cancelled. However, the tone softened once the Liberals returned to power in February 1980. Canada went ahead with the Olympic boycott, but the grain embargo was lifted. Similarly, the Canadian government shared calmer, West European perspectives on the growing crisis in Poland. The Canadians were clearly sympathetic toward "Solidarity," but Mr. Trudeau did not want the Polish events to erupt into another East-West confrontation.

With the election of Ronald Reagan, and especially in the wake of his denunciation of martial law in Poland, the gap between Canada and the United States widened even more. Ottawa became increasingly apprehensive over Washington's drift away from its traditional moderate and predictable course in East-West relations, and its more openly confrontationist stance toward Moscow.

IV

The initiative to take a more decisive stand vis-à-vis the United States came as much from the Canadian public as from the government. Many Canadians were concerned about the Reagan Administration's emotional and bellicose attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Loose talk from the President and his senior advisers

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[6] "A Canadian Leader Looks at the Soviet Union," statement by Prime Minister Trudeau to the House of Commons, May 28, 1971.

(accessible in its full rhetoric to a Canadian audience via U.S. television networks)—of escalating the arms race, of limited nuclear conflict, of "star wars," and of a struggle between good and evil—have frightened many of those in Canada who had been used to the quiet management of the balance of terror by the superpowers. There has been as a result a marked shift in the attitudes of the Canadian public toward its southern neighbor. In a poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in mid-1983, 51 percent of the respondents named the Soviet Union as the main threat to world peace; but 21 percent felt that the United States posed the greater danger.

This trend in Canadian opinion acquired a specific target when the U.S. and Canadian governments agreed to test air-launched cruise missiles in northern Canada. The request to conduct the tests had been made originally by the Carter Administration. The U.S. Air Force was eager to test the inertial guidance system of the missile in terrain and climatic conditions similar to that of the northern Soviet Union. Since Canada is the only country with such attributes, Ottawa was asked to allow the USAF to test missiles from the Arctic to the Canadian Armed Forces testing base at Cold Lake, Alberta. When an agreement in principle was reached early in 1982 between the Reagan Administration and the Canadian government, Ottawa found itself with a determined and articulate opposition at home. By January 1983, a Gallup poll indicated that 52 percent of those Canadians who were aware of the cruise missile issue were opposed to testing.

A wave of public protests against cruise-missile testing was organized by numerous peace groups. In November 1982, 15,000 people demonstrated in Ottawa; other rallies were held across the country. These protests were followed in April 1983 by even larger demonstrations: in Vancouver alone, 65,000 people joined the mayor in a march through the streets of the city. Between November 1982 and May 1983, the prime minister's office received 6,570 telegrams and letters and 20,000 write-in forms and petitions on the cruise missile issue. A great deal of attention focused on Litton Systems of Toronto, which manufactures the guidance system for the cruise missile. Litton was also the target of a bomb attack in October 1982, the only incident of serious violence thus far associated with the cruise missile protests.

The cause of the peace movement gained the support of scientists, church leaders, politicians, labor leaders, and literary and academic figures. The Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops called the delivery in the spring of 1983 of 3,500 letters of protest to Prime

Minister Trudeau "a symbol of whether we opt for life or commit ourselves to a path that may lead to the ultimate death and destruction of all humanity." A number of unions, including the United Auto Workers of Canada and the Canadian Union of Public Employees, have expressed their disapproval of cruise-missile testing. Writing in the prestigious Toronto *Globe and Mail* in March 1983, a spokesman for the Canadian Medical Coalition for the Prevention of Nuclear War argued that if because of NATO and NORAD Canadians are obliged to prepare for their own demise, "perhaps it would be best to call into question Canada's association with these alliances."

Opposition to cruise-missile testing is reflected in the House of Commons, albeit unevenly. The small but articulate New Democratic Party has firmly lined up against the cruise missile. While the front benches of both the Liberals and Conservatives are committed to testing, a number of the backbenchers of both major parties have voiced their reservations.

The strength of popular opposition to cruise-missile testing has put the Trudeau government on the spot. There is little doubt that the Liberal leadership shares many of the public's apprehensions about the bellicose course of the Reagan Administration. As the prime minister himself put it in May 1983, Canadians "are demonstrating against what they see as the policy of the American president who has, rightly or wrongly, been perceived as warlike or so hostile against the Soviet Union that he can't be trusted. President Reagan and some around him have given some justification for those fears."

V

The Canadian government's predicament has not been all of American making, however. The Liberals themselves have generously contributed to their own problems in foreign policy. In the latter half of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, Mr. Trudeau's attention was firmly fixed on domestic problems: defusing Quebeçois nationalism, patriating the constitution from Britain, coping with recession, and, last but not least, fending off political challenges from the Progressive Conservatives.

Foreign policy, as a consequence, paled into insignificance in the Liberal government's eyes. Since 1970, there has not been a comprehensive reexamination of external policy (one was started by the Conservative government in 1979, but it never got beyond the blueprint stage). Mr. Trudeau, openly skeptical about the relevance of diplomats, surrounded himself with advisers who have been mostly economists, lawyers or experts in administrative theory, but who lacked any broader conception of Canada's role in the world or an appreciation of the continuing importance of diplomacy in the 1970s.

Certainly there was no clear-cut set of priorities—in sharp contrast to the Pearson period. As a result, Canadian statecraft fast became a patchwork of old initiatives and ad hoc responses to new exigencies. The thrust of Canadian foreign policy has been dissipated on issues of secondary importance. The prime minister and his secretary of the cabinet, Michael Pitfield, have expended a great deal of energy on "reforming" the foreign policy bureaucracy in an attempt to make it more "rational." Despite three reorganizations since 1980, however, little attention appears to have been paid to the question of what purposes this refined administrative structure is going to serve. Mr. Trudeau's initial attention after the 1980 elections seemed to focus on North-South problems; and although by the end of the 1970s he was the doyen of Alliance statesmen, Canada took a back seat in NATO, leaving the management of East-West relations to the two superpowers.

There have been rare flashes when the prime minister signaled that he is cognizant of the need for a more activist Canadian foreign policy. In an address to the United Nations in 1978, he advocated a "strategy of suffocation" of nuclear weapons; in a victory speech after the elections in February 1980, he presented a comprehensive agenda for improving East-West relations. But there has been no consistent follow-through. The Canadian government avoided taking a public stance on the strategic issues that divided NATO; nor did it offer any advice, in public at least, to the United States on arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R. In 1979, when all major European leaders openly urged the U.S. Senate to ratify the SALT II treaty, Mr. Trudeau did not join them, either as prime minister or opposition leader. And for the first two years after Ronald Reagan's election, despite the increased militancy of statements from Washington about the Soviet threat and what is needed to counter it, the silence from Ottawa continued.

The government's initial nonchalant position over cruise-missile testing stemmed from not having thought through the strategic implications of this new weapon. Since the NATO decision in 1979, Ottawa comforted itself with the erroneous view that Canada could support the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe without actually having more to do with it than accepting Litton's defense contract for the cruise missile's inertial guidance system. Soon, however, the Canadian government found itself caught at the very center of the strategic implications of this weapon.

The system that Washington has asked Ottawa to test is a second-generation cruise missile: this air-launched version is clearly not a theater, but a strategic, weapon. In the event of East-West conflict, these cruise missiles would be launched against the U.S.S.R. by American bombers flying over Canada's polar regions. And once the Soviets deploy their own version of air-launched cruise missiles (which they appear to have already tested), they will be using the same route. Defense against this generation of weapons may require a resurrection of the electronic screens of the 1950s. The new DEW line of the 1980s would be in the form of mid-course barriers in northern Canada which would detect incoming Soviet bombers and even destroy them (preferably before they had an opportunity to launch their missiles). The strategic significance of the Canadian north could once again become as important to the United States as it was in the pre-intercontinental ballistic missile era. A new strategy to fit these changed circumstances would have to be evolved jointly by Washington and Ottawa. But initially the Canadian government had little understanding of what it was getting into; it still does not seem to grasp fully the consequences of this new situation.

The Canadian government's reluctance to take a public stand on foreign policy issues may also have been due to force of habit. With but one short interlude, the Liberals have been in power for two decades; they have become used to taking the public for granted. Foreign policy has been very much the private domain of the prime minister and his closest advisers. Neither Mr. Trudeau nor his fast-changing External Affairs ministers have been inclined to elucidate the complexities of East-West relations for the benefit of the public. Thus, they have only succeeded in aggravating the bewilderment and apprehension over cruise-missile testing. Ironically, it was the Canadian External Affairs minister, Mark MacGuigan, who, at a NATO meeting in December 1981, lectured his West European colleagues on their peace movements: noting that such popular movements are "more a product of fear than logic," he urged his counterparts to do a better job in public relations. Little did he know of the gathering storm at home.

Only in 1982 did things begin to change in Ottawa. Allan MacEachen, who had been foreign minister from 1974 to 1976, and who had grown to be one of Mr. Trudeau's closest colleagues in the cabinet, was returned to that post. Canada has also adopted a more distinct profile in East-West relations. In the fall of 1982, the prime minister personally attended Brezhnev's funeral; he was soon followed to Moscow by a high-level External Affairs delegation to undertake a comprehensive review of Canada-U.S.S.R. relations—the first since the invasion of Afghanistan. In March 1983, on the eve of Vice President Bush's visit to Ottawa, Mr. Trudeau became more voluble on the issue of arms control. In the House of Commons, he urged the Americans to be more flexible in the Geneva negotiations. And after a meeting with Mr. Reagan in Washington in April, Mr. Trudeau revealed that he had pleaded with the President to hold a summit meeting with Mr. Andropov.

At the same time, the Liberal government launched a vigorous public campaign in defense of cruise-missile testing. On May 9, newspapers across the country received an unprecedented open letter from the prime minister presenting the government's view on the issue. Mr. Trudeau defended the preparations to deploy cruise missiles in Europe as a means of pressuring the Soviet Union to remove their SS-20s. "Having declared our support for the two track strategy," he wrote, "Canada should bear its fair share of the burden which that policy imposes upon the NATO alliance." Two months later, he would even argue that refusing to test the cruise missile would be tantamount to a Canadian withdrawal from NATO. The prime minister's personal campaign had little effect. In many editorials and letters to the editor, Mr. Trudeau's argument that refusing to test the cruise missile would entail withdrawing from NATO was dismissed as totally disingenuous, for cruise-missile testing does not stem from specific intra-alliance obligations; it is exclusively a Canada-United States bilateral matter.

The announcement in July that an agreement had been signed authorizing the commencement of testing in early 1984 prompted another round of coast-to-coast demonstrations. Yet, in the face of continued opposition, the government stood firm. At a Liberal Party think-tank on foreign policy held at Val Morin, Quebec, in August, Mr. MacEachen reasserted that the decision to test the cruise missile was irrevocable. For 30 years, he declared, Canada's security has been ensured by nuclear deterrence provided by the Western Alliance; the ability to preserve Canada's democratic way of life was inseparable from the security of the United States. He balanced this view, however, by stressing that the East-West dialogue must not be left exclusively to the United States and the Soviet Union. "The other countries, including Canada, ought to be there influencing one and influencing the other in directions which are useful and productive."

When the Korean Airlines 747 was shot down in September, the chill on Canadian-Soviet relations was immediate and pervasive, and not only because there were ten Canadians among the 269 civilian dead; there was widespread revulsion at this merciless act. It was unanimously condemned in the House of Commons and Aeroflot flights to Montreal were suspended for 60 days. But the incident had no mitigating effect on the cruise missile controversy: advocates of testing used it as evidence of the need for Western strength in armaments; opponents came to the opposite conclusion, that it demonstrated the urgent need for arms control.

The peace movement also tried to stall the testing through the judicial system. In an unprecedented move, a coalition of 26 anti-cruise-missile groups sought to have the government's decision declared unconstitutional on the grounds that the testing violated the guarantees of life set out in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms enshrined in the new 1982 Constitution. They scored an important victory when a Federal Court judge agreed to hear their case against the government. While it is unlikely that the peace movement will succeed in blocking the tests through the courts, the testimony that will be presented will undoubtedly receive widespread public attention.

By the fall of 1983, the government's efforts to elucidate the cruise missile issue had borne some fruit: polls indicated that only 38.5 percent of Canadians were opposed to testing, although only 41 percent supported it. On October 22, there were more "refuse the cruise" demonstrations throughout the country, with 17,000 people taking to the streets in Toronto alone. Even more significant, 57 percent of Canadians believed that over the last five years the danger of nuclear war has increased; two-thirds supported the government's efforts to lean on both superpowers to bring about nuclear disarmament. Clearly the public debate has moved beyond the cruise-missile testing issue to embrace broader foreign policy considerations.

VI

The strong stand over the cruise missile was also motivated by Ottawa's desire not to complicate further the already strained Canada-United States relationship. For by 1982, relations between the two countries on a number of bilateral issues had reached an unpleasant nadir—the result of a decade of competing nationalisms.

Mr. Trudeau returned to office in 1980 at a time when Canadian economic nationalism was at a peak. A more strident nationalism was also evident in the United States: the Nixon Administration's ten-percent import surcharge of August 1971 was the most telling manifestation of this. The Nixon "shocks" hit Canada particularly hard, and not only because of the country's dependence on the United States (more than half of Canada's gross national product is generated by foreign trade; 70 percent of Canadian exports go to the United States). More importantly, Washington refused to grant Canada the kind of exemption that had so readily been given in the past under the special relationship that had flowered since the days of Franklin Roosevelt and Mackenzie King in the late 1930s and 1940s. While the specialness of the relationship had been in slow decline over the 1960s as a new generation succeeded the wartime and postwar group of officials in Ottawa and Washington, the events of 1971 signaled that that period of a privileged position had drawn to a close.

The import surcharge, and Washington's negative response to Canadian requests for an exemption, galvanized Ottawa to reexamine the Canadian-American relationship. In a study completed in 1972, three options for Canadian-American economic relations were explored: maintaining the status quo; seeking further economic integration with the United States; or developing a long-term economic strategy to reduce Canada's vulnerability. Two of the options were but straw men: the status quo was obviously unsatisfactory, and no party has supported closer economic ties with the United States since the Liberals under Sir Wilfrid Laurier were defeated in 1911 on the issue of reciprocity. The so-called Third Option, which was adopted as policy in the fall of 1972, was an admixture of economic measures to diversify trade and to pursue a domestic industrial restructuring. Under this strategy, the Canadian government created the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) in 1972 to monitor and regulate foreign investment; and in 1976, Ottawa signed economic agreements with the European Communities and with Japan. After the 1980 elections, in a continuation of the Third Option policy, Mr. Trudeau introduced the National Energy Program (NEP), a wide-ranging scheme to "Canadianize" the oil and gas industry, and promised to strengthen FIRA.

These measures highlighted basic ideological differences between the two countries' approaches to the proper role of the state in the economy. Traditionally, Canadians have been used to a greater degree of government intervention in the economic sphere than Americans. The shift to the right in the United States under the Republicans exacerbated these differences. While the Carter Administration greeted the economic measures adopted after Mr. Trudeau's return to power in 1980 with initial protests, these were continued, fortissimo, by the Reagan Administration, which immediately set about to protect American interests in Canada by reversing Canadian policy. Throughout 1981, Canadians were subjected to what they perceived almost as a coordinated campaign of sharp criticism from American business circles and business-related publications.[7]

The acrimony over economic policy, especially NEP and FIRA, was reflected in a number of other disputes between the two countries. Mr. Reagan inherited two longstanding problems. The first was a fisheries treaty which had been negotiated and signed by the Carter Administration, but which the Senate refused to ratify. The second was the question of acid rain, in which the Reagan Administration initially showed little interest. Other "low" policy squabbles included the Garrison Diversion project in North Dakota; the Alaska gas pipeline; national gas prices; import restriction legislation over lumber; and trucking and overland transport regulations. Despite regular negotiations on these issues, little progress was made while the atmosphere continued to be clouded by the economic question.

By mid-1982, the American efforts to reverse Mr. Trudeau's 1980 policies, marked at times by blunt reminders about Canada's economic vulnerability, proved effective. The Trudeau government for all intents and purposes backed away from its economic platform, managing to salvage only some parts of its National Energy Program (some other aspects of this policy were in ruins anyway, since it was predicated on the erroneous assumption that world oil prices would continue to rise rapidly).

Moreover, the advent of George Shultz in June 1982 brought to the State Department a leader thoroughly familiar with Canadian-American issues and their past history. Mr. Shultz adopted a calmer attitude toward economic disputes and evidently established a good personal rapport with Mr. MacEachen. The two ministers developed a pattern of periodic meetings that served to ease tensions substantially even where the issues could not immediately be resolved.

Partly in response to this more relaxed atmosphere, the Trudeau government moved in mid-1983 to open abandonment of the Third Option policy. A Cabinet position paper issued in August accepted Canada's heavy reliance on the U.S. market, and urged new efforts to expand trade between the two countries.

On the American side, the State Department in September 1983 took a step small in American terms but widely noted in Canada, announcing that its Bureau of European Affairs—which handles relations with Canada—was being renamed the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, with the Canadian section headed by a new deputy assistant secretary of state. With the appointment of William Ruckelshaus as the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency in May 1983, the Reagan Administration has shown somewhat greater sensitivity to the problem of acid rain. Yet, at another meeting of the two foreign ministers in Halifax in mid-October, nothing much was accomplished. Mr. Shultz praised Canada as a staunch ally of the United States in agreeing to test the cruise missile, but Mr. Ruckelshaus made no concrete promises to reduce acid rain, stating that this was a complex domestic American problem.

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[7] For an assessment of the atmosphere of this period and of the issues involved, see Marie-Josée Drouin and Harald B. Malmgren, "Canada, the United States and the World Economy," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1981/82, pp. 393–413.

On the strategic issues, the Reagan Administration was slow to respond. When in early 1983 Vice President Bush was sent around NATO capitals to explain U.S. policy on arms control, Ottawa was not included on his itinerary. The U.S. Ambassador in Ottawa—not known for diplomatic finesse—advised the Canadian government to ignore the peace movement. Eventually, however, the political significance of the peace movement seems to have filtered into Washington. In March, Vice President Bush made a special trip to Ottawa, and in April the two foreign ministers met to review both multilateral and bilateral relations.

With the avowed fiasco of both the domestic and international components of the Third Option policy, Canada's economic relations have indeed acquired new importance. Basically there are two choices. The first would be to embrace Mr. Reagan's early proposal for a "North American accord," and move deliberately toward closer economic integration with the United States. This path would, however, be fraught with electoral problems for any Canadian political party rash enough to take it. It is thus likelier that the government will choose, as it has in the past, to pursue the other alternative: negotiating piecemeal agreements over specific issues, arguing periodically for special treatment of Canada. This would mean an attempt to return to the special relationship between the two countries which existed at mid-century. The success of this policy, however, depends on a continued positive response from Washington and perhaps on a continuation of Liberal rule.

VII

The present position of Pierre Elliott Trudeau resembles that of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1982 in West Germany—the two leaders, having shared overall East-West perspectives in the past, may still meet the same end in their careers. The political fortunes of the Liberals, like those of the Social Democrats in Germany from 1980 to the fall of 1982, have been steadily sagging. The Liberals continue to trail the Progressive Conservatives in popular support: the polls in September 1983 showed Tory support at 55 percent, compared to 27 percent for the Liberals.[8] The present House of Commons expires in 1985; elections in 1984 are therefore a certainty. And, as in West Germany, the two most important issues in that election will be the state of the economy and foreign policy.

The Conservative Party is confident of victory. Its growing popularity has been linked to the party's new leader, Brian Mulroney, a young, articulate and thoroughly bilingual lawyer from Montreal. Mr. Mulroney and his external affairs spokesman, Sinclair Stevens, have taken foreign policy positions well to the right of the earlier Clark government. In their anti-communist rhetoric, they come close, if not to the Reagan Administration, at least to the Thatcher government in Britain. They advocate closer military and economic ties with the United States. Yet, the actual changes carried out by a Conservative government may prove to be more of style than substance. For the Conservatives have little experience in foreign affairs and no distinct strategic doctrine of their own. In the last analysis—as the example of the Diefenbaker government demonstrated—they are likely to fall back on the familiar "two track" policy.

The New Democrats oppose both cruise-missile testing and economic integration with the United States. They are unlikely to fare well in the next election, since their popular support has been dropping. However, they remain well-entrenched in the western provinces, so that they may hold the balance of power in the next House of Commons if a minority government is returned. And the NDP is a committed and articulate party which, regardless of its representation, will press hard for its goals both inside and outside parliament.

Between these two extremes, the Liberals—and especially Mr. Trudeau—are engaged in some fancy footwork. By strongly supporting cruise-missile testing, they avoid the trap into which the West German Social Democrats fell—being tainted with anti-Americanism. At the same time, however, they carefully distance themselves from the positions taken by the Reagan Administration over broader East-West issues. Indeed, they try to draw out the Conservatives—as they did effectively in the Commons debate over the

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[8] These figures, when translated into numbers of seats in the House of Commons are, however, somewhat misleading. The Conservatives continue to have little firm support in Quebec; the Liberals are thus assured of substantial representation from this populous province in the next parliament.

Korean airliner tragedy—to take bellicose positions vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. in order to discredit them in the eyes of Canadians who are apprehensive about American bellicosity. This tactic was used during Margaret Thatcher's visit to Canada in early October 1983. In a speech to parliament, she engaged in strong anti-communist rhetoric (sounding much like Mr. Stevens, though more clever); Mr. Trudeau then subtly but unmistakably distanced himself from her.

By the fall, the prime minister had donned the garb of senior statesman in an effort to bridge the present chasm between Moscow and Washington. He established a special task force of government officials to look for ways to reduce tensions between the two superpowers. At the same time, it was disclosed that he plans to visit several West European capitals, probably to be followed by trips to Moscow and Washington to promote his ideas.

In a much-heralded speech at the University of Guelph on October 26, Mr. Trudeau warned about the "ominous rhythm of crisis" in East-West relations. He emphasized that he harbors no illusions about détente from the 1970s, but that he is not ready to write it off as a complete failure either. He called for stabilizing both nuclear and conventional armaments at a lower level. To overcome the present stalemate between the two blocs he advocated that the two-track approach be supplemented by a "third rail" of "high level political energy to speed the course of agreements."

The prime minister's initiative met with a generally favorable public response. Even *The Globe and Mail*, a paper not known for warmth toward the Liberal government, stressed the need for nonpartisan support for his efforts. In trying to defuse the East-West tensions, it observed, Mr. Trudeau was expressing "the authentic voice of the Canadian people" and the hopes "for a peaceful world" which they all share.

These initial steps to have Canada play a more prominent role must be taken with a grain of salt, however. Lester Pearson's experience a generation ago suggests that it is doubtful whether Canadian attempts to mediate between the U.S.S.R. and the United States would have any effect. Mr. Trudeau's enthusiasm to play such a role may also be short-lived—if his past international initiatives are any indication. Indeed, a good many Canadians view his new interest in foreign policy as little more than an election gimmick, aimed at bolstering sagging political fortunes. And there is the risk that if the prime minister's initiative evokes a warmer response from Moscow than from Washington, the Conservatives could turn the tables on him and charge the Liberal leader with undermining the unity of the Western Alliance.

A leader who is on the verge of being removed from power at home is also not likely to carry much weight in international affairs. And the fact remains that the Trudeaumania of 1968 has degenerated into Trudeauphobia in 1983, particularly in the western provinces. In the summer, when he was on vacation, there were calls from Liberal backbenchers for his resignation. His critics were silenced on his return, but rebellion may again surface in the party—particularly in view of later polls confirming a sharp downward trend in Liberal popularity. Should he resign before the next elections, the leading candidate to replace him would be John Turner, a former finance minister who resigned in 1975 and who in the meantime has safely distanced himself from Mr. Trudeau.[9] Under a new leader, it is still possible that the Liberals could stage a comeback, particularly if the economy, so tightly bound to economic fortunes in the United States, continues to improve during a presidential election year. It should also be easier for a new leader to return to a more active Pearsonian tradition in foreign policy.

VIII

Whatever the outcome of the political process, Washington will likely find a new aggressiveness in its relations with Ottawa. Canada's foreign policy is unlikely to be marked by the inertia that characterized it before 1982. A new government will be prodded in this direction by a public more alert to international issues, and more concerned about security policy and their government's role in the uneasy balance between East and West.

The cruise missile issue has proved an important catalyst. The debate has acquired broader, often symbolic dimensions: it now concerns Canada's foreign policy as a whole. This is reflected in greater attention being paid to international issues by the mass media and the public at large. A telling measure of this was Mr.

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[9] Mr. Turner, who was born in the west, is bilingual and since 1975 has been a prominent lawyer in Toronto. He has the best chance of winning broad support throughout the country, but it is by no means certain that he can be lured from his present comfortable position to become what might turn out to be just the leader of the opposition. Another potential contender is Donald MacDonald, also a former finance minister, who was poised for a leadership race in 1979 when it appeared that Mr. Trudeau would retire. When the latter changed his mind, Mr. MacDonald was left dangling. His subsequent acceptance of the chairmanship of a commission on the national economy from Prime Minister Trudeau has not enhanced his prestige. Among the present cabinet ministers, the most qualified and appealing candidate would be the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, Jean Chrétien. However, as a Quebecker succeeding another French-Canadian, he would be unlikely to capture English Canada. Moreover, the strong, century-old tradition in the Liberal Party of alternating anglophone and francophone leaders suggests that he would have difficulty securing support in a leadership convention.

MacEachen's admission in August 1983 that there should be a better dialogue with the public over foreign policy issues. Whether there is a Liberal or Conservative government in 1984, it is likely that a long-overdue comprehensive review of external relations—with considerable public input—will be undertaken.

A new government, then, will likely insist that its views on strategic matters be taken into account in the determination of American nuclear strategy. Canada's very existence is at stake, and the government in Ottawa will want to be kept closely informed about nuclear weapons developments and the progress of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The least the Canadians will demand, as a popular slogan has it, is that there be "no annihilation without consultation."

And, despite its modest station in the world, Canada has sufficient leverage over the United States to press for these objectives. It controls territory crucial to the Western Alliance; its security is inexorably linked to that of the United States—all the more with the advent of a new generation of strategic weaponry. In the economic sphere, Canada's bargaining position has improved too. Dependence on the U.S. economy has been offset somewhat by increased Canadian investment in the United States. Similarly, Canada's natural resources continue to be vital to the United States. Increased trade works to mutual advantage—and mutual dependence.

Greater activism and concern about broader international issues does not, however, mean that a new government in Ottawa in 1984 will take a sharply different course in its foreign policy. For there is a self-sustaining consensus in Canada about the fundamental givens of Canada's foreign policy. Such consensus falls well short of bipartisanship, but it is reflected in the stands on external relations taken by both the Liberal and Conservative parties.

That key fundamental given is the recognition that Canada's location between the United States and the Soviet Union has not changed since the days of Wilgress and Reid. Governments in Ottawa can try to ignore that geopolitical reality, as Mr. Trudeau was inclined to do. But before long, its centrality to Canadian foreign relations is bound to be thrust back upon policymakers in Ottawa.

John Lewis Gaddis

THE RISE, FALL AND FUTURE OF DÉTENTE

One of the occupational hazards of being a historian is that one tends to take on, with age, a certain air of resigned pessimism. This comes, I think, from our professional posture of constantly facing backwards: it is not cheering to have to focus one's attention on the disasters, defalcations, and miscalculations that make up human history. We are given, as a result, to such plaintive statements as: "Ah, yes, I knew it wouldn't work out," or "I saw it coming all along," or, most often, "Too bad they didn't listen to me."

Such, I am afraid, is the tone we historians have taken in looking at the last decade or so of Soviet-American relations. Détente, we now tell each other, was not an end to cold war tensions but rather a temporary relaxation that depended upon the unlikely intersection of unconnected phenomena. There had to be, we argue, approximate parity in the strategic arms race, a downplaying of ideological differences, a mutual willingness to refrain from challenging the interests of rivals, an ability to reward restraint when it occurred and to provide inducements to its further development, and the existence of strong, decisive and intelligent leadership at the top in both Washington and Moscow, capable of overriding all of the obstacles likely to be thrown in the path of détente by garbled communications, sullen bureaucracies, or outraged constituencies. To have found all of these things in place at the same time, we maintain, was about as likely as some rare astronomical conjunction of the stars and planets, or perhaps a balanced budget.

As a result, we have tended to see the revival of the cold war as an entirely predictable development rooted in deep and immutable historical forces. Those of us who hedged our bets about the durability of détente can now comfortably pat each other on the back, exchanging statements like: "We were right all along," or "Too bad they don't listen to historians," or "Isn't pessimism fun?"

But if historians are ever going to provide much in the way of usable guidance to policymakers—which is to say, if we are not

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going to leave the field wide open to the political scientists—then we are going to have to address not only questions of what went wrong, but of what might have been done differently. Were there things that could have been done to avoid the collapse of détente? Might these provide a basis for reconstituting it—perhaps in a more durable form—at some point in the future?

What follows is an attempt to account for the decline of détente not in terms of historical inevitability—because, beyond death, and perhaps unbalanced budgets, nothing really is inevitable in history—but rather as a failure of strategy from which there are certain things we might learn. The emphasis is on deficiencies in American strategy, not because the United States was solely, or even primarily, responsible for the collapse of détente, but because it is the only strategy we are in a position to do anything about. The Russians will have to learn from their own mistakes, which, as recent events once again confirm, have not been inconsiderable.

First, though, a word about strategy itself. I see it quite simply as the calculated relationship of ends and means, whether in the realm of military, political, economic, ideological or psychological competition. It is a multi-dimensional process that cannot be reduced to, or entirely divorced from, any one of those components. Our own contributions to the failure of détente arose, I will suggest, to a considerable degree from just that failure to view strategy in all of its dimensions—from our tendency, instead, to place its various elements in separate and discrete compartments. If this analysis is correct, then the future of détente—if there is to be one—may well depend in large part upon our ability to recapture some sense of just what strategy is all about in the first place.

II

As the concept of détente has fallen into disrepute in recent years, it has become fashionable to call for a return to, or a revival of, containment. The implied message of such groups as the Committee on the Present Danger, and of such members of that organization as have been, since 1981, in positions of official responsibility, has been that we should never have abandoned a strategy that recognized so clearly the nature of the Soviet threat, that provided such decisive programs for action, and that thus served to keep the peace throughout most of the cold war. From the perspective of these observers, the decision to seek détente in the early 1970s was an unwise exercise in wishful thinking, the effect of which was only to shift the signals, in the eyes of Moscow's watchful and ambitious ideologues, from red to yellow to green.[1]

But this assessment reflects a misunderstanding both of containment and of the détente that followed it, for containment never was a consistently applied or universally understood strategy. Like most strategies, it evolved over time and under the pressure of circumstance, to such an extent that its original founder, George F. Kennan, came ultimately to deny paternity when confronted with some of its more exotic manifestations.[2] If one is to understand where the idea of détente came from and what functions it was intended to serve, one must first be aware of how the idea of containment has evolved over the years.

A good place to begin in tracing this evolution is with a proposition that is, or should be, unexceptionable: that strategy can never be divorced from the costs of implementing it. There is an unassailable link between the objectives one seeks and the resources one has with which to seek—between one's ends and one's means. No successful strategy can ignore this relationship; unsuccessful strategies often fail precisely for want of attention to it.

For the policymaker, this linkage normally boils down to one of two options: shall interests be restricted to keep them in line with available resources; or shall resources be expanded to bring them into line with proclaimed interests? Does one allow the perception of limited means to force differentiations between vital and peripheral interests, on the ground that one cannot afford to defend every point against every adversary? Or does one allow the perception of undifferentiated interests to force the expansion of means, on the ground that one cannot afford, anywhere, to leave flanks exposed?

The history of containment can be written largely in terms of oscillations between these concepts: between the belief that limited means require differentiated interests, on the one hand, and the belief that undifferentiated interests require unlimited means, on the other.[3]

The original strategy of containment, as articulated largely by Kennan and as implemented by the Truman Administration between 1947 and 1949, operated from the presumption that the American capacity to shape events in the world at large was severely limited, both by the fragility of the domestic economy, which could easily slip into an inflationary spiral if spending was not kept under tight control, and by postwar pressures for demobilization, which had resulted in the abrupt dismantling of the wartime military establishment. As a consequence, the Kennan concept of containment was selective regarding interests to be defended—primarily Western Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East, and the Pacific offshore island chain—regarding the means of defense—primarily the economic rehabilitation of war-devastated economies, with military capabilities effectively restricted to the cautious use of air and naval power—and regarding the nature of the threat itself, which was seen quite precisely as the expansion of *Soviet* influence, with communism elsewhere in the world a danger only where it was directly and irrefutably under Moscow's control. The idea was to confront our principal adversary in arenas of competition chosen by us, employing means most consistent with the kinds of power we could most feasibly bring to bear.[4]

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[1] See, for example, Norman Podhoretz, *The Present Danger*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980.

[2] See George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1967, p. 367.

[3] An expanded version of this argument can be found in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

By early 1950, though, a succession of events—the victory of communism in China, the Soviet development of an atomic bomb, increasing concern about the dangers of piecemeal aggression in peripheral areas—all had contributed to the perception of vulnerable flanks having been left exposed. The result, in the form of NSC-68, was an expansion of means to fit more broadly defined interests: in the view of Paul Nitze, the principal author of that document, there was no real distinction between what was vital and what was not. Nor was there any reason to think that, through the adoption of Keynesian economic techniques—the use of deficit spending to stimulate the economy—the nation could not afford the means to sustain a strategy of global containment, in which we would be prepared to respond wherever and in whatever way our adversaries acted, without escalation or capitulation.

Korea, of course, provided a quick test of that strategy, and although that conflict did not result in a military defeat, its duration and costs—and particularly the fact that the strategy that governed it seemed to involve relinquishing the initiative, allowing adversaries to determine arenas and instruments of competition—forced yet another reconsideration of containment in Washington. For the incoming Eisenhower Administration, the global threat appeared no less dangerous than it had to the authors of NSC-68; the great difference was that the new President and his colleagues emphatically rejected Keynesian economics. Worried about the prospects of both perpetual deficits and confiscatory taxation, the Eisenhower Administration concentrated on finding ways to make containment work more effectively at less cost.

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[4] The famous "X" article in the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs* was, at best, a misleading explication of what Kennan had in mind. See, on this point, Kennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 364–367; and John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment: A Reassessment," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1977, pp. 873–887.

The result was a contraction of means in the form of a scaling down of conventional forces, together with a proportionately greater reliance on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, which, whatever else one might say about them, had the advantage of being relatively cheap. Once again, as with the Kennan strategy, concern about costs had produced selectivity in means, although in this case no contraction of interests. Nuclear weapons seemed to provide a way to defend global commitments at reasonable expense—a way, as John Foster Dulles liked to put it, to choose the time and the nature of our own response, thus denying adversaries the luxury of determining how and where we would expend our resources.

The problem here, of course, was credibility: could one really expect the United States to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in order to defend such unpromising pieces of real estate as Quemoy and Matsu? Did one not run the risk, by limiting one's means so narrowly, of encouraging once again piecemeal attacks on peripheral flanks, of having one's position gradually eroded by low-level challenges, none of them of sufficient size or gravity to merit nuclear retaliation? Such was the argument John F. Kennedy and his advisers made against the Eisenhower strategy, and, upon coming into office, they reverted to the concept of NSC-68: that means had to be expanded to meet interests. Keynesian economics again came into fashion; budgetary deficits became less of a concern; and the United States embarked upon the strategy of "flexible response," aimed at giving us the capacity to respond to aggression wherever it occurred, at whatever level it occurred.

But just as Korea had exposed the liabilities of NSC-68, so too Vietnam, in ways far more painful and traumatic, revealed the limitations of "flexible response": if one resolved to restrict one's response to nothing more or less than the other side's provocation, did one not then again relinquish the initiative to the other side, leaving it with the ability to make the real decisions as to the commitment and disposition of one's forces? How could one indefinitely sustain such a strategy without wrecking not only the domestic economy, but also the domestic political consensus any government must have in order to function successfully?

It was with this dilemma in mind that the architects of détente began to frame their strategy. Confronted by the necessity of cutting costs without abandoning containment, the Nixon Administration could have done several things:

(1) It could have returned to the early postwar concept of using economic development as a bulwark against communism—but attempts to transfer Marshall Plan solutions to the Third World areas that now seemed at risk had already proved to be unfeasible;

(2) It could have returned to the Eisenhower-Dulles concept of nuclear deterrence—but the Soviet Union had now attained approximate strategic parity with the United States, in part as a result of the distractions of Vietnam, and such an approach could hardly have carried much credibility;

(3) It could have done nothing at all, in the belief that the Russians and their allies would sooner or later overextend and exhaust themselves—but the new Administration was much too sensitive to the fragility of existing power balances to embrace such a passively optimistic course of action.

As it happened, Nixon and Kissinger did none of these things; instead they embraced "détente" *as a means of updating and reinvigorating containment.* The term had been in use since the early 1960s to connote a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union, and although such a relaxation was one part of the new Administration's approach, it would be a considerable oversimplification to say that this was its chief priority. Rather, détente was a means of maintaining the balance of power in a way that would be consistent with available resources. It was a redefinition of interests to accommodate capabilities. It was, like the Eisenhower strategy, a way to make containment function more efficiently, but through a method at once more ingenious and less risky than the old "massive retaliation" concept.

This method, on the face of it, was breathtakingly simple: containment would be made to work better at less cost by reducing the number of threats to be contained. The Nixon Administration tried to do this in three ways:

First, it sought to contract American interests, thereby lowering the danger of overcommitment. Because limited resources would not permit the defense of all vulnerable points, distinctions would have to be made, once again, between what was vital and what was not. Both Nixon and Kissinger conceived of American interests in classical balance-of-power terms (much as Kennan had): for them, the preferred situation would have been a pentagonal world order, with independent power centers in the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, Japan, and China all balancing one another. Admittedly, the kind of the power these nations could bring to bear was not the same: only two of the five were nuclear superpowers; others, like Western Europe and Japan, were economic giants; China's strength lay in neither the military nor the economic sphere, but in its sheer size and unique ideological position. The point though, Kissinger argued, was that the balance of power did not depend solely on an equilibrium of military strengths: what was required instead was an overall balance among all of the various components of power—a balance that would maintain itself without disproportionately large, and therefore disproportionately exhausting, American efforts.[5]

Second, the new Administration revised its criteria for identifying adversaries. Ideology alone, Nixon and Kissinger insisted, would no longer ensure hostility, because even ideologically antagonistic states could share common objectives in certain situations. By this logic, it might actually be possible to work with some communists to contain others. It was this reasoning that produced, of course, the dramatic reversal of policy toward China, and, as a consequence, an almost overnight contraction in the number of potential enemies to be contained.

Third, the Nixon Administration sought to engage the Soviet Union, for the first time on a sustained basis in the postwar period, in a direct effort to reduce tensions through diplomacy. These negotiations proceeded, not on the basis that all differences with the Russians could be resolved, but rather on the expectation that they could be managed: that despite competition between the two countries, there remained areas of congruent interest which, if identified, could provide the basis for a more efficient approach to containment by lowering still further the number of threats to be contained. Discussions were to be carried on with a keen sense of the relation between power and diplomacy: it could not be expected that the Russians would make concessions for nothing. Instead, both deterrents and inducements—sticks and carrots—would have to be used, and it was here that the idea of "linkage" came into play. Trade, credits, and technology transfers, it was thought, could be exchanged for Moscow's agreement to put a lid on the strategic arms race, to cooperate in managing crises in the Third World, and most immediately, to help the United States extricate itself gracefully from Vietnam. There was, thus, nothing idealistic about this approach to negotiation with the Russians; rather, it reflected what one would have to say was a remarkably cynical and manipulative view of human nature.

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[5] See Kissinger's speech to the *Pacem in Terris* III Conference, Washington, October 8, 1973, printed in Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 3d ed., New York: Norton, 1977, pp. 128–129.

Détente, then, was hardly an abandonment of containment, as its critics have charged. It was, rather, an imaginative effort to accommodate that strategy to existing realities, to maintain that calculated relationship of ends and means that any strategy must have in order to succeed. "We did not consider a relaxation of tensions a concession to the Soviets," Kissinger has recalled. "We had our own reasons for it. We were not abandoning the ideological struggle, but simply trying—tall order as it was—to discipline it by precepts of the national interest." And, again: "Détente defined not friendship but a strategy for a relationship among adversaries."[6]

In a curious way, in fact, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy resembled the original idea of containment as articulated by Kennan during the first years of the cold war. For that strategy too had sought, by means short of war, to maintain the global balance of power against Soviet expansionism. It had involved as well the association of American interests with a pentagonal world order, the idea of working with some communists to contain others, and the use of negotiations to seek to modify Soviet behavior.[7] In this sense, then, the architects of détente were not only functioning within the spirit of containment in shaping their strategy: they actually brought that strategy back, whether they realized it or not, to much the same point from which it had begun a quarter century before.

III

In some respects, this strategy of seeking containment by way of détente succeeded remarkably well. The SALT I agreements did limit significant aspects of the strategic arms race. Chronic issues perpetuating cold war tensions in Europe, notably Berlin, were now defused. Détente reversed, with deceptive ease, long-standing patterns of hostility by building a cooperative relationship with the Chinese at the expense of the Russians. Soviet power in the Middle East declined dramatically at a time when the dependence of Western economies on that part of the world was growing. Détente brought the Russians themselves into a position of economic dependence on the West that had not been present before. And, above all, détente ended Washington's myopic fixation with what Kissinger called "a small peninsula on a major continent"[8]—Vietnam—and focused its attention back on more important global concerns. It is no small tribute to the architects of détente—though one should not deny credit as well to the clumsiness of the Russians—that by any index of power other than military, the influence and prestige of the United States compared to that of the Soviet Union was significantly greater at the beginning of the 1980s than it had been a decade earlier.[9]

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[6] Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1982, pp. 236–237, 600. See also pp. 594, 980–983; and Richard Nixon's recent discussion of "hard-headed détente" in *The New York Times*, October 2, 1983.

[7] See, on this point, Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 25–88.

[8] Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1979, p. 1049.

Despite these achievements, though, détente by 1980 was almost universally regarded as having failed. The Russians had surged ahead of the United States in both strategic and conventional military power, it was argued. They had tightened rather than loosened controls on their own people. They had continued efforts to destabilize Third World areas; they had violated solemn agreements and, of course, most conspicuously, in 1979, they had brutally invaded Afghanistan. If this was containment, critics asked, could appeasement be far behind?

To some extent, these charges reflect a misunderstanding of what détente was all about in the first place. As we have seen, it was never intended entirely to end the arms race, or to eliminate competitions for influence in the Third World, or to serve as an instrument of reform within the Soviet Union, although official hyperbole at times gave that impression in the early 1970s. Rather, it sought to provide mechanisms for managing conflicts among adversaries, thereby lowering the dangers of escalation and overcommitment without at the same time compromising vital interests. Still, the fact that détente had come under such widespread criticism by 1980 suggests that its problems lay deeper than simple misunderstandings over objectives.

I would argue that the failure of détente grew in large part out of its never having been fully implemented: that significant components of that strategy—components critical to its success—were never really put into effect. Let me illustrate this point by discussing three areas: linkage, the military balance, and human rights.

(1) *Linkage.* The objective here was to try to change Soviet behavior through a process of positive and negative reinforcement: Russian actions consistent with our interests would be rewarded; those of which we disapproved would in some way be punished. But this implied a clear and consistent view of what American interests were, and of the extent to which Soviet behavior either enhanced or undercut them. That clear vision, in turn, implied

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[9] For one recent measurement of the phenomenon, see "What the World Thinks of America," *Newsweek*, July 11, 1983, pp. 44–53.

central control over the linkage process: one could not divide authority and still expect coherent strategy.

But division of authority is precisely what occurred. The late Senator Henry Jackson and his congressional colleagues torpedoed the 1972 Soviet-American trade agreement by requiring increased rates of Jewish emigration before credits and most-favored nation treatment would be provided—this despite the fact that the agreement itself had been intended as a reward for Soviet cooperation on Berlin, SALT, the Middle East and Vietnam. Later on, others outside the Administration took it upon themselves to decide where in the Third World the Russians should have shown restraint in return for the favors we had provided them, or to what extent they should have cut back on military expenditures, or what internal changes they would have to make in order for the negotiating process to continue.

Now it is probable that the Administration overestimated from the beginning what linkage could accomplish. The Russians made it quite clear that they would feel free to continue competition in Third World areas; moreover, as Kissinger later acknowledged at least with respect to Vietnam,[10] the Administration may have exaggerated its degree of control in such areas in the first place. Still, a final assessment on the principle of linkage cannot be made because the Administration was never allowed to define precisely what was to be linked to what, or to deliver the rewards it had promised in return for cooperative behavior.

(2) *The military balance.* Détente was, as we have seen, an approach to containment based on the perception of diminishing military means, these having declined as a result of the Vietnam War. The idea had been to attempt to constrain the Russians without further constraining ourselves. In the field of strategic weapons, Nixon and Kissinger accomplished their objectives with remarkable success: they managed to convince the Russians that they needed a SALT agreement more than we did, despite the fact that the agreement actually negotiated limited weapons programs only Moscow was likely to pursue. What is not often recognized about SALT I is that Nixon and Kissinger had intended to couple it with a military buildup of their own in areas not restricted by the agreement—notably, the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine, and the MX and cruise missiles.[11]

But again, this could not be done without congressional approval, and once more the problem of divided authority came into play.

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[10] Kissinger, *op.cit.*, pp. 1135, 1145–1146, 1151, 1153.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 1245–1246; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 998–1010.

Senator Jackson again imposed his priorities on the negotiating process, this time with a demand for across-the-board numerical equivalence in strategic weapons systems, despite the fact that the military had never sought, and Congress would never have authorized, building programs to reach those equivalencies. Vietnam had brought anti-military sentiment on Capitol Hill to an unprecedented intensity; there grew out of this a corrosive skepticism toward all government pronouncements on defense needs—including its warnings, now known to have been conservative, on the extent of the post-SALT Soviet military buildup. As a result, strategic modernization programs that Nixon, Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had intended to accompany the SALT I agreement were seriously delayed; more seriously, in order to get even these scaled-back appropriations through Congress, the Administration had to make significant cutbacks in conventional forces as well.

The consequence of this is something still not fully appreciated to this day: that the Nixon and Ford Administrations presided over the most dramatic reallocation of resources from defense to domestic purposes in modern American history. Defense spending as a percentage of total national budget had dropped from 44 percent at the time Richard Nixon took office in 1969 to 24 percent by the time Gerald Ford left it in 1977. Defense spending as a percentage of gross national product went from 8.7 percent in 1969 to 5.2 percent in 1977.[12] To be sure, some reduction in military spending would have occurred in any event as the Vietnam War came to an end. But reductions on this scale clearly exceeded what the two Administrations wanted, or what, in retrospect, can be considered to have been wise, in view of what we now know of Soviet military spending during the same period. If, in the case of linkage, the carrots Washington had intended to use to make détente work had been held back, now, in the military field, so too had been the sticks.

(3) *Human rights.* One of the grounds upon which the strategy of détente was most criticized was that it ignored the moral dimension of foreign policy. The United States could not expect to have its views prevail in the world, the argument ran, if those views were at variance with the deepest and most fundamental principles for which the nation was supposed to stand. Only by abandoning strategies based solely on considerations of power could the United States achieve the respect it needed both at home and abroad if its policies were to succeed.

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[12] Based on figures in U.S. Bureau of the Budget, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979,* Washington: G.P.O., 1979, pp. 364, 435.

Once again, though, this charge that détente proceeded without reference to moral questions reflected a poor understanding of what that strategy actually involved. For despite the seemingly cold-blooded geopolitical orientation of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, and despite some obvious moral lapses on the part of that doctrine's chief practitioner, the strategy of détente did not ignore moral issues. It did, however, insist upon the priority of order over justice. Without some framework of order, Kissinger repeatedly maintained, echoing the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, there could be no justice: that quality tends not to flourish in conditions of war, anarchy or revolution. Accordingly, the priority for détente was to build a stable international order within which the security interests of great states could be satisfied; that having been achieved, then the claims of justice might, for once, have some chance of being honored.

The only problem, as Kissinger recognized, was that "stability" was not the kind of concept to which passions would rally.[13] When it became clear that, from the viewpoint of the Administration, "stability" required prolonging the American involvement in Vietnam, or attempting to overthrow a constitutionally elected government in Chile, or consorting with repressive dictators on both the right and the left, then cries of outrage began to be heard, from both right and left at home. It is an indication of the potency of this appeal that both Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter could invoke the human rights issue during the 1976 campaign—albeit from different perspectives and with different targets in mind—and that this could become, once Carter took office in 1977, the major area in which he sought to distinguish his Administration from the one that had gone before. The opportunity to approach justice by way of order, like the attempts to approach containment by way of linkage and by way of increasing American military power, never really got off the ground.

Clearly, Nixon and Kissinger must bear some of the responsibility for all of this. Despite earnest and, on the whole, candid efforts to explain what was in fact a sophisticated and far-sighted strategy, they never really succeeded in putting it across, whether to their own bureaucracies, the Congress, or the public as a whole. To a considerable extent, their method undercut itself: they relied on secrecy and tight control to achieve major breakthroughs on China, Vietnam and arms control, yet that same shielding of the policy process from public scrutiny was seen by many as having got the nation into Vietnam in the first place and, for that matter, into Watergate as well. Secrecy, in itself, is not necessarily a bad thing. But unwise things done in secret can later come back to haunt those who would seek to do wise things in the same way.

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[13] Henry A. Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," in Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, p. 94.

Similarly, Nixon, Ford and Kissinger led the public to expect too much from their initiatives. Although they never claimed that détente would end all difficulties with the Russians, they did participate in the conclusion of two sweeping but meaningless agreements that seemed to imply something very much like that. I have in mind here the statement on "Basic Principles" to govern Soviet-American relations, signed at the Moscow Summit in 1972, and the Helsinki Accords of 1975. No one who knew anything about the Soviet Union should have expected that these agreements to refrain from seeking unilateral advantages or to observe human rights would actually be kept. But the White House incautiously agreed to them, thereby laying the foundation for future arguments that one could not expect the Russians to keep any agreements under any circumstances.

It must be said as well, though, that détente also ran into an unusual amount of plain bad luck. It was unfortunate that the strategy had to be put across in the atmosphere of mistrust and cynicism that followed the Vietnam War, that Nixon's own lack of scruple should have brought the Watergate crisis down upon his Administration just as détente was getting under way, that the Russians should have chosen the succeeding years to test the limits of détente in a series of provocative maneuvers ranging from Angola to Afghanistan, and that it should have fallen to the Carter Administration, which, although it favored détente, at no point clearly understood the strategy that lay behind it, to deal with them. Life is unfair.

Any strategy conducted on the basis of diminishing resources, whether at the level of geopolitics or below, will involve making distinctions between vital and peripheral interests, between mortal and simply bothersome threats. One cannot defend all points against all challenges. But this principle of concentrating one's resources and using them economically does have the disadvantage of leaving flanks exposed. If one misjudges the interests at stake or the threats that confront them, then one risks having one's position undermined in sudden and dangerous ways. A great premium is placed, therefore, upon the accurate assessment of defensive requirements, and of the risks posed to them. Discriminating judgments have to substitute for indiscriminate deployments, and that, given the American constitutional system, is a lot to expect of any

Administration, whether Democratic or Republican, liberal or conservative, moral or amoral.

IV

Since 1981 we have reverted to the idea of making containment work through deployment rather than discrimination. The Reagan Administration has rejected détente, with its emphasis on distinctions between interests, on gradations of threat, and on multidimensional responses. Instead we have returned to an earlier form of containment: one that assumes virtually unlimited resources for defense and little real prospect of settling differences through negotiation until what Dean Acheson used to like to call "situations of strength" have been created.

Few serious observers of the international scene would have questioned the need, in 1981, for substantial increases in defense appropriations—indeed, it is worth recalling that the Pentagon budget actually bottomed out during the last years of the Carter Administration, and was already on its way up at the time Reagan took office. Still, the current leadership has stressed defense over diplomacy in its dealings with the Soviet Union to a greater extent than would have been the case had Carter won reelection; one would, in fact, have to go back to the late Truman Administration to find a comparable emphasis upon the accumulation of military hardware and a corresponding degree of skepticism regarding negotiations.

To be sure, Kremlin leaders have done little to allay this skepticism. Their own military buildup, until very recently, has proceeded at an alarming rate, even allowing for the characteristic Russian tendency to "overcompensate" in such matters. They have maintained an opportunistic policy of attempting to exploit Western weaknesses wherever possible, often without regard to what concrete gains this might bring them. The recent Korean airliner incident demonstrates once again their chronic inability to anticipate the effects their own actions have on the rest of the world: to the extent that cohesion exists among the Soviet Union's adversaries, it is due, one suspects, more to Moscow's belligerent and at the same time querulous behavior than to Washington's diplomatic skill.

Still, the ineptitude of one's adversary provides little greater long-term protection against the defects in one's own strategy than does a related phenomenon that has benefited the Reagan Administration until quite recently: the fact that, compared to its immediate predecessors, it has been unusually fortunate in not having to face hard choices, either at home or abroad. It is worth examining these shortcomings, because they could become significant if that good luck—or the Kremlin leadership's habit of periodically shooting itself in the foot—should at some point run out.

(1) First, and most important, the Reagan Administration has embraced a defense strategy based on unlimited resources without providing reliable mechanisms for generating those resources. Financing a defense buildup through the economic stimulus of deficit spending—"military Keynesianism," one might call it—was a plausible enough approach during the Truman and Kennedy Administrations, when inflation was negligible and there was still some foreseeable prospect of balancing the budget. But the current economic climate is very different. For even though the Reagan Administration has brought inflation under control—with a considerable assist from Chairman Paul Volcker of the Federal Reserve Board, one might add—it has done so by tolerating the highest levels of unemployment we have had since the Great Depression, a policy that may prove difficult to sustain over time. And even if unemployment does decline, as it slowly seems to be doing, there remains the problem of massive budget deficits which seem likely to keep interest rates high, and thus to endanger recovery, for years to come.

To be sure, the Administration has attempted to apply to this problem its own backhanded version of Keynesianism—supply-side economics. But where previous flirtations with Keynesianism had involved expanding the budgetary pie for everyone, supply-side economics seemed to imply vast increases in the military's share and vast cutbacks in everything else, including curiously enough taxes, with the balance not to be made right until some distant day when the presumed benefits of this procedure would, as Mr. David Stockman inaptly put it, "trickle down."[14] Whatever its effect on the domestic economy, this was not an approach well calculated to build the public support that will be necessary if high levels of defense spending are to continue for very long.

And yet, there seems to prevail in the higher circles of this Administration the belief that if only we "stay the course" on defense spending, we can ultimately force the Russians to bankrupt their economy in the effort to keep up. If the historical record is any guide, we should be wary of this vulture-like argument: predictions of a Soviet economic collapse have been circulating since 1917 and it has not happened yet, any more than Moscow's own persistent predictions of our impending economic demise have come true.[15] A government's ability to tolerate discomfort in the name of defense depends, in large part, upon the extent of its authority over its own citizens, and there is no reason to expect, soon, a concentration of power in Washington that would rival Moscow's in that respect.

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[14] William Greidner, "The Education of David Stockman," *Atlantic*, December, 1981, p. 47.

We are stuck, then, with the fact that there is a direct relationship between the national security and the national economy. If one appears aimed at the moon while the other seems headed in the opposite direction, a certain imbalance results that is not likely to produce a stable domestic consensus. Of all the postwar Presidents, the one who would have been most appalled by the Reagan Administration's emphasis on military spending would have been the most military of all of them—Dwight Eisenhower. For it was Eisenhower's fundamental conviction, held with rock-like tenacity, that one could not have a healthy defense without a healthy economy: the two went hand in hand, and if seeking one meant sacrificing the other, then the whole game was lost. "We must not destroy," he said more than once, "what it is we are seeking to defend."[16]

(2) Second, the Reagan Administration, in its zeal to accumulate new weapons, has been slow to seek opportunities to make containment work through negotiation. Defense spending does not take place in a vacuum: in calculating its costs, one should take into account not only the immediate expenses involved in research, development, production and deployment, but also the probable response of the other side, which may make further expenditures necessary at a later date. One thinks of our decision, more than a decade ago, to place multiple warheads on our land-based missiles: the Russians' determination to follow our lead, and the fears we then developed about the vulnerability of those very missiles, led first to plans for deploying the cumbersome and costly MX, and more recently to a new conceptual breakthrough—the "Midgetman" single-warhead missile.[17] Might it not have been to our advantage to have sought a negotiated ban on multiple-warhead land-based missiles in the first place? Diplomacy, it is too often forgotten, can also be a means of achieving security—often at less cost and with fewer unfortunate side effects than a crash defense buildup.

But what is there to negotiate about? How can we trust the Russians to abide by agreements reached, given their dismal record in the past? In fact, if one looks at agreements which were in the Russians' own best interests to keep, such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty or SALT I, their record is much better than it has been on such things as the 1972 "Basic Principles" statement, or the Helsinki Accords. Agreements among great nations are only as good as the interests that lie behind them. No one should expect treaties permanently to constrain sovereign states against their will; the trick, rather, is to base such agreements upon specific areas of overlapping interest.

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[15] See, on this point, Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "Reagan and Russia," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1982/83, p. 263.

[16] Eisenhower press conference, November 11, 1953, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, Washington: G.P.O., 1960, p. 760.

[17] Henry Kissinger, "A New Approach to Arms Control," *Time*, March 21, 1983, pp. 24–26.

Such areas do exist, most obviously in the field of arms control. Both sides have found it to their advantage to observe the provisions of the unratified SALT II treaty: one wonders what possible disadvantage there could now be to going ahead and ratifying it? Why not proceed with the negotiation of a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? Why not investigate opportunities to reduce *both* theater and tactical nuclear forces in Europe, perhaps in connection with the "no-early-use" strategy that progress in conventional weaponry has now made "thinkable"?[18] And yet, the Reagan Administration confines its efforts to a series of separately pursued and so far unproductive negotiations on strategic and theater nuclear forces. Despite recent indications of greater flexibility in these talks, it still does not appear to have worked out a consistent position—how does one reconcile the "build-down" concept with deploying the MX in existing silos, for example, since the "build-down" would appear to require destroying two older warheads for each new but highly vulnerable one? Nor does the Administration seem to have grasped the possibility that broadly conceived and reliably verifiable arms control agreements, even those requiring substantial concessions on the part of ourselves and our allies, might well purchase greater security at less cost than the current tendency to deploy first, and then hope for negotiations afterwards.

Where it reflects the interests of both sides, and where it is verifiable, arms control works. It is not disarmament. It may not even involve arms reduction. But a framework of agreement between the superpowers can slow down and even stabilize the arms race; if nothing else, it can enhance each side's ability to monitor what the other has. That in itself is sufficient reason to pursue the opportunities, with greater vigor and on a broader scale than has been done up to now.

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[18] Whether or not one agrees with the "no-first-use" proposal put forward in 1982 by McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith in "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1982, pp. 753–768, there is no question that it has caused the strategy of "no early use" to be discussed seriously for the first time. See, for example, Bernard W. Rogers, "The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, pp. 1145–1157; Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes and Franz-Josef Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, pp. 1157–1171. See also the "Comment and Correspondence" sections in the Summer 1982 and Fall 1982 issues of *Foreign Affairs*, and McNamara's further discussion of the subject, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983, pp. 59–80.

(3) Third, the Reagan Administration has allowed support for containment to erode both at home and abroad by taking too casual an attitude toward the dangers of nuclear war. One of the arguments frequently cited against arms control—and against the whole détente strategy, for that matter—is that it induces complacency among one's own citizens and among allies overseas. But if the past three years have demonstrated anything at all, it is that the reverse is also true: overzealousness in the pursuit of defense can induce fears, not so much of the enemy himself, but of the very means by which one is trying to deter him. The purpose of a deterrent, Michael Howard has wisely commented, is both to discourage and to reassure: to discourage one's adversary from aggression, and to reassure one's own population and allies about their safety.[19]

The Reagan Administration's limited interest in arms control, together with its early pronouncements on fighting limited nuclear wars, firing nuclear warning shots, and do-it-yourself backyard civil defense—the "three feet of earth" theory—all of this has succeeded in undermining reassurance to a dangerous degree. It has also validated, once again, what historians will recognize as the Law of Unintended Consequence: the tendency of governments to bring about, through their own lack of foresight, precisely what it is they most seek to avoid.

For there now exists, both in this country and abroad, an anti-nuclear movement of unprecedented proportions. The strength of this campaign goes far deeper than the few conspicuous protesters who chain themselves to the gates of nuclear weapons plants; nor does it depend upon the immediate fortunes of the freeze movement. A revulsion against the very idea of nuclear deterrence is well underway, and if the Administration does not make progress soon on arms control, it is likely to see the initiative taken away from it both here and in Europe in ways it may regret, and which may not always be in the national interest. For it is the very weapons that are now the object of so much concern that have played a major role in keeping the peace for almost four decades; it would be tragic to see their deterrent role curtailed in the name of peace because a national administration did not know how to make use of them in that capacity without appearing to relish war.

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[19] Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1982/83, pp. 309–24.

These lapses on the part of the Reagan Administration reflect, it seems to me, a mono-dimensional approach to national security policy: they reveal a tendency to define interests and threats in chiefly military terms, with little or no awareness of the political, economic, or psychological components of strategy. As a result, this Administration runs the risk of generating something of the same antimilitary backlash that made the conduct of our affairs so difficult in the early 1970s. Containment, if it is to be accomplished successfully and sustained over the long term, is going to have to involve a keener awareness of these nonmilitary dimensions of strategy than the current Administration, to this date, has shown.

V

Containment will no doubt remain the central focus of our strategy in world affairs for some years to come. The Soviet Union shows no signs of contenting itself with the existing distribution of power in the world; experience certainly should have taught us by now that our capacity to moderate Moscow's ambitions by any means other than some fairly crude combination of sticks and carrots is severely limited. Still, there are a few things we might learn from our experience with containment to this point; things any future administration might do well to keep in mind as it seeks to devise strategies for dealing with the Russians.

(1) One is precisely how little we have learned from the past. We have shifted back and forth between the polarities of limited means and unlimited interests—between the risks of discrimination and the excesses that flow from its absence—having to learn each time the problems with each approach, oblivious, for the most part, to the possibility that we might do better with less dramatic swings of the geopolitical pendulum. Has the time not come to attempt to build into our policy-formulation process some sense of what has gone before, and at least of what elementary conclusions might be derived from it? There are various ways in which this might be accomplished: one might establish a permanent nonpartisan staff for the National Security Council, the only key policymaking body in this field that does not now have one; one might draw in a more formal and systematic capacity than is now done upon the expertise of retired presidents, national security advisors, secretaries of state and other experienced "elder" statesmen; one might even take the drastic step of encouraging high officials actually to read history themselves from time to time. The point would be to get away from our amnesiac habit of periodically re-inventing the wheel; after all,

the general shape of that device is reasonably well understood and may not need to be re-thought with each revolution.

(2) A second and related priority should be to insulate our long-term external concerns from our short-term internal preoccupations: no single deficiency in our approach to strategy and diplomacy causes us more grief than its subordination to the volatile and irresponsible whims of domestic politics. As a historian, and therefore something of a skeptic about the possibilities of human perfection, I cannot be very optimistic about achieving this. Indeed, the trend, in recent years, has been in just the other direction, toward the more frequent and more flagrant intrusion of politics into national security issues, and toward longer and longer periods of time required to repair the damage. No other great nation in the history of the world has fallen into the curious habit of re-thinking its foreign policy at quadrennial intervals to meet the anticipated desires of a particular small and snowy northern province, or one chiefly noted for the production of corn and pigs. A compression and rationalization of our presidential selection procedures would help remove these temptations; so too would a return to the tradition of bipartisan consultation on controversial foreign policy questions, a direction in which the Reagan Administration quite wisely is moving. What is really needed, though, is a change in our standards of political decorum: if we could get to the stage at which it would be as unacceptable to play politics with critical issues of foreign and national security policy as it has now become to joke about women and minorities from public platforms, then we would be well along the way toward solving this problem. But not until then.

(3) At the same time, there should be a greater and more deliberate effort made to relate national security policy to the national economy. We should never again succumb to the illusion that means are infinite, and that therefore the ends of strategy can be formulated quite independently of them. Means in fact will always be limited in some way; the art of strategy consists largely of adjusting desirable ends to fit available means. The Vietnam experience ought to have taught us that no nation can sustain a defense policy that wrecks its economy or deranges its polity; we need to recapture Eisenhower's insight that there is no more critical foundation for national strength than the national consensus that underlies it.

(4) We could also learn to be more precise about just what it is we are out to contain. Is the adversary the Soviet Union? Is it the world communist movement? Is it the great variety of non-com-

munist Marxist movements that exist throughout the world? Surely in an era in which we rely upon the world's most populous communist state to help contain the world's most powerful communist state, in an era when some of our best friends are socialists, there can be little doubt about the answer to this question. And yet, as our current policy in Central America and the Caribbean shows, we persist in lumping together the Soviet Union, international communism, and non-communist Marxism in the most careless and imprecise manner—to what end? It is a fundamental principle of strategy that one should never take on any more enemies than necessary at any given point. But we seem to do it all the time.

(5) It follows from this that we could also make greater use than we do of our friends. Most other nations heartily endorse our goal of a world safe for diversity; few, given the choice, would align themselves with the quite different goals of the Russians. Nationalism, in short, works for us rather than against us. And yet, we seem to go out of our way, at times, to alienate those who would cooperate in the task of containment. The blank check we have extended to the Israelis over the years—however useful in producing occasional grudging concessions on their part—has nonetheless impaired our ability to make common cause with the other nations of the Middle East whose interests we largely share: that the Russians have been able to take so little advantage of this situation is more a testimony to their ineptitude than to our wisdom. Our support for Taiwan for years prevented any exploitation of the Sino-Soviet split, and to this day retains the potential for weakening our very important relationship with mainland China. Our attitude toward white minority regimes in southern Africa has not always been best calculated to win us influence in the rest of that continent, most of whose leaders emphatically share our desire to keep the Russians out. Recently we even went out of our way to alienate some of our closest European allies by imposing a set of sanctions on the Soviet Union that no one thought would work, while at the same time, and for the sake of a domestic constituency, withholding another more potent set of sanctions (on grain) that might have. Containment would function more efficiently if others shared some of the burden of containing. And yet, we sometimes seem to make that difficult.

(6) Another trick that would make containment work better would be to take advantage, to a greater extent than we have, of the Russians' chronic tendency to generate resistance to themselves. This is one reason why Moscow has not been able to exploit the opportunities we have handed them in the Middle East and Africa;

it is why they have such difficulty consolidating opportunities they have taken advantage of themselves, as in Afghanistan. It is a cliché, by now, to describe the Soviet Union as the last great imperial power; what is not a cliché, but rather one of the more reliable "lessons" to be drawn from the admittedly imprecise discipline of history, is that imperial powers ultimately wind up containing themselves through the resistance they themselves provoke. Nothing could be clearer than that this is happening to the Russians today, and yet we seem not to take it much into account in framing our policies. We should.

(7) It would also help if we would cool the rhetoric. The current Administration is hardly the first to engage in verbal overkill, but the frequency and vividness of its excesses in this regard surely set some kind of record. The President has informed us that Jesus—not Kennan—was the original architect of containment.[20] The Vice President has recently criticized not only Soviet but Tsarist Russia for arrested cultural development, pointing out (with some historic license) that that country took no part in the Renaissance, the Reformation or the Enlightenment;[21] this would appear to be the diplomatic equivalent of saying: "Yeah, and so's your old man!" These are childish, but not innocent, pleasures. They demean those who engage in them, and therefore dignify the intended target. They obscure the message: how many people will recall Ambassador Charles Lichenstein's eloquent and amply deserved condemnation of the Korean airliner atrocity once he had coupled it with his offer to stand on the docks, waving goodbye to the United Nations? That the Russians themselves have long been masters of the art of invective is no reason to try to emulate them; this is one competition in which we can safely allow their preeminence.

(8) Finally, and in this connection, we should keep in mind the ultimate objectives of containment. That strategy was and still should be the means to a larger end, not an end in itself. It should lead to something; otherwise, like any strategy formulated without reference to policy, it is meaningless. There is a tendency in this country to let means become ends, to become so preoccupied with processes that one loses sight of the goal those processes were supposed to produce. We have been guilty of that to some extent with containment; we have missed in the past and are probably

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[20] Reagan speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 19, March 14, 1983, Washington: G.P.O., 1983, pp. 367–369.

[21] Bush speech to the Austrian Foreign Policy Association, Vienna, September 21, 1983, as quoted in *The Washington Post*, September 22, 1983.

today still missing opportunities to manage, control, and possibly resolve many of our disagreements with the Russians, apparently out of fear that such contacts might weaken the public's resolve to support containment. But that is getting things backward. The original idea of containment was ultimately to facilitate, not impede, the attainment of a less dangerous international order. It would not be a bad idea—from the point of view of everybody's interests—to get back to that concept.

VI

It would not be inappropriate, in thinking about these problems, to recall the story of Dr. Samuel Johnson and the dog that walked on its hind legs. What was remarkable, the great man pointed out, was not that the dog walked badly that way, but that it was able to do it at all.

Given all the impediments that exist in our society to the rational formulation of strategy, what is remarkable is not that we have done less well than we might have these past three and a half decades, but that we have done it at all. Containment has, on the whole, been a successful strategy, despite all its imprecisions, inefficiencies, and inconsistencies. One reason for this is that we have been fortunate in our antagonists—the Russians have been even more inept than we in seeking to promote their interests in the world.

Still, that is no excuse not to do better. We really ought not to go on framing long-term national security policy in response to short-term domestic political expedients, crossing our fingers each time in the hope that the result will relate, in some way, to the external realities we confront, and to our own long-term interests. We ought not to neglect, to the extent that we do, the relationship between national security and the national economy. We ought not to make unnecessary difficulties for ourselves through imprecision about what it is we are containing, through the impediments we place in the way of those who would join with us in that enterprise, and through our absent-mindedness about the ultimate objective that strategy is supposed to produce.

All of these things fall under the category of what Clausewitz, a century and a half ago, called "friction"—the problems an army, or a nation, inadvertently creates for itself by implementing what may be a perfectly good strategy in a short-sighted, haphazard, or poorly thought-out way. They make the difference between doing something well and just doing it, like Dr. Johnson's dog.

Détente, as conceived by Nixon and Kissinger in the early 1970s, was a well-intentioned effort to minimize this kind of friction: to make containment work more efficiently by taking a more precise view of what it was we were trying to contain, and by enlisting the aid of others in doing the containing. The fact that it failed says less about the flaws in that strategy than about the imperfect way in which it was executed—and that, in turn, raises an interesting dilemma. For if the evidence of Korea and Vietnam tells us anything at all, it is that this country will not support a foreign policy based on containment that disregards. But if we are to minimize costs, we will need to have a strategy, and that implies the need for discrimination, consistency, and central direction: qualities not easily incorporated into the American political system.

The task, then, will be to reconcile the division of authority our constitutional structure demands with the concentration of authority our position in world affairs requires. It will not be an easy task, to be sure, but it is not an entirely unfamiliar one either. We have managed it in the past, though at about the level of competency of Dr. Johnson's dog. One would hope, with experience, that we could learn to do it more gracefully, with less upsetting of furniture and shattering of crockery along the way. But better to do it awkwardly than not to do it at all.

Thomas G. Karis

REVOLUTION IN THE MAKING: BLACK POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA

For a quarter-century, the goals of American policy toward South Africa have remained remarkably consistent, but that consistency has served to mask sharply contrasting perceptions of the nature and direction of change in that country's racial policies. U.S. policymakers—including those of the Reagan Administration—have deplored official South African racism, affirmed the American belief in government by the consent of the governed, predicted fundamental change, and prayed that it would come peacefully. But beyond such broad outlines, American analysts have differed sharply in their specific judgments regarding the effectiveness of white-led change in South Africa, and the importance of black opposition to white rule.

The disagreements that underlie U.S. policy are sure to become more evident as the racial conflict within South Africa intensifies. And nowhere are the questions of U.S. goals and tactics likely to be posed more acutely than in U.S. policy toward the outlawed African National Congress—the oldest and most popular South African opposition movement, now enjoying a broad-based resurgence of support for its program of resistance to the white South African government. The umbrella organ of African nationalism in South Africa since 1912,[1] the ANC was officially banned in 1960, and has been engaged in "armed struggle" against the regime for over two decades. Although nearly all of its military support comes from communist sources, the ANC has become a well-organized liberation movement with wide-ranging international connections. During recent years, moreover, its sabotage and guerrilla attacks have become more frequent and sophisticated.

The ANC has been experiencing an extraordinarily open and country-wide resurgence within South Africa. The movement's

[1] The term "African" is used in this essay to mean black Africans. The term "black" is used here (as it is often used within South Africa itself) to refer to Africans, Indians, and mixed-blood "Coloureds."

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best-known leader, Nelson Mandela, who has served nearly 20 years of a life sentence for planning sabotage, easily ranks as the most widely admired African in the country. African support for the ANC is nationwide, cutting across tribal or ethnic groups, classes, regions, age, and education. Its broad aims, if not its tactics, undoubtedly command the support of the overwhelming majority of Coloureds and Indians and a small minority of whites.

Washington has typically been decades late in understanding black South African opposition movements, and U.S. policy toward the ANC is no exception. The Reagan Administration's most important statement on policy toward South Africa does not mention the ANC. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger said on June 23, 1983, that the policy of "constructive engagement" supports those "who are committed to peaceful change away from apartheid." America sees regional stability primarily as a problem of relations between states rather than as a problem rooted within South Africa and spilling over borders. The Administration, therefore, does not regard ANC guerrillas as "freedom fighters," its characterization of the "contras" fighting the Nicaraguan regime. Nor does it appear that Washington regards the ANC as a "legitimate political force," its characterization of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement in Angola. On the other hand, the Administration does not share the simplistic South African view that the ANC is a Soviet surrogate—a characterization adopted in November 1982 by Senator Jeremiah Denton's Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism.[2] Administration spokesmen see the ANC as "basically an African nationalist organization."

"There is a crisis in southern Africa," Mr. Eagleburger said, and the United States is "uniquely situated to speak to all sides in the conflict." Yet the Administration does not speak to the ANC, and it has not even taken a clear position toward the South African government's campaign to destroy the ANC both through increased repression inside South Africa and by a growing series of military actions against ANC centers in neighboring countries. The Administration sees no alternative to change controlled by the white government, fearing that any policy of pressure may lead to revolutionary chaos open to Soviet exploitation. In effect, then, "constructive engagement" means reliance on white initiatives, even though this has the effect, in the eyes of the country's black majority, of aligning the United States with white rule.

Administration spokesmen have also judged South Africa's new constitution, overwhelmingly endorsed by white voters on November 2, 1983, to be "a step in the right direction." Under it, Parliament will be reconstructed to include Coloureds and Indians for the first time, but in racially separate chambers. Despite those token changes, however, the new arrangement still excludes any participation by South Africa's African majority—a fact which can only increase racial polarization and is likely to intensify, rather than avert, racial conflict. Nor does the white government give any sign of reversing its other policies: stricter controls over African access to urban areas, large-scale movements of "surplus" Africans, and pursuit of "homeland independence" entailing loss of South African citizenship for certain African groups.

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[2] *Soviet, East German and Cuban Involvement in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa*, report prepared for the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, U.S. Senate, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., Washington: GPO, 1982.

Is current American policy most likely to contribute to peaceful change? Or is not the likely outcome just the kind of violent confrontation American policy seeks to avoid, in a situation where the direction of white South African policy is not changing and the ruling whites refuse to negotiate with the ANC and similar groups?

This article focuses on the issues posed by the importance of the ANC. It examines, first, the successive stages in the history of that organization, to what degree it is committed to violence, and its connections to the Soviet Union and other outside countries. The conclusion which emerges is that the United States should alter its posture toward the ANC, not only as a matter of principle but as a matter of U.S. national interest. In the years to come, no American policy can ensure a peaceful transition to a South Africa in which all citizens participate in the political process. But only by dealing with all sides—specifically including what is by far the most important African nationalist movement—can the United States do all that lies within its power to bring about that essential humane and geopolitical goal.

II

African professionals formed the ANC in 1912.[3] Its roots sprang from the Cape Colony's nonracial, though qualified, franchise for blacks in the mid-nineteenth century and in missionary education for Africans before that. Early ANC leaders found inspiration in the United States, and many of them, including the movement's first president, John Dube, and its principal founder, Pixley Seme, received their education at American schools and universities.

[3] Some passages on historical background appearing here are taken from the author's chapter on the ANC in *South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence*, ed. Thomas Callaghy, New York: Praeger, 1983. See also Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter, eds., *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974–77, 4 volumes.

For almost four decades, the ANC and its predominantly middle-class leaders responded to South Africa's segregationist and exploitative policies by organizing deputations, petitions, and public meetings. Then, in the watershed election of 1948, the National Party came to power in South Africa, and embarked upon its systematic "apartheid" policy of expanding customary segregation and giving it statutory form. Apartheid affected Coloureds and Indians as well as Africans and aimed at removing all liberal vestiges of their participation in the central political process.

Under the influence of an energetic new Youth League that included such future leaders as Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo, the ANC responded sharply to the new Nationalist program, and in 1949 adopted a new program of mass action: illegal but nonviolent boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience. This led to the 1952 Defiance Campaign, planned jointly with Indians. The political involvement of many thousands was intensified when some 8,500 Africans and their allies went to jail.

In the face of mounting government repression, ANC leaders reassessed in 1950 the need for non-African allies. They welcomed the formation of a multiracial congress alliance headed by the ANC and including congresses representing Indians, Coloureds and whites.

In forming that alliance, ANC leaders wrestled with the issue of their relationship to the small Communist Party of South Africa, which had by then been outlawed. Formed by whites in 1921, the Communist Party was the oldest Marxist-Leninist party on the continent. It rapidly became Africanized in the mid-twenties, and some of its leading Africans also joined the ANC. The visibility of whites and Indians in the Communist Party's leadership sparked African hostility during that period—it remains an important source of friction today—and youthful nationalist leaders such as Tambo and Mandela initially opposed cooperation both with communists and non-Africans. Anxious about unity, however, distinguished leaders of the older generation defended the record of African communists as one of loyal service to the ANC, and a small number of African communists began to play important roles in the ANC in the 1940s, although they did not, as the government claimed, dominate or control it.

In 1955 the congress alliance issued its Freedom Charter, a document that remains central as a definition of the aims of the ANC. We shall return to the ideological characteristics of this Charter. But its most important feature was its categorical declaration that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white."

This formulation was at the center of bitter disputes. Some ANC Youth Leaguers, who lacked the experience of close cooperation with whites and Indians, had remained in the ANC as an "Africanist" faction. They were finally to split in 1959, forming the Pan Africanist Congress under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe. While sharing the ANC's nonracial aims, the PAC rejected the Freedom Charter and insisted with mystical overtones that Africans were the indigenous owners of the soil. They also charged whites with manipulating events and pressing for premature action that harmed rank-and-file Africans. Today the Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognizes both the PAC and the ANC, but internecine disputes have largely crippled the PAC. Yet the PAC's Africanist appeal is potentially a powerful one.

The ANC has functioned throughout its history as an omnibus national movement. During the 1950s it operated on the fringes of illegality and faced innumerable problems of organization. Formal membership, therefore, was never a valid measure of its political significance. The ANC had strongholds in eastern Cape Province and on the Witwatersrand and both rural and urban pockets of support in most parts of the country. Repeatedly, it held rallies that attracted thousands and conducted popular, if often abortive, campaigns.

The 1950s were a time of sporadic and turbulent protest by Africans, much of it spontaneous. The decade ended in a watershed for African politics at Sharpeville, south of Johannesburg, on March 21, 1960. A line of jittery police opened fire on a peaceful crowd of anti-pass demonstrators organized by the PAC. Sixty-seven Africans were shot dead, the great majority hit in the back as they ran; 186 were wounded, including 40 women and eight children. Both the ANC and the PAC were outlawed and went underground. Many of the leaders were arrested, and thousands were detained under emergency regulations.

III

As a legal organization, the ANC was ill-prepared to embark on a militant campaign. Its leaders, who had come of age in a relatively open political system, were even less prepared for clandestine activity. In prison and underground, ANC leaders inevitably found themselves dealing with popular demands for violent action, which they had to balance against their own concern that such action would leave deep bitterness and could be counterproductive.

In December 1961, Chief Albert Lutuli, president of the ANC, was allowed to travel to Oslo, Norway to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of African patience during the 50 years of the ANC's legal existence. He read aloud President John F. Kennedy's congratulations on his record of "peaceful means" and repeated ANC calls for sanctions and external pressure.

A week later, on the day South African whites celebrate the defeat of the Zulus in 1828, the ANC's newly formed military wing, "Umkhonto we Sizwe" (Spear of the Nation), exploded home-made bombs at symbolic targets at times when no one would be injured. To protect rank-and-file members as well as Lutuli, efforts had been made to keep Umkhonto separate from the ANC. But in Oslo Lutuli ratified the ANC's historic turn when he spoke of the legitimacy of "armed force provoked by the adamancy of white rule." White and Indian communists participated in forming Umkhonto despite objections within their party to the feasibility of violence. The developing ANC-Communist Party alliance was given organizational expression in 1969 in the establishment of a Revolutionary Council with authority to direct Umkhonto and the armed struggle. The Council's vice-chairman under Tambo was Dr. Yusuf Dadoo, chairman of the Communist Party.

During the next decade, South Africa became a powerful police state, using detention and torture but also winning some black collaboration. The police smashed underground cells and demoralized the radical opposition. The unearthing of Umkhonto's headquarters in mid-1963 was followed by the sentencing to life imprisonment of Mandela and other major leaders. Tambo, who had been sent abroad, was cut off and had to add long-range military preparation to his diplomatic and propagandistic functions.

By the end of the 1960s, the ANC seemed to be little more than a shadowy presence in South Africa. At a conference in Tanzania in 1969, it emphasized the primacy of African "national consciousness" but also invited whites, Indians, and Coloureds to join. Meanwhile, in reaction to the political lull and passivity, South Africa saw the stirrings of what came to be called the Black Consciousness movement. Defining "black" to denote the status of racial oppression rather than color, a new generation of outspoken African, Coloured, and Indian students exerted a pervasive national influence for "psychological liberation" through their writings, meetings, and symbols of defiance. Steve Biko was to become the movement's internationally known spokesman before his brutal death at the hands of the security police in late 1977.

African workers also displayed a new sense of power in the 1970s.

Nearly 100,000 workers in the Durban area went on strike in early 1973 with almost no visible leadership. The collapse of the Portuguese government and, in 1975, the coming to power of revolutionary governments in Mozambique and Angola heightened black expectations inside the Republic.

A new era in black protest was signaled on June 16, 1976, in Johannesburg's Soweto. A student demonstration against instruction in the Afrikaans language was met by guns and turned into an uprising. According to official statistics, 575 people died in the shooting and rioting that followed, 134 of them under the age of 18. Other estimates were much higher. Demonstrations, arson, and violence (mainly by the police) spread to many parts of the country. What made "Soweto" a watershed was the qualitatively new level of defiance and fearlessness among black youth. It also resulted in the first substantial exodus of blacks for guerrilla training. Most of them moved through Swaziland and gravitated to the ANC in Tanzania.

On October 19, 1977, the government cracked down, banning all the major Black Consciousness organizations. It also detained African leaders known for their moderation, together with a few of their white allies. In the face of the government's repressive capacities, it had become clear that the kind of spontaneous, loosely organized protest represented by Sharpeville and Soweto could not be effective.

IV

The six years since the 1977 crackdown have witnessed a revival in above-ground black politics and the burgeoning of black unions. These legal activities, at one end of the action spectrum, have been accompanied by a resurgence of the ANC at the other end, pursuing a long-term strategy of "armed struggle" coordinated with mass political pressures such as demonstrations, boycotts and strikes. In effect, the opposition is pursuing two tracks, although there are already signs that the two could become linked at some point.

For its part, the ANC has expanded its structures within South Africa and set up camps in neighboring countries to train guerrillas, as well as establishing infiltration routes for their entry into South Africa. The aim of this violent component in the ANC strategy has been to conduct sabotage and small-scale guerrilla attacks against symbols of government oppression. And, in response, the government has conducted a systematic campaign against the ANC, including the open use of South African forces to attack alleged ANC centers in neighboring countries. The government is also suspected of responsibility for the assassinations of prominent ANC personalities both inside and outside South Africa.

The ANC's armed efforts for over 20 years have often been amateurish and abortive; they have also been marked by restraint. Its leaders acknowledge that its sabotage and small-scale guerrilla attacks have essentially been exercises in "armed propaganda." ANC guerrillas have attacked such targets as police stations, offices of government departments and officially sponsored black councils, and such symbolic targets of strategic significance as railway lines, oil depots, and electricity substations. The ANC has also taken responsibility for a small number of attacks on African policemen and the assassination of a few informers and state witnesses, actions obviously designed to deter such collaboration. But it has rejected the terrorism of indiscriminate killing and the assassination of white leaders, kidnapping, and other measures used by extremist groups elsewhere.

Thus, at least until May 1983, the number of lives lost in ANC actions was very small. In January 1983 this writer was given, by a Defense Force official, a memorandum summarizing casualties over the previous five years in the Republic, Transkei, Ciskei, and Venda. In incidents attributed to the ANC but not in every case confirmed, 22 people died, four of them white.[4]

Not until mid-1980 did ANC attacks appear seriously to worry the regime. At that time the ANC carried out its first major sabotage of strategically crucial facilities. Infiltrators cut through security fences and sabotaged three SASOL oil-from-coal plants 75 miles apart; no one was hurt.

On January 31, 1981, South African commandos made their first open crossing of the Mozambique border, destroying three ANC houses in Matola and killing 12 men (described as refugees by the ANC). They cut the ears off some.

After a lull of nearly two years in large-scale actions, in December 1982 helicopter-borne South African soldiers descended on Maseru, the capital of independent Lesotho, in a midnight raid. With cold-blooded deliberateness and with flares, bazookas, and machine guns, they sought out South Africans who they believed to be ANC activists in scattered houses and apartments. The invaders killed 42 people, including five women and two children. Some of the victims may have had military training; apparently most of them were refugees and visitors. Because of outdated intelligence, 12 Lesotho citizens were killed.

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[4] Press reports have indicated a larger number of casualties in incidents relating to resistance, but not necessarily involving the ANC or the PAC. During the five years ending February 1982, there were reports of about 51 deaths, fewer than half of them white policemen or soldiers, and 113 injured. Some observers estimate that four or five times as many incidents of sabotage and clashes with government forces have occurred but have not been allowed to appear in the press.

The ANC retaliated ten days later. In a salute to those killed in Maseru, four bombs in a staggered series over a period of 12 hours damaged the tightly guarded Koeberg nuclear power station under construction near Cape Town. Again no one was hurt.

Still stunned and infuriated by the Maseru raid, the ANC struck again on May 20, 1983, reaching a new level of violence and dramatic effect. A car bomb was exploded outside a military headquarters in downtown Pretoria at rush hour, killing 19 and injuring more than 200, including blacks. In targeting military personnel, the attack marked a shift in tactical emphasis. Three days later, South African planes attacked Matola in Mozambique, claiming 64 deaths, 41 of them ANC members. Although ANC members had occupied houses in Matola, the government of Mozambique asserted that they had left, and that the casualties were all civilian citizens of Mozambique—setting the total at six, including two children.

The South African external attacks have been part of a campaign to destabilize its neighbors and put pressure behind South African demands that those neighbors deny facilities of any kind to the ANC. The vulnerable black states near the Republic now deny that there are any ANC military facilities in their territory. But this does not satisfy the South Africans. On October 17, 1983, they returned to the attack, bombing offices in downtown Maputo in Mozambique allegedly used by the ANC for planning military operations but described by local residents as a propaganda center only.

Since the Pretoria attack, ANC leaders have engaged in an extended reexamination of their strategy, including problems of infiltration. The creation of a *cordon sanitaire* of black states can be expected to give greater impetus to ANC guerrilla training within the Republic's townships and depressed rural areas. Acknowledging "the reality" that countries bordering South Africa cannot provide bases, Oliver Tambo claimed in July 1983 that ANC guerrillas were being trained inside South Africa and that a political base had been created there. Yet the day appears many years away when the ANC underground, however linked to above-ground organizations, can seriously threaten the regime.

While the Pretoria bombing was a shock in some black quarters, the ANC's guerrilla actions also have a strong popular appeal, especially to angry and impatient young blacks, even as ANC activists and guerrillas are apprehended, jailed, sometimes tortured, killed in shootouts, and in a few cases hanged. Men whom whites regard as "terrorists" are acclaimed by blacks as "heroes and martyrs," says Bishop Desmond Tutu, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches. For its part, the government remains implacable: one high Defense official has told the writer that the problem posed by the ANC can be dealt with by killing every one of its members.

At the same time, white Defense leaders have often described the conflict as 80 percent political and only 20 percent military. And the ANC's resurgence can best be seen less in the scale of its clandestine activity than in the growth and openness of its popular support. Observing this in South Africa, one must remind oneself that the ANC has been outlawed for 23 years; its leaders, jailed, banned, or in exile; and anyone believed by the government to be furthering its aims, subject to prosecution for treason.

A new crackdown is always in the cards—or, more likely, less conspicuous and tailor-made restrictions. But for the time being, open protest has become revitalized, catalyzed in 1983 by the debate over the government's new constitution and by new legislative controls, seen by most blacks as a further entrenchment of white supremacy. Although outdoor meetings have been outlawed since 1976, 15,000 to 20,000 people at a time (attendance is now being controlled) have attended funerals of prominent ANC personalities. There, at meetings indoors, and at trials, supporters display ANC flags and colors of black, green, and gold. They show ANC slogans, give black power salutes, and sing freedom songs. Church bells tolled throughout Soweto, the sprawling black area near Johannesburg, in the early hours of June 9, 1983, when three ANC guerrillas were hanged.

The best organized display of support for the ANC in almost a quarter-century occurred on August 20–21, 1983, near Cape Town. The defiant reading of a message of greetings and solidarity from Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders in prison produced a standing ovation. It was the high point of a mass meeting of over 12,000 people, calling for the national launching of a United Democratic Front.

The UDF is now in being. Built up regionally since January, it is a locally based front—not an organization with individual members—of over 400 community, labor, religious, youth, and other organizations representing all races. Many of the organizations focus on local grievances. In the its multiracialism, the UDF resembles the congress alliance of the 1950s but differs organizationally since the alliance was comprised only of national organizations. The

UDF will be more difficult to decapitate. The membership of its affiliated groups is estimated to range from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000.

Seeking to encompass the widest possible opposition to the government's unfolding policy, the UDF has carefully avoided making adherence to the Freedom Charter a condition of membership. But its three presidents are veteran ANC activists: Oscar Mpetha, Archie Gumede, and Albertina Sisulu, the wife of Walter Sisulu, the ANC's imprisoned secretary-general. Its list of "patrons" includes Mandela, Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, and other prominent leaders or associates of the ANC.

Linked with them, however, are patrons and key officers who have not been identified with the ANC or were once prominent in the Black Consciousness movement. Among the former are Dr. Allan Boesak, president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches; Reverend Beyers Naude, the still-banned Afrikaans leader of the banned Christian Institute; and Andrew Boraine, the once-detained former president of the English-speaking National Union of South African Students, whose father is a leading member of the Progressive Federal Party. Among Black Consciousness personalities are Reverend Smangaliso Mkhatshwa, the formerly detained secretary-general of the Catholic Bishops' Conference, Aubrey Mokoena, Popo Molefe, and Mosiuoa Lekota.

As reflected in the UDF, the ANC's appeal is not difficult to see. As a national movement rather than a party, it symbolizes the historic struggle for equality. While other movements and organizations have risen and fallen, it has endured. In exile, the ANC has built organizational strength and won international legitimacy. In appealing for unity, it has been nondoctrinaire, with room for Christians, liberal pragmatists, communists, and members from all classes. As above-ground forces within South Africa have been harassed and their leaders repressed, as the PAC outside has waned, the ANC has inherited support almost by default. Leaders who have left South Africa and joined the ANC have represented diverse backgrounds and orientations: Barney Pityana, a close associate of Steve Biko, and Tenjiwe Mtintso from Black Consciousness; Thozamile Botha, the charismatic Port Elizabeth leader; and Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo, the main opponent of Kaiser Matanzima in nominally independent Transkei.

It is impossible to know how many of those within South Africa who identify with the ANC's aims are disposed to take part in some kind of revolutionary activity. Not uncommonly, Africans who appear conservative or bourgeois will exclaim: "We are all ANC; the ANC is in the hearts of the people." Some of this support may be symbolic, a diffused manifestation of frustration and opposition to continued and often ruthless control by a white minority years after blacks elsewhere in the region (except Namibia) have achieved independence. On the other hand, much of the ANC's support is dedicated and intense.

V

The ANC is of course far from being the only organization in opposition to the South African government. In the parliamentary arena, the white Progressive Federal Party carries on its minority role of constant critic, led by Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert and Helen Suzman, and supported by many important business and mining leaders such as Harry Oppenheimer. Many PFP members, however, did not follow the party line of opposing the constitution proposals in the November 2 referendum.

Outside the parliamentary arena, the South African Council of Churches and the increasing number of black labor unions are active. And Bishop Desmond Tutu—described by Joseph Lelyveld of *The New York Times* in 1982 as "probably the most widely accepted black leader in South Africa today"—has great impact and influence both as an individual and as a church leader. Other organizations appealing to blacks include AZAPO (the Azanian People's Organization), the Black Consciousness successor to the groups banned in 1977, and Inkatha, the Zulu-based national movement led by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland. Other homeland leaders have built local political parties, but neither they nor AZAPO and the underground PAC are serious rivals of the ANC.

Inkatha is thus seen by many outside observers as the only real competitor for widespread black support. Unlike the ANC, it is a legal organization and Buthelezi is able to travel widely outside South Africa. Inkatha poses a difficult problem for the ANC both at home and abroad. Although Black Consciousness spokesmen have treated Buthelezi with contempt because of his homeland role, the ANC during the 1970s maintained informal and fraternal relations. They considered it important that the strategically situated KwaZulu have a sympathetic leader who would refuse independence, as Buthelezi has. Furthermore, Inkatha, whose uniforms and colors resemble those of the ANC, was regarded as a potentially important mass organization that might eventually mesh with the ANC.

Black hostility to Buthelezi within South Africa has intensified, however. And after he was seen as antagonistic to school boycotts and other popular campaigns in 1980, Tambo and other ANC officials attacked him publicly. Buthelezi has, in turn, responded to such criticism with increasingly bitter rhetoric. A resolution of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in April 1983 declared that the ANC had become "opponents of the black people." Senior ANC leaders continued to hope for reconciliation, but their number has now dwindled. Those who have appreciated Buthelezi's potential role are concerned that he has a hidden agenda of displacing Mandela and the ANC.

Buthelezi's hypersensitivity has limited his ability to act as a unifying force. He has talked of workers' and consumers' power but made little progress in organizing it. Inkatha has also failed to sponsor protest campaigns that would attract youthful or militant support. Claims regarding its membership, most of it Zulu, are open to question; and, because of pressure to join, loyalty may be limited. As late as October 1982, Buthelezi was saying that Inkatha had about 360,000 members; by January 1983 his claim was 750,000.

In that month, Buthelezi's leadership suffered a humiliating blow. In a political breakthrough for the government, the middle class leaders of the Coloured Labour Party decided to participate in the proposed constitutional scheme. The party had been Buthelezi's most important ally in the South African Black Alliance, a loose coalition centered on Inkatha. Still more damaging has been the decision of the broad-based United Democratic Front to exclude Inkatha from affiliation.

Nevertheless, as a politically astute Zulu leader who makes African nationalist appeals, Buthelezi will continue to be a consequential personality. He has calculated that as pressures mount for radical change, whites will be compelled to turn to him as the most acceptable black leader. He opposes armed struggle (while threatening to undertake it), is prepared to compromise on one man one vote, endorses free enterprise, and promises reform and stability within South Africa's capitalist system. For a time, he was developing links to the National Party, but during the referendum campaign on the constitutional proposal he allied himself to the official white opposition, the Progressive Federal Party. As protest is mobilized, Buthelezi's warning that the alignment of black political groups with the ANC will trigger a "black civil war" may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The relative appeal of the ANC and other black groups cannot be evaluated with any precision. An official government commission on security laws reported in February 1982 that ANC support was confined to a "very small minority." On the other hand, military spokesmen say that ANC guerrillas are "everywhere." Other officials accuse popular organizations, for example, the South African Council of Churches and some black labor unions, of doing the work of the ANC. Africans of undoubted credibility make estimates of popular feeling that should be given weight. Bishop Tutu, for example, has placed Mandela at the top of his list of "our real leaders."

Joseph Lelyveld described popular black reaction to the ANC's May 1983 Pretoria bombing as jubilant despite the fact that blacks were among the victims. Support for the ANC, he observed, had apparently been bolstered. In Durban, supposedly the power base of Buthelezi, Lelyveld wrote, "there was a perceptible shift of sentiment among black youths in favor of the underground." ANC expectations are probably correct that an "intensification" of the guerrilla struggle will result in such shifts on a wider scale.

For judgments that are presumably more scientific, one may turn to opinion polls. A 1977 West German study found Buthelezi the most widely admired political personality in parts of Natal and the Transvaal. In 1981, Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, South Africa's leading researcher in this field, conducted a survey of African opinion for a commission initiated by Buthelezi. It dealt with Natal, where Zulus predominate, and the Transvaal, but not the eastern Cape, historically an ANC stronghold. A majority of Africans in Natal supported Inkatha, Schlemmer found, but the ANC had made considerable advances in the province since 1976. When asked how people would act if the ANC came secretly to ask for help, nearly half of the respondents in Natal, including rural people, expected that "most" or "many" would help.

The survey confirmed the extent of open support for the ANC. "Popular recognition of the ANC leadership," said Schlemmer, "has climbed very rapidly since 1977 and may still be rising." On the Witwatersrand, "the ANC emerges in the dominant position on the first spontaneous mention." This was true among all subgroups, although support dropped off among skilled manual workers. Schlemmer also found much potential for violence in the "considerable hard core militancy" of skilled and semi-skilled manual workers and some rural subsistence people. Among African degree holders on the Witwatersrand, an extraordinary 70 percent believed that "only violence" could bring about basic change.

Precise percentages should be treated with suspicion, but polls give a rough picture of political relationships. A detailed poll for the Johannesburg *Star*, shortly after the Buthelezi Commission survey, asked Africans in Johannesburg, Durban, and Cape Town how they would vote in a parliamentary election among candidates from the ANC, Inkatha, AZAPO and the PAC. The ANC emerged first in each city including Durban, in all the main African language groups including Zulu, in all age groups (although Inkatha was close among those over 40), and in all occupational groups except among the unskilled, where it was roughly equal with Inkatha. The more skilled or professional and the younger tended to be pro-ANC. The three leaders most liked were Mandela, 76 percent; Dr. Ntatho Motlana (the Soweto leader who opposes government-sponsored black councils), 58 percent; and Buthelezi, 39 percent, with Mandela and Motlana outranking Buthelezi even in Durban. Buthelezi's low standing among educated Africans was evident three years earlier in a survey designed by Schlemmer of men in Soweto over 16 whose education was mid-high school or above. Asked who people like themselves saw as "their real leaders," only five percent gave Buthelezi's name.

VI

Whatever their longstanding tactical differences, all African leaders without exception appear to be united on the issue of the government's constitutional proposals. Indeed, the ANC's 30-year-old call for a national convention has been revived by a group of government-recognized black leaders, including both Buthelezi and Matanzima, who are calling for a "nonracial democratic society." Their South African Federal Union includes leaders of semi-autonomous and independent homelands, urban councils, and business organizations.

Leaders such as these are constrained by vested interests and temperament from joining a radical struggle. Both internal and external pressures are also strong on homeland leaders to cooperate with the South African military, as several are now doing, to resist insurgency. Some homeland leaders do have popular support. Unlike the dictatorial and corrupt leadership of Transkei, Ciskei, and Venda, Dr. Cedric Phatudi of Lebowa, for example, commands a good deal of local respect. An elderly gentleman genuinely committed to the creation of a federal system that would be nonracial, he has little to say about programs for the redistribution of wealth and is averse to mass protest.

Black politics appears to be in disarray, although the extent of that disarray can be exaggerated. More fundamental than questions about armed struggle and boycott are deeply rooted differences about the role of whites. Thus AZAPO is strongly opposed to the ANC's Freedom Charter. One of its spokesmen, Saths Cooper, who recently completed a six-year term in prison, has even criticized Mandela as an "accommodationist" for dealing with prison officials.

Disagreements also reveal, however, a vitality in debate that augurs well for the future of democracy in South Africa. At the same time, antagonists display encouraging efforts to accommodate divergent views. Acting in a conciliatory spirit, AZAPO was instrumental in organizing a National Forum on June 11–12, 1983, which brought together representatives of nearly 200 black organizations, excluding those involved in government-sponsored institutions. The organizers discouraged any criticism of the Freedom Charter, but, on the assumption that the Charter was "dated," a "Manifesto of the Azanian People" was produced. Unlike earlier expressions of Black Consciousness, the Manifesto was reconcilable with the Charter—both are loosely socialist—but the ANC's National Executive Committee reacted by warning against those who diverted the people from the goals "enshrined" in the Freedom Charter. Responding to recent efforts to fuse Black Consciousness and class consciousness, the Manifesto identified the enemy as "racial capitalism."

The National Forum is not an organization, but rather a committee planning a second convocation for April 1984. In the meantime, the formation of the UDF may have eclipsed it and may discourage future involvement in the National Forum. Ideological differences will not easily be submerged. Nevertheless, influential leaders are impatient with such differences and recognize that there is room in the liberation struggle for many different approaches.

Meanwhile, an important influence for unity is exerted by prominent personalities with credibility in both the "Charterist" and Black Consciousness camps. Three were on the National Forum organizing committee: Dr. Boesak, Bishop Tutu, and Dr. Manas Buthelezi, the Lutheran bishop who was recently elected president of the South African Council of Churches and who has been compared with Martin Luther King. There are other important personalities who can also serve as links and mediators.

That alignments are blurred and overlapping can be seen in the relation of the two leading federations of black trade unions to each other, to the National Forum and the UDF, and indirectly to the ANC. The four-year-old Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), with over 106,000 signed-up members, has earned a reputation for professionalism and avoidance of politically provocative actions. It accepts that workers should be "part of the wider popular struggle" but criticizes the ANC for tending "to encourage undirected opportunistic political activity." Its long-run strategy is discussed in Section X below. Because it sees the struggle as one more of class than of race, its gravitation is toward the UDF. Constituent unions have expressed sympathy for the UDF, but FOSATU has not affiliated with it.

The rival Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), a three-year-old federation with an estimated membership of over 100,000, opposed the inclusion of whites in FOSATU's leadership although it has no problem itself in using white assistance. Its constitution calls for "a nonracial democratic society based on black leadership." In ongoing unity talks with FOSATU and strong unaffiliated unions, CUSA has argued for a framework that is worker-controlled, that is, black-controlled. Its leaders point to the ANC model: a nonracial membership whose national executive committee is all-African. Because of the priority it has given to opposing the government's constitutional proposals, CUSA participated in the National Forum and, despite criticism, has become affiliated with the UDF.

VII

What of the ideological position of the ANC? The official South African position is that the ANC is controlled by Moscow through white communists, notably Joe Slovo. Supporting this allegation is the acknowledged presence of some African communists in the ANC structure.

The ANC's key document is still the Freedom Charter of 1955. Based on notions of natural rights liberalism, it is not a Marxist document; it envisages a mildly socialist but not anti-capitalist bourgeois democracy. In the Charter, the ANC endorsed the nationalization of mineral wealth, banks, and "monopoly industry" or, as critics said, state capitalism. In exile, the ANC's rhetoric has become more radical, but no program of future policies has been enunciated that supplants the Freedom Charter.

Mandela acknowledged in 1964 that he, like many other African leaders, was a socialist who had been influenced by Marxism. But he was not a Marxist, he said, nor had he ever joined the Communist Party. He disagreed with Marxists regarding the West's parliamentary system and admired the British Parliament as "the most democratic institution in the world." He also admired the U.S. Congress, the doctrine of separation of powers, and the American judiciary. Almost two decades later, Thabo Mbeki, an ANC spokesman whose father is serving a life sentence with Mandela, wrote in *The New York Times* on July 18, 1983, that the ANC had striven since 1912 "for a South Africa governed according to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

The nonracialism of the ANC is appealing to progressive-minded whites. And the nonracial stress on Africans as workers appeals to radical whites. The issue of reconciling African nationalism and class struggle, which produced ideological tensions historically within the Communist Party, has not seriously troubled the ANC. With the growing importance of industrial workers in South Africa and perhaps because the importance of members with working class backgrounds has grown, ANC rhetoric has come to assume that the appeals of class and nationalism are complementary.

Although non-Africans were admitted to the ANC in 1969, the National Executive Committee remains an all-African body.[5] Internal complaints about the role of non-Africans, similar to those made by the "Africanists" who formed the PAC, resulted in the expulsion of eight veteran ANC members in the early 1970s. Whether or not such sentiments are important within the ANC today is difficult to assess. In any event, the preeminence of Africans in directing the struggle was underlined in May 1983 when the 1969 Revolutionary Council (designed to direct the armed struggle) was abolished. Decision-making, said ANC spokesmen, would be tightened and centralized in the National Executive Committee.

As for personal connections, there are indeed a few interlocking memberships between the ANC and the Communist Party. Moses Mabhida, general secretary of the Communist Party, and Stephen Diamini, also a communist and president of the South African Congress of Trade Unions, are both members of the ANC's National Executive Committee. Whether or not an ANC member is also a clandestine member of the Communist Party appears to be of no great interest to nationalist leaders who are preoccupied with immediate tasks.

In any event, ideological inclinations vary among ANC members generally. An uneasy balance exists between those whose primary goals are political and those who believe liberation can come only with socialist reconstruction. At this stage, doctrinal differences within the ANC can easily be overstated and their importance exaggerated. The ingredients are present, however, for a vigorous debate if or when a democratic system comes into being. Both the ANC and the Communist Party recognize that the organizations are separate and independent from each other, that the ANC is the leader of the alliance, and that Communists who are members of the ANC are obliged to be loyal to it. The burden is on critics to demonstrate that practice contradicts understandings on which everyone agrees. Influence within the relationship is difficult to estimate, but it is undoubtedly reciprocal. To assume that in any collaboration between African nationalists such as Tambo and Communists the latter will inevitably dominate is to underestimate the experience and sophistication of nationalist leaders.

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[5] South African security experts who deal with the ANC are becoming better informed and more sophisticated. Yet a chart with data on the ANC National Executive Committee which South African officials supplied to Senator Denton's Subcommittee contained many inaccuracies. It listed five persons who were not members, including a white, an Indian, and a Coloured, listed one person under two names, and omitted four longtime members. Several members were identified as communists who are not publicly known as such. Presumably state witnesses or informers, who are often unreliable, have alleged that those persons are clandestine communists.

VIII

As in its umbrella reach within South Africa, the ANC outside has engaged in a nondoctrinaire and nonaligned search for aid from every source. When Mandela left the country secretly for six months in 1962, he sought out the full spectrum of African leaders, beginning with Emperor Haile Selassie, and the leaders of both the Labour and Liberal parties in London. The aid of Sweden was crucial in keeping the external mission afloat in the late 1960s. Since then, the ANC has received substantial aid from the Soviet Union (mainly in kind rather than in cash). Responding to a persistent question about Soviet influence, Oliver Tambo said in 1982:

> The Soviet Union has no influence on the ANC any more than Canada has. What has really happened is that we found ourselves, decades ago, fighting against racism—and relatively weak. We went in search of friends, to Canada, the United States, Europe, India, and elsewhere. Some received us well, some were lukewarm, some turned us down. The Soviet Union gave support. So did other countries—Sweden, for example. Sweden gave us assistance without strings except that no funds may be used to buy guns. The Soviet Union does not have to say that because it gives us the guns. The supposed stigma of getting assistance from the Soviet Union has no meaning whatever in southern Africa. There would be no independence for anyone without those weapons. That's what ordinary people think. Where would we be without that assistance? Could we go to Washington?

Today the ANC receives some 90 percent of its military support from communist sources (that is, from the Soviet bloc). However, these sources probably supply less than the Reagan Administration's estimate of 60 percent of overall support. Although early aid from China dried up after the Sino-Soviet split, the ANC maintained contact, and following Tambo's most recent visit to Beijing in May

1983, China has given some financial aid and has promised to supply arms.

Both the Organization of African Unity (in 1963) and the United Nations General Assembly (in 1973) recognize the ANC and the PAC as national liberation movements. ANC spokesmen make a point of saying that arms from the Soviet Union come to the ANC through members of the OAU in accordance with its resolutions and those of the United Nations that call on member states to provide material aid. Military training takes place mainly in Africa.[6]

U.N. recognition of the ANC and the PAC gives them the kind of official standing from which much follows. Both have observer status and can take part in debates in the General Assembly, the Security Council, and specialized agencies on matters of direct concern to them. The General Assembly contributes annually to the cost of the ANC's New York office ($107,696 in 1982–1983). The total amount of non-military aid from U.N. specialized agencies is unusually difficult to ascertain because most of it goes to individuals rather than to the ANC as an organization.[7]

ANC-sponsored students have an edge over other South African refugees in the selection process of the United Nations Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa. The United Nations Development Program has supported the ANC's Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College in Tanzania (named after the first ANC guerrilla to be hanged, in 1979). The ANC is concerned about academic and professional training to fulfill future needs in South Africa. Small numbers of ANC members have received such training in both communist and non-communist countries, including Cuba (about 100 in 1980), Nigeria, and the United States. Tambo has expressed support for educational programs that bring black South Africans to the United States so long as the programs have some contact with the ANC and its beneficiaries do not alienate themselves from the liberation struggle.

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[6] Most ANC recruits are trained in Angola under ANC instructors who have been trained in the Soviet Union or East Germany. Training has taken place at various times not only in the Soviet Union and East Germany but also in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco. In mid-1978 the South African security police believed that about 4,000 Africans had left after the Soweto uprising and that about three-fourths went into ANC camps. Recent estimates vary widely: an official government commission in 1980–81, 1,400 trained fighters; the London *Financial Times*, 5,000 "under arms"; the South African Defense Force according to a press report, 7,000; and a South African academic expert, 7,000 trained and another 7,000 in training. The ANC will not confirm or deny such reports.

[7] In some cases, however, the ANC serves as the "operational partner" of a specialized agency. In Angola, for example, there are about 6,200 South African refugees, nearly half of whom are of school age. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees considers them to be under the aegis of the ANC. Having earned a reputation for efficiency, the ANC is now acting for the High Commission in developing an agricultural settlement—not a military training camp—on a farm of almost 15,000 acres donated by the Angolan government. At present, it houses only a small number of refugees. The aim is for the farm to attain self-sufficiency as has the ANC's farm in Zambia, which provides agricultural training and also produce for both ANC people and the local market. The High Commission's aid was phased out there in 1983.

In its quest for international legitimacy, the ANC has established a presence in some 33 countries around the world. ANC officials have often met with prime ministers and other high officials. In 1978 Tambo and three other leaders of southern African movements were received by Pope John Paul II. Frequent occasions for public recognition arise when Nelson Mandela is given awards. For example, on July 24, 1983, the 200th anniversary of the birth of Simon Bolivar, Tambo and heads of state attended a ceremony in Caracas, Venezuela for the joint award to Mandela and King Juan Carlos of Spain of a prize named for the Latin American liberator.

There has been built up a complex pattern of aid and recognition from governments, political parties, and religious, trade union, student and other private bodies.[8] ANC leaders stress the variety and extent of such help for health, educational, and humanitarian projects and its expansion in recent years, especially in western countries.

Governments on the African continent extending some form of aid include Nigeria and Algeria (each has recently granted $1,000,000), Egypt, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Senegal. Tambo recently visited Saudi Arabia, which is also providing aid. Western governmental donors include Sweden, where ANC representatives meet annually with officials ($4,210,000 in 1982); Norway ($1,650,000); Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Finland ($236,000), and (in the past) Canada.

The ANC's network of fraternal relations extends to democratic socialist as well as communist parties. The Socialist International recognizes the ANC and has given it observer status. The West German Social Democratic Party supports a foundation that provides aid. In Italy, for example, virtually all political parties have donated non-military goods for a "Ship of Solidarity," due to arrive in Dar es Salaam in December 1983, destined for the ANC and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

In addition to aid from the Social Democratic Party, the Otto Benecke Stiftung, a government-funded foundation administered by West German students, contributes about $400,000 annually to maintain 120 of some 900 students at the ANC's college in Tanzania. West German officials have also met with ANC representatives, describing the meetings as a "critical dialogue" that is a form of pressure on South Africa.

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[8] Once a candidate for ordination in the Anglican (Episcopal) Church, Tambo has appealed for help from "the world Christian community." The World Council of Churches' program to "combat racism" has given modest grants for years (in 1983, $70,000). Immediately after the bombing of the ANC's office in London in 1982, the British Council of Churches offered alternative facilities. The United Church of Canada and Catholic aid agencies are among other religious supporters.

IX

Not until 1959, the year before Sharpeville, did an American ambassador meet with an ANC leader. Philip Crowe, although concerned with the maintenance of "correct relations with an ally in the cold war," met Chief Albert Lutuli and found him "a moderate man." Not until the Kennedy Administration did U.S. anti-apartheid rhetoric include praise for black leaders, and not until the fourth of July, 1963, did the American Embassy invite a black guest to its annual reception.[9] During the Johnson Administration, Embassy officials attended political trials and spoke privately to South African authorities in mid-1964 about the repercussions of a possible death sentence for Mandela and others on trial. The potential political importance of South Africa in the United States was evident in 1966 when Senator Robert Kennedy made an emotion-filled visit to the Republic, including a call on the rusticated Lutuli.

President Nixon tilted U.S. policy toward white South Africa. His Administration's signals of reassurance to the white regime included relaxation of existing restrictions on U.S. military sales, and private meetings in Washington between U.S. and South African military officials. Incredible as it may seem, his ambassador, John Hurd, went pheasant hunting with government leaders on Robben Island, where ANC and other political prisoners were serving life sentences.

During the Carter Administration, ANC contact with Ambassador Andrew Young and other officials in New York became "easy-going," as ANC leaders put it, but there was no "critical dialogue" between the ANC and the State Department. Within South Africa, the wide-ranging contact of the American ambassador with black opposition leaders was unprecedented.

Because of this "rhetoric of disapproval," South African blacks "by and large, held the U.S. in high regard" during the Carter period, Bishop Tutu wrote in 1982. But they were "aghast" when the Reagan Administration "sided with the status quo." Arguments against sanctions to help blacks in South Africa lost all credibility, said Tutu, when sanctions were used to help whites in Poland. "As my own personal little protest at the actions of the Reagan administration," he concluded, "I no longer attend U.S. Embassy functions nor do I see Reagan administration people."[10]

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[9] The American Embassy had also avoided extending travel invitations to black leaders whose passport applications might be turned down. In contrast, the Soviet Union and China invited ANC leaders in the early 1950s to attend conferences and make tours, which they did without passports. The Soviet consulate in South Africa was closed in 1956, presumably for serving drinks to blacks.

President Reagan's State Department, even at the junior level, has had no communication with the ANC. The ANC's representative has not set foot inside the U.S. mission to the United Nations since January 1981, and his formal request for a meeting with Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick has gone unacknowledged. On the other hand, the President met with Chief Buthelezi in a small group before a mass prayer breakfast in January 1983 and spoke of his admiration for him. Buthelezi had also met Presidents Nixon and Carter. The Reagan Administration has wisely avoided, however, responding to Buthelezi's standing invitation for an "overt alliance" between the United States and Inkatha, initially made in 1980.

The ANC issues harsh words in criticism of U.S. foreign policy generally. But ANC leaders do not have a doctrinaire belief that a change in U.S. administrations is inconsequential. Indeed, the optimism they sometimes express regarding future U.S. policy toward South Africa is remarkable. ANC leaders show a keen interest in the vagaries of U.S. politics and in gaining the sympathetic understanding of the broad American center. On June 12, 1981, the ANC achieved a breakthrough in American recognition of its importance when Tambo was invited to a dinner discussion with representatives of General Motors, Ford, and four other major U.S. investors directly involved in South Africa. Tambo and his aides have met with leading members of Congress and recall appreciatively the spirit of a meeting with Nancy Kassebaum, Republican chairman of the Senate's subcommittee on Africa.

Senator Jeremiah Denton's subcommittee, on the other hand, has declared its intention to investigate the U.S. "support apparatus" for the ANC, SWAPO, "and other terrorist organizations which act internationally in opposition to U.S. security interests, and to explore means of curtailing such support." The "support apparatus" is undefined. Presumably it refers to the wide and growing array of church, black, labor, student, and other groups that make up the American anti-apartheid movement. Its organization began in 1952, when sympathy for the Defiance Campaign led to the formation of the American Committee on Africa, led by George Houser, a minister and early civil rights activist. As a partisan in the South African liberation struggle, endorsing both the ANC and the PAC, it sponsored Tambo's first trip to the United States in 1960.

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[10] Desmond Tutu, "Black South African Perspectives and the Reagan Administration," *TransAfrica Forum*, Summer 1982, pp. 7–15.

None of the ANC's American supporters is involved in its military activities, but financial and other assistance is given to ANC members and health, educational, and refugee programs. The pacifist American Friends' Service Committee has contributed books to the ANC's college in Tanzania. The ANC's supporters, the influential black lobby TransAfrica, and universities around the country provide a platform to ANC speakers.

X

Scenarios of the future can only be speculated upon, but it is difficult to envisage any in which the ANC will not have a central role. It is also impossible to see how violence can be ended so long as the regime is dug in and refuses to negotiate. From the American Revolution to Zimbabwe, the struggle for self-determination has often been accompanied by violence.

That negotiation with representative black leaders cannot be avoided is a principle endorsed by many white South African opinion-makers. Only occasionally, however, do they confront the reality of the political movement symbolized by the ANC. Such recognition was expressed on January 9, 1981, in a quickly deflated trial balloon in *Beeld*, the most influential Afrikaans newspaper and the Transvaal mouthpiece of the prime minister. Ton Vosloo, the editor, compared the ANC's "black nationalism" and support for it with the Afrikaner nationalism of the National Party. After identifying some non-negotiable conditions, he concluded, "The day will yet arrive when a South African government will sit down at the negotiating table with the ANC."

Bishop Tutu, who has met with ANC leaders while abroad but is not authorized to speak for them, volunteered in mid-1983 to act as a go-between in arranging negotiations. He had "little doubt," he said, "that the ANC would stop the armed struggle if it heard the government wanted seriously to negotiate dismantling apartheid." One condition would be that "our leaders in prison and exile" be participants in negotiation. There are undoubtedly additional prerequisites the ANC would insist upon before agreeing to a cease fire. Given the current imbalance of white and black coercive power, the scenario is fanciful. Nevertheless, it seems important to note the issues that appear negotiable and those that do not. There is an encouraging possibility of some common ground with such men as Vosloo.

The ANC's primary aims—that South Africa should be nonracial, unfragmented, and governed according to a system of majority rule based upon universal suffrage—are not negotiable. Nor can the ANC be expected to accept any entrenchment of white economic privilege or rights to land. But if one accepts the positions of senior leaders at face value, the ANC would accept a bill of rights that guaranteed rights essential to a free political process. Since it has not arrived at any position regarding political institutions and procedures for the protection of minority rights, it is not committed to a "winner take all" system. Open to negotiation would be a federal system ("unitary" is often used loosely to mean an undivided country, not a unitary form of government), a bicameral legislature, electoral procedures, and judicial review.

Economic policy remains to be worked out, although the aim of a redistribution of wealth is essential. The ANC's orientation is toward an economy that is socialist, but pragmatic about free enterprise. On the question of attendance at the negotiating table, the ANC expects that other black groups who share historic aims would be included. Furthermore, no prescribed timetable exists for movement toward the goals set forth above.

Although ANC leaders still envisage some form of national convention, their expectation is that this could happen only after the liberation movement had transformed the climate for foreign business and imposed unacceptable costs on the whites. A persistent hope is that violence could be minimal if the wheels of the political system and the economy are stopped from turning. The vision is an old one: that masses of workers on whom the economy depends can bring down the regime. Over 30 years ago, the plan of the Defiance Campaign envisaged sustained and spreading strikes. Hoping for peaceful change, Buthelezi talks of grass-roots organization leading to a "groundswell" of numbers that will confront and overwhelm the oppressor. Thus, there is a romantic dimension to his realism. It also can justify postponement of interim action such as boycotts or civil disobedience while bolstering popular faith in eventual victory.

Another long-range strategy is that of the Federation of South African Trade Unions. In a careful mid-1982 statement, it praised the ANC as "a great populist liberation movement" of the 1950s but argued that changes—concentration of capital and the rise of a large industrial proletariat—have created conditions for a self-conscious workers' struggle. The important long-range task, therefore, is to build "non-racial, national, industrial unions, based on shop-floor strength." Prudently, FOSATU does not elaborate on how its strategy will mesh with popular movements or the nature of the political transition to a "society controlled by workers." But it foresees "bitter struggles" ahead. In commenting on the argument that only black workers and not armed struggle can win, Tambo has conceded that "the workers are potentially decisive" but insists that this is so only if accompanied by "the armed component."[11]

Just what combination of legal, extra-legal, and illegal pressures will create a crisis for white power is unclear. The ANC talks of preparing the ground politically for the eventual involvement of masses of people in military action. This longer-range strategy envisages armed insurrection for the seizure of political power. How the rhetoric of "a war fought by the entire people" can be translated into reality in South Africa is conjectural. Presumably many would participate by using simple forms of sabotage. Discipline and control would be obvious problems. Already there are defendants in security trials who are untrained revolutionaries with no ANC connections.

Popular pressures to hit "the Boer" appear to be mounting. The racial dimensions of the struggle are recognized by the ANC's 14-year-old basic document on strategy and tactics. It gives primacy to African "national consciousness" in the face of a growing "all White solidarity" and foresees a "confrontation on the lines of color—at least in the early stages of the conflict." Yet there are strong constraints against indiscriminate killing of whites. Counteracting the "terrorist" image and comparison to the Palestine Liberation Organization propagated by the government is important for the ANC's standing in many Western countries. In 1980 the ANC became the first liberation movement to sign the protocol extending the Geneva Convention to wars of national liberation.

The most important constraint is the ANC's policy on racial cooperation. It places a high priority on facilitating the growth of white groups within South Africa that support its aims and would be prepared to cooperate with it. The ANC is genuinely anxious, in short, not to exacerbate racial bitterness, thus jeopardizing the goal of a nonracial society.

XI

The Reagan Administration's "constructive engagement" with South Africa carries grave risks for the national interest of the United States. South Africa is continuing in the direction it has been going for over 35 years. Despite the enlargement of privileges for some urban Africans, Coloureds, and Indians, white supremacy is now more entrenched than ever. Having been institutionalized, it is about to be constitutionalized. To discern a "hidden agenda" for basic change, as does the Reagan Administration, is to engage in the wishful thinking that has characterized U.S. policy for far too long.

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[11] In interrogating trade union leaders and in trials, the police and prosecutors have attempted, thus far without success, to link certain unions to the ANC by alleging ties to the ANC's ally, the South African Congress of Trade Unions. Union leaders, denying the allegations, have argued that it is unrealistic to believe that a clandestine organization can function among workers.

One should not underestimate the capacity of the white rulers to take initiatives that win black collaboration. But they cannot defuse popular demands for a universal franchise and majority rule. Nor does South African experience support any expectation that the government can succeed with repression and crackdowns in preventing black leadership from being replenished and rising again.

Leaders of the so-called homelands and nominally independent states and a small number of African businessmen and other middle-class blacks, opposing violence and communism, will attempt to gain popular credibility. But in competing for support, they are no match for more determined opponents of white supremacy, especially when these are being joined by most of the younger and better educated blacks. Nor can one expect that Chief Buthelezi's post-referendum invitation to the "external mission" of the ANC and the PAC for a "marriage of convenience," implied to be under his leadership, will amount to any more than rhetoric for white and external consumption.

The popular black opposition, manifested most recently in the United Democratic Front, will continue to organize at the community and workplace level. Campaigning on local grievances, local groups will strengthen the base of a regional and national coalition that identifies with ANC aims and leaders. Some important black leaders will continue to oppose the tactical cooperation with whites endorsed by the ANC, but pressures for closer unity will grow. Black trade unions generally will avoid political confrontation while building their strength but in time will become significant partners of popular movements. Mass political and labor protest will exert greater pressure on the regime than will armed attacks by the ANC, but these attacks will enhance confidence and the popular standing of the ANC.

The longer the struggle takes, the more will violence spread and become bloodier on both sides. Despite the ANC's nonracialism, white-black polarization is almost bound to become more bitter. Needing larger amounts of military aid, the ANC will become more reliant on communist sources, although it will also look for such aid elsewhere.

If the perceived U.S. alignment with the white minority continues, the disastrous consequence would follow of being on the losing side of a conflict in which the Soviet Union is seen by most blacks as on the side of liberation. The United States would be repeating the mistake it has made elsewhere in the world in supporting reactionary and dictatorial regimes. Compounding the mistake would be the unique racial dimensions of the conflict and the passions it would evoke in the United States and elsewhere.

Revolution is in the making in South Africa, and violence will be a part of it. In the case of South Africa, black leaders will continue to calculate that mass pressures, including strikes and boycotts, will be more efficacious than violence. Minimizing violence should also be an important goal for the United States. To this end, it should contribute to pressures on South Africa for genuine negotiation, although one can hardly envisage this except under domestic and external pressures that are overwhelming.

In pressing South Africa to change direction, the United States cannot be ambiguous on a step that symbolizes such a change: the universal franchise. As recognition of an equal stake in society, it has been endorsed by nearly every black leader in South Africa since the end of World War II. It is crucial to any settlement.[12]

So is the role of the ANC. The United States can hardly stigmatize the ANC for its failure to eschew violence so long as the American alternative is unilateral change by a minority government based upon institutionalized violence. Fruitful negotiation cannot be limited, as the Reagan Administration would have it, to those who are "committed to peaceful change."

It follows that the United States should maintain contact not only with black groups tolerated by the government but also with the ANC. It should recognize the ANC as a legitimate political force whose guerrillas are freedom fighters entitled to treatment as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. The United States should also expand programs of education and humanitarian assistance to black South Africans, and these should include members of the ANC. As part of an effort to disengage itself from the South African embrace, the United States should also make clear that it will not come to the aid of the South African regime even if the black opposition has some communist support.

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[12] From the Union's formation in 1910 until 1936, Africans had been able to vote on the common roll in Cape Province, although only for white members of Parliament. They were then transferred to a separate roll. In 1960 even this remnant of the franchise was eliminated.

Vice President Walter Mondale was briefed to avoid the term "majority rule" and to use "full political participation" when he met Prime Minister John Vorster in 1977. But afterwards, in a press conference, he explained that "full political participation" meant one man/one vote. Shortly after President Reagan's inauguration in 1981, Harry Oppenheimer, South Africa's preeminent capitalist and a longstanding advocate of a qualified franchise, declared that power-sharing must mean "one man, one vote" and that "substantial steps" must be taken toward it within the next five years "to avoid a revolution in South Africa." Later in the year, Edward Heath, the former Conservative prime minister of Britain, said in Johannesburg, "No formula for a constitution will successfully defuse the growing forces of unrest if it does not provide for a universal franchise at the national level." Robert McNamara endorsed Heath's position in Johannesburg in 1982. In contrast, Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker has criticized the Carter Administration for having been "preoccupied with the goal of obtaining 'full political participation.'" The words were avoided by Lawrence Eagleburger in his mid-1983 statement when he predicted that black South Africans would "gain fuller participation" in society and politics.

The imponderables in the South African situation are too many for long-range prediction. Yet one can say with confidence that the United States is now proceeding down a blind alley. Nor is light likely to be seen in any "internal settlement" detour comparable to that led by Bishop Muzorewa in Zimbabwe. Future stability and growth depend upon the emergence of a government that has popular legitimacy. If the leadership of that government has the qualities of individuals like Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, the late Steve Biko, Desmond Tutu, Oliver Tambo, and Nelson Mandela, the United States will see in power leaders with the independence it hopes for.

Kishore Mahbubani

THE KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM: A SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERCEPTION

In the five years since Vietnam invaded Kampuchea to depose Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot and install its own client regime, the situation in Kampuchea has settled into what is widely viewed as a long-term stalemate. Despite strong international condemnation, and ongoing guerrilla resistance from the Khmer Rouge and other nationalist groups, Vietnam has retained close control over Kampuchea through its puppet leader, Heng Samrin, and has shown little apparent interest in either a military withdrawal or a political compromise settlement. U.N. and other efforts to initiate peace talks have been fruitless, and the prospect of a long-term Vietnamese occupation has seemed virtually unavoidable.

On closer inspection, however, it may be premature to accept the current impasse in Kampuchea as permanent. Such a judgment neglects several significant dimensions of the problem—most importantly the consequences of the existing situation for Vietnam itself. Five years after the invasion, Vietnam is still bleeding. In addition to the 180,000 Vietnamese troops occupying Kampuchea, it has to bear the formidable costs of maintaining a 600,000-man military and militia force at and near the Sino-Vietnamese border. Its economy, which never really recovered from the dislocations of earlier wars, continues to stagnate. Deprived of international assistance (except from the Soviet bloc, Sweden, France and India), it has no realistic prospects of improving. Vietnam's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita decreased from $257 in 1978 to $189 in 1982, and after 40 years of war, malnutrition levels in Vietnam remain at extremely high levels. Economic scarcities and exposure to bourgeois lifestyles in the South have made the traditionally disciplined Vietnamese party cadres more susceptible to corruption from southern Vietnam. Several observers have noted the slow process of social and political deterioration in Vietnam.[1] The long-term consequences of this could be very telling.

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[1] William Shawcross, "In A Grim Country," *The New York Review of Books*, September 24, 1981, p. 62; Edmund McWilliams, "Vietnam in 1982: Onward Into The Quagmire," *Asian Survey*, January 1983, p. 62.

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Inside Kampuchea, Vietnam still faces important challenges. The Vietnamese-installed satellite regime, unlike parallel regimes in Eastern Europe, or even Laos, remains shaky. As the Kampuchean nation recovers from the ravages of the Pol Pot years, when at least one million people died from starvation, forced labor and mass executions, Kampuchean nationalism is gradually beginning to resurface. Opposition to Vietnamese rule has now been coordinated in the form of the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, established in June 1982, where the posts of president, vice president and prime minister are held respectively by Norodom Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan and Son Sann. Sihanouk ruled the nation from 1953 to 1970, Son Sann, a former prime minister, leads the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and Khieu Samphan represents the remnants of Pol Pot's government. Pol Pot remains the military commander of the Khmer Rouge forces. Even if Vietnam wins most of the military battles, as the U.S. Army did in Vietnam, it is losing the political battles in Kampuchea. Perhaps this explains the desperate move to bring Vietnamese settlers into Kampuchea, a move that will inflame Kampuchean nationalist sentiment even more.

Conventional wisdom in the West has tended to say that Vietnam will stay the course in Kampuchea. It would be foolish to deny the unique Vietnamese record for tenacity. Yet, even the best long-distance runner eventually gets exhausted. He may be prepared to run the extra mile if the end is in sight. This is what kept North Vietnam going, especially after 1968, when its leaders saw the clear erosion of domestic support for the war in the United States. This time, as Indochinese history produces yet another irony, the Vietnamese leaders have to ask themselves: is there a light at the end of the tunnel?

It is this new combination of political, economic and military realities that makes the states of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) guardedly optimistic that Vietnam will accept a compromise negotiated settlement in Kampuchea. Those states, which include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, are obliged to sustain the combination of pressures on Vietnam (any relaxation of pressures may only prolong Vietnam's agony). Yet the door has to be kept open to Vietnam to negotiate a settlement.

The ASEAN states have consistently said that they do not seek a defeat or humiliation for Vietnam. Vietnam's security interests will have to be taken into consideration in any Kampuchean settlement. The main theme/purpose of this essay is to state that such a settlement, in spite of the obvious practical difficulties, is both probable as well as feasible. Unlike the other trouble spots of the globe, the main initiatives to resolve the Kampuchean problem have emerged from the region. Since the ASEAN states will have to live with the consequences of these initiatives, they can ill-afford to sustain any illusions about this problem.

Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea[2] pulled it firmly into the Sino-Soviet dispute; its withdrawal from Kampuchea could extricate it. A full resolution of this dimension of the problem would almost inevitably require the participation of the United States. The rewards for the United States would be clear: It could pave the way for a historic reconciliation between Vietnam and the United States, help to close a bitter chapter in American history, gradually heal a painful sore in the American psyche and create another region of the world where U.S. interests would be safeguarded. Such a rapprochement would be welcomed in the region as it would increase the incentives for Vietnam to become a more peaceful member of the Southeast Asian community.

If the prospect of a peaceful Kampuchean settlement seems so unreal in today's context, it is important to remind oneself of the recent history of Indochina. Who in 1973 (only ten years ago) could have predicted that Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea would fall to the communists in two years? Who in 1975 could have predicted that Vietnam would invade Kampuchea? Who in 1975 could have predicted that China and Vietnam, as close as "lips and teeth" during the war with the United States, could fall out and clash militarily? Indeed all three events occurred in a time span of less than four years. Perhaps if underlying trends, rather than surface developments, had been analyzed more closely, one might have anticipated some of these developments. The underlying trends in Indochina today suggest that the time may be ripening for new developments.

II

In January 1979, as the U.N. Security Council was convened in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. Ha Van Lau (now Deputy Foreign Minister), told Singapore's

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[2] As recently as 1970, the Kampuchean population was instigated by Lon Nol's government to launch brutal attacks against the Vietnamese living in Kampuchea, even those who had been there for several generations. These ethnic tensions are too deeply rooted to be easily erased from Kampuchean memories. See William Shawcross, *Sideshow*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979, pp. 117–118, 120.

Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. Tommy Koh, in the corridors of the United Nations, that the ASEAN states should not bother with the Kampuchea issue. In two weeks, he confidently said, the world would have forgotten the Kampuchean problem. Clearly, Vietnam envisaged its invasion to follow the lines of the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia: a quick blitzkrieg operation, destruction of all resistance, rapid establishment of a fait accompli that would survive the (brief) world condemnation. Given the growing awareness in 1978 of Pol Pot's record, the Vietnamese might have even counted upon some world sympathy and support.

To the surprise of all observers and participants, the international condemnation of Vietnam brought together a remarkable collection of states, including the majority of nonaligned states. Until the invasion of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese had become accustomed to being lionized in Third World forums for their "anti-imperialist" credentials. They were therefore unprepared for the diplomatic isolation that followed. Indeed Vietnam's insensitivity to world opinion and its remarkably maladroit performance in various U.N. debates have led to a surprising phenomenon. The U.N. votes against Vietnam have increased each year. On October 20, 1983, Vietnam made a stunning concession by deciding *not* to formally challenge the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea at the United Nations. This decision revealed that, notwithstanding the Vietnamese leaders' record for tenacity, they do have a good understanding of political realities. This latest development provides new hope that a compromise Kampuchean settlement may be feasible.

Vietnam may have made an even bigger miscalculation on China's response to its invasion of Kampuchea. Having signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union in early November 1978, Vietnam may have expected an angry response from the People's Republic but probably only a rhetorical one. Instead Vietnam suffered a major invasion from the P.R.C. in February 1979. This invasion may not have inflicted lasting physical damage on Vietnam, and Vietnam was not forced to withdraw any of its forces from Kampuchea. The subsequent Vietnamese military buildup along the Sino-Vietnamese border may have even tilted the military balance at the border in favor of Vietnam and reduced the credibility of any Chinese threat to inflict a "second punishment" on Vietnam. All this would, however, miss the crucial point: the P.R.C. has forced Vietnam to factor in Chinese military retaliation as a *cost* that Vietnam may have to pay some time in the future. Even more significant, the Chinese invasion has left a deep psychological impression on the Vietnamese leaders. Unlike the French or the Americans, the Chinese are never going to withdraw from the border or the region. As one Chinese leader is reported to have remarked: in confronting China, the Vietnamese have picked up a huge boulder and dropped it on their own feet.

Both sympathetic and unsympathetic observers of Vietnam have acknowledged the terrible economic situation within Vietnam. Paul Kattenburg, an experienced and sympathetic American observer, visited Vietnam in early 1983 and reported the following:

> The economic picture in Vietnam is dismal. Vietnamese experts frequently stated or implied a need for foreign assistance and did so with a sense of urgency. Vietnam has become one of South East Asia's poorest countries. It has the lowest level of nutrition. It has a staggering international debt, to both Soviet and Western lenders. Soviet economic assistance has become crucial to Vietnamese economic planning, and Soviet experts have penetrated virtually all sectors of Vietnam's economy.

Indeed Kattenburg, who was stationed in Hanoi as a U.S. Foreign Service officer in the early 1950s, remarked that apart from some "minor tokens of development" (referring to sandals worn by previously barefoot people and the widespread use of bicycles), he "could find little to distinguish the Hanoi of 1983 from that of 1952."[3]

It would be salutary here to compare Vietnam's economic record with that of the non-communist ASEAN states (once described as the "dominoes" of Southeast Asia). In contrast to the continuing process of social and economic deterioration in Vietnam, "the ASEAN countries have been experiencing what can be described as a peaceful and orderly revolution. Dramatic changes have occurred in their political, social and cultural life."[4] Thailand now enjoys a per capita income of $800, compared to Vietnam's per capita income of $189; Thailand's gross national product (GNP) is larger than that of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea combined. Some other statistical comparisons may highlight Vietnam's unusual condition. ASEAN's combined population is 275 million, five times that of Vietnam; ASEAN's combined GNP amounts to over $200 billion, more than 20 times that of Vietnam. Yet, Vietnam alone maintains over a million men under arms, larger than all five ASEAN armies combined. It is not surprising that Vietnam's economy should continue to deteriorate. Chinese leaders today are clearly aware of how many precious years were wasted in the decades of social and political turmoil their country had to undergo under Mao. Vietnam has not even begun the process of catching up that China has undertaken. Can Vietnam afford to remain economically backward in a region that promises to be one of the fastest growing areas of the world?

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[3] Paul M. Kattenburg, "So Many Enemies: The View from Hanoi," *Indochina Issues*, No. 38, June 1983, published by the Indochina Project of the Center for International Policy, in Washington.

[4] Lawrence B. Krause, *U.S. Economic Policy for ASEAN: Meeting the Japanese Challenge*, Washington: Brookings, 1982, p. 17.

The social costs that Vietnam is paying are harder to document but no less real in their impact. A recent analyst notes:

> Hanoi's ability to feed, clothe, and provide medical care for the people of Vietnam continued to fall far short of need in 1982. While rice production rose to nearly 16 million tons in 1982, significant reduction in grain imports in 1981–82 precluded marked improvement in supply availability. Foreign visitors reported that medical care in Vietnam continued to deteriorate in 1982, and illness among refugees was widespread. The incidence of tuberculosis and malaria has risen markedly, particularly in the rural south because of the unavailability of medicine, underdosing when medicines were available, overextension of the medical infrastructure, and the prevalence of malnutrition.[5]

There are also an increasing number of stories of maladministration, indiscipline and corruption among Vietnamese party cadres.

None of this should be taken to mean that the Vietnamese regime is anywhere near collapsing. Few countries, communist or noncommunist, can match the Vietnamese leaders' record of cohesion and unity in the face of struggle. Vietnam is run by a group of hardy and tough men. They have fought their battles against the French and the Americans with great skill (albeit at a great cost to Vietnam). Unfortunately, however, many of their political perceptions, convictions and views were forged in the 1930s and 1940s and, with the exception of accomplished diplomat and Politburo member Le Duc Tho, they have had little acquaintance with the outside world and the West. In the 1980s these leaders are grappling with problems that they had never encountered before. The Vietnamese leaders will not be the first to persist with policies which were once successful but which would no longer work in changed circumstances. Theodore H. White quotes Hu Qiaomu on Mao's old-age policies:

> "It was as if the law of inertia took over," said Hu Qiaomu, once Mao's private secretary, today in the Politburo as spokesman of China's intellectuals. "He was speeding the train down the track. The train came to a bend because the terrain of China is different from what Mao thought. The train could not take the turn. It derailed."[6]

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[5] Edmund McWilliams, *loc. cit.*, p. 66.

[6] Theodore H. White, "China: Burnout of a Revolution," *Time*, September 26, 1983, p. 32.

In difficult phases of the 1946–75 Indochina War, the Vietnamese leaders could still count on some tough military solution that could lead to the eventual withdrawal of the French and the Americans. Today, a military defeat of the P.R.C. is inconceivable. Inside Kampuchea, the resistance movements have grown stronger rather than weaker after five years of Vietnamese occupation. The absence of a military solution that Vietnam could turn to leaves Vietnam especially helpless as it watches itself losing the more crucial political struggle inside Kampuchea, in the international arena and perhaps at home within Vietnam.

III

Kampuchea (or, more accurately, Cambodia, as it has traditionally been called) is one of the oldest Southeast Asian states. Angkor Wat testifies to that. Its dated history can be traced back to the seventh century. In recent times, 80 years of French rule were followed by 17 years of Sihanouk, five years of Lon Nol, three years and nine months of Pol Pot and five years of Vietnamese rule. That's the historical setting in which one must see the impact of the Pol Pot era. The nation was badly beaten down, upwards of one million people were killed or died, but somehow the nation survived. In January 1979, the Vietnamese invasion came first as a welcome relief, allowing the nation to breathe a little more freely again. In the mid-1980s, as the painful years of Pol Pot's rule fade away gradually in Kampuchean memories, the nation will again remember its longer history.

The conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam goes back a long way. Almost every Kampuchean knows that the delta regions of southern Vietnam used to belong to Kampuchea. In spite of the obvious ideological differences between the three nationalist coalition leaders, Sihanouk, Son Sann and Khieu Samphan, there is no disagreement in their perceptions of Kampuchean history and the growing encroachment of Vietnam upon Kampuchean territory. Most Kampuchean leaders today are painfully aware that if Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea becomes permanent, the Kampuchean nation could fade away as an independent entity.

In this historic setting, it is hardly surprising that the Vietnamese should have great difficulties creating an effective satellite regime in Phnom Penh. The Heng Samrin regime could barely survive two weeks if the Vietnamese army withdrew. The only relatively forceful leader that the regime was able to produce, Pen Sovan, was removed when he began to disagree with the Vietnamese advisers. Heng Samrin remains a distant shadowy figure. A few younger energetic ministers like Hun Sen and Keo Chanda do make some sort of impression upon visiting foreigners, but the regime's political base is virtually nonexistent. Not only are all its leaders tarred by their Vietnamese ties, but an estimated one-third of them, including Heng Samrin, are crippled by also having been part of the Pol Pot regime.[7]

In contrast to the continued weakness of the Heng Samrin regime, all three resistance forces have grown in strength, especially in the last two years.[8] Recent reports even suggest that Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge forces have gradually succeeded in recruiting more fighters. The reasons for this are still unclear. Perhaps memories of the Pol Pot years are being replaced by growing dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese presence. Perhaps it is because the Khmer Rouge forces, with an estimated 40,000 men, remain the largest, best equipped, and best trained single resistance effort. A Kampuchean refugee joining the Khmer Rouge is assured of clothes, shoes, a bowl of rice, rifle and ammunition. Neither Son Sann's nor Sihanouk's forces can guarantee this yet.

Still, Son Sann's KPNLF has reached the respectable level of 10,000–12,000 men, reasonably well armed and well trained. The Sihanoukists claim to have 5,000 men. They have been able to make deeper forays into Kampuchea from the Thai-Kampuchean border, and are gradually proving to be a great nuisance to the Vietnamese forces inside Kampuchea. The brutal Vietnamese attacks early this year on KPNLF camps along the Thai-Kampuchean border, including the terrorizing of the civilian population with artillery shelling, could be read as a Vietnamese recognition of the significance of the KPNLF. It can no longer be ignored. The KPNLF's capacity to grow is, however, crippled by low levels of assistance. Son Sann visited Washington, D.C. in September 1983 hoping to receive more American assistance. He left a disappointed man.

The Kampuchean resistance forces will probably never develop the strength or momentum to defeat the Vietnamese militarily in Kampuchea. Both Son Sann and Sihanouk have publicly admitted this. The main purpose of the resistance has been to deprive the Vietnamese of any legitimacy for their stay in Kampuchea, to act as a focus of Kampuchean nationalism and to increase the costs to Vietnam for its occupation. The classical theory of guerrilla warfare states that as long as guerrilla forces do not lose, they can be considered to be winning. If the resistance continues to grow in effectiveness, it would increase incentives for Vietnam to agree to a compromise settlement.

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[7] See Elizabeth Becker's article in *The New York Times*, September 27, 1983.

[8] The coalition has no formal political or military headquarters. Its leaders meet periodically, most recently in New York, and the resistance forces are coordinated through liaison at the Thai-Kampuchean border.

The Kampuchean resistance movements have been compared unfavorably with the Afghan insurgents. Certainly Kampuchea does not have the tradition of warrior tribes, well-armed, ceaselessly involved in internecine warfare. Left to its own devices, the Kampuchean population is likely to return to quieter agricultural pursuits. Kampuchea is blessed by a fertile land and a freshwater lake, Tonle Sap, that could provide enough fish for the entire Kampuchean population. (This incidentally may explain why most Vietnamese settlers have been located around the Tonle Sap.)

Ironically, this same Kampuchean "disadvantage" when compared with the Afghans is also its strength when a compromise settlement is envisaged. A Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan would leave any successor Kabul regime with great difficulties in controlling the countryside or governing the population. Unlike Lebanon, to cite another contrast, the Kampuchean population is relatively homogenous, both in ethnic and religious terms. The Kampuchean population is therefore more likely to accept an effective Kampuchean regime in Phnom Penh (unless of course it resorts to Pol Pot's methods of rule).

By creating a small, efficient resistance organization, staffed mainly by educated Kampucheans, Son Sann has proved that the educated and trained Kampucheans have not been totally decimated in the 1970s. Some of them have sacrificed a comfortable emigré life to return to the harsh border conditions. They exist in sufficient numbers to man the basic administrative structure of the state that would be created if the Vietnamese withdrew. Contrary to popular belief, there *need not* be chaos or anarchy if the Vietnamese withdraw.

In exile, Sihanouk has proved to be a powerful symbol of Kampuchean nationalism. He has played a forceful role in destroying Vietnamese credibility in the Third World. The recent Vietnamese decision not to challenge Democratic Kampuchea's U.N. credentials was in part at least an acknowledgment of Sihanouk's effectiveness as president of Democratic Kampuchea. If he returns to Phnom Penh, Sihanouk could prove to be an even greater unifying factor, perhaps telling the Kampuchean population that they may have finally emerged from the full cycle of horrors they have witnessed since his removal in 1970, barely 13 years ago.

Notwithstanding the criticisms that have been made of Sihanouk, there is virtually no other Kampuchean leader who is so closely identified as a symbol of the Kampuchean nation. Son Sann lacks Sihanouk's charisma but, contrary to superficial impressions, is wily and shrewd. He is also scrupulously honest, dedicated, and most important of all, has succeeded in creating an organization manned by talented and dedicated Kampucheans. There have been many historical differences between Sihanouk and Son Sann, some resolved, some unresolved, but if the two of them were to return together to Phnom Penh, each providing strengths that the other lacks, a viable regime could be created. There will be bickering, even some bitter acrimony between the followers of these two leaders, but since they have survived together in a coalition government with the Khmer Rouge for over 18 months, the prospects of them working together successfully in Phnom Penh are even greater.

One of the most widely shared fears about Kampuchea is the nightmarish scenario of the Khmer Rouge sweeping into control if Vietnam decides to withdraw its forces. Certainly a precipitate Vietnamese withdrawal could result in that happening, but such a withdrawal is almost inconceivable. Having invested so much in its Kampuchean venture, Vietnam is not likely to withdraw totally without its minimal security needs being met. The return of the Khmer Rouge would create precisely the sort of situation that triggered off the Vietnamese invasion in December 1978: a hostile military presence along the Kampuchean-Vietnamese border, a rapid military buildup and an increased Chinese presence. For virtually similar reasons, in addition to the possible horrible consequences for the Kampuchean population, the ASEAN states would find such a situation difficult to accept.

The main features of a compromise Kampuchean settlement are therefore not difficult to discover: a gradual phased withdrawal of Vietnamese forces (carried out in harmony with a planned introduction of interim arrangements, including an international peacekeeping force, to ensure law and order); disarmament of all Khmer factions; the formation of an interim administration to manage the country with international assistance; and finally free elections held under U.N. supervision. Kampuchea will have to accept the status of a neutral state. The details of such arrangements may not be easily agreed to but once the key principles are agreed to, and, more crucially, if all the key parties, especially ASEAN, Vietnam and China, find it in their interests to respect the agreement, the arrangements will eventually fall into place.

The main guarantee that all parties will need is that Kampuchea should not quickly disintegrate into anarchy or chaos: that is the crucial role that Sihanouk and Son Sann will have to play—quickly recreate a structure that could hold. The inclusion, in the interim administration, of some Kampucheans now serving in the Khmer Rouge or Heng Samrin regimes should not be surprising: the Kampucheans among themselves will know which figures are acceptable and which are not. Both Sihanouk and Son Sann have stressed the need for national reconciliation policies following a Vietnamese withdrawal. Slowly a Kampuchean consensus could emerge.

When the costs to Vietnam of its occupation of Kampuchea reach a sufficient level and if the forces of Sihanouk and Son Sann demonstrate a capacity to grow in strength and effectiveness, two key ingredients would have fallen into place for a settlement to emerge. The third ingredient, however, may be the most critical: an agreement among the three key powers of the Pacific region, i.e., China, the Soviet Union and the United States, not to block such a Kampuchean settlement.

IV

The direct involvement of both the P.R.C. and the Soviet Union (contrasted to the indirect and somewhat distant involvement of the United States) would suggest that a Kampuchean settlement would require their participation. The P.R.C. is the main provider of military aid to the Kampuchean resistance forces and applies direct pressure on Vietnam at the Sino-Vietnamese border. A Kampuchean settlement without the involvement, or at least tacit approval, of the P.R.C. is not likely.

Curiously, the Vietnamese have made no attempts to suggest that the P.R.C. has no role to play in Kampuchea. Indeed, Vietnam argues that it is in Kampuchea primarily because of the "China threat." At times Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has even suggested that the Kampuchean issue concerns only China and Vietnam. Of course, the Vietnamese have intended to use the "China threat" both as a propaganda weapon and as a justification for staying in Kampuchea. In so doing, however, they have acknowledged that the P.R.C.'s participation is necessary in any Kampuchean settlement.

It is difficult to figure out the real Vietnamese attitudes toward China. On the one hand, they have invaded and occupied Kampuchea in full awareness of the fact that this would bring down China's wrath upon Vietnam. Obviously the Vietnamese had calculated that they could, for the short term at least, live with Chinese anger. Yet, the Vietnamese have at the same time made relatively frantic efforts to get the Sino-Vietnamese talks going. Several times Vietnam has proposed a truce or cease-fire along the Sino-Vietnamese border. The Vietnamese have also tried to restart the Sino-Vietnamese talks, last held in September 1978, but the P.R.C. has steadfastly refused to do so. China has clearly calculated that time is on its side.

It would be wrong to infer from this, however, that the P.R.C. has been intransigent or unaccommodating on the question of a settlement for Kampuchea. One significant fact here is that the Chinese leaders have declared their willingness to accept the results of any free elections held in Kampuchea after a Vietnamese withdrawal. The P.R.C. could well have insisted upon the reinstallation of the Democratic Kampuchean government in Phnom Penh, which would be the correct "legal" position to adopt. Governments removed by foreign invading forces have the right to resume office when the invading forces leave. It is interesting and useful to note here that neither the U.N. resolutions on Kampuchea, nor the declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea, have adopted this correct "legal" position—and China has endorsed all these resolutions and declarations.

Recently, *Beijing Review* came out with a 14-page analysis of the Kampuchean problem. The five-point plan enunciated by the P.R.C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 1, 1983 was reiterated as the Chinese position on the Kampuchean issue. The fifth point is especially crucial:

> (5) China seeks no self-interest on the question of Kampuchea. China is willing to refrain from any form of interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea, to respect the independence, neutrality and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, and to respect the result of the Kampuchea people's choice made through a genuinely free-election to be held under U.N. supervision.[9]

Another significant aspect of the five-point plan is the Chinese claim that normalization and improvement of Sino-Vietnamese relations would follow the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. The P.R.C. could, for example, have included the abrogation of the Soviet-Vietnamese Peace Treaty, the removal of Soviet military facilities from Vietnam or the reduction of Soviet-Vietnamese ties as additional conditions for normalization.

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[9] Guo Yan and Dong Nan, "The Kampuchean Issue—Its Origin and Major Aspects," *Beijing Review*, September 12, 1983, p. XVIII.

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

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

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

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

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

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Right Versus Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy in the United States
Michael S. Teitelbaum, population and immigration expert, examines the arguments surrounding the present acute controversy over new legislation. Fall 1980, No. 59102.

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: A Proposal
William F. Buckley, Jr., Editor of *National Review*. Spring 1980, No. 58401.

V

Vietnam's dependence on the Soviet Union is almost total. Without Soviet economic and military support, the Vietnamese economy would crumble.[10] Supplies to Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea and at the Sino-Vietnamese border would dry up in weeks. Vietnam would be left vulnerable vis-à-vis the P.R.C. In spite of this clear dependence, the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship is not a simple patron-client relationship. Vietnam is too proud and too tough a nation to accept a totally subservient role, although its room for maneuver has been diminished considerably over the years as a result of its growing dependence on the Soviets.

This dependence increased sharply after its invasion of Kampuchea. This would seem to suggest that the Soviet Union would do little to encourage a settlement in Kampuchea, for fear of losing a dependent client state.

Yet, the Soviet Union has had to bear a heavy burden in supporting Vietnam. Most estimates suggest that the Soviet aid comes to $3 million a day—a total of $1 billion a year. As described by Evelyn Colbert, a former State Department officer, the benefits the Soviets have received in return for their assistance are substantial, including access to Vietnamese ports for the Soviet Pacific fleet, improved intelligence-gathering capabilities against China and the United States, and basing facilities which greatly extend the range of Soviet military aircraft in East and Southeast Asia.[11]

But Mrs. Colbert goes on to argue that this relationship with Vietnam has not been without cost to the Soviet Union: it has compounded the many differences the Soviet Union has with the United States, added another issue to Sino-Soviet frictions, and reinforced ASEAN suspicions of the Soviet Union. Hence, Mrs. Colbert suggests the intriguing possibility that the Soviet Union may not necessarily oppose a Kampuchean settlement. She says:

> At the same time, any settlement in Kampuchea acceptable to Hanoi but not also requiring rupture of the Soviet-Vietnam relationship would probably be acceptable to Moscow, which would have reason for confidence that the limited resources available from other potential donors would keep Hanoi reliant on its generosity. Indeed, Moscow would probably welcome the opportunity to share the burden. Some relaxation of tension between Beijing and Hanoi would probably also be welcome as long as it did not go too far.[12]

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[10] McWilliams, *loc. cit.*, pp. 65–66.

[11] Evelyn Colbert, "Power Balance and Security in Indochina," published by Security Conference on Asia and the Pacific, Marina del Rey, California, April 1983, p. 21.

[12] Colbert, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

However, it would be unrealistic to expect the Soviet Union to nudge Vietnam toward a Kampuchean settlement. As the current relationship is fraught with a lot of strain, the Soviets are unlikely to initiate moves that could heighten Vietnam's sense of insecurity, which has indeed increased since the resumption of Sino-Soviet talks in October 1982.[13]

Nevertheless, as one is a superpower with global interests, it is inevitable that Soviet and Vietnamese interests will not always coincide. This has happened several times in recent history. The Soviets were willing to sacrifice Vietnamese interests for Soviet purposes at the Geneva Conference in 1954; they proposed in 1957 that both South and North Vietnam be admitted to the United Nations, and in 1964 Soviet interest in avoiding confrontation with the United States led to a Soviet decision to restrict the level of Soviet aid to Vietnam.[14] In 1972, the Soviet Union decided to embrace Richard Nixon a month after the bombing of Haiphong. If Mrs. Colbert's analysis of Soviet-Vietnamese relations today is correct, Soviet interests would be served by a settlement in Kampuchea, as long as their vital interests in Vietnam are not threatened. The Soviets may not be willing to launch the initiatives for such a settlement, but as long as they decide *not* to block any such initiatives, this means that none of the major parties involved in the conflict, *with the sole exception of Vietnam*, are opposed to a compromise settlement in Kampuchea.

VI

The ASEAN states have laid the groundwork for a settlement of the Kampuchean problem by mobilizing international opinion against Vietnam (which accounts, in part, for Vietnam's economic distress), motivating the Kampuchean resistance forces to work together against the Vietnamese occupation, and lobbying both Beijing and Moscow to accept a compromise settlement. Yet Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea has resulted in its direct involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute and it would require the participation of another major actor to help Vietnam extricate itself from this conflict. Only the United States has the credentials to play such a role.

It will not be easy to motivate the United States to play a leading role in the Indochina theater. Memories of Vietnam still remain vivid within the body politic of the United States. Even today, eight years after the departure of U.S. forces from Vietnam, any American involvement overseas, whether it be in Chad, Lebanon or Nicaragua, is inevitably compared with Vietnam. Stanley Karnow states that before the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the phrase "Remember Munich" would enter into any foreign policy discussion; today the phrase is "Remember Vietnam."[15] This concern over U.S. domestic reaction, plus the fear of a public perception of another U.S. failure in Vietnam if any U.S. initiative fails, inevitably leads to a sense of caution among U.S. policymakers in their decisions concerning Indochina.

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[13] McWilliams, *loc. cit.*, p. 69.

[14] Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle*, New York: Pegasus, 1967, pp. 40–42, 45–48; William E. Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964–1965*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967, pp. 68–71.

The present situation in Southeast Asia provides a lot of satisfaction to U.S. leaders. The ASEAN countries have the fastest growing economies of the Third World and, combined together, form the fifth largest trading partner of the United States. The foreign ministers of the United States, Japan, the European Community, Canada, Australia and New Zealand participate annually in the meetings of the ASEAN foreign ministers, a testimony to the growing significance of ASEAN. The United States enjoys close political and economic ties with each of the ASEAN states and has a treaty relationship with two ASEAN members, the Philippines and Thailand. In the wake of the collapse of Indochina, there were widespread fears that there would be a precipitate withdrawal from Southeast Asia. These fears have receded as the United States has quietly but firmly reaffirmed its interest in a stable Southeast Asian region. Vital trade and strategic routes pass through the region. There is virtually no other part of the Third World that the United States can point to as a similar "success story" of U.S. foreign policy.

Given its interest in the continued political stability and economic growth of the ASEAN region, the United States has maintained a keen interest in the Kampuchean issue, which is perceived as the biggest single threat to ASEAN security. The United States has several times reaffirmed its security commitment to Thailand, ASEAN's frontline state, and has airlifted military equipment promptly in response to Vietnamese incursions into Thai territory. The Vietnamese leaders would have taken note of these American gestures, but they now need to be convinced that the United States will play a forceful and active role in the event they agree to a compromise settlement in Kampuchea.

Hitherto the American government has stated that it will follow the lead of the ASEAN governments on the Kampuchean issue. In practice, however, the American government has been obliged to take into consideration its global interests, including its relations with China and the Soviet Union, in the formulation of its policies regarding Kampuchea.[16] At the International Conference on Kampuchea, the U.S. government tried to steer a neutral course on the differences that arose between ASEAN and China over the question of the successor government in Kampuchea following a Vietnamese withdrawal. These differences have since been resolved by the Chinese publication of the five-point principles where the Chinese acknowledged that the former Democratic Kampuchea government would not resume office in the event of a Vietnamese withdrawal.

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[15] See Stanley Karnow, "Vietnam As an Analogy," *The New York Times*, October 4, 1983.

Even though the present situation provides a lot of satisfaction to U.S. policymakers (and in private many American officials derive some pleasure from the fact that, this time around, it is Vietnam that is bleeding at low cost to the United States), the rewards for the United States in the event of a settlement may be even greater. A Kampuchean settlement would pave the way for a historic reconciliation between the United States and Vietnam. As Vietnam would be perceived to be making the necessary compromises by withdrawing its troops from Kampuchea, there should be little domestic opposition to such a reconciliation.

Such a reconciliation, which could prove to be as dramatic as the U.S.-China reconciliation in 1972, could help close a bitter chapter in American history and slowly lay to rest the "ghost" of Vietnam that haunts U.S. foreign policy. If carried out smoothly and successfully, with the cooperation of ASEAN, China, Japan and its other Pacific allies, an American President could hope to reap some domestic political dividends from such a move. No great venture can be undertaken without risks, but given the balance of political, economic and military factors in Indochina, it may be time for the United States to play a more active and decisive role in Indochina.

VII

A solution for the Kampuchean problem would involve the following elements:

—a gradual withdrawal of Vietnamese forces accompanied by the introduction of an international peacekeeping force;
—simultaneous disarmament of all Khmer factions;
—creation of an impartial elections commission under U.N. auspices;

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[16] A Congressional Research Service study, entitled "Vietnam's future policies and role in Southeast Asia," Washington: G.P.O., April 1982, presents an illuminating study of U.S. options on pp. 70–72.

—free elections without any coercion of the population;
—gradual reestablishment of a Khmer governing authority through creation of a bureaucracy, army, judiciary, etc.;
—declaration of neutrality for Kampuchea; and
—massive infusion of international assistance to both Kampuchea and Vietnam.

The ravages of 13 years of conflict and war have done incalculable damage to the social and political fabric of Kampuchea. Some acrimonious divisions have undoubtedly arisen among different segments of the Kampuchean population. The danger of civil war following a Vietnamese withdrawal cannot be totally ruled out, unless the different factions are effectively disarmed.

Bearing in mind these difficulties, a realistic scenario would have to prescribe a gradual and phased withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, perhaps with the Vietnamese remaining in some strength as international peacekeeping forces enter the country. The disarmament of the factions will also be difficult, as most of them are likely to stash away their arms as a guarantee against some other party reneging on the agreement. Elections could also be difficult in the immediate aftermath of a withdrawal, and an interim administration *acceptable to all the Kampuchean parties* may have to be created while a viable state structure is gradually rebuilt.

Ultimately, however, the Kampucheans are confident that a viable state can be created. The Kampuchean nation has withstood similar tests in the past—even experienced massacres similar to those of the Pol Pot era. Somehow the nation has always managed to survive. The presence of Sihanouk and Son Sann could help ensure that some of the ancient traditions of Kampuchea are revived and preserved, even if a modern state structure is created. Most Kampuchean participants in this exercise would have a strong motivation to succeed. If they failed, the only practical alternative would be the reintroduction of the Pol Pot regime or, a more likely possibility, a reinvasion by Vietnam in the wake of civil war in Kampuchea.

VIII

The stakes in Kampuchea are high. The outcome in Kampuchea could well determine the future political orientation of Southeast Asia. If Vietnam were finally to succeed in its fait accompli of occupying Kampuchea, in spite of the opposition of ASEAN, China and the Pacific countries, it might begin to explore fresh initiatives. Already Vietnam has endorsed some Laotian claims on Thailand's northeast territory. This does not mean that Vietnam is intrinsically expansionist—Vietnam would be merely following Lenin's maxim: prod with the bayonet; if you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, withdraw. For this reason, the ASEAN states cannot afford to see Vietnam succeed in Kampuchea. This explains the extraordinary cohesion and unity of the five members of ASEAN in the face of persistent Vietnamese attempts to divide it.

Yet the prospects for Vietnam succeeding are bleak. A close analysis of the political, economic and military realities of the situation shows that Vietnam may be headed for disaster. To use Hu Qiaomu's vivid analogy of a speeding train to describe Mao's old age policies, the Vietnamese leaders are now caught in a speeding train that is going to run into a solid mountain called China. Unlike the West, the Chinese leaders are not preoccupied with obtaining foreign policy successes on the eve of elections. They can afford to wait. Ultimately the strain of confronting a nation of one billion people will tell on Vietnam. In fact, by delaying a compromise settlement, Vietnam may be playing into the hands of the Chinese leaders who may prefer to deal with a much weakened Vietnam in five to ten years.

Aware of this possibility, ASEAN policymakers, unlike American policymakers, derive little satisfaction from present trends. A weak Vietnam, subject to pressures from outside powers such as the Soviet Union or China, could bring instability to the rest of Southeast Asia. A strong Vietnam, disentangled from big power conflicts, committed to economic development in harmony with the rest of Southeast Asia and indeed the entire Pacific region (including China), could bring real long-term stability by removing the grounds for any big-power involvement in the region.

A more nimble and flexible Vietnamese leadership would have acknowledged these realities by now. Unfortunately, the present generation of Vietnamese leaders have learned just one lesson in their long years in power: it pays to tough it out. Psychologically, if for no other reasons, Le Duan and his Politburo colleagues will have a hard time accepting the possibility that they made a mistake in their final years. Hence the pressures on Vietnam will have to be sustained if a compromise settlement is to emerge. If recent reports of growing disintegration of the Heng Samrin regime are true, Vietnam's difficulties inside Kampuchea are likely to increase. In recent months, the Vietnamese have been forced to resort to more brutal methods to retain control in Kampuchea—a sure sign of trouble for any colonizing power. Internationally, there is little prospect of a reduction in Vietnam's isolation. Vietnam has in effect conceded this by its decision not to challenge Democratic Kampuchea's credentials at the United Nations. Even though economic sanctions have never really been effective in affecting a nation's policies, the current policy of the United States, Japan and most other advanced industrialized countries to deprive Vietnam of economic aid have succeeded in hitting Vietnam at its weakest point.

The trickiest problem that the ASEAN states have faced in managing the Kampuchean problem has been that of balancing clear and unambiguous messages to Vietnam: on the one hand, opposition to the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea will be tough and sustained; on the other hand, however, the door is open for a compromise settlement. In public, the latter message has been conveyed several times. A carefully phrased moderate and conciliatory signal was sent to Vietnam in the form of the Appeal for Kampuchean Independence issued by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on September 21, 1983. Similar messages have been conveyed in private signals to Hanoi.

Unfortunately, until now, the reply from Vietnam continues to be negative. Perhaps the Vietnamese leaders are still counting on breaking one of the weak links in the chain of opposition that they face. It may be useful to attempt new diplomatic initiatives from time to time, but there is also the danger that such moves could be interpreted by Vietnam as a sign of weakness. The ultimate message that has to be conveyed to Vietnam is that, this time around, time is not working on Vietnam's side. If this message is sent in a clear and sustained fashion, the ASEAN states can call upon their friends to wait and see the fruits of one of the oldest Asian values: patience.

Claude Malhuret

REPORT FROM AFGHANISTAN

For three years now, Medecins sans Frontières—Doctors Without Borders—has been in Afghanistan. The first medical teams it sent arrived in May 1980, five months after the Soviet invasion. Since then, we have sent 162 physicians and nurses who replace each other in relays for periods of four to eight months, providing an uninterrupted MSF presence. We have equipped and operated a total of 12 hospitals in the provinces of Nuristan, Paktia, Badakhshan (close to the Soviet border), Wardak (some 40 km from Kabul), Bamiyan, Uruzgan, and Zabul. Four of these hospitals were deliberately bombed and destroyed by Soviet planes in the fall of 1981. We evacuated two other hospitals in areas where we felt the need for medical services was limited and where local medics whom we have trained have been able to take over. At the present time, the MSF has 22 persons working in six hospitals. From our uninterrupted presence in Afghanistan, we have been able to evaluate the situation in the country since the beginning of the war, specifically in the areas where we are working. The current situation in Afghanistan is one of protracted war. The duration and character of the war derive directly from the Soviet style of anti-guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla warfare has already demonstrated its effectiveness elsewhere, and until recently no one has known how to counter it. The scattering of populations, the creation of village strongholds, and control and card-indexing of inhabitants have proved to be very useful means of restricting guerrilla advances, but the resistance fighters have always won out in the end.

It is true that there are examples to the contrary, such as the victory of the British army in Malaysia, and that of the French expeditionary corps in Algeria. But in the latter case, de Gaulle realized that France's long-term position was untenable and so he

[1] Medecins sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) was created in 1971 by a group of physicians who had worked in Biafra during the Nigerian civil war of the 1960s. This rapid-deployment medical organization has sent teams to conflict-torn areas in Southeast Asia, Lebanon, Chad, East Africa, Angola, Central America, and Iranian Kurdistan, often despite the opposition of host governments.

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complied with the demands of the National Liberation Front, even though the Front was in a very poor military position when negotiations began.

Totalitarian regimes have analyzed these repeated failures and found a new answer to the guerrilla "problem," one that is simple, logical and effective. Since the basis of the strength of a resistance movement lies in the practice that Mao Zedong called "the fish taking to the water," the easiest way to separate the guerrillas from the population is to empty the fish bowl and capture its contents. In other words, an effective counter-strategy in the face of guerrilla action involves massive reprisals against the population, sometimes including the extermination of a large part of that population.

Some might think that such prospects would be repulsive to even the most determined invader. But this has not been the case; this philosophy has become a reality before our very eyes over the past several years. In the province of Ogaden, which revolted against the regime in power in Ethiopia, towns and villages were leveled one after the other. Nearly one million refugees—almost all the inhabitants—are now in refugee camps in nearby Somalia. And air units from Addis Ababa have no scruples about making raids on the camps.

In Kampuchea, the Vietnamese victory over the Khmer Rouge four years ago would never have been possible if the people had not been starved into submission by the Vietnamese, who feared that part of the relief support might fall to the enemy forces of Pol Pot. While tens of thousands of Kampucheans died of hunger and hundreds of thousands fled into Thailand, thousands of tons of food provided by international relief organizations spoiled on the docks of Kompong Som. The only portions of these supplies that were used went to feed the occupying Vietnamese forces and the Kampucheans under control in the pacified areas.

This type of warfare is currently being used in Afghanistan, the only difference being that the Afghan resistance groups have thus far made it fail. It may therefore be more difficult to recognize the pattern in all of these anti-guerrilla campaigns, but their common characteristics can be divided into three main categories: how the Soviet version of anti-guerrilla warfare compares with traditional Western anti-guerrilla warfare; what specific means it uses; and what the final outcome is.

II

One difference between the type of warfare used by the Russians in Afghanistan and that used by Western armies, such as the French in Algeria or the Americans in Vietnam, is that Western armies try to control the population and make every effort to prevent infiltration by guerrillas. From the bases they set up in towns, they try to establish a sphere of influence, to find support in the villages and hamlets, and to create militias to defend areas that might be attacked by guerrilla fighters before reinforcements from the regular army arrive. To ensure that resistance groups cannot get supplies from the people, the Western armies set up protected villages where the people are brought together and where food, supplies, and livestock are stored.

Manhunts are continuously organized, from the bases that are considered safe, to capture or kill guerrillas or to seize their caches of arms and ammunition. In all, despite the irresponsible acts committed by the French army in Algeria and the U.S Army in Vietnam, their anti-guerrilla warfare was based on one principle: to obtain the support of the population by any means, such as by giving privileges to newfound allies and by waging a hard war against the *enemy*. I have already noted the poor results of this type of warfare.

The Soviets operate differently. In Afghanistan, the towns held by the occupying Soviet forces are not used as bases to secure a hold over the neighboring areas. The towns are used as garrisons and as logistical stepping-stones. They provide storage facilities, aviation bases, barracks, and strongholds. The rest of the country is not under Soviet control. Protected villages do not exist. No effort is made to offer privileges to try to win over the population. The few military operations that involve ground forces are merely for strategic purposes. Some examples are the engagements that have taken place on the road from Kabul to the Soviet border, in the Panjshir Valley and the Wakhan corridor; operations there are not designed to capture resistance fighters.

The reason for this difference in anti-guerrilla tactics is very simple: the Soviets are not as naïve as the Westerners. They understood long ago—perhaps back at the time of the 1933 Ukrainian genocide when this tactic was used quite successfully—that a war involving guerrillas and anti-guerrilla fighters would never be won by either side if the emphasis was placed on being in the good graces of the population. On the contrary, the war would be won by the side that succeeded in making terror reign.

III

This brings me to the second aspect: specific means used to counter resistance movements. This does not involve a warm bath/

cold shower tactic, but the exclusive use of boiling water—again and again and again, until both the guerrilla fighters and the population ask for mercy.

During the first phase, until late 1980, air and ground equipment and infantry units were brought together to establish the reign of terror in this fashion. To mention just one example, in the province of Hazarajat in central Afghanistan, several hundred armored vehicles would leave either Kabul or Jaghori and occupy a valley that could easily be entered. The population, which had warning either by rumor or because they had seen the helicopter movement, fled into the mountains. The Soviet troops therefore entered empty villages where they remained for a few days, harassed by the Muslim resistance groups—the Mujahedeen—who also barred their access to the upper valleys. During those few days, the soldiers pillaged and burned homes, set fire to crops and dragged off with them the few inhabitants left behind—mostly old people, whom they interrogated or summarily executed.

In 1980, three of these raids by Soviet troops took place along the Shibar Pass road; the soldiers thereby managed to occupy Bamiyan, Yakaolang, and Panjau for about ten days in June with 300 armored vehicles, in August (again with 300 armored vehicles), and in September (with 120 armored vehicles). In their last attack, the Russians destroyed everything in sight, set fire to crops, and burned bazaars to the ground in Panjau, Yakaolang, and several villages on the road to Shibar. They left the former American hospital in Yakaolang in ruins.

During a similar expedition in the fall of 1980, many homes were burned down in the region of Turkmen, west of Kabul, and the small hospital in Lolenj was also completely destroyed. The same kinds of destruction took place in mid-December in the northern part of Ghazni province. When one of our medical teams arrived two days after the end of the fighting, fires were still smoldering in a number of villages, and people were being wounded by booby traps left behind by the Soviet troops. Once again, the effect sought was terror, not strictly military victory.

Since late 1980, warfare using such operations has dropped off, probably because the Red Army has lost too many of its troops. But the Russians have now found other ways to impose a reign of terror, particularly by the use of air raids against which the poorly equipped resistance fighters are completely defenseless. In the Hazarajat region, for example, the villages bombed in the last two years are much too numerous to be listed here in full. Just a few of the targets were Jaghori, Panjau, Behsud, Jalrez and Waras. In Jalrez, a home where a wedding was taking place was bombed and the tragedy left several dozen victims. In Waras, where the independent provisional government of Hazarajat has its headquarters, the helicopters bypassed this organization, which should have been a tempting target, and attacked the village bazaar.

Military intervention carried out mainly by helicopter also includes dropping mines and booby-trapped toys. I shall not go into detail, but only stress two points. First, camouflaged anti-personnel mines are not designed to kill, but to injure. The Russians know quite well that in this type of war, an injured person is much more trouble than a dead person. The injured person demobilizes fighters who have to transport him, and, of course, he can no longer fight. In many cases, he will die several days or weeks later from gangrene or from staphylococcus or gram-negative septicemia, with atrocious suffering, which further depresses those who must watch him die. The MSF has also seen the damage caused by the explosion of booby-trapped toys, in most cases plastic pens or small red trucks, which are choice terror weapons. Their main targets are children whose hands and arms are blown off. It is impossible to imagine any objective that is more removed from conventional military strategy, which forswears civilian targets.

The second aim of dropping of anti-personnel mines is to affect the economy. First, troops try to set up a blockade using mines that are scattered by the thousands along the passes leading to Pakistan (but with almost no success), and second, they try to scatter the people's livestock. When I arrived in Afghanistan for the first time in 1980, I was immediately struck by the number of goats and cows that had legs in splints made of bamboo sticks and tied with wire. The herdsmen explained to me what had happened: these animals had stepped on mines and been injured as a result of the explosion. But the greatest loss, the herdsmen told me, is not so much the ones with splints, but rather all those animals that were killed from secondary infections. And although the Afghans clear the mines from the roads to prevent more human deaths, the animals in the fields continue to get killed. Livestock in several regions of the country has been slaughtered in this way. The effect of this slaughtering on the food supply in Afghanistan is clear.

Another point to be considered is the question of refugees—those still in Afghanistan as well as those who have fled. These refugees should not be considered in the traditional way, as an unfortunate but unintended consequence of the war, but rather as part of Soviet warfare strategy, the same that was used in Kampuchea, the Ogaden and Eritrea. The objective is, as mentioned earlier, to evacuate the country in order to isolate the guerrilla fighters.

The methodical pursuit of this objective is the only possible explanation for the incredible number of Afghan refugees. Some flee the country to Iran and Pakistan, where they are once again "used" by the Russians, whose agents infiltrate the refugees' ranks to further aggravate the conflicts that exist in Pakistan between different ethnic groups, as many believe is happening in Baluchistan. The figures for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran as reported to international bodies run in excess of four million.[2] Out of an Afghan population of 15 to 17 million, this figure is already enormous.

But to this figure must be added the hundreds of thousands of "internal" refugees who remain within Afghanistan. They have fled to the main towns, where they come under the control of the state army. Thus, this enlarged refugee count should be compared not to the total population of Afghanistan, but to the population in the rural areas that are held by the resistance fighters. When one adds to that the number of persons killed either in the fighting or by diseases that frequently find their cause in malnutrition—especially among children—one can better understand why that Soviet strategy is highly effective and that it has no doubt been responsible for chasing nearly half of the population away from guerrilla strongholds.

Also, several thousand children are sent to the Soviet Union to study to be officers one day in the Socialist Republic of Afghanistan; this offers a very close comparison with the Russians' "liberation" of the southern republics of the U.S.S.R. in the 1920s and 1930s, which led to a total victory over what has been called the Basmachi ("bandit") revolt.

IV

Before coming to the last issue, which concerns the final outcome of the tactics just discussed, a word must be said about one of the conditions needed for this strategy to be a success: secrecy.

International public opinion would never accept such enormities if it were informed daily on the developments in Afghanistan. The need for secrecy explains why borders are systematically closed and why journalists are not allowed to enter the country. Of course, some journalists disregard this, but they are so few in number that their reports draw little attention. Compare, for instance, the amount of coverage on Afghanistan with that given for several years on the war in Vietnam.

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[2] The Iranian government informed the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1983 that there are 1.5 million Afghan refugees in Iran; Pakistan reports 2.8 million Afghan refugees inside its borders.

The French physicians who have been on permanent duty in Afghanistan for the last four years have become key eyewitnesses, and in spite of their lack of experience in journalism, they have been able to make up somewhat for the negligence of news reporting. I use the word "negligence" because, if a small organization like ours can succeed in maintaining more than 20 physicians on permanent duty in four provinces in Afghanistan, despite government acts of violence against them, the news media could do likewise. The Russians cannot tolerate the fact that we are there to witness what is happening, and we have therefore become their target. In 1980 and 1981, four MSF hospitals were deliberately destroyed by MI-24 helicopters. Two other hospitals in the region of Panjshir, which are operated by another French organization, Aide Medicale Internationale, were destroyed in the same way. May I add that one of the hospitals had a big red cross clearly visible on its roof.

Also, on several occasions, the physicians themselves have been pursued by Soviet soldiers who had in their possession photos of the doctors that they showed to the people they questioned. All the doctors have managed to get away except one, Dr. Philippe Augoyard, who was captured in January 1983. But we do not think that the Russians will try that type of operation again, as it proved disastrous for their image in Europe—especially of course in France. Rather than discouraging new recruits, which was probably the goal, the Augoyard case let physicians in other countries know about our work. Such incidents result in a bad press that affects the Soviets in other spheres. At the present time, only 50 percent of our medical teams are French; the remainder are Dutch, English, Belgian, Swiss, Scandinavian, and other nationalities. If, for example, a Dutch doctor were arrested in Afghanistan, the anti-Soviet publicity would certainly influence the ongoing debate over the installation of American missiles in Europe.

V

Now we come to the question of the final outcome of the Soviet strategy. The examples given above concerned Kampuchea and Ethiopia. The reason for this is that Afghanistan is not a very good example to illustrate Soviet anti-guerrilla warfare, precisely because the results have so far been unsuccessful. The towns of Afghanistan, the main bases for Soviet intervention, are poorly controlled. Not a week goes by without word of an attack against the government or against communist-bloc embassies in Kabul. In response, the heavily commercial districts in big cities such as Herat and Kandahar were reportedly severely bombed and nearly destroyed by planes because they had gone over to the resistance—just another example of the Soviet terror strategy and massive destruction, which can be contrasted with the house-by-house taking of the Algiers Casbah by the French army in 1970, with little loss to property or human life. The Soviet strongholds of Bamiyan, Ghazni, Gardez, and Khost are completely encircled by the Mujahedeen. In Bamiyan, for example, a garrison composed of 200 Russians and 200 Afghans has its post high up on a peak; supplies reach the garrison by helicopter. Helicopters are therefore gaining in importance for the Soviets as a means of transport between towns because communication links are not at all under control, although efforts have recently been made to improve them.

The puppet government of President Babrak Karmal has also attempted psychological warfare, by trying to play on local antagonisms among the Pushtun tribes. But the government has not been very successful at this, particularly since the death in 1981 of Faiz Mohammed, Minister for Tribal Affairs, who was killed by a group he was trying to bribe.

The cease-fire agreements that have been made have worked as much in favor of the resistance fighters as they have in favor of the government leaders, and they are based more on a balance of power than on a successful psychological warfare strategy. This is currently the case in Panjshir.[3]

The number of armored vehicles that have been destroyed by resistance forces is incredibly large, considering their outdated weaponry and suicidal tactics (such as leaping onto tanks with homemade gasoline bombs). We counted more than 600 vehicles destroyed in the areas where we work, which, when extrapolated, comes to a total figure of some three to four thousand for the entire country. This figure is generally found to be so unbelievable that, whenever I mention it, I never fail to have with me a set of slides to document what I am saying.

The economic blockade has also not succeeded. The border areas are as easily accessible as they were before it was imposed; our medical teams need only three days to reach the central province of Hazarajat. Our movement is not restricted, as people generally think; we travel by car or truck, and only during the day.

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[3] During the summer of 1983, Ahmad Shah Massoud, resistance commander in the Panjshir Valley, negotiated a truce with the Soviets, refusing to deal with the Kabul regime (thus forcing the Soviets to implicitly recognize him). Under the truce, he resupplied the valley, opened supply lines and formed alliances with leaders in the north and as far west as the town of Herat. The truce has now ended, and Massoud has refused to extend it.

Setting fire to crops and storage shelters is another anti-guerrilla tactic, but its effect is limited because less than half the amount of food that was needed before the war is needed now due to the diminished population. In addition, caravans going to and from Pakistan continue to bring fresh produce. Another striking—and ironic—example of the ambiguous effect on the economy, also from Hazarajat, is the need in Kabul for firewood, which has forced the government to deal with the resistance. The resistance fighters bring wood to government outposts and exchange it for salt or sugar from Kabul.

Despite the attempts to restrict the food supply, trends in local market prices indicate that the blockade is not working. Some prices have actually dropped since the Soviet invasion. At Jaghori, for instance, a gallon of gasoline that cost 200 to 300 Afghanis (AFS) in 1979 costs 160 AFS today. A pack of cigarettes that cost 60 AFS in 1979 now costs 28 AFS. These figures suggest that supplies are adequate to keep prices from rising. Other prices have risen, but less rapidly than those in many Third World countries, even countries that are not at war: a *ser* (15 pounds) of flour cost 70 AFS in 1978; it rose to 160 AFS in 1979; today it costs 180 AFS. The price of a *ser* of tea doubled between 1978 and 1979, from 960 to 1,920 AFS; since then it has only risen to a current price of 2,500 (less than one-third of the 1978–79 rate of increase), and even this price rise may be largely attributable to inflation.

The examples illustrating the poor short-term effect of Soviet strategy suggest a rather optimistic trend with regard to the Afghan resistance movement, but my conclusion is much less so. Everything I have said about the current situation shows that the war in Afghanistan is one in which the balance of power has not changed in four years, in spite of the fact that the two adversaries are unequally matched—on one side the world's biggest army, on the other a handful of people standing tall against the invader. There is no sign of any change soon in this state of affairs, and I do not believe that the Afghans can be beaten in the short or medium term. But Soviet strategy involves two aspects that may make the outcome in Afghanistan differ from the Western experience; one, already mentioned, is the use of mass terror, completely unlike any of the more moderate types of intervention. The second is that the Soviets can afford a protracted war in the short term for the sake of a long-term victory.

The Russians do not need smashing victories to announce to their citizenry, as Soviet public opinion does not influence Soviet policy. Catastrophes, such as that in the Salang tunnel where several hundred Soviet and communist-regime troops (and civilians) were killed, do not incite an outcry in Moscow for Soviet "boys" to come home. The Soviet army can wait it out as long as it did for the Basmachi revolt to end—and it waited for that for 20 years. It can wait even longer if necessary. The Afghan resistance will hold out for a long time, but in the end it will probably be beaten. It might not be beaten, however, if in the coming years there is a profound change in the international balance of power and in the reactions of Westerners to Soviet totalitarianism. It is not impossible that this change could take place, but only a very wise person would dare to predict the future of Afghanistan.

Seymour Maxwell Finger

THE REAGAN-KIRKPATRICK POLICIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

As U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick has represented a dramatic change in style and approach from her immediate predecessors (and, in her confrontational predilections, from all previous American U.N. ambassadors except for Daniel Patrick Moynihan). Her political philosophy, her attitude toward the United Nations and her relations with African delegates, in particular, are diametrically opposed to those of Andrew Young and Donald McHenry. They were liberals; she is a staunch neo-conservative on foreign policy issues. They saw the United Nations as a helpful forum for arriving at peaceful solutions; she considers it "a dangerous place" where conflicts tend to be exacerbated. They cultivated the African representatives at the United Nations and frequently represented black African viewpoints in Washington; she reflects the Reagan line, which is perceptibly friendlier to South Africa. These differences are not merely personal; they reflect differences in attitudes between the Carter and Reagan Administrations.

To understand Jeane Kirkpatrick, one must first understand her political philosophy. In foreign policy she is a conservative. She acts and speaks out of ideological conviction, as the representative of an Administration that is, by American standards, unusually ideological. She is critical of those who believe that Americans "should concern ourselves with universal values, with abstract supranational goals, with what they are predisposed to call democracy and freedom, and not with such mundane matters as American power."[1] Her criticism does not mean that she is skeptical about the virtues of democracy and freedom. On the contrary, she is firmly convinced that the American concepts of democracy and freedom are superior to Marxism or any other collectivist society. Rather, her criticism is directed against those who would subordinate U.S. national interests—and particularly in the East-West struggle she sees in deeply moral terms—to "abstract" moral concerns directed at U.S. allies or associates.

Her ideological affinity with the President is made clear in the essays and speeches collected in her most recent book, *The Reagan Phenomenon*. In the foreword, Robert Nisbet (noting her involvement in the formulation of foreign policy, not only as the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, but also

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[1] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, address to the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, New York, June 2, 1982, reproduced in the *American Foreign Policy Newsletter*, August 1982. See also J. J. Kirkpatrick, "U.S. Security in Latin America" and "Reflections on Totalitarianism" in *Dictatorships and Double Standards*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982, pp. 53–91 and 96–138.

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as a member of the Cabinet *and* the National Security Council) concludes that "her admiration for the President is very admirably deep" and that the evidence "suggests accord between the two on matters dealt with in this book." Those matters include policy toward Central America, Israel, Afghanistan, southern Africa, human rights, the Soviet Union and the United Nations. Like Reagan, she tends to view foreign policy issues in terms of Soviet-U.S. confrontation and considers détente to have been a mistake.

In the lead address of the book, "The Reagan Phenomenon and the Liberal Tradition," originally delivered on May 28, 1981,[2] Kirkpatrick declares that "the liberal democratic and the Marxist-Leninist traditions are antithetical in their conceptions of human life and politics as well as in their practices." She sees American power as "necessary for the survival of liberal democracy"; concludes that détente had not produced "the expected liberalization in the U.S.S.R."; notes Soviet gains in Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, Southern Yemen and Afghanistan in the 1970s; sees Reagan's election as the end of the Vietnam era and a return of the nation's self-confidence; and calls for greater clarity and firmness toward the U.S.S.R.

That speech, clear in its application to relations between the industrialized Western countries and the Soviet bloc, leaves unanswered the question of how to deal with more than a hundred countries that fit in neither category. What about countries that profess a brand of Marxism but reject domination by either superpower? What about dictatorships like Zaïre, South Korea, the Philippines and many others that are anti-communist but are clearly not liberal democracies? Kirkpatrick addresses that question in her best-known essay, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," which appeared in *Commentary* in November 1979 and brought her to Reagan's attention.[3]

She starts her essay with an attack on the Carter Administration, "whose crowning achievement has been to lay the groundwork for a transfer of the Panama Canal from the United States to a swaggering Latin dictator of Castroite bent." She then charges that in Iran and Nicaragua, "it actively collaborated in the replacement of moderate autocrats friendly to American interests with less friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion." And she goes on to argue that the United States was wrong in trying "to impose liberalization and democratization on a government confronted with violent internal opposition—not only in Nicaragua and Iran but also in Angola, Vietnam, Cuba before the triumph of Castro and China before the fall of Chiang Kai-shek." This is indeed a formidable and striking catalogue, indicating clearly that (at least in hindsight) she would have favored unquestioning U.S. support of Portuguese colonialism, Ngo Dinh Diem, and Fulgencio Batista, as well as Chiang. All of these cases were surely far more complex than her analysis suggests; and it is difficult to find a "moderate" autocrat among them. In the case of Chiang's China and Diem's South Vietnam, the regimes were so weak and unpopular that the real question is whether the United States acted wisely in giving them as much support as it did.

Yet Kirkpatrick has a point. The overwhelming majority of nations in the world are not liberal democracies; hence, we rarely have the choice between dealing with "good" democracies and "bad" dictatorships. Nor, as she points out, does the United States have the capacity to democratize and modernize these countries. Still, if we are to deal with a nation at all, we must deal with its government, however imperfect. (The Carter Administration, despite its emphasis on human rights, maintained relationships with right-wing dictators in Latin America, Asia and Africa, as well as with left-wing ones in Yugoslavia.)

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[2] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *The Reagan Phenomenon - and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy*, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983, pp. 3–16.

[3] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary*, November 1979, pp. 34–45. This essay is reprinted in her 1982 book of collected essays and speeches, *Dictatorships and Double Standards*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

There are, of course, gray areas, such as the 1979 "internal settlement" government of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, where the United States followed the British lead in withholding recognition, a policy sharply criticized by Kirkpatrick in her article. Had the United States recognized the Muzorewa government, it could not have a useful relationship with the present government of Zimbabwe. While professing Marxism, Robert Mugabe has been notably less friendly toward the U.S.S.R. than toward the United States.

Kirkpatrick makes a distinction between "traditional" dictators such as the Shah and General Somoza, who allegedly offer a hope of gradual democratization, and totalitarian (communist) dictators, who offer no such hope. Yet, as the staunchly anti-communist Theodore Draper has pointed out, the distinction is hardly so ironclad: there are Marxist regimes that have introduced degrees of liberalization (e.g., Yugoslavia, Hungary) and right-wing dictators who have not liberalized at all. (Draper also notes that it was not traditional in Nicaragua for the dictator to own 50 percent of all property, and that the Shah's downfall was precipitated largely by his efforts to modernize a traditional society too fast.)[4]

However much scholars may dispute the pros and cons of Kirkpatrick's thesis, Ronald Reagan welcomed it; it fitted in perfectly with his policy of confronting communism. Indeed, he has made the doctrine his own, particularly in Central America, with military aid to the government of El Salvador fighting rebels there and to rebels fighting the Marxist government of Nicaragua. And Kirkpatrick is in the inner circle of policymaking for Latin America, currently serving as the President's representative to the Kissinger commission on Central America and widely accorded a major responsibility for the harder line toward Nicaragua evident since mid-1983.

II

Clearly, Kirkpatrick's political philosophy has had a decisive impact on her attitude and actions at the United Nations. She has returned to the Moynihan tactics of confrontation with the "nonaligned" majority. Like Moynihan, she is convinced that the United States must state its views clearly and consistently at the United Nations, and she and her team have done so. She has not hesitated to stand alone on issues and has done so with great regularity. No one can doubt the consistency, coherence and firmness of U.S. behavior at the United Nations during her tenure, and that has gained a measure of respect even from opponents.[5]

But speeches and resolutions are not all that happen at the United Nations, even though they consume the bulk of its time and are most visible to the public. Most speeches and General Assembly resolutions are soon forgotten. Important actions can be taken only by governments, and influence on them can usually be effected by informal conversations and a persuasive ear rather than public rhetoric and votes. Indeed, in my own 15 years at the United Nations, I found these informal conversations more important and productive than public rhetoric. One of Kirkpatrick's principal deputies has referred to the United Nations as a "soapbox" rather than a place for negotiation, and that appears to characterize her Mission's approach.

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[4] Theodore Draper, review of *Dictatorships and Double Standards*, *The New York Times Book Review*, July 25, 1982, pp. 12–13. See also Alan Tonelson, "Human Rights: The Bias We Need," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1982–83, pp. 55–61.

[5] Interviews with U.N. ambassadors, a veteran journalist and an experienced scholar on the United Nations.

Underlying this approach is Kirkpatrick's belief that the United Nations as it now functions has strayed from the goals of the Charter and that it is now an arena where conflicts are exacerbated rather than resolved. In her book she concedes that the United Nations of the 1960s played a useful role in ameliorating dangerous situations in the Congo (now Zaïre), Cyprus and the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. But, she argues, current debates at the United Nations tend to exacerbate conflicts for three main reasons:

1. The number of parties to the conflict is extended, as countries feel constrained to participate in debates and vote on issues in which they have no direct interest.
2. The pressure to vote and choose sides breeds polarization.
3. The blocs at the United Nations are mechanisms for conflict exacerbation and extension; e.g., the use by the Arab group of their position within the Afro-Asian bloc to generate speeches and resolutions against Israel and the United States.[6]

In an interview with the author on April 7, 1983, Ambassador Kirkpatrick was asked whether, on balance, she considered the U.N.'s influence as positive or negative. In reply, she said there were two United Nations. The United Nations of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was a constructive force. On political and security issues, however, she considered it a negative influence, for the reasons cited above.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick is on solid ground when she notes that most debates in the General Assembly are ideological and that there is little room for compromise or negotiation on resolutions. Also, discussion and voting in the General Assembly naturally widen the circle of participation. And sometimes bringing an issue to the United Nations is a hostile act, as when the Arab countries bombard the General Assembly with a plethora of resolutions against Israel.

But the U.N.'s record on conflict resolution, while far below the expectations of 1945, has much more to its credit than the three cases cited by Ambassador Kirkpatrick. One could add a host of other examples, such as the peaceful settlement of the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands on West Irian, the Iranian agreement to allow a U.N. referendum which resulted in the independence of Bahrain, and the presence of a U.N. peacekeeping force to stop the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in Yemen. In fact, of more than 150 disputes submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly, only a dozen long-range problems have thus far defied solution.[7] The others have been resolved through the United Nations or between the parties themselves.

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[6] "The Problem with the United Nations," in *The Reagan Phenomenon*, *op. cit.*, pp.92–98. See also A. Yeselson and A. Gaglione, *A Dangerous Place*, New York: Viking, 1974, a source Kirkpatrick quotes in expounding her philosophy.

[7] A. Leroy Bennett, *International Organizations*, 3rd Edition, Englewood (N.J.): Prentice Hall, 1984, pp. 130–131. See also S. M. Finger, *Your Man at the U.N.: People, Politics and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy*, New York: New York University Press, 1980, for additional examples of how decisions at the United Nations have contributed to the settlement of both political and economic disputes, especially pp. 4–9, 53–54, 57–64, 116–24, 172, 179–89.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick could point out, with justification, that these successes are in the past; the United Nations has had little impact on current disputes such as the Iran-Iraq war, Arab-Israel disputes, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, and the conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua. But there have been "slumps" before, notably from 1952 to 1956; consequently, it may be premature to give up on the United Nations as an instrument of peace.

Her negative view of the United Nations is reflected in "Standing Alone," an address Kirkpatrick made in October 1981.[8] She refers to the United States as "impotent" at the United Nations, noting that the United States and Israel are the only two countries that are not members of geographic blocs; e.g., Afro-Asian, Latin American, Eastern European and Western Europe and Other (WEO). There are also sub-groups, such as the EEC-10 (Common Market), the African, Asian and Arab blocs and ASEAN (Southeast Asia). These groups play a key role in deciding on candidacies, proposing agenda items and resolutions and mobilizing votes. The Soviets dominate a bloc of about a dozen countries which, except for Romania on occasion, can be expected to do their bidding. By contrast, that the United States is not a member of any bloc is a handicap.

Yet the handicap need not be crippling. The United States has frequent informal meetings with the WEO group and has friends in all the other groups except the Soviet bloc. And foreign representatives to the United Nations are not fools, even though many occasionally make foolish speeches. They recognize that the United Nations cannot do anything important without U.S. cooperation. It should be noted that the membership went through an entire session of the General Assembly in 1964–65 without voting rather than risk the withdrawal of either superpower.

What the nonaligned, constituting almost two thirds of the membership, do control is the agenda and the flow of resolutions in the General Assembly, as Kirkpatrick notes in "Standing Alone." They have used that majority to focus on Israeli-Arab issues, Namibia, South Africa and the New International Economic Order (NIEO)—all issues on which the United States is in the minority. The Soviets take an opportunistic position on these issues, supporting the nonaligned majority on self-determination as long as it is against Western interests; on Afghanistan, where the majority has voted for several resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Soviet belief in self-determination is less evident.

Whether the nonaligned countries are using their majority wisely is questionable. The fact that they have focused so much on anti-Western issues, with inflamed and repetitive rhetoric and resolutions, has seriously undermined confidence in the United Nations among Western peoples, governments and media. Without such support useful results cannot be achieved. And the disenchantment in the United States has produced the Moynihan and Kirkpatrick reaction of embattled confrontation in the United Nations Still, the United States has some responsibility to lead in more constructive directions and not just exchange brickbats. If there is no hope of constructive dialogues, the nonaligned majority will have no incentive to desist from rhetoric invective and sterile resolutions.

Kirkpatrick's response, like Moynihan's, emphasizes that the United States should take very seriously what representatives say and do at the United Nations.

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[8] Reproduced in *The Reagan Phenomenon*, *op. cit.*, pp.79–91.

Criticizing previous representatives she says: "We operate as though there were no difference between our relations with supporters and opponents, with no penalties for opposing our views and values and no rewards for cooperating" and "as though we had no coherent national purposes that link issue to issue."[9] Under her guidance, the United States has gone more frequently to capitals to object to antagonistic votes or speeches by representatives. Such tactics, if not used to excess, can be very helpful and should be employed on important matters.

But there is a limit to the number of issues that can be usefully discussed in capitals. Often an embassy representative who has only a superficial understanding of an issue must talk with a foreign ministry official who understands even less. Moreover, such a step should only be taken *after* consultation with the representative at the United Nations; otherwise, one may needlessly antagonize the representative and multiply the number of contacts in the capital beyond the point of diminishing returns.

The difference between Jeane Kirkpatrick and her predecessors is most notable in relations with African delegations. They frequently differed with Andrew Young on particular resolutions and issues, but they liked him and were convinced of his sincerity and understanding. They even would, where possible, try to avoid embarrassing him with the U.S. government. With Kirkpatrick, on the other hand, they feel little sympathy and much resentment against her "uppity" attitude.

Instead of emphasizing empathy with the Third World at the United Nations, Kirkpatrick has shown that the United States can strike back, both in words and action. A notable example was her reaction to a one-sided communiqué of the ministers of foreign affairs and heads of delegations of the nonaligned countries, issued on September 28, 1981, in New York. On October 6, she sent a letter to virtually all U.N. ambassadors who represent nonaligned countries, expressing surprise that the ambassador or his/her country "would or could associate yourselves with a document composed of such base lies and malicious attacks upon the good name of the United States." The letter also noted that the U.S.S.R., which was conducting or supporting occupations of Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Chad, was not mentioned in the communiqué while the United States, which was then occupying no country, was criticized nine times. While Kirkpatrick's points were well taken, her manner of presenting them provoked widespread resentment among the nonaligned ambassadors, including those friendly to the United States.[10]

Subsequently, she managed to develop reasonable working relationships with several friendly nonaligned ambassadors, but the sense of confrontation persists. U.S. handling of the Law of the Sea Conference (to which we shall return) left particular scars: T. T. B. Koh, the astute and veteran U.N. Ambassador from Singapore, has observed of that period that "the tough tactics of the U.S. didn't go down well with their friends in the (nonaligned) movement." Coming from Koh, who is widely respected and has been one of the staunchest of America's friends over many years, this observation must be taken seriously. And, referring to the nonaligned summit meeting of March 1983, Nigeria's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations said his country and other moderates backed off from an effort to delete specific references to U.S. intervention in

[9] *Ibid*, p. 104.

[10] *Time*, October 26, 1981, referred to the letter as an undiplomatic "letter bomb."

Latin America because "we couldn't afford to be seen publicly as giving in to Washington."[11]

As part of the "get tough" campaign, Washington has been computerizing individual Third World country votes in order to take them into account when considering aid requests. But adjusting the aid spigot to accord with U.N. votes can be difficult, given all the other factors that must be considered. For example, the Soviet Union votes with the United States nearly as often as Jordan does, and Zimbabwe, the recipient of the largest U.S. aid program in Sub-Saharan Africa, votes with the United States less often than Libya.[12]

Zimbabwe has indeed been a recent test case. Even after an apparently cordial visit by Prime Minister Mugabe to President Reagan in Washington in September, Zimbabwe abstained on the Security Council resolution condemning the Soviets' shooting down a Korean civil airliner. According to *The New York Times*, Kirkpatrick proposed that aid to Zimbabwe be cut substantially but was successfully opposed by Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and the Congressional Black Caucus.[13]

III

Jeane Jordan Kirkpatrick had many careers—as scholar, teacher, author, lecturer—before she came to the United Nations in 1981. Born in Duncan, Oklahoma, in 1927, she attended Stephens College (Missouri) and received her B.A. from Barnard in 1948, her M.A. from Columbia in 1950 and her Ph.D. from Columbia in 1968. Her doctoral dissertation, on Peronist Argentina, was an important factor in her becoming a specialist on Latin America. In 1955, she married Dr. Evron M. (Kirk) Kirkpatrick, longtime executive director of the American Political Science Association and now Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. They have three grown sons.

An adult lifetime of managing a family and a career have made Jeane Kirkpatrick a disciplined person who makes optimum use of time. Before her appointment to the United Nations, she authored three books (*Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society*, 1971; *Political Women*, 1974; and *The New Presidential Elite*, 1976), and numerous articles in scholarly and influential journals. Meanwhile, she reared a family and carried on a career of teaching and research, principally at Georgetown University and the American Enterprise Institute.[14]

Her husband, a friend of Hubert Humphrey, led Jeane Kirkpatrick from a scholarly interest in politics to active participation in the Democratic Party. Disappointed by the nomination of George McGovern, they helped in 1972 to found the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. These are Democrats who espouse traditional liberalism on domestic issues but are hard-line conservatives on foreign policy and are popularly known as "neo-conservatives." She became Vice Chairman of the Coalition, which included Norman Podhoretz, editor of *Commentary* magazine, Eugene Rostow and the late Senator Henry Jackson.

As noted earlier, her *Commentary* article, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," fitted in admirably with Ronald Reagan's own hardline conservatism and brought her to his attention. She served in his foreign policy advisory group in the 1980 campaign, and her appointment as representative to the United Nations was a natural, from his standpoint. She was a Democrat and the only woman in his initial cabinet—an important consideration for a President whose position on women's rights has been strongly criticized by feminists. Above all, she shared his conservative, anti-Soviet views on foreign policy and could be counted on to be a tough, articulate advocate at the United Nations. At a Cabinet meeting he referred to her as "our heroine."[15]

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[11] David J. Shapiro, "Third World Moderates Rebound," *The Interdependent*, March/April 1983.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *The New York Times*, October 21, 1983.

[14] See Marian Christy, "The Frenetic World of Jeane Kirkpatrick," *Boston Globe*, July 19, 1981.

Her personal relationship with the President and their shared ideology on foreign policy have given Kirkpatrick a strong position in the Administration. She sits not only in the Cabinet but also in the National Security Council and takes both of these positions seriously; consequently, she is in Washington much of the time. With no strong deputy in overall charge at USUN, she tends to run the Mission by telephone during her frequent absences.[16]

The chain of command for the U.S. Ambassador at the United Nations has often been a source of confusion and occasionally friction; after all, since Henry Cabot Lodge, the Ambassador has had Cabinet status, although Kirkpatrick is the first to sit regularly at the National Security Council. Yet, with rare exceptions, instructions to New York come at least formally from the State Department, and in many past periods the Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) has been a major participant in framing policy decisions and in their execution. In Ambassador Kirkpatrick's case, the first Assistant Secretary for IO was Elliot Abrams, son-in-law of Norman Podhoretz, who clearly shared the Podhoretz-Kirkpatrick line of thinking. When Abrams moved over to become Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Affairs, he was replaced by Gregory Newell, a man in his thirties who, like Abrams, had little background in international politics. Neither has been a rival for influence: Kirkpatrick runs her own show, reporting more directly than almost any predecessor to the Secretary of State and on frequent occasions to the President.

There were some well-reported differences between Kirkpatrick and Alexander Haig when he was Secretary of State. The best-known was a controversy over her negotiations during Security Council consideration in July 1981 of the Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction. Under instructions from the State Department to veto any resolution involving sanctions or other punitive measures, she negotiated a condemnatory resolution with Iraq that was mild enough to be acceptable to the United States. Some days later, aides to Haig let out word that she had been prepared to support a resolution that would have imposed sanctions on Israel but that Haig had stepped in to stop it. Haig himself announced the day after the story was made public that there was no truth to it. Still, there was much speculation that the "leak" by the aides reflected a feeling that Haig was not getting due credit.[17]

Haig, who was periodically a part of the negotiations, at one point asked Kirkpatrick to negotiate for better terms, which is to say terms milder to Israel. That meant, in part, eliminating Iraq's demands for a review of arms policies toward Israel. Kirkpatrick and her team had already been working toward that end and were pleased when the Iraqis decided to drop the whole question of arms policies toward Israel, leaving the way open for a condemnatory resolution in which the United States could join.

Although there was serious concern in Israel that the U.S. vote for condemnation might signal a change in U.S. policy and Kirkpatrick's stance,[18] her subsequent actions and statements dispelled such fears. A knowledgeable Israeli observer at the United Nations has described her as "the best representative Israel ever had."

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[15] *The Reagan Phenomenon, op. cit.*, inside dust jacket.

[16] Interview with senior official at USUN, April 13, 1983.

[17] Dorothy Rabinowitz, "Reagan's 'Heroine' at the U.N.," *New York*, July 20, 1981, p. 36.

In June of 1982, Haig's differences with Reagan's White House inner circle and his constant press to be publicly acknowledged as the President's "vicar for foreign policy," coupled with policy disputes, led to the acceptance of his resignation. Kirkpatrick was on a trip to Africa at the time, leading to a quip by Oleg Troyanovsky, the Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations, that she was the only hunter who had bagged her prey in Washington while on safari in Africa.[19]

In any case, Haig's replacement by George Shultz ended conflict between Kirkpatrick and the Secretary of State, at least on matters directly related to her U.N. job. Shultz appears to be much more secure in his position and much less concerned with getting credit and jockeying to be closer to the President. Kirkpatrick has continued to have clear access to the President and was in constant touch with Judge William P. Clark when he was Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs.

She has also filled the controlling upper echelon of her Mission (USUN in bureaucratic parlance)—including *all* key jobs—with people who share her views. Her alter ego in the Security Council is Ambassador Charles Lichenstein, an old family friend. Lichenstein was a campaign aide to Richard Nixon in the 1960s and served in the Nixon White House from 1969 to 1974, as an assistant for public information, policy development, and congressional and political liaison, and was deputy to White House Counsel Dean Birch in the Ford Administration.

Kirkpatrick's first representative to the Economic and Social Council was José Sorzano, an anti-Castro refugee from Cuba who came to the United States two decades ago, took his Ph.D. in political science at Georgetown, and served as a research assistant for Kirkpatrick's book on Peron. Sorzano's deputy, Mark Plattner, who came from a position with the Twentieth Century Fund, is also a neo-conservative. Her chief counselor is Carl Gershman, for years head of the militantly anti-communist Social Democrats-USA and a writer known for his opposition to special allowances and moral dispensations for the Third World. Gershman had earlier done public relations work for Jonas Savimbi, leader of the anti-communist insurgents in Angola. It is a team long on loyalty to Kirkpatrick and sharing her neo-conservative views but short on experience in international diplomacy.[20]

Initially, the Deputy Permanent Representative was Marshall Brement, a career Foreign Service officer who came to the post from an assignment on the National Security Council and considered himself compatible with the new team. Nevertheless, he was generally shut out of Kirkpatrick's inner circle and left by mutual accord after seven months to become ambassador to Iceland. He was replaced by Kenneth L. Adelman, 36, who had served on Reagan's transition team and shared Kirkpatrick's views fully. In fact, Adelman's tough anti-Soviet speeches earned him the sobriquet of USUN's "hit man" among U.N. diplomats.[21] A man of considerable charm and intellect and an accomplished writer, he was handicapped by a lack of diplomatic experience. In January 1983, Adelman was nominated to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and, after several months of controversy over his lack of experience in arms control, won confirmation by the Senate. José Sorzano, Kirkpatrick's Georgetown protégé, has replaced Adelman.

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[18] Leon Hadar, "Jeane Kirkpatrick: Joining the Jackals?," *Jerusalem Post*, June 26, 1981.

[19] Interviews with a senior West European diplomat, February 22, 1983, and a former senior USUN official, April 14, 1983. See also *The Washington Post*, November 25, 1982, p. A-33.

[20] See Rabinowitz, *loc. cit.*, pp. 40–41. Also, press releases from USUN and Bernard Nossiter, "New Team at U.N.: Common Roots and Philosophies," *The New York Times*, March 3, 1983.

The only top-level holdover was Ambassador Richard Petree, Deputy Representative to the Security Council, and an able, experienced career Foreign Service officer who had served at USUN under three other Permanent Representatives, including William Scranton, a Republican. He was fully prepared to serve loyally under Kirkpatrick but, like Brement, found himself left out of the inner circle. After six months Petree decided to retire and accept a position as president of the U.S.-Japan Foundation. He was replaced by William C. Sherman, another veteran Foreign Service officer. Despite his title, Sherman rarely speaks in the Security Council; Lichenstein serves as Kirkpatrick's alter ego there. Instead, Sherman's principal job is running the Mission's staff. He is not an insider. Only those of the *Commentary*-Georgetown-neo-conservative team are in the inner circle. As a result, many veteran staff members feel left out of the mainstream.

While U.S. Permanent Representatives have usually brought some congenial individuals with them, often as deputy, secretary or press spokesman, they have generally kept experienced staff and assigned key roles to capable Foreign Service personnel to a much greater degree than Kirkpatrick has. Even Andrew Young, though he was determined to have a strong personal influence on policy, had a number of experienced professionals in key spots and they had influence on him. His principal deputy was James Leonard, a veteran Foreign Service Officer. His deputy for the Security Council, Donald McHenry, had long years of experience in the State Department dealing with U.N. affairs. McHenry was used fully in the Security Council and in working, with substantial authority, toward a settlement in Namibia. He also did not hesitate to argue with Young where he differed on policy. And he succeeded Young as Permanent Representative in August 1979. Finally, there was Petree, who had ambassadorial status and succeeded McHenry as deputy for the Security Council in 1979. Thus, three of the four deputies with ambassadorial rank were professionals; they knew the United Nations, had wide contacts and were respected by other delegations and key Secretariat officials.

Yet Ambassador Kirkpatrick herself has decried the amateurism and ineptitude of U.S. representation at the United Nations. In a speech to the Heritage Foundation, she declared that our Permanent Representatives and Assistant Secretaries for International Organization had changed so rapidly that it took much of their tenure to gain the necessary experience.[22] Given the turnover in American Presidents, a comparable turnover in U.S. Permanent Representatives appears inevitable. Yet Warren Austin served for six years, Henry Cabot Lodge for seven, Adlai Stevenson for four and a half, Arthur Goldberg and Young for almost three each. Moreover, the record shows that even short-term Permanent Representatives can serve successfully *if they come with political skills and use an*

[21] Interview with a senior West European diplomat November 19, 1982. Also, interview with a professor who had surveyed more than 80 U.N. Missions, May 6, 1983. See also James Fallows, "The Ordeal of Kenneth Adelman," *The Atlantic*, June 1983.

[22] *The Reagan Phenomenon, op. cit.*, pp.103–05.

experienced staff. Scranton, George W. Ball and McHenry, for example, were most effective.

Although insensitive to the need for professionals in upper echelons, Jeane Kirkpatrick, to her credit, has acted to improve the conditions of service at USUN for career Foreign Service officers. The most important change is a system whereby the major part of their rent in expensive Manhattan is paid by the government, bringing their allowances closer to those of foreign representatives. She has also proposed that Foreign Service Officers serve longer at USUN than the usual two or three years, a sound idea in light of the complexity of multilateral diplomacy at the United Nations and the importance of knowing people as well as issues. Yet these changes will mean little unless the career professionals feel that they have meaningful input into the formulation and implementation of policy and are not shut out by an inner circle of ideologues. Throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, USUN was the most professional and experienced of all missions and was respected as such. Then the experienced professionals were in the inner circle, had an impact on policy, and many rose to ambassadorial rank at USUN. With the loyal support they provided, even a new Permanent Representative could function effectively.

IV

The lack of experienced professionals in key roles has been a particular handicap in dealing with other U.N. missions, including those of friendly Western European allies. Numerous Western diplomats and U.N. Secretariat officials have commented on the limited availability of Kirkpatrick and her staff. Since she spends much of her time in Washington, abroad, or making speeches, her appearances in the U.N. building are usually for specific purposes, such as making a statement or seeing the Secretary-General. Neither she nor her principal deputies appear to spend much time in the Delegates Lounge, the time-honored center for informal contacts, picking up information, consulting and getting acquainted.[23] This is where early warning signals can be picked up on the projected moves of other delegations and where preliminary soundings can be made quickly on U.S. initiatives. It is especially important for the United States, which is not a member of any geographic group.

When Kirkpatrick does appear, she has clout. Though characterized as "a hard-line conservative" and tough in the sense of standing firm on her convictions, Kirkpatrick is not bombastic and does not shout. Her political philosophy and attitude toward the United Nations are very much like Moynihan's, but where he was flamboyant she is low-key. Yet she commands attention, not only as the representative of a superpower who is clearly supported by the President, but also as a person who crafts her statements with care. Delegates listen carefully, knowing that she means what she says. But many are turned off by her professorial style of lecturing and the fact that she does not spend much time listening to other people. A senior diplomat representing one of America's closest allies observed that the Reagan-Kirkpatrick ideology puts the United States in a difficult position at the United Nations, and that her confrontational style makes it worse. Another, citing these problems and the lack of any senior USUN staff with political savvy at the United Nations, said it added up to "a disaster."[24]

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[23] A series of more than twenty personal interviews conducted from November 1982 to May 1983.

[24] Personal interviews, January–May 1983.

Kirkpatrick has been criticized for her tendency to lecture Third World representatives as if they were undergraduates, for not learning the intricacies of U.N. politics, and for preferring to express her ideology rather than focus on concrete political goals. These views are expressed in interviews with representatives of friendly NATO allies as well as by Third World representatives and coincide with those gleaned by reporters for major newspapers and a national magazine (which early stated: "Friends and foes alike consider Kirkpatrick's staff inexperienced and inept").[25] Similar comments were made to a Canadian professor who polled about 80 U.N. diplomats in connection with a book he is writing.

While she may differ as to the reasons, Kirkpatrick herself testifies to the fact that the United States is isolated at the United Nations.[26] In another speech on "Problems of the Alliance," she noted: "At the United Nations, the alliance is not very strong. At the United Nations, the United States frequently stands alone on controversial issues, some of which are very important to us, some of which are important to others. At the United Nations, our European allies often prefer a posture of nonalignment between us and the Group of 77 on the so-called North-South issues, which consume much of the time of that organization. On some other issues, they vote with our adversaries."[27]

On the positive side, Kirkpatrick is credited with giving strong, effective responses to Soviet attacks. She is at home and gracious in French and speaks Spanish fluently. Also, even those who criticize her ideological fervor and style acknowledge that she is not personally vindictive or petty. And her performance has improved as she has gained experience at the United Nations.

In the past two years, she has developed a successful and important relationship with Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who became the Secretary-General of the United Nations in early 1982. An experienced Peruvian diplomat who has served as his country's ambassador to Moscow, Pérez de Cuéllar is liked and respected by U.N. diplomats and the Secretariat's top staff, with whom he worked for almost a decade. He served as Peru's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1971–75; was the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Cyprus, 1975–77, and U.N. Undersecretary General for Special Political Affairs, 1979–81.) It is also well known that he did not campaign for the job and that he intends to retire after one five-year term; consequently, he has no need to bend to political pressures from any member or group of members. Kirkpatrick calls him "a man of great intelligence, high integrity; he is an unusually fair, reasonable, decent man."[28] She told me she briefs him regularly on the Middle East, Central America, Namibia and other areas where the United Nations and the United States share concerns and that he is most appreciative.[29]

She has also expressed full support for the Secretary-General's efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to maintain peace. In a most candid and perceptive introduction to his annual report to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1982, Pérez de Cuéllar noted that the Security Council, which the U.N. Charter charges with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, too often finds itself unable to take decisive action to resolve international conflicts. Its resolutions are increasingly defied or ignored. Too often the Council seems powerless to generate the support and influence necessary to insure that its decisions are respected.[30]

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[25] *Time*, October 26, 1981.

[26] "Standing Alone," reproduced in *The Reagan Phenomenon, op. cit.*, pp. 79–91.

[27] "Problems of the Alliance," reproduced in *The Reagan Phenomenon*, pp. 174–75.

[28] *Ibid*, p. 215.

[29] Interview with Jeane Kirkpatrick, April 7, 1983.

There are, of course, two sides to the coin. While members should, under the Charter, comply with Security Council decisions, much depends upon the way in which those decisions are reached. If the Council is pushed by a transitory majority into debates and resolutions that are one-sided and propagandistic, its decisions will not command respect or compliance. If, on the other hand, the Council's members strive for the objective, impartial resolution of disputes and take decisions that have general support, those decisions are more likely to secure the cooperation of member states.

In his report, the Secretary-General suggested various ways of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to maintain peace. These include: first, earlier recourse to the Security Council and a more active role by the Council in initiating discussion or action before a dispute reaches a point of crisis; second, a review of the functioning of the Security Council, including its procedures to facilitate the objectives just mentioned; third, the maintenance of adequate working relations among the permanent members of the Security Council within the Council for the purpose of the peaceful resolution of disputes whatever their relations may be outside the United Nations; and, fourth, the serious effort by governments to follow through with real and active support after decisions have been adopted by the Security Council.

Kirkpatrick has expressed full support for the Secretary-General's efforts. Despite some skepticism as to prospects for success, she has participated actively in informal meetings of the Security Council to consider his suggestions. (In addition to his concerns, she is disturbed by what she calls recent "General Assemblyization" of the Security Council. This is the tendency to load the speakers' roster with nonmembers of the Council who can be counted on to support a particular viewpoint; this places the emphasis on polemics rather than negotiation.) She has consulted very frequently with the British representatives, Sir John Thomson and his predecessor, Sir Anthony Parsons, on ways to make the informal meetings more fruitful.

V

In the handling of specific issues at the United Nations, as already noted, no U.S. representative has been a firmer friend of Israel than Jeane Kirkpatrick. She has not hesitated to urge using the American veto in the Security Council or voting alone with Israel when she believes that Israel is being treated unfairly. Given the Arab influence within the "nonaligned" movement, which constitutes a majority of U.N. membership, along with Soviet opportunism and West European ambivalence, that is often. In the Security Council she has also used the potential U.S. veto to secure changes in draft resolutions. The resolution concerning Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, discussed above, is a notable example.

Support for Israel fits her neo-conservative philosophy on foreign policy. Her personal sympathy was made clear when she attended the Third World Conference on Soviet Jewry in Jerusalem, March 15–17, 1983. Israel is strong, a democracy, and a firm friend of the United States. And the blatant one-sidedness of the U.N. majority on Arab-Israeli issues outrages her sense of fair play, as she makes clear in *The Reagan Phenomenon*. In a 1981 speech, "Israel as Scapegoat," she compares U.N. procedures with the Camp David process, which was oriented toward practical results and limited to the parties directly concerned and the United States as mediator.[31] By contrast, she finds that at the United Nations the objective was not to find common ground but to isolate and denigrate Israel and "ultimately to undermine its political legitimacy." A decisive role is played by the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

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[30] Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, *UN Chronicle*, October 1982, p. 2. See also Ernst B. Haas, "Regime decay: conflict management and international organizations, 1945–81," *International Organization*, Spring 1983, p. 189.

One example she cites was a Security Council resolution in 1981 that sought to blame Israel for the violence committed against the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem by a deranged Australian Jew—an act that had been unequivocally denounced by the Israeli authorities. The United States voted against the draft resolution. Meanwhile the Council was ignoring the bloody Iran-Iraq war, the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

On one important issue of substance—Israeli settlements in the West Bank—Ambassador Kirkpatrick has almost certainly played an important part in a U.S. position significantly different from that of the Carter Administration. She has consistently vetoed resolutions condemning these settlements, while recording the Reagan position that, though not illegal, they are "obstacles to peace."

Ambassador Kirkpatrick has been like her predecessors in taking a totally firm and strong stand against the repeated and blatantly unfair efforts of certain Arab states to deprive Israel of the right to participate in the U.N. General Assembly. The procedure specified in the U.N. Charter for suspending or expelling a member requires a recommendation from the Security Council. Such a recommendation would certainly be vetoed by the United States, and probably by Britain and France as well.

A more likely threat is action in the General Assembly to deny Israel participation in its work by rejecting the credentials of its delegation. Such action was taken in 1974 against South Africa, which has not participated in the United Nations since then. Similar action against Israel, whose delegation is chosen by a representative, democratic government, would not only be contrary to the U.N. Charter but also grossly unfair. Though the General Assembly condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there has been no suggestion that the Soviets be barred from participation. And in 1981, while Iraq was invading Iran, an Iraqi was elected president of the Assembly. Israel, surrounded by enemies, has resorted to arms against threats to its survival, certainly under more serious threat than the U.S.S.R. and Iraq when they undertook their invasions.

On October 16, 1982, Secretary of State Shultz made the U.S. position clear. He stated that such action would be a clear-cut violation of the U.N. Charter, would create further conflict and division and "would do great damage to the entire United Nations system." He warned that, if the action were taken, the United States would withdraw from participation in the General Assembly and withhold its assessed contributions.[32]

The attempt to exclude Israel came during the 37th session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1982. Shultz's warning, made more credible by the withdrawal of the U.S. delegation to the Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency following the rejection of Israeli credentials there, had a strong impact on U.N. delegations, including the Arabs. Moreover, Kirkpatrick and her delegation worked hard at persuasion and the Secretary-General forcefully lobbied against the attempt to expel Israel, arguing that it would spell disaster for the organization.[33] The majority of Arabs then backed away from such action, and the attempt by a non-Arab country, Iran, to bring the issue to a vote was easily blocked. A similar attempt at the 38th session in 1983 was also defeated.

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[31] Reproduced in *The Reagan Phenomenon, op. cit.*, pp. 109–18.

[32] *The New York Times*, October 17, 1982, p. 20. See also S. M. Finger, "How U.S. Can Protect Israel in the U.N.," *Newsday*, July 15, 1982.

VI

Latin America has been an area of great interest to Jeane Kirkpatrick since she began work on her dissertation on Peronist Argentina almost two decades ago. It is not surprising that she has focused major attention on Latin American issues at the United Nations and has had great influence on policymaking in Washington. Her positions have been consistent with the hard-line conservatism expounded in "Dictatorships and Double Standards," particularly with regard to El Salvador and Nicaragua. It seems clear that she and William Clark were principally responsible for the replacement of Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders and Ambassador to El Salvador Deane Hinton in May 1983. Enders and Hinton, neither of whom has had a notably dovish record in the career Foreign Service, were identified with a two-track approach, i.e., negotiations with the rebels in El Salvador and with Nicaragua while continuing military aid to El Salvador. This approach was apparently not hard-line enough for Clark and Kirkpatrick.

In October 1983, Clark was nominated for the post of Secretary of the Interior and was succeeded by his deputy, Robert McFarlane. The shift meant not only that Kirkpatrick lost out on a job that she undoubtedly would have preferred but also that she has lost an important ally (Clark) in the National Security Council. It remains to be seen whether this personnel action signifies a definite shift in Reagan's policy toward a willingness to accept the present revolutionary regime in Nicaragua under conditions that would minimize its security threat to other Central American countries and to the United States, or whether the President will pursue a policy of destabilizing or toppling that regime, as was done in Grenada.

In line with its traditional position that Central American and Caribbean issues should be dealt with in the Organization of American States (OAS), a regional organization of the type envisaged in Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, the United States has not brought such issues to the United Nations. But other countries have, and the United States has had to face the issues there.

At the 36th session of the General Assembly in 1982, a draft resolution was introduced reaffirming a Franco-Mexican communiqué which supported a negotiated settlement between the government of El Salvador and the rebels. Despite U.S. opposition the resolution was co-sponsored by five of its NATO partners. Nine of the ten EEC countries supported it; only the United Kingdom abstained. The resolution was adopted, over the negative votes of some 20 Latin nations. Kirkpatrick deplored this as "an ominous pattern," showing her own conviction that the United States was right and its European allies wrong and that they should have displayed greater solidarity.[34]

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[33] *The Interdependent*, March/April 1983, p. 5.

[34] *The Reagan Phenomenon*, *op. cit.*, pp. 174–75.

At the 37th session (1982) Nicaragua was elected to one of the two Latin American seats on the U.N. Security Council. It garnered the necessary two-thirds majority, despite strenuous U.S. efforts to forestall its election. This is in marked contrast with the failure of Cuba in 1979, when it had the chairmanship of the nonaligned group, to win a seat on the Security Council. At that time the United States was following a notably more sympathetic policy toward the Third World and that may have had an impact on the voting.

On March 23, 1983, Nicaragua brought to the U.N. Security Council a charge that the United States was aiding rebel groups in their efforts to overthrow the government in Managua. Nicaragua said it did not seek a resolution but rather a public forum to express its concern.

In response, Mrs. Kirkpatrick described the Nicaraguan complaint as the claim of a new right—"the right of repression of its own people with impunity and with immunity from the consequences thereof." She pointed out that the Nicaraguan ruling group had reneged on its promises to the OAS, in a letter dated July 17, 1979, of "a broadly representative democratic government," with "full observance of human rights" and free elections. She observed that the independent political parties representing the private sector withdrew from the Council of State in protest against the violence and jailing of their leaders and the suppression of free speech; that labor unions "were harnessed and harassed when they tried to resist being incorporated into the state"; that the churches have been progressively repressed; and that no free elections have been held or even scheduled.[35]

Speaking again on March 25, Mrs. Kirkpatrick reiterated her charges of Nicaraguan internal repression and intervention in El Salvador. She also found it necessary to take issue with certain friendly or neutral governments whose statements, she said, indicated that "the confusion and intimidation had already had insidious effects"; i.e., Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and China.[36]

It is hard to believe that these governments, regardless of the wisdom of their positions, took them as a result of confusion and intimidation. Indeed, that statement appears to stand in contrast with her own evaluation in her *New York Times* essay of March 31, entitled "U.N. Mugging Fails." There she argues that neither "the United States nor Honduras was isolated and the Nicaraguans did not secure broad support for their preferred bilateral approach. Instead, support developed for a regional approach to what are clearly regional problems." She cites Venezuela's backing for a conference of the Central American countries "plus five neighboring democracies," Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic and Panama. (And where would Panama and the other Latin American countries have stood if the Carter Administration had not negotiated a treaty to turn over, in gradual stages, control of the Canal to that "swaggering dictator"?) She concludes: "The losers in this unconventional United Nations drama were those who seek to use United Nations arenas and procedures to polarize nations, spread hostility and exacerbate conflict for short-range political advantage. The winners are all those who hope it is not too late to restore the Security Council as an arena for their rational discussion and management of international disputes."[37] But the support the United States received was in favor of a negotiated settlement, *not* of the "contras" trying to destabilize the Nicaraguan government.

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[35] USUN Press Release 21 (83), March 24, 1983. For further insight into Mrs. Kirkpatrick's thinking, see "U.S. Security and Latin America," in *Dictatorships and Double Standards, op. cit.*, pp. 53–95.

[36] USUN Press Release 23 (83), March 25, 1983.

It is doubtful that the Sandinistas considered themselves losers. They came to the Security Council in order to have a forum to express their views and get media attention—which they did.

In the Falklands (Malvinas) crisis, Kirkpatrick found herself torn between our British and Latin American allies. She tried briefly to dissuade the U.K. representative, Sir Anthony Parsons, a highly skilled career diplomat with long experience at the United Nations, from bringing the issue to the Security Council, arguing that airing it there would make the Argentines less willing to compromise. Nevertheless, the British went ahead and the Council began discussion of the issue on April 1, 1982.

By unfortunate coincidence Ambassador Kirkpatrick was the guest of honor at a dinner at the Argentine embassy in Washington the next evening. Also present were Deputy Secretary of State Walter Stoessel and Assistant Secretary Enders. That same day Argentine troops had invaded the Falklands, President Galtieri having ignored Reagan's telephone advice not to resort to force.[38]

Because of the diplomatic skills of Parsons and his team, British démarches in certain key capitals, and the naked character of the Argentine invasion, Britain won support for a resolution demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falklands (Resolution 502, April 3, 1982). The vote was ten in favor, one against (Panama) and four abstentions (U.S.S.R., Poland, China and Spain). The United States voted with its British ally and Kirkpatrick, despite her initial misgivings about bringing the issue to the Council, subsequently expressed admiration for the great skill of Parsons and his team at the United Nations.[39] Guyana and all five African and Asian members voted with the British, despite the fact that Argentina is sometimes considered a Third World nation and was arguing the question as a colonial issue.

In the ensuing weeks, while Britain prepared its military counterattack, Secretary Haig undertook an exhausting mission of mediation, shuttling between London, Buenos Aires and Washington. Then on May 2, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, who had discreetly stood aside during Haig's attempt, began mediation efforts with the Argentine and British representatives at the United Nations. (On that same day Haig had announced the failure of his mission and the *General Belgrano* was sunk, followed two days later by the sinking of HMS *Sheffield*.) By May 14, Pérez was cautiously optimistic that he had an agreement on a "set of ideas for a negotiated settlement"; i.e., mutual withdrawal, diplomatic negotiations for a definitive settlement of the dispute, the lifting of sanctions and exclusion zones and the establishment of transitional arrangements in the Falklands under U.N. auspices pending the outcome of diplomatic negotiations.

The British, in an earnest effort toward a peaceful solution, accepted the proposal, suggesting only minor alterations designed to clarify provisions concerning troop withdrawal and the participation of the Falkland Islanders in the transitional administration. Kirkpatrick was convinced that it was a good deal and spent the whole of one evening until 2 a.m. trying to persuade Argentina's representative to the United Nations, Enrique Ros, that Buenos Aires should go along. Unfortunately for all the interested parties, and especially Argentina, the Argentines, on May 18, rejected it. That was the end of the Secretary-General's mediation effort.[40] On that same day, HMS *Fearless* sailed into the waters of the total exclusion zone of the Falklands and the war began in earnest, ending in the humiliating defeat of Argentina.

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[37] *The New York Times*, March 31, 1983, p. A23. The reference to the "swaggering dictator" and the Panama Canal is from her article, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," discussed earlier.

[38] *The Sunday Times of London* Insight Team, *War in the Falklands*, New York: Harper and Row, 1982, pp. 111–30.

[39] *The Reagan Phenomenon*, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

Following the failure of Haig's efforts at peaceful mediation, the United States, to the dismay of the Argentines, gave some logistic and full political support to Britain. Kirkpatrick, concerned about the damage this was doing to U.S. relations with Latin American states, held several meetings with Argentina's foreign minister and its representative to the United Nations. Even though she cleared these meetings in advance with the President and the State Department, Haig was furious and accused her of being "mentally and emotionally incapable of thinking clearly on this issue" because of her close links with the Latins. She, in turn, criticized him as being incapable of understanding Latin American sensibilities. Her efforts in fact were aimed at bringing an end to the fighting.[41]

Meanwhile, at the U.N. Security Council, Spain and Portugal proposed on June 4 a draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire. Britain, whose forces had gained the upper hand, was determined to veto it. Kirkpatrick, with an eye toward the Latins, requested State Department authorization to abstain rather than vote against the resolution, which would in any case have been nullified by the British veto. Haig, then at the Versailles Summit, was finally persuaded to authorize an abstention, but his new instructions arrived five minutes too late.[42]

Certainly Kirkpatrick cannot be faulted for her determined efforts at the United Nations to maintain good relations with the Latins, while not abandoning Britain and principle. Yet one has to wonder whether her pursuit of the ideas advanced in "Dictatorships and Double Standards" might bear some responsibility for Argentina's invasion. Given Carter's policies of coolness toward the Argentine military dictators, they would have been in no doubt about the United States siding with Britain in the event of an Argentine invasion. In 1981 and early 1982, Reagan and Kirkpatrick went all out in showing good will toward the Argentines, who in turn were providing military help to the U.S.-supported government in El Salvador. Would President Galtieri have launched the invasion if he had known in advance that, in a showdown, the United States would side with Britain? One cannot be certain, since Galtieri was having domestic problems and the invasion was to some extent a diversion from those problems—a diversion which failed miserably.

Kirkpatrick was more successful on Puerto Rico. In 1953, the U.N. General Assembly, in Resolution 748, formally recognized that the people of Puerto Rico had exercised their right to self-determination and removed Puerto Rico from the list of non-self-governing territories. In light of elections held since then, parties espousing either statehood in the United States or a continuation of the present commonwealth status have averaged about 95 percent of the vote. In a second referendum on status, 60 percent of those voting opted for commonwealth, 39 percent for statehood and only one percent for independence. Nevertheless, in 1982, Cuba, which argues that independence is the only true expression of self-determination for Puerto Rico, requested the inscription on the General Assembly agenda of an item concerning the status of Puerto Rico. It had done the same in 1971. Again, as in 1971, the Cuban move was rejected by a majority. True, the same result had been achieved before, and Cuba has been unsuccessful for more than a decade. Nevertheless, such victories never come easy; the Kirkpatrick team worked hard to achieve it.

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[40] *War in the Falklands, op. cit.*, pp. 176–84.

[41] *Ibid*, pp. 256–57.

[42] *Ibid*, pp. 257–58. See also Anthony Parsons, "The Falklands crisis in the United Nations, 31 March–14 June 1982," *International Affairs*, Spring 1983, pp. 169–78, for a superb account by an insider.

VII

With continued strong support from, and lobbying by, Middle East and ASEAN countries, the Kirkpatrick team has also managed to maintain majority support for resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign (Soviet) forces from Afghanistan and Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. In the Afghan case, the McHenry team in 1980 achieved a vote of 104 in favor, 18 against and 18 abstentions, a very solid vote attesting to the aversion of most nonaligned states to superpower aggression and, incidentally, flying in the face of the Moynihan-Kirkpatrick thesis that there is a nonaligned coalition with the Soviet bloc. That strong majority has held up in subsequent sessions. In November 1982, the vote was 114 in favor, 21 against, and 13 abstentions.

On Namibia (formerly South West Africa), little progress has been made. The five-nation contact group, formed in 1977 on the initiative of Andrew Young, has continued its efforts to reach settlement, but the central U.S. role previously played by Donald McHenry has now been transferred almost wholly to Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker and his colleagues in the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs.

The process has on several occasions appeared to be close to fruition, but South Africa has always found some reason to stall or hold out; the Reagan Administration's approach to South Africa of "constructive engagement" has produced no visible South African concessions.[43] The current stumbling block, introduced by the United States, is a condition that Cuban troops be withdrawn from neighboring Angola simultaneously with the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia.

The most dramatic and potentially far-reaching change of position adopted by the Reagan Administration was on the Law of the Sea Convention, which had been negotiated under U.N. auspices for ten years and on which agreement seemed near in early 1981. The Reagan Administration, with its ideological emphasis on unfettered private enterprise, took a very skeptical view of certain provisions of the Convention, especially those concerning seabed mining and the establishment of an Internation Seabed Authority. More than 150 nations waited for a year while the United States reviewed the provisions of the draft. Then in March 1982 the United States spelled out its objections in dogmatic terms.

Efforts to reach a compromise on the U.S. objections failed. When the convention was voted upon on April 10, 1982, 130 nations were in favor, four against (Israel, Turkey, the United States, Venezuela) and 17 abstained (nine

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[43] See Robert Rotberg, "On Southern Africa," *The New York Times*, December 10, 1982, op-ed page. Also, S. M. Finger, "Viewpoints," *Newsday*, April 12, 1981.

Soviet bloc and Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Thailand, Britain, West Germany).[44]

Ambassador Koh of Singapore, President of the Conference that negotiated the Convention, was deeply disappointed in the U.S. position. After all, the sharing of seabed mining sites resulted from a compromise suggested in 1976 by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in a speech at the Pierre Hotel in New York, evidently with clearance from President Ford. As for the required transfer of technology, Koh pointed out that technology was more than just plant and equipment; consequently, mining companies would be far from powerless in dealing with the Authority.[45]

Just what role Ambassador Kirkpatrick played on this issue is not clear from the public record. One informed account indicates that Washington officials were solely responsible for the formulation and presentation of the U.S. position.[46] When I asked her in April 1983 about the U.S. position, she replied: "No comment."

The United States has been even more isolated on disarmament issues at the United Nations. At the 37th session of the General Assembly, for example, it cast the lone negative votes on Resolution 73, stating an urgent need for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 111–1–35 (abstentions); Resolution 78A, Report on Bilateral Discussions, 114–1–32; Resolution 83, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, 138–1–7; and Resolution 98A, calling on the Soviets and the United States to resume bilateral negotiations on the proliferation of chemical weapons, 95–1–46.[47] Other NATO powers and the U.S.S.R. and its allies abstained on these resolutions, except for Resolution 83, which they supported. These lone negative votes were further evidence of the Reagan Administration's inclination to confront the nonaligned countries who supported these resolutions.

On budget issues, however, the United States has found allies among the other principal contributors, particularly the Soviet Union. It has voted with the Soviet bloc, on the losing side, on budgetary resolutions concerning the International Civil Service Commission, the U.N. Institute for Training and Research and the U.N. Disaster Relief Organization. In November 1982 the United States, Soviet and British ambassadors made a joint approach to the Secretary-General demanding that he put a lid on the total U.N. budget, which is about $800 million for 1983 (roughly one thousandth the size of the U.S. budget). The United States pays 25 percent of the assessed U.N. budget, the U.S.S.R. (including the Ukrainian and Byelorussion S.S.R.) about half of that. The Soviets and the Americans have long been strange bedfellows in opposing the rapid growth of the U.N. budget, which has increased by 73 percent over the last five years. I recall organizing similar joint démarches with the Soviets, British and French in the late 1960s, when the U.N. budget was about a fourth of its present level, and the coordinated actions did serve as a temporary restraint.

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[44] *UN Chronicle*, June 1982, pp. 3–22. See also Elizabeth Mann Borgese, "Law of the Sea: The Next Phase," *World Politics* 83/84, Guilford (Conn.): Dushkin, 1983.

[45] Interview with Ambassador T. T. B. Koh, New York, January 4, 1983.

[46] See Leigh S. Ratiner, "The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, pp. 1006–1021. This article by one of the U.S. negotiators goes into great detail on the positions of individuals and departments in Washington, and also describes the events of the spring of 1982. It contains no mention of Ambassador Kirkpatrick or of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations.

[47] *UN Chronicle*, January 1983, pp. 135–39.

In the present controversy, the American delegations have gone one step beyond the other principal contributors by unilaterally submitting an amendment to each Assembly resolution that called for additional spending. The amendment says that "in no case will financial obligations incurred exceed the level of resources approved" for the original 1983 budget. Michael J. Berlin suggests that "underlying the policy is the feeling by Kirkpatrick and others in the Reagan Administration that the U.N. Secretariat is becoming the enemy." In a December speech in Washington, she charged that diplomats at the United Nations and U.N. bureaucrats themselves are engaged in a Marxist "class war" against the United States and its corporations and are seeking to redistribute the world's wealth to achieve "global socialism."[48]

Most recently, the link between budgetary and policy concerns has been evident in the case of UNESCO. For several years, the United States has consistently opposed activities by the UNESCO staff and formal proposals that would favor more governmental control of the media, as advocated by the Soviets and certain Third World countries. At the fall 1983 session of the UNESCO General Conference, this U.S. position took the form of advocating a no-growth budget as well as opposing any code or resolution that would restrict the freedom of the media. As in the case of the attempt to withdraw Israel's credentials, the United States has carried its position to the point of an explicit threat by Secretary Shultz to withdraw from the organization or to withhold the U.S. assessment.

VIII

Jeane Kirkpatrick has lived up to her own criteria as she expressed them in January 1982: "We take the United Nations very seriously. . .we make certain that when we speak we are serious and credible. . .and pursue a consistent policy over time, letting our actions demonstrate that we are, indeed, serious people who notice and who care and who can distinguish between actions and between countries who behave like friends and supporters of democratic institutions—and those who do not." She also emphasized that these are the policies of President Reagan.[49]

Certainly she has shown that the United States can be tough, but is that the same as being influential? While influence is always hard to measure, the record of her tenure, along with that of the only other U.S. Permanent Representative who followed a confrontationist policy, Moynihan, suggests the contrary.[50] She has cast 14 of the total of 36 vetoes by the United States; Young, in a comparable period, cast only three. For 38 years, the United States had never had to stand alone in voting against a Security Council resolution critical of American action, but it was forced to do so on October 28, 1983; no other member voted against the draft resolution deploring the U.S. invasion of Grenada and calling for the withdrawal of forces. (Contrast this with the British success on the Falkland Islands resolution, even allowing for the fact that the Argentines were the invaders there.)

The failure of the United States to block the election to the Security Council of either Guyana or Nicaragua by the General Assembly in 1981 and 1982, respectively, is in marked contrast with the defeat of Cuba's election effort in 1979. Also noteworthy is the great difficulty the United States experienced in mustering nine votes in the Security Council on September 12, 1983, for a resolution deploring the Soviets' shooting down of a civilian Korean airliner with 269 innocent victims aboard. The unfortunate remark by Ambassador Charles Lichenstein on September 19, 1983, suggesting that, if U.N. delegates did not like New York, the U.S. delegation would cheerfully bid them a fond farewell as they "sailed off into the sunset," may have been good domestic politics, but did not play well among U.N. delegates. Ambassador Kirkpatrick's own statement, in an NBC television interview October 30, that "the U.N. is against us" does not suggest a state of mind that would view the organization as a place where the United States can win friends and influence people.

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[48] Michael J. Berlin, "U.N. Budget Growth: Major Donors Shout They Won't Take It Anymore," *The Interdependent*, January 1983, p. 5.

[49] *The Reagan Phenomenon*, op. cit., pp. 117–18.

[50] See S. M. Finger, *Your "Man" at the U.N., op. cit.*, p. 235, for a review of Moynihan's record.

Her consistency, seriousness and toughness are respected by other delegations. So is the fact that she clearly has the ear and the support of the President. She articulates well, writing or speaking. And, unlike Andrew Young, she has not embarrassed the President by public actions or statements contrary to established policy.

Yet, overall, most U.N. representatives, including those of European allies and other friendly governments, are critical of her performance, for three main reasons:

1. Her ideological approach involves repeated, often unnecessary, confrontations with Third World representatives and makes cooperation difficult even for friendly delegations. Diplomacy normally strives to expand one's circle of friends and narrow the circle of enemies. Her approach tends to do the opposite, though it may provide comfort to beleaguered friends. Her approach also tends to diminish public support for the United Nations because she speaks more often in public as a critic than a supporter.

2. Her speaking style, her lack of diplomatic experience and her relative inaccessibility have also hampered her effectiveness. Delegates criticize her professorial style of lecturing and her bent toward confrontation. They also complain that she has little time to listen to them in New York.

3. Her top staff, especially her close ideological friends in the inner circle of USUN, also lack diplomatic and U.N. experience. They are having to learn the skills of listening, lobbying and negotiating at the United Nations and have not progressed rapidly. In the 1960s, USUN had the experienced staff and network of friends at the United Nations, while the Soviet staff was relatively inexperienced. Now the roles are reversed.

Yet the fundamental issue is not technique or speaking style; it is the approach the United States and other members take toward the United Nations. Should the United Nations be primarily an arena for confrontation or a forum for accommodation? And in which direction should the United States, as a major power, lead? The experience of the Moynihan and Kirkpatrick incumbencies appears to suggest that the strategy of confrontation serves the interests neither of the United States nor the United Nations.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

THE NEW DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN THE MODERN AGE. By Abba Eban. New York: Random House, 1983, 427 pp. $19.95.

An illustrious diplomat takes up his pen to comment on world politics since World War II. Much of it, surprisingly perhaps, is standard stuff, though with occasional flashes of Eban's wit and eloquence. He says the expected about American and Soviet policies, security and arms control, and about Europe and the Middle East, but on the U.N. and on the changing character of diplomacy, which has occupied so much of his own career, his gifts of understanding, criticism and exposition are readily apparent.

THE U.S., THE U.N., AND THE MANAGEMENT OF GLOBAL CHANGE. Edited by Toby Trister Gati. New York: New York University Press, 1983, 380 pp. $37.50 (paper, $15.00).

Periodically the U.N. is reexamined to see how well it has fulfilled the hopes of its founders, the principles of the Charter, and the interests of its members, notably the United States. This 35-year review undertaken by the United Nations Association comprises 16 papers or reports. All are moderate, free of illusion and relatively well disposed toward the world organization—none wish to take the U.S. out of the U.N. or the U.N. out of the U.S. The authors know their subjects well, but the large number of contributions makes for considerable repetition. For the general reader the chapter on international organization in Abba Eban's book, noted above, covers the same ground more briefly and with much more style.

PEACEKEEPING: APPRAISALS AND PROPOSALS. Edited by Henry Wiseman. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1983, 461 pp. $40.00.

General Indar Rikhye and other scholars and pioneers in this field associated with the International Peace Academy have taken one of the most successful examples of U.N. activity, peacekeeping, and subjected the record to a searching appraisal from several angles of vision: from U.N. headquarters in New York (a chapter written by Brian Urquhart), from commanders in the field, and from the two sides of a critical peacekeeping zone (Egypt and Israel), and others. A significant and potentially influential book.

NEGOTIATING PEACE: WAR TERMINATION AS A BARGAINING PRO-

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CESS. By Paul R. Pillar. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, 282 pp. $25.00.

Most modern wars have ended not in the surrender of one side but through a bargaining process establishing the terms of armistice or peace. The process has been studied, but never so fully as in this book, which draws on many wars from 1812 on and takes most of its illustrations from the recent conflicts in Korea, Algeria and Vietnam. No war is precisely like another, but the parallels and similarities in the patterns of interaction between military and diplomatic moves are striking. Clear reasoning and clear writing, except for the flights into graphs and mathematical formulas.

THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT IN THE 1980s. Edited by William J. Taylor, Jr. and Steven A. Maaranen. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1983, 504 pp. $39.95.

This volume defies brief description, for it goes into a host of topics, from energy to the oceans to terrorism to space, to say nothing of common or garden wars, with hypothetical "scenarios" dotting the text throughout. One general idea is that there will be conflict aplenty in the near and intermediate future, and that most of it will be low-intensity conflict, for which America ought to be but is not well prepared. James Schlesinger and Robert Komer lead off and lend some authority and tone to the book, but their presentations are too brief to be very helpful.

THE END OF WORLD ORDER. By Richard Falk. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983, 358 pp. $16.50.

Richard Falk is not one to pussyfoot around the big questions of the arms race, nuclear policy, and world order. He rejects the "realist" position that the national states system is still viable, and the "neorealist" solution of adaptation and reform, urging a breakthrough to a new world order based on human values before it is too late. His ideas are already familiar from his numerous writings, and much of this book takes the form of reprints or expansion of previously published pieces. But they are well brought together in a package, a consistent body of unorthodox thought.

GOVERNMENTS UNDER STRESS: POLITICAL EXECUTIVES AND KEY BUREAUCRATS IN WASHINGTON, LONDON, AND OTTAWA. By Colin Campbell. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983, 388 pp. $24.95.

In this ambitious four-year project, a political scientist looks at the functioning of government, specifically the executive branch, in three democratic English-speaking countries, basing his work mainly on numerous interviews in depth. He does not deal with the process of foreign policy decision-making, but his probing of the interaction of institutions and individuals, especially the personalities and methods of the top political leaders—Carter, Callaghan and Trudeau, for example—throws light on where many of the problems lie in foreign as well as in domestic affairs.

LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA. Edited by Bernard H. Oxman, David D. Caron and Charles L.O. Buderi. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1983, 183 pp. $21.95.

The main questions addressed by this symposium of legal and political experts, some of whom took part in the lengthy negotiations which are now history, are whether the Law of the Sea treaty was a good or bad one and whether the U.S.

was right to refuse to sign it. The authors disagree on these and other points, but in combination they provide an excellent critique of the treaty and of the problems of law, economics and even ideology that have persisted.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

ALLIANCE SECURITY: NATO AND THE NO-FIRST-USE QUESTION. Edited by John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal. Washington: Brookings, 1983, 222 pp. $28.95 (paper, $9.95).

It has often been overlooked in the widespread debate over the no-first-use of nuclear weapons that the *Foreign Affairs* article which stimulated it (McGeorge Bundy *et al.*, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," Spring 1982) called *not* for the immediate adoption of such a policy, but for a *study* of the implementation and the consequences of a new approach. This work is such a study, undertaken by acknowledged American and European experts. It is unlikely to be excelled in quality. The authors look at the historical background of the issue, examine the requirements of nuclear and conventional deterrence, and discuss the impact which no-first-use would have upon NATO strategy, as well as the political prospects for its adoption. A brief summary can do little justice to its wise thoughts. Although the book does not conclude that a simple switch to no-first-use is either desirable or imminent—given both political inertia and differences in judgments on strategic policy (as well as real divergences in American and European interests)—the authors do find serious defects in the current nuclear posture of NATO which are capable of remedy. Short-range nuclear weapons should be removed from their vulnerable forward positions. Because NATO and the Warsaw Pact are in adequate balance to make feasible the deterrence of conventional attack by conventional means alone, NATO could move toward a strategy that has a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. This study lists some specific ways in which this could be done—but, one must ask, are pressured governments, confused publics, and depleted treasuries prepared to undertake this?

NATO'S NUCLEAR DILEMMAS. By David N. Schwartz. Washington: Brookings, 1983, 270 pp. $28.95 (paper, $10.95).

This volume is a felicitous companion for the Brookings book above, although there is no evidence that it was intended thus. It focuses on various schemes, over the past two decades, to reassure Europeans of the continued "coupling" of U.S. nuclear forces with the defense of Europe, often through "hardware" solutions. The author reviews in some detail the Thor-Jupiter deployments, the Norstad Plan for the placement of mobile medium-range missiles, the multilateral force, and the background to NATO's December 1979 decision to start to deploy Pershing IIs and cruise missiles at the end of 1983. The history is accurate, and this well-written book serves as useful reminder of the important antecedents to the present debate on nuclear weapons in Europe. The close student of the subject will not, however, find much that is new either in information or analysis.

CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE. By John J. Mearsheimer. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1983, 296 pp. $29.50.

Using a number of historical case studies, the author argues persuasively that, if one side has the capacity to launch a blitzkrieg, "conventional deterrence" is likely to fail. But, turning to the conventional balance in Europe, he concludes that the Warsaw Pact could not score a quick and decisive victory over NATO—in other words, the prospects for conventional deterrence in Europe are quite good. The value of new precision-guided weapons should not be overestimated—they will not render the tank extinct—but by reducing the chances of a successful direct blitzkrieg, they enhance deterrence. This is an intelligent, well-researched and organized study which should be of special value to professional strategists.

THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR FORCES. By Paul Bracken. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, 252 pp. $19.95.

One is impressed by how much Bracken, dealing with a critical subject that has received little analysis in the non-classified literature, is able to say in this important book. The dependable command and control of nuclear forces, involving such questions as how to assess warning signs or how to assure the proper management of nuclear forces during a military alert, is obviously second to nothing in importance. In a war each side would seek to destroy the other's communications nets and command systems. This is a sophisticated but also a readable book which helps fill a major gap.

DEADLY BUSINESS: SAM CUMMINGS, INTERARMS, AND THE ARMS TRADE. By Patrick Brogan and Albert Zarca. New York: Norton, 1983, 384 pp. $17.95.

The underworld of the arms trade—not the F-15s or AWACS but the rifles and machine guns passed on from country to country—is the province of Sam Cummings, who is said to control 90 percent of the world's private trade in guns. This fast-paced book by two European journalists is about Mr. Cummings, who resides in Monte Carlo and Villars, Switzerland, from where he runs his Interarms company, and who sees himself as just another successful businessman. Selling weapons can be like selling washing machines, clean and legal, and need not involve moral scruples. The authors provide many fascinating details of arms deals, often in a Third World setting.

COMMUNIST NATIONS' MILITARY ASSISTANCE. Edited by John F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1983, 201 pp. $20.00.

Informed writings about the military assistance practices and policies of countries such as North Korea, Vietnam, China and Cuba are a rarity. They are to be found in this interesting and scholarly volume.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

THE TWO FACES OF MANAGEMENT: AN AMERICAN APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP IN BUSINESS AND POLITICS. By Joseph L. Bower. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983, 303 pp. $19.95.

Beguiled by the idea of "management," Americans have confused efficiency with legitimacy and mixed technocratic and political criteria. The issues are more complex than distinctions between business and government and private vs. public interests. Professor Bower of the Harvard Business School, in this enlightening and often original analysis, castigates the media, economists and others who have obfuscated matters. He rejects the emphasis others have put on the need for a national consensus, tripartite cooperation in industry, assorted foreign models, extreme decentralization and reliance on the market. He wants more intermediate organizations with special purposes, but above all he wants a clear understanding of what is involved in getting better management of both kinds.

POWER AND PROTECTIONISM: STRATEGIES OF THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES. By David B. Yoffie. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, 282 pp. $30.00 (paper, $15.00).

This is a very helpful book but an uneven one. First the author lays down a strategy whereby developing countries can do well in trade in spite of the apparently successful efforts of rich countries to force them to limit exports of some manufactures. Then he presents a first-rate, detailed examination of the textile negotiations, mostly between the U.S. and Japan and Hong Kong, from the 1950s to date. Much shorter discussions of shoes, television sets and automobiles end the book. Bargaining and negotiation get much more attention than economic flexibility, although the latter is crucial to the argument and needs further analysis.

POLICY AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES. Edited by Kozo Yamamura. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983, 348 pp. $25.00.

This addition to the mounting pile of studies of Japanese-American economic relations aims to be informative and to clarify matters for non-specialists. Some excellent authors contribute papers on steel, the exchange rate, industrial policy, Japanese import restraints, the guidance the Tokyo government gives its businessmen and other sensitive matters.

BRAZIL'S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A CASE STUDY OF THE STATE AS ENTREPRENEUR. By Thomas J. Trebat. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 250 pp. $42.50.

Despite all the troubles of the Brazilian economy, there has been an undercurrent of admiration for the management of government-owned enterprises in that country, something that cannot be said of many developing countries. Trebat, an American academic, shares this favorable view and documents it in some detail. He explains the good record by a number of factors, some pertaining to the management and finance of the enterprises, others to the size and growth of the Brazilian economy as a whole. This is an interesting work in a rather neglected field, considering how many state-owned enterprises there are—and not only in developing countries.

MÖGLICHKEITEN UND GRENZEN EINER KONTROLLE INTERNATIONALER ROHSTOFFMÄRKTE DURCH ENTWICKLUNGSLÄNDER. By Gutmann Habig. Hamburg: Verlag Weltarchiv, 378 pp. DM. 58.

This is a careful study of the bauxite and copper markets, coupled with the use of sensible economic models and some political assessment. The conclusion is that the prospects for true cartels are poor, but that for bauxite, the producing countries may go on as they have, capturing a higher share of the rents than they used to. For copper the prospects are poorer. If the producing countries want high prices and secure markets, they ought to look seriously at joint ventures with companies in the industrial world, where the demand is.

L'ÉTONNANTE HISTOIRE DE L'OPEP. By Pierre Terzian. Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1983, 400 pp.

This lively history of OPEC tells more than most books about the early days, and brings out the personalities involved as well as the policies of their governments. It stresses the ability of the organization to endure through changing circumstances and to gain strength, not least in response to external pressure. But as of early 1983, the author has the same questions as everybody else about OPEC's future. He is a Lebanese journalist of Armenian origin who now works at the Arab Center for Oil Studies in Paris.

IMF CONDITIONALITY. Edited by John Williamson. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1983, 679 pp. (Cambridge: MIT Press, distributor, $30.00).

The behavior the International Monetary Fund tries to exact from countries that borrow from it is often the subject of political and emotional reaction. But economic results are crucial if the world monetary system is to hold together. This large and excellent collection of papers and comments—mostly by economists—looks at the experience of a number of countries and has something to say on almost every aspect of the subject.

THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE: A BRIEF HISTORY. By Charles A. Jones. New York: St. Martin's, 1983, 153 pp. $22.50.

In addition to being brief, this history is clear and fair minded. The author suggests that excessive use of rhetoric may have done some damage to the collective action of the developing countries. He concludes that the North-South dialogue "ranks well below structural reform in the South and liberalization of Northern trading regimes" in its potential for Third World economic development. There is a good bibliography.

THE UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE: U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE 1980s. Edited by Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Mark J. Miller. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983, 303 pp.

The ten papers in this volume—mostly by academic experts—provide a solid analysis of a number of major aspects of the complicated immigration question. The history of immigration policy, future demography, foreign policy, the labor market, legal issues and the international ramifications which the United States has to think about are all taken into account.

CHANGE AND ADJUSTMENT: EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. By Jacques Steenbergen, Guido de Clercq and René Foqué. Deventer (Netherlands): Kluwer, 1983, 216 pp. $44.00.

The clash of national legal systems and the difficult evolution of Community law is only one of the themes of this interesting study. The authors are lawyers who are both realistic and imaginative in showing how the Community's external powers depend not only on its powers over internal industrial policy but also on "the content of the policy actually pursued." They conclude with a detailed discussion of trade policy issues and thoughtful suggestions for a multi-tiered international trading system.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. Edited by Abraham S. Becker. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1983, 182 pp. $22.95.

Meeting before the Versailles Summit in 1982, the experts at this conference had various good ideas about reducing strains within the Western Alliance caused by differences about economic policy toward the Soviet Union. But they did not foresee the pipeline dispute. Nevertheless, the tough-minded editor, an experienced analyst, puts his finger on the right issues.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF EAST-WEST TRADE. Edited by Gary K. Bertsch and John R. McIntyre. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1983, 258 pp. $25.00.

Well-chosen articles, a substantial bibliography, and comments by the authors that aim to sharpen a whole series of complex matters.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

THE FACES OF POWER: CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FROM TRUMAN TO REAGAN. By Seyom Brown. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, 672 pp. $35.00 (paper, $11.95).

This is a revised and extended combination of the author's 1968 edition of *The Faces of Power* and his 1979 study of the Kissinger years, *The Crises of Power*. The new material (125 pages) on the Carter Administration is especially good. Brown's conclusion is that Carter often used international power effectively but that he suffered from overblown idealistic rhetoric.

PEDDLERS OF CRISIS: THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER AND THE POLITICS OF CONTAINMENT. By Jerry W. Sanders. Boston: South End Press, 1983, 371 pp. $8.50 (paper).

An ambitious study of the rise of "containment militarism" in the era of NSC-68 (1950) and its resurgence in the contemporary Committee on the Present Danger. About half the book deals with the Committee's successful attack on the alleged inadequacies of the Carter Administration, especially the SALT II agreements. Although the author is no sympathizer with the aims of the CPD, he presents a fair and well-documented account of a very articulate and effective elite pressure group.

EAGLE DEFIANT: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980s. Edited by Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber and Donald Rothchild. Boston: Little, Brown, 1983, 404 pp. $17.95.

These 13 original and detailed essays on the first two years of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy occupy the common ground of journalism, history, and political analysis. A sequel to the same editors' equally worthy collection on the Carter Administration, *Eagle Entangled* (reviewed in *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1979).

WRITING HISTORY AND MAKING POLICY: THE COLD WAR, VIETNAM, AND REVISIONISM. By Richard A. Melanson. Lanham (Md.): University Press of America, 1983, pp. 283.

An interesting study of ways in which historians of 20th century American foreign policy have sought to influence policy and of how policymakers, in turn, incorporate historical assumptions in their work. The author uses the Carter Administration as a case study, and for that purpose interviewed two dozen former officials in 1981. He concludes that the Carter Administration applied "the lessons of Vietnam" no more effectively than the earlier cold warriors applied "the lessons of Munich."

IN THE SHADOW OF FDR. By William E. Leuchtenburg. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1983, 346 pp. $19.95.

A stimulating and original survey of the political impact of Franklin D. Roosevelt's image on his successors in the White House. Truman was resentful, Eisenhower suffered (in liberal eyes) by invidious comparison, Kennedy was ambivalent, Johnson celebratory, Nixon strangely admiring, Carter shallow in his use of FDR symbolism, and Reagan the first to turn his back on the New Deal.

ON REAGAN: THE MAN AND HIS PRESIDENCY. By Ronnie Dugger. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983, 320 pp. $19.95.

A thorough attack from the liberal side on Ronald Reagan's ideas and policies. Dugger makes extensive use of the transcripts of Reagan's radio speeches in the 1970s in his documented portrait of a man dedicated, as Dugger sees it, to serving the rich at the expense of the poor, stripping away constitutional rights, reversing progress toward racial equality, plundering the nation's natural resources, and pursuing a foreign policy which risks nuclear war. No Democrat could ask for better campaign material.

THE REPUBLICAN RIGHT SINCE 1945. By David W. Reinhard. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983, 294 pp. $25.00.

A solid, traditional political history with the focus on the pursuit of the presidency—featuring Robert Taft, Barry Goldwater, and Ronald Reagan.

ENVOY TO THE MIDDLE WORLD: ADVENTURES IN DIPLOMACY. By George McGhee. New York: Harper, 1983, 496 pp. $25.00.

The author served in the State Department for 20 years, and during the period covered by this memoir (1949–1951) was the first Assistant Secretary of State assigned responsibility for the Near East, Africa and South Asia—"the middle world." The most interesting chapters deal with the crisis involving Iran's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Ambassador McGhee's use of recently declassified British diplomatic documents adds another dimension to the story.

WITHOUT HONOR: DEFEAT IN VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA. By Arnold R. Isaacs. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1983, 559 pp. $19.95.

This vivid account of events from the negotiating of the Paris agreement of January 1973 ("peace with honor") to the Communist victory in Vietnam in 1975 is indispensable for an understanding of the last phase of the Vietnam war. The author was a war correspondent in Indochina during those years and his firsthand descriptions of the impact of war on the Vietnamese people have seldom been equaled. He has supplemented personal observation with extensive research to produce a superb book, a well-documented indictment of the Washington, Saigon, and Hanoi regimes in this bloody debacle.

THE MODERN AMBASSADOR: THE CHALLENGE AND THE SEARCH. Edited by Martin F. Herz. Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1983, 211 pp. $12.50 (paper, $7.00).

An anthology of commentary—some original, some reprinted—principally by former ambassadors, on the nature of the beast and his/her responsibilities. Lighthearted, informative, and filled with practical advice. Another of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy's useful, non-theoretical publications.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

IN DEFENCE OF CANADA—INDOCHINA: ROOTS OF COMPLICITY. By James Eayrs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983, 348 pp. $45.00 (paper, $17.50).

This fifth volume of James Eayrs' magisterial study of Canadian external affairs since World War I concerns Canada's participation, along with India and Poland, in the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos in 1954–1957. Eayrs shows how Canadians were caught between the ideal of the ICSC as instruments of impartial peacekeeping and the impulse to assist the U.S. in waging the cold war, even when that meant condoning blatant violations of the Geneva Acccords. The impulse prevailed; hence the "complicity." Here is an important contribution to the history of the Vietnam story, with copious documentation from Canadian archives.

G. S.

INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA. By Walter LaFeber. New York: Norton, 1983, 357 pp. $18.95.

The author sees U.S. policy in Central America as having been based for more than a century on fear of revolution, and argues that the U.S. dependency system, often buttressed by force, ironically fuels a growing revolutionary process. This is a scholarly account from a strongly and uniformly critical viewpoint. The volume contains no explicit set of policy recommendations, nor does it address the basic question of an alternative, if there is one, to a dependency relationship for Central America.

EL SALVADOR: AMERICA'S NEXT VIETNAM? By Steffen W. Schmidt. Salisbury (N.C.): Documentary Publications, 1983, 217 pp. $19.95.

The author, a Colombian with experience in El Salvador who now teaches in the U.S., has an intimate rapport with his subject matter. He points out the lack of common ground for any compromise between those who cling totally to the past and those who reject it entirely. He opposes current U.S. policy, but gives a balanced, though pessimistic, picture that culminates in Ginsberg's formula: "You can't win. You can't break even. You can't even quit the game."

THE NEW CUBAN PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN. Edited by Barry B. Levine. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1983, 274 pp. $26.00.

Fifteen essays consider the history, nature and extent of Cuban influence in the Caribbean, Mexico and South America, and Cuban relationships with revolutionary parties elsewhere, in the context of the Soviet Union and the Third World. An essay by Robert Pastor on Cuba and Russia notes that "the Soviets do not tell the Cubans what to do, but they do let the Cubans know what they cannot do, and the Cubans accept that."

THE NEWER CARIBBEAN: DECOLONIALIZATION, DEMOCRACY, AND

DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Paget Henry and Carl Stone. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983, 348 pp. $30.00 (paper, $12.95).

Sixteen essays, many by Caribbean contributors, are grouped under the headings of decolonialization and national development, contemporary world order and national development, and democracy and national development. The viewpoints range from centrist to those advocating deep alterations in class structure and production relationships. This is another volume in the Inter-American Politics series under the auspices of the Center for Inter-American Relations.

U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS. Edited by Clark W. Reynolds and Carlos Tello. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983, 375 pp. $25.00.

THE FUTURE OF CENTRAL AMERICA: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE U.S. AND MEXICO. Edited by Richard R. Fagen and Olga Pellicer. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983, 228 pp. $20.00.

These two volumes inaugurate a new series, binational in conception and authorship. The first book consists of 18 papers, on trade, energy, national security, agriculture, employment and migration, and long-term prospects. The second contains ten chapters covering, inter alia, the effects of the policies of the two countries on each other, and their perceptions of the Central American crisis. The thrust of this volume supports open recognition of radical movements in Central American countries, coupled with their nonalignment in international affairs.

IMPACTS OF MEXICAN OIL POLICY ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. By Jesús-Agustín Velasco. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1983, 236 pp. $26.96.

Written from the Mexican viewpoint, this study outlines the role of oil policy in the entire national scene. The potentialities, the challenges, and the dangers created by oil are fully recognized, as is its dual nature as miracle drug and reality-distorting narcotic.

BRAZILIAN COMMUNISM, 1935–1945. By John W. F. Dulles. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983, 289 pp. $25.00.

A companion volume to the author's *Anarchists and Communists in Brazil, 1900–1935*, this work tells of the life and deeds of the Communist Party in the time of Vargas. The ups and downs of Luis Carlos Prestes, the Comintern, and the Russian-inspired Aliana Nacional Libertadora beginning in 1935, are recounted, as is the 1935 revolt in Rio and the Northeast. Detailed and scholarly.

CONTROLLING LATIN AMERICAN CONFLICTS: TEN APPROACHES. Edited by Michael A. Morris and Victor Millan. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1983, 272 pp. $22.50 (paper).

Academic in approach, the essays here analyze and categorize conflicts on the basis of more than 30 kinds of situations. The ten types of conflict control are: traditional diplomacy, national approaches, confidence building, use of international organizations, domestic conflict containment, consensus building, case study approaches, and variants of arms control.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

THE COMMITTED OBSERVER. By Raymond Aron. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1983, 292 pp. $17.00.

Raymond Aron, who died in October, was a brilliant, erudite intellectual, one of the few authoritative voices of Europe's old liberal tradition. This autobiographical conversation—a welcome prelude to his memoirs just published in France—makes clear that all his adult life he followed two self-assigned "imperatives": to seek the truth and at the same time to be an actor in the world. A scholar who was at once philosopher, historian and sociologist, he was also a prolific writer-journalist. He saw his double career as complementary—"journalists are just as intelligent as university professors, often more so." With Montesquieu and Tocqueville as models, Aron wrote his commentary on contemporary events as a practical moralist, a liberal realist, imbued with *civisme,* and at odds with all the parties, especially the left, with which he basically sympathized. Impatient with all ideologues, a foe of all totalitarianisms always, he was an early advocate of Algerian independence and a critic of all Marxist and *Marxisand* tendencies. Editor of a Gaullist paper in wartime London, he believed, at least until November 1942, that there was "a France, deep-seated and silent, that was both Gaullist and Petainist." He was by temper and conviction a man of *mesure,* of prudence; especially in the 1930s his being Jewish *and* assimilated restrained his writing. Even this small book reminds us that his death is an immeasurable loss to public reason in the West.

FINEST HOUR: WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 1939–1941. By Martin Gilbert. London: Heinemann/Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983, 1274 pp. $40.00.

A tome hard to hold, harder still to put down: an enthralling account of Churchill's conduct of the war during the bleakest years of Britain's history. The odds were heavily in Hitler's favor; after the fall of France, the British had few assets, save the RAF, Churchill's spirit, and the scientific genius that at Bletchley had led to the deciphering of enemy codes. All the uncertainties and adversities of war are sketched; Churchill emerges as unsurpassed wartime leader and sustainer of morale, but also as the restless military planner, ever prodding, ever demanding. In this masterpiece of Gilbert's many-volumed biography, some themes receive special attention: Churchill's concern with the occupation of Narvik as early as the fall of 1939, the talk of a mediated peace amidst the battle of France, the role of deciphered intelligence in Churchill's decisions. But this is above all a brilliant study of leadership when England was close to defeat and when Churchill "awoke with dread in my heart." Gilbert presents a monument to greatness—and is awed by it.

AMERIKANISCHE WECHSELBÄDER. By Marion Gräfin Dönhoff. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983, 319 pp.

"America, hot and cold" would be a rough translation of the title of this collection of leading articles from *Die Zeit,* written over the last 32 years by Germany's foremost liberal editor and ever perspicacious observer. In the 1950s she celebrated America as a model; since 1971, she has viewed us with mounting apprehension, deploring especially the moralizing indecisiveness of President Carter and the harsh ideological stance of President Reagan. An Atlanticist and a friend of the United States, Marion Dönhoff is also committed to détente, or at least to a realistic policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that would seek to contain or reduce existing conflicts and the arms race. At bottom she sees U.S. foreign policy perpetually oscillating between messianic moralism and *Realpolitik*, as exemplified by Kissinger. These brilliantly written articles mirror America's travails as a world power and tell us much about ourselves and about European perceptions.

NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICIES AND EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION. Edited by Christopher Hill. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin, 1983, 207 pp. $35.00.

The record of a conference at Chatham House, with papers by European experts, on each of the EEC member states who together built up a habit of consultation on foreign policy, known formally as the European Political Cooperation. It has been particularly active in dealings with international organizations and with specific regions, such as the Middle East. This European practice is important, inadequately known in this country, and usefully examined in this volume.

THE ALLIANCE: AMERICA, EUROPE, JAPAN: A HISTORY OF THE POSTWAR WORLD. By Richard J. Barnet. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, 544 pp. $19.95.

A popular history of the Alliance, which was never as untroubled as we now like to imagine. Perennial disputes have marked this most long-lived of peacetime partnerships: questions of defense, of economic rivalry, of leadership and consultation. Individual leaders and private organizations, such as the Trilateral Commission, receive much attention. The last chapter, entitled "Coming Apart," deals with the Reagan Administration and the peace movement.

FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY. Edited by John H. Herz. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1983, 308 pp.

Historians and social scientists examine the transition of various European countries and Japan from right-wing dictatorships to democratic regimes. The authors respect the particularities of each case; general laws are hard to come by. The question of how new regimes deal with the legacies of the old is specially emphasized, and the four chapters dealing with Germany would suggest that the Federal Republic did badly in this respect, particularly in denazification, though the strength of the Bonn regime would appear to be beyond doubt. A useful, if uneven, collection.

JUSTICE AT NUREMBURG. By Robert Conot. New York: Harper, 1983, 593 pp. $22.50.

A summary of the trial and of the Nazi record which was exhumed and judged. One of its avowed purposes, to prove that the Holocaust did in fact occur, received greater corroboration at subsequent trials. This is a popular retelling, without much depth or analysis, but inevitably gripping, with good sketches of the defendants and the inter-Allied, behind-the-scenes wrangling.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

ANDROPOV. By Zhores A. Medvedev. New York: Norton, 1983, 227 pp. $14.95.

YURI ANDROPOV: A SECRET PASSAGE INTO THE KREMLIN. By Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova. New York: Macmillan, 1983, 320 pp. $15.95.

The paucity of hard information on Andropov's career has not discouraged biographers, especially Russians with little cause to celebrate his achievements. Zhores Medvedev, writing in London with some long-distance help from his brother Roy in Moscow, gives a plausible account of the struggle for succession and a probably accurate picture of Andropov as a cool and capable apparatchik who played his cards well and made it to the top. The more sensational book by Solovyov and Klepikova provides more information on Andropov's drive to power than any published hitherto, and also more unsubstantiated allegations, such as his masterminding of the seizure of the American hostages in Iran, or his attempts to eliminate three obstacles (Brzezinski, John Paul II, Walesa) to Soviet military action in Poland. The sketchy notes on sources added at the end of the book do not entirely remove doubts and questions. The authors are journalists who, until 1977, lived and wrote in the U.S.S.R.

SOVIET POWER: THE KREMLIN'S FOREIGN POLICY—BREZHNEV TO ANDROPOV. By Jonathan Steele. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, 416 pp. $19.95.

A British journalist gives a sober and non-alarmist picture of the U.S.S.R., its problems and its outlook for the years ahead. Much of it is now the conventional wisdom (although not in Reagan's Washington) to the effect that in foreign policy Soviet military power is matched by political failure, restraints on the use of military means, an increasingly realistic view of world conditions, and a continuing conservatism in the Brezhnev mold.

THE SOVIET VIEW OF U.S. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE. By Jonathan Samuel Lockwood. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books (for the National Strategy Information Center), 1983, 175 pp. $19.95.

One does not have to agree with all the arguments and conclusions of this volume to recognize the service it performs by its careful summary and analysis of the large body of Soviet writing on U.S. doctrine from 1954 ("massive retaliation") to 1980 ("countervailing strategy"). The author, an American military intelligence officer, rightly stresses the heavy influence of their own cast of strategic thought—especially the concept of the changing correlation of forces resulting from the U.S.S.R.'s own military buildup—on the Soviets' interpretation of U.S. strategy and defense policy.

THE PATTERN OF SOVIET CONDUCT IN THE THIRD WORLD. Edited by Walter Laqueur. New York: Praeger, 1983, 250 pp. $24.95.

In his introduction, Walter Laqueur traces the ups and downs of Soviet progress in the Third World, and of Western assessments of it, illustrating the propensity on both sides to simplification and self-deception. His colleagues then review the record in a number of Asian and African countries. These are for the most part competent studies (the best is Paul Henze's on the Horn of Africa) but leave many questions, including some raised by Laqueur himself, unanswered.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE 1980s. Edited by Mark V. Kauppi and R. Craig Nation. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1983, 292 pp. $29.95.

These essays overlap various published studies and occasionally overlap each other, but the book as a whole does achieve the stated purpose of bringing the subject closer to the present and airing fresh perceptions and interpretations. As for the rest of the 1980s, there is not much more for Western observers to say until the Andropov leadership shows more of its hand on Middle East policy.

THE "LIBERATORS": MY LIFE IN THE SOVIET ARMY. By Viktor Suvorov. New York: Norton, 1983, 202 pp. $13.95.

This personal narrative of a former Soviet officer (writing under a pseudonym), anecdotal in form and crude in language, supplements his earlier *Inside the Soviet Army*. The most interesting part describes his adventures as a participant in the campaign to "liberate" Czechoslovakia in 1968. The effect is one of caricature. True or not, it is amusing.

EASE MY SORROWS: A MEMOIR. By Lev Kopelev. New York: Random House, 1983, 256 pp. $17.95.

A third volume of Kopelev's series of informative and moving autobiographical works, this one on the period 1947–1954 when he was incarcerated in a special prison camp for scientists who could do research useful to the regime, and before his full disillusionment with the Soviet system. Readers will recognize him as "Rubin" in Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle*.

WRITERS IN RUSSIA: 1917–1978. By Max Hayward. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983, 340 pp. $22.95.

Collected essays and articles by the late Max Hayward, demonstrating his profound knowledge and sensitive appreciation of the Russian literary scene. The issues of cultural freedom and conformity provide a commentary on the Soviet system and reach beyond its borders.

LATVIA IN THE WARS OF THE 20th CENTURY. By Visvaldis Mangulis. Princeton Junction (N.J.): Cognition Books, 1983, 228 pp. $19.50.

A primer of Latvia's tragic history, written from the nationalist viewpoint and using numerous Latvian sources. Most of it, as the title suggests, is on the events of the two world wars, with only cursory attention to the two decades of independence in between and to the Soviet period since 1945.

THE POLISH DRAMA, 1980–1982. By Jan B. deWeydenthal, Bruce D. Porter and Kevin Devlin. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1983, 351 pp. $27.95.

The research staff at Radio Free Europe is as well equipped as any center in the West to understand and interpret the dramatic happenings in Poland since 1980. Three of its members have written one of the best studies yet to appear on that country's 15 months of semi-freedom and the aftermath. Not a definitive history, it picks from the complex totality of developments a few vital ones, such as the effects of the crisis on the Communist Party, the reactions and decisions of the U.S.S.R., and the impact on coummunist parties elsewhere in Europe.

AMERICA'S OTHER VOICE: THE STORY OF RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY. By Sig Mickelson. New York: Praeger, 1983, 269 pp. $25.00.

The story of "unofficial" broadcasting to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has never been told with such authority and in such detail as in this book by a former CBS executive who served for a time as president of RFE and RL. The accent is less on the accomplishments and failures in the target countries than on organization, financing and relations to U.S. government agencies and foreign policy. The narrative runs from now-it-can-be-told revelations of the 1950s through the adjustment to the exposure of the CIA connection in the 1960s to the struggle for survival and the reorganization under legislation in the

1970s and since. Mickelson is refreshingly candid, and he has used a great deal of perishable material, from interviews and his own recollections, to give us a solid and irreplaceable history of a unique endeavor.

HUNGARY 1956 REVISITED. By Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin, 1983, 174 pp. $28.50.

Not a retelling but a reinterpretation of the events of 1956 and their meaning for Hungary and for the world. The authors, scholars who left Hungary in the 1970s, have a definite point of view, which is radical and socialist but not communist. They see the revolution as defying simple explanation: it was both nationalist and socialist, and was directed not only against Moscow but also the Western powers which were jointly responsible for the infamous Yalta-Potsdam system and which failed both Hungary and the cause of freedom in 1956. A book which invites debate and merits a careful reading.

THE LUST FOR POWER: NATIONALISM, SLOVAKIA, AND THE COMMUNISTS, 1918–1948. By Yeshayahu A. Jelinek. Boulder (Colo.): East European Monographs, 1983, 185 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $20.00.)

An Israeli historian of Czechoslovakian background traces the tortuous development of various approaches (Czech, Slovak, Czecho-Slovak, and Soviet) on the part of communist leaders to the question of Slovakia's place in Czechoslovakia and in Central Europe. The evidence is far from complete but sufficient to document the author's main theme, the strength of Slovak nationalism and its importance in the communist struggle for power.

DJILAS: THE PROGRESS OF A REVOLUTIONARY. By Stephen Clissold. New York: Universe Books, 1983, 352 pp. $27.50.

Milovan Djilas has written at such length about himself and his experience that a sympathetic biography, as this is, can hardly be more than a distillation. But the late Stephen Clissold has performed his task with skill and grace, with measured judgment, and with good use of his own rich background in Yugoslav affairs.

SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE AFTER TITO: A POWDER-KEG FOR THE 1980s? Edited by David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf. New York: St. Martin's, 1983, 211 pp. $22.50.

A curious melange of individual pieces on the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean, in which authors from East, West and in between talk past each other. The only sign of a common theme is a fascination with the idea of a nuclear-free zone.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

THE MIDDLE EAST REMEMBERED. By John S. Badeau. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1983, 271 pp. $25.00.

Memoirs recorded as oral history from conversations with L. Carl Brown, a fellow laborer in the Middle East vineyard. Dr. Badeau had a remarkable career as missionary, teacher, administrator and diplomat. For most readers the recollections of his service as ambassador to Egypt in the early 1960s will carry the greatest interest, but the entire book radiates the wisdom, wit and humanity of the man himself.

MIDDLE EAST MISSION: THE STORY OF A MAJOR BID FOR PEACE IN THE TIME OF NASSER AND BEN-GURION. By Elmore Jackson. New York: Norton, 1983, 128 pp. $12.95.

In 1955 the director of the Quaker office at the U.N. undertook, at Cairo's suggestion, an exploratory mission to encourage negotiations for a settlement between Egypt and Israel. Many years later he now adds a chapter to the history of the times by describing the circumstances of this experiment in unofficial shuttle diplomacy. The enterprise probably had no real chance of success in that year of fedayeen raids, Israeli reprisals, and deteriorating U.S.-Egyptian relations, but Jackson points to some might-have-beens and draws several positive lessons from the episode.

SYRIA: MODERN STATE IN AN ANCIENT LAND. By John F. Devlin. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1983, 140 pp. $16.50.

John Devlin, with years of experience as a CIA analyst, has a deep knowledge of Syria, but due to the limitations of space imposed by himself or by the editors, he imparts too little of it in these pages. The book is a good introduction to the country, especially in its treatment of the "political dynamics," but it is disappointingly sketchy in dealing with external questions such as the complex and crucial relationship with the U.S.S.R.

ARAB OIL POLICIES IN THE 1970s. By Yusif A. Sayigh. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1983, 271 pp.

One of the few Arab economists to see oil problems in the large, Sayigh recounts and defends the revolutionary decisions of the past decade made by OPEC, OAPEC, and individual Arab states, and places them in a global historical context. He then points out the incomplete nature of that revolution and the need for Arab countries to assure their future by new and more farsighted policies in both upstream and downstream operations, and especially in using oil wealth for development. Supportive but not uncritical of the Arab record, generally negative and antagonistic toward the West, he nevertheless retains hope for a new international economic order based on true interdependence.

POLITIK IN ISRAEL. By Michael Wolffsohn. Opladen: Leske Verlag & Budrich, 1983 776 pp.

A handbook of Israeli politics too massive to hold in the hand, truly German in its thoroughness and detail. It gives the history of parties, ideologies, elections and political practices since before independence, with attention to generational change, "Oriental" immigration, relations with the Arab minority, and many other factors which have changed the system even as it has retained its essence.

ZIONISM AND ECONOMY. By Baruch Kimmerling. Cambridge: Schenkman, 1983, 169 pp. $18.95 (paper, $11.25).

The economy originally developed by the Jewish community in Palestine and later by the Mapai governments of the state of Israel was the product of the socialist Zionist ideology of the East European leadership. It was modified, of course, by the economic realities of the environment, although the resistance of the Zionist model to the laws of economics was extraordinary. From the standpoint of international relations, this study has added interest in its treatment of (a) the role of the Arabs in the Zionist scheme of things and in reality, and (b) the shift in outlook in Israel with the decline of Labor and the rise of Likud.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

ONE BILLION: A CHINA CHRONICLE. By Jay and Linda Mathews. New York: Random House, 1983, 383 pp. $17.95.
BROKEN EARTH: THE RURAL CHINESE. By Steven W. Mosher. New York: Free Press, 1983, 336 pp. $17.95.

Both books portray a China with deep-rooted problems. The Mathews paint a picture of a nation low in morale, disillusioned with communism, and mired down in the most oppressive and inefficient bureaucracy on earth. Still, they see a China that is held together by its traditional culture, and they conclude that the new reforms have brought quick results of incalculable importance. But they do not develop this theme. Steven Mosher was one of the first Western anthropologists to be allowed unrestricted study in a rural village in southeast China, and his is one of the most revealing books on contemporary China yet published, sparking such controversy (and objections from the Chinese Government) that he was expelled from Stanford University. It offers a rich panorama of daily life in rural China and considerable insight into the rigid bureaucracy that is such a perennial obstacle to change. And it provides striking evidence of the extreme skepticism of many Chinese about the capacity of the Chinese Communist Party to modernize the country. It should be noted, however, that the agricultural reforms in China, which amount to a de facto decollectivization, are having a stunning impact on agricultural productivity; by not taking this sufficiently into account, both books may be excessively pessimistic.

THE ORIGINS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. VOL. II: THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD, 1958–1960. By Roderick MacFarquhar. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, 170 pp. $35.00.

MacFarquhar's exceptionally well documented study and careful analysis is a model of scholarship and will be drawn on by Sinologists for years to come. This is the second volume in a trilogy which examines the politics, economics, culture and international relations of China from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. (Vol. I was reviewed in the April 1976 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.)

VIETNAM UNDER COMMUNISM, 1975–1982. By Nguyen Van Canh. Stanford: Hoover, 1983, 328 pp. $34.95.

The author was a professor at the Saigon University law school and an active member of the Dai Vet, Vietnam's staunchly anti-communist nationalist movement. He provides a thorough account of the structure of Vietnamese society under communism, drawing both on official statements and on interviews with refugees. The picture that emerges is grim: Vietnam's "Bamboo Gulag" includes at least 50 "reeducation" camps with more than 126,000 inmates as of 1980–81. Particularly brutal is the treatment of former Catholic, Buddhist, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders. Thich Tri Quang, a monk who gained worldwide fame as the leader of the Buddhist opposition to Diem, was detained for 16 months in a dungeon. As a result he lost the use of his legs and is now confined to a wheelchair.

NORTH KOREA IN TRANSITION: FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DYNASTY. By Tai Sung An. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1983, 212 pp. $29.95.

This is one of the most carefully researched and thoughtful accounts of political life in North Korea yet written. There is a particularly good section on the dynastic succession: Kim Il-song's efforts to elevate his son Kim Chong-il to the position of future Great Leader.

THE GREAT GAME: RIVALRY IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND SOUTH ASIA. Edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. New York: Praeger, 1983, 275 pp. $27.95.

There are two interesting essays in this conference collection. Gary Sick provides a historical overview of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf during the past 35 years and finds an absence of feasible or well-defined objectives. Bhabani Sen Gupta, an Indian analyst, stresses the growing interdependence of South and Southwest Asia. He argues that if India were to improve its relationship with Pakistan, normalize relations with the U.S., and maintain a certain distance from the Soviet Union, it could gain the needed access to Arab petrodollars.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

NO SHORTCUTS TO PROGRESS: AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT IN PERSPECTIVE. By Goran Hyden. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, 223 pp. $35.00 (paper, $9.50.).

The Ford Foundation representative in Nairobi takes a hard look at the obstructions to African economic development. Hyden emphasizes the difficulties of achieving economic growth in a still largely peasant society where family and clan ties still largely supersede the profit motive. In his view, Africa's economic development will only come with the growth of a genuine (i.e., profit-oriented) bourgeoisie, generated through the emergence of markets and the breakdown of the peasant "economy of affection." He advocates that aid be channeled through nongovernmental organizations and invested in infrastructure and the alleviation of poverty, not in governmental projects serving mainly to bolster the current system of narrowly focused government patronage. His prescription is not clearly enough laid out, however, to show how it would avoid what he sees as the main pitfall besetting development assistance—the further distortion of administrative systems increasingly irrelevant to the needs of most of their nominal subjects.

POOR COUNTRIES OF AFRICA: STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENT CRISIS. Occasional Papers of the German Development Institute, No. 71; Berlin, 1982, 196 pp.

In addition to solid case studies of development problems in Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Somalia, the Sudan, Benin and Upper Volta, this collection provides an authoritative European perspective on the World Bank's 1981 study reflecting liberal economic theory and entitled *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*. The authors see major difficulties with the Bank's prescription for a push toward exports—both regarding supply (the problem of ecological and structural constraints) and demand (the limited market for African agricultural products).

CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA: BLIND ALLEYS OR NEW DIRECTIONS? By Christopher R. Hill. Totowa (N.J.): Barnes and Noble, 1983, 224 pp. $27.50.

The director of the Centre of Southern African Studies at the University of York offers a balanced assessment of changes in attitudes in South Africa, particularly on the part of white elites. In his view, Afrikaner consciousness is shifting, but glacially, at least in relation to the urgency of their situation. He presents his findings in the form of anecdotal but informative descriptions of current influential groups or agents of change, including business, unions, parliament, academics. Especially interesting is his detailed account of a dissident Afrikaner student leadership surprisingly out of step with (or out in front of) their fellows.

SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. Edited by Thomas M. Callaghy. New York: Praeger, 1983, 420 pp. $45.00.

This comprehensive update on South Africa in its regional context is distinguished by essays on chromium by Owen Ellison Kahn, the ANC by Thomas Karis, and Zimbabwe by Larry Bowman, Michael Bratton and Rukudzo Murapa.

ETHIOPIA, GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES, 1941–1974: THE POLITICS OF EMPIRE. By Harold G. Marcus. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, 210 pp. $26.00.

This straightforward, readable historical narrative focuses on U.S. involvement in Ethiopia through the abortive 1960 coup; the Emperor emerges as keenly attentive to manipulating his American patron and largely oblivious to social and economic conditions beyond the palace. Marcus does well at providing the perspectives of both Ethiopian elites and U.S. diplomats.

THE EMPEROR: DOWNFALL OF AN AUTOCRAT. By Ryszard Kapuscinski. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983, 164 pp. $12.95.

Regarded within the author's native Poland as a metaphor for the ingrown corruption of dictatorship, this prose poem about the fall of Ethiopia's emperor penetrates deeply into the workings of autocratic power and its effects on the attendant courtiers. Through the painstakingly retrieved (and perhaps artfully embellished) recollections of former palace functionaries, Kapuscinski depicts a feudal monarch whose administrative genius served one end—the concentration of all control in his hands. The slow unravelling shows the importance of the facade to both ruler and ruled: both struggle to maintain the pretense as the last hedge against chaos.

Janet Rigney

SOURCE MATERIAL

I. DOCUMENTS

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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NEW ISSUE

October 27, 1983

$16,500,000

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The First Boston Corporation

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NEW ISSUE

October 27, 1983

650,000 Shares

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Common Stock

Price $17 Per Share

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The First Boston Corporation **Hambrecht & Quist**
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

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